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PEGIDA: Fearful patriots or right-wing radicals?

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Declaration

I, Ruth Katharina Glasmeier, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

The comments made by the PEGIDA leadership, followers and speakers, Wilders, Wagensveld, and Robinson do not represent the opinions of the author.

“We are standing here because the government does not offer any solutions. We are standing here because the representative democracy is failing and is developing into a political party proportional representation machinery. We are standing here because we want to keep our Germany the way we know and love it. We are standing here because we do not want to be educated by arrogant know-it-alls. We are standing here because we are opposing the foreign infiltration and extinction of our culture. And we are standing here because our homeland is dear to us. And we want to preserve it for our children and grandchildren. And we are standing here because we have a vision.”(Festerling in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015)¹



PEGIDA protest March 23, 2015 in Dresden (photo: Ruth Katharina Glasmeier)

“If you love Germany, then raise the alarm. If you love your husband or wife, then raise the alarm. If you love your children, then raise the alarm. Warn your neighbours, your colleagues, warn your friends of the danger of an Islamisation, a danger for your country, your freedom, your children.” (Wilders, 2015d)

¹ All translations from German, Dutch, and Latin are, if not otherwise specified, made by the author. This includes translations from official German governmental sources, PEGIDA, Wagenveld, Wilders, and German and Dutch studies

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Abstract

Right-wing movements have become more popular in recent years. This shows in the increase of right-wing populist or right-wing radical parties in different European governments. Despite this European wide trend, Germany did not have a successful right-wing movement. This changed with the creation of PEGIDA and the AfD. Since this type of movement is relatively new in Germany, this thesis aims to understand PEGIDA.

The thesis aims to answer the question of *Who are PEGIDA?* To do so, it will focus on the reasons for people to join PEGIDA, PEGIDA's norms and identity, their ideology and how this is comparable to other European right-wing movements, as well as the role of other European right-wing movements in the success of PEGIDA. This thesis will answer these questions through fieldwork, qualitative interviews with Edwin Wagenveld and Tommy Robinson, as well as an ideological frame analysis.

To understand the concept of right-wing movements, this thesis will look at different theories. To understand norms, identity and culture, this thesis will look at the social construction of these as well as European integration. A definition of ideology will be offered. Moreover, it aims to understand right-wing movements in general, with a special focus on right-wing populism, right-wing radicalism, and right-wing extremism. Finally, it will explain important terms when talking about protest movements in Germany.

The results show, that in its base PEGIDA appear as an anti-Islamic right-wing populist movement. The people at PEGIDA Dresden have a strong national identity and fear losing it. While these followers as well as Wagenveld and Robinson can be defined as fearful patriots, the German leadership are right-wing radicals. Interestingly, although other movements support PEGIDA, they did not play an active role in the success and development of PEGIDA. Only the Monday demonstrations of 1989 played a role in PEGIDA's success.

Besides that, while other movements focus on the dangers of Islam, PEGIDA mainly argue about the perceived failures of the government, the press, the EU, and others.

This thesis will conclude that the members of PEGIDA are a mix of fearful patriots and right-wing radicals who fight to retain their national identity against the influences of Islam and the political elites.

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Abbreviations

- *9/11*: The attack on the World Trade Centre, New York, September 11th, 2001
- *AfD*: Alternative für Deutschland [Alternative for Germany]
- *Antifa*: Antifaschistische Aktion [anti-fascist action]
- *ARD*: Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Consortium of public broadcasters in Germany
- *BFP*: British Freedom Party
- *BNP*: British National Party
- *CDU*: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands [Christian Democratic Union of Germany]
- *CSU*: Christlich Soziale Union [Christian Social Union]
- *DDR*: Deutsche Demokratische Republik [German Democratic Republic]
- *ECJM*: Europe's Counter-Jihad Movement

- *EDL*: English Defence League
- *EU*: European Union
- *FN*: Front National [National Front]
- *FPÖ*: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs [Austrian Freedom Party]
- *IR*: International Relations
- *ISIS*: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
- *NF*: National Front
- *NPD*: Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands [German national democrats]
- *NSDAP*: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei [National Socialist German Workers' Party]
- *Orga-Team*: The organisational team of PEGIDA
- *PEGIDA*: Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes [Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West]
- *PKK*: Kurdistan's Workers' Party
- *PVV*: Partij van de Vrijheid [Freedom Party]
- *SP*: Socialistische Partij [Socialist Party]
- *SPD*: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [Social Democratic Party of Germany]
- *TU Dresden*: Technische Universität Dresden [Technical university Dresden]
- *UK*: United Kingdom
- *UKIP*: UK Independence Party
- *USA*: United States of America
- *VVD*: Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]

1 Introduction

When the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West met for the first time on October 20, 2014 in Dresden, no one thought they would last. However, almost one and a half years later they are still a successful movement and have spread not only in Germany, but also to other European countries, and even to Australia (Kremp, 2016). Although similar movements or political parties have existed in other European countries for years, they are a novelty in Germany.

This novelty has nothing to do with the assumption that Germans are not fearful or not worried about Islam. On the contrary, on that score they are at a similar level with the Netherlands, the UK, and France (Field, 2007; Hafez & Schmidt, 2015; van der Noll, 2012). Because Germany never had a similarly strong right-wing movement, and because of PEGIDA's success and the general right-wing trend in Europe, it is important to understand who PEGIDA are. This includes understanding their reasons to protest, their norms and identity, their connection to similar movements in Europe, as well as their ideology.

PEGIDA aim to maintain the Christian-Jewish culture of the European society, by regulating immigration (PEGIDA, 2014). Although PEGIDA is not yet an official political party, they are actively involved in politics; in 2015 PEGIDA officially supported the independent candidate for the mayoral elections in Dresden, Tatjana Festerling (Fischer, 2015). Besides that, they announced that they want to run for the local elections in 2016 and the national elections in 2017 (Preker, 2015).

Beyond their German focus, PEGIDA managed to spread to other European countries, including Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK (Rucht, 2014). Although PEGIDA exist in these countries, most of them already have a political party with similar sentiments in their respective governments. Most of these openly

support PEGIDA. This includes speeches by Geert Wilders of the PVV, Tommy Robinson, former EDL leader and new leader of PEGIDA UK, Anke van Dermeersch and Filip Dewinterat from Vlaams Belang, and many more (Hopkins, 2015; Milmo, 2015; Parris-Long, 2015; Reiter & DPA, 2015; Vorländer et al., 2016). This support suggests a connection between these movements and PEGIDA.

Next to these connections, the reasons for PEGIDA's existence are important in order to understand PEGIDA. Influencing circumstances can be the general right-wing trend as well as the refugee crisis in Europe and Germany. Another reason can be the disenchantment with politics and the low voter-turnout. In particular, the local elections in Bremen 2015 support this point; less than 50% of the voters went to the elections, less than ever before in West Germany. Several newspapers blame the current German government and especially Merkel for that (Müller, 2015). Consequently many Germans do not believe in the German government anymore and are dissatisfied with politics in general (Güllner, 2013). Besides the elections in Bremen, the elections in Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt speak for a strong increase in the support for right-wing populism in Germany. Although the numbers of voters increased, the AfD were very successful and were voted into all the regional parliaments (Gathmann & Wittrock, 2016).

The disenchantment with the German politics however is only one challenge that influences the German people. Another is the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, which began in 2007. Within this crisis countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and France, had to support other economically weaker EU countries such as Greece, in order for them not to become bankrupt (Lane, 2012). This led to the European public being dissatisfied with the actions of the government, which effectively played a role in the creation of right-wing populist groups in several European countries (Häusler & Roeser, 2015).

All of these points may have led to the creation of PEGIDA. When the *Orga-Team* first gathered to decide on a name for their new movement, they had to make a decision: to only focus on Germany or to regard Islamisation as a European issue. This led to many discussions between the members. However, after a while they concluded that Islamisation had to be looked at in the greater European context. They wanted to be open to all Europeans who are scared of losing their identity (Geiges et al., 2015). It is therefore interesting to look at PEGIDA within this European context.

1.1 Research questions

The fear of Islam, the general right-wing trend in Europe, and the disenchantment with politics make it even more important to understand PEGIDA. Therefore, the research question is: *Who are PEGIDA?* This question will be approached by looking at the following sub-questions:

- What are the reasons for people to join PEGIDA?
- What are PEGIDA's identity and norms?
- What is the ideology of PEGIDA and how is it comparable with similar European movements?
- What roles do other European right-wing movements play in the success of PEGIDA?

Through this research question, this thesis aims to understand the reasons why people join the movement itself, and the underlying connections between other European right-wing movements. Within these connections, the focus will be on Geert Wilders and Tommy Robinson. This is not only because both spoke at PEGIDA, but also because of my understanding of Dutch and English. To answer these questions, the thesis will use qualitative interviews with PEGIDA followers as well as two members of the leadership. Furthermore,

this thesis aims to reveal possible connections between right-wing movements through an ideological analysis.

A qualitative research approach was chosen, since a quantitative research approach would be difficult to conduct, due to the fact that there are no official and accessible membership records of the PEGIDA followers. Hence, such research would not produce a balanced and representative sample. Qualitative research is therefore more useful, since it focuses on information rich cases. Moreover, the research does not focus on the posters and chants of the protest. This is because similar research already exists. Also, this research does not focus on any other branch of PEGIDA than PEGIDA Dresden and PEGIDA Nederland [PEGIDA Netherlands]. This is due to the time limit, and the fact that PEGIDA Dresden are the original movement. Furthermore, investigating PEGIDA Nederland provides great insight into the minds of PEGIDA followers in a country that has a successful right-wing populist party.

1.2 Outline

Besides these connections, this thesis also aims to understand PEGIDA and their reasons to exist. Through that, it will create an understanding of how to deal with this movement and whether or not they are similar to other movements in Europe. To do so the thesis is divided into eight chapters:

- I. *Background and literature*: To understand the context of the thesis better, this section introduces existing research on PEGIDA and explains existing literature on right-wing movements in Europe.

- II. *Methodology*: This chapter explains the process of collecting and analysing data. This includes fieldwork, qualitative interviews, as well as text-based research.
- III. *Theoretical framework*: The theoretical framework will explain norms, identity and culture, right-wing movements, and other terms important to this thesis. It aims at creating the basis for understanding the research conducted.
- IV. *Right-wing movements in Germany and PEGIDA*: This chapter will introduce the right-wing movements in Germany. It will also provide background information to the creation of PEGIDA and their members and goals.
- V. *Results*: This section will analyse the results from the fieldwork, interviews and ideological analysis
- VI. *Discussion*: The results from the analysis will be compared and looked at through the literature review and theoretical framework.
- VII. *Conclusion*: From the research done, a conclusion will be offered, answering the research question.

2 Background and literature

In order to understand right-wing movements in Europe this section will give an introduction and background information to existing literature. Since PEGIDA are such a novel movement in Germany, it received much attention by researchers. These studies have been the basis for the approach chosen in this thesis, how to conduct the research, and what was possible. This section also offers an understanding of the European context through summarising some of the studies on right-wing movements in Europe.

2.1 Literature on PEGIDA

This section will introduce how to best approach PEGIDA based on the few existing researches. The researches not only explain possible constraints, but also function as a check-up tool and help to understand whether the applied approach is valid. The studies used were the following: Daphi et al. (2015); Geiges et al. (2015); Paetzelt, Buchallik, Scharf, and Pleul (2015); Paetzelt and Eichardt (2015); Vorländer, Herold, and Schäller (2015). Vorländer et al. (2016) published a book in January 2016, but although some information of this book will be used during the thesis, it is not included in this section due to time constraints.

The first study this section will focus on is by Daphi et al. (2015). Their *“Protestforschung am Limit”* [Protest research at the limit] focuses on a systematic analysis of posters, symbols, mottos, and speeches as well as an online survey. They call this study at the limit because of the little time they had, the situation at the protest, and the insecurities regarding this new movement. Although it was a challenge, they received 123 replies to their 670 invites.

From the respondents, men were more open and wanted to share their thoughts and ideas. The authors concluded that most of the respondents usually vote right or centre. The

respondents inform themselves about PEGIDA especially through social media. Most of these people have three fears: the loss of national identity and culture, that coming German generations are not going to be well off, and that Germany is paying too much into the EU (Daphi et al., 2015).

From these characteristics, Daphi et al. (2015) conclude that there are two groups of people at the protest: the xenophobes, who make up 69% of the respondents, and the disappointed, who make up 31% of the respondents. The latter do not like Islam, but do not fear it as much as the xenophobes do. Their main reason to join the protests is the disillusionment with the current politics. The speeches deal with the latter; they focus on the media as the 'enemy' and criticise politics and the elites.

The study also focuses on the most important topics addressed by the speeches, the people, and the posters. First, PEGIDA criticise the asylum and immigration policies. Second, they criticise the current government. Finally, they are dissatisfied with the media coverage. Less important points are the dislike or prejudice towards Islam, criminal asylum seekers, strengthening national culture against foreign infiltration, oppression of freedom of speech, and more direct democracy (Daphi et al., 2015).

Paetzelt et al. (2015) also used a questionnaire to learn more about the protesters, their motivations, opinion, and context. One of the main reasons to protest is the general misrepresentation of PEGIDA by the media and politics, and the general dissatisfaction with the government and their policies. When it comes to refugees, a majority believes that real refugees should be accepted, but that Germany already took too many in. When it comes to Islam, PEGIDA followers do not differ greatly from the rest of the German population. Most of the respondents are patriots, but also feel European. Paetzelt et al. (2015) conclude that one third of the respondents can be qualified as right-wing national xenophobes.

A few months after the initial study, Paetzelt and Eichardt (2015) conducted another research to see how the PEGIDA followers developed. Although general Islamophobia had increased, the results still did not differ greatly from the original results. Moreover, Paetzelt and Eichardt (2015) conclude that Islam is not the main reason, but the dissatisfaction with the asylum laws and politics in Germany. Real refugees should stay. Also, the followers are still dissatisfied with the German politics. These people also feel less European than in the initial study. Paetzelt and Eichardt (2015) concluded that the majority of the respondents are xenophobic patriots.

Vorländer et al. (2015) also try to analyse PEGIDA based on a survey. They chose a pen-to-paper format. This was to ensure that only people who actually attended the protests would respond. Their goal was to understand the “socio-democratic composition and their central motives” (Vorländer et al., 2015, p. 12). They concluded that the main motivations of PEGIDA members to join the protest focus on politics and Europe. Islam only plays a minor role (Vorländer et al., 2015).

Besides these four studies, Geiges et al. (2015) published a book focusing on all aspects of PEGIDA. The chapters include topics on the development of PEGIDA, an observation of the protests, online survey, focus groups, media discourse, the relationship between PEGIDA and the AfD, as well as reactions from other countries. Since Chapter 5 will discuss most of these topics, this will only focus on the general results from the book.

Geiges et al. (2015) conclude that the typical PEGIDA follower is middle aged, male, and a populist. His political ideas are mainly right-wing liberal, and in the future he will vote for the AfD. Moreover, it will most likely be his first protest ever. The main reason to protest is the dissatisfaction with the government’s current policies. These should focus more on the national interests, the need for a more pluralistic society, and improved law and order.

Besides these typical characteristics, PEGIDA followers tend to see themselves in opposition to ‘the others’. ‘The others’ are the left-wing supporters, asylum seekers, gypsies, and Islam. The followers perceive the latter as “violent, sexist, underdeveloped, archaic, and intolerant.” Muslims also tend to build their own parallel societies (Geiges et al., 2015).

2.2 The European context

In order to better understand PEGIDA and their connections to other European movements or parties, it is important to also look at the European context. Support for right-wing movements grew significantly after the Second World War. However, it was not until the 1990s, when Silvio Berlusconi joined the Italian government, that right-wing populist parties gained parliamentary seats in their respective governments. Since then, the number of right-wing populist parties in Europe has been steadily increasing (Mudde, 2013).

These groups made it into a majority coalition government in three European countries: Austria, Italy, and Switzerland. In other countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, these parties acted as the supporting party for a minority government (Mudde, 2014). The most successful right-wing populist parties in Europe include (Rooduijn, 2014):

- Austria: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
- Belgium: Vlaams Belang
- Denmark: Dansk Folkeparti
- The Netherlands: Partij voor de Vrijheid
- France: Front National
- Italy: Lega Nord
- UK: UK independence party (Albrecht & Peter, 2015)

But how did these parties gain so much support? The main reason lies in the fear of losing one's national identity due to globalisation. Because the national governments failed to respond to this fear, people needed an alternative, and therefore turned to right-wing populist parties (Ansari & Hafez, 2012). Another theory by Cherribi (2011) focuses on the end of the Cold War, as this is when people lost their enemy and scapegoat. When terrorists attacked the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001, the western world regained this image of an enemy (van der Noll, 2012).

According to Holz, the shared fear of someone else, in the past of the Jews, connects people over borders (as cited in: Wodak, 2013). However, the different right-wing populist groups display this fear differently. In Austria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and France the groups focus on their fascist past. In the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland however, they focus on the "perceived threat from Islam". Hungary, Greece, Italy, and the UK share the sentiment that minorities are a threat to their national identity. Finally, in the USA, right-wing populists follow a "traditional Christian (fundamentalist) conservative-reactionary agenda" (Wodak, 2013, p. 26).

Ivarsflaten (2008) focuses on what unifies right-wing populist parties in Europe in their success. For this, she uses the data from the European Social Survey (2002-2003). Based on this, she arrives at several conclusions. First, economic reasons only play a minor role in the choice to vote right-wing populist. This is because the majority parties also manage to mobilise people on the same basis. However, right-wing populists manage to attract some voters who are dissatisfied with their national economy. In countries like Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Norway, distrusting the politics mobilised people to vote for right-wing populists. She concludes that lack of faith in the EU does not play a great role in the success

of these groups. The main reason for the success however is immigration. If the country fails to address this issue properly, people are more likely to support right-wing populist groups.

All these points led to people looking for an alternative to the current governments; they found this alternative in 1992 through Jörg Haider in Austria. By showing other countries in Europe how to fight the loss of national identity, he opened the door to right-wing populism in Europe (Cherribi, 2011). He claimed to be one of the people. Several other right-wing populist groups adapted this concept. Wodak (2013) claims that this concept of '*ad populum*' [To the people] is a common feature in all right-wing populist groups in Europe. It aims at giving the people the feeling that they represent all of them. Moreover, it claims that everyone in the country has the same opinion. The European Sovereign Debt Crisis also boosted the support of right-wing populist groups; while the national governments failed to answer the fears of the population, right-wing populist groups provided seemingly easy answers to the issues at hand (Häusler & Roeser, 2015).

These answers seemed to be successful; in the 2014 elections for the European Parliament, many of the right-wing populist parties managed to get seats. The FN managed 25% of the votes, FPÖ 20%, and UKIP 28%. Due to this success, the FN wanted to build a coalition with Lega Nord, the FPÖ, the PVV, and the Vlaams Belang. They hoped that through this coalition they could unite against the EU and regain sovereignty of their respective countries. Nevertheless, they did not manage to get the 25 representatives from seven countries; UKIP did not want to work together with the FN, which in their eyes is extremist. The coalition failed (Albrecht & Peter, 2015).

Despite this initial failure, in June 2015 several leaders of right-wing movements announced the formation of the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group. Even though UKIP did not support this coalition, one of their former members, Janice Atkinson, was the deciding

seat: She left UKIP to support the formation of the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (Jublin, 2015). The group consists of members from: FN (22), PVV (4), FPÖ (4), Lega Nord (5), the Polish Congress of the New Right (2), Vlaams Belang (1), one independent member from Romania, and one ex-UKIP member (European Parliament MEPs, 2015). The members of this coalition can join in on all matters in the plenary sessions and bring their ideas to the table. They also receive a budget from the European Parliament for their work and ideas (Jublin, 2015).

One country in which right-wing populism is highly popular, are the Netherlands; 9/11 and the murder of the Islam critics Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, greatly influenced the population's image of Islam as the enemy (van der Noll, 2012; Vossen, 2010). Fortuyn was a popular politician who introduced the discussion around Muslim culture and moved away from the issue of immigration (Oudenampsen, 2013). This generated much support from the public. In the national elections right after his death, the Fortuyn list managed to get into second place (Evans-Pritchard & Clements, 2003).

After Fortuyn, Geert Wilders gained significant support in the right-wing populist debate. He became famous through his short movie *Fitna*, which showed the negative side of Islam and how it is a threat to Dutch norms and values (Cherribi, 2011). The party surrounding Wilders, the PVV, was established in 2005 (de Lange & Art, 2011). In their first elections in 2006, they received 5.9% of the votes. This number increased drastically in the 2009 European elections, where they became the second biggest party with 17% of the votes (Vossen, 2010). They received their best result in 2010 and became the third strongest power in the Netherlands. This led to the PVV being the deciding factor in the outcome of the elections. After much debate they decided in October 2010 that they would support the minority government (van Kessel, 2011). Since the beginning of the refugee crisis the PVV

has regained support; in the polls on December 3, 2015, the PVV became the biggest party with 30 seats, compared to 26 seats for the popular VVD (Ipsos, 2015).

The goals of the PVV focus on saving the Dutch culture from the influences of Islam and the EU (Rooduijn, 2014). They want to do this by leaving the EU first, and regaining their freedom and independence after that. This way, they believe, they can improve their economy and quality of life. Besides leaving the EU, they also want to change the immigration laws; immigrants have to work and integrate into Dutch culture. They are also opposed to people having dual nationality. If the immigrants do not comply with these rules, they have to leave the Netherlands. Besides immigration, they also want to change the democracy into a more direct one and they want to abolish the king (Partij Voor de Vrijheid, 2012).

Most people who vote for the PVV have no trust in the current government (95%), compared to 71% of those that do not vote for the PVV (Hooghuis & Bank, 2009). The typical PVV voter is male and between 35 and 64 (Hooghuis & Bank, 2009; NOS, 2015). He is relatively educated or low educated. Most have a low income compared to the Dutch average (NOS, 2015).

The UK has also had right-wing debates since the 1960s. These debates were met with the creation of the NF in 1967. The NF claimed that the elites neglected the issue of immigration. They hoped that by creating a party, they could politicise this. However, they split up in the 1980s and dispersed into several splinter groups (Solomos, 2013). From these splinter groups the BNP emerged. Their focus was on issues with the black and ethnic minorities in the UK. They perceived them as a threat to “the unity and order of British society” (Solomos, 2013, p. 127). As these communities live in the UK, they perceive them as an internal enemy (Solomos, 2013).

Next to the BNP, UKIP is another UK movement with right-wing ideologies. UKIP was established in 1993 (Hayton, 2010; Lynch, Whitaker, & Loomes, 2011). In 2014, UKIP received more votes at the European Parliament election than at the national election (Johnson, Johnston, & McLean, 2014). Their success can be attributed to their goals. Their main goal is to leave the EU (Albrecht & Peter, 2015; Hayton, 2010). Similarly to the PVV, they believe that this will lead to economic benefits through regaining control. They also want to limit immigration through leaving the EU and introducing an Australian style immigration system. Anyone who does not comply with British rules has to leave. After five years one can apply for citizenship. Besides immigration they try to improve the general welfare state in the UK and support the British culture and heritage (UKIP, 2015).

Besides UKIP, the probably most known right-wing movement in the UK is the EDL. It was established in 2009 at an unofficial protest in Luton. It calls itself a human-rights organisation “to protect the inalienable rights of all people to protest against radical Islam encroachment into the lives on non-Muslims” (Goodwin, 2013, p. 5). The ideas of the EDL are connected to the blog of Paul Ray, a former BNP member. Together with Tommy Robinson, Ray created the United Peoples of Luton, from which the EDL emerged. Robinson eventually became the leader of the EDL (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013).

From the British section of the EDL, this movement gained strength within the last years. In 2012, the EDL started working together with the BFP which was made up out of former BNP members. Through this alliance the EDL gained more political influence as well as a possibility of receiving funds more easily. Nevertheless, Robinson left the BFP in October 2012 again (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013). In 2013, Robinson left the EDL and joined a ‘counter-extremism think-tank’, the Quilliam Foundation (Siddique & Quinn, 2013).

Besides its political alliances, the EDL spread to other European countries under the name of the ECJM. The goals of the ECJM are first to prepare for the new civil war against Islam. According to the ECJM, the media and the elites ignore the threat of Islam and shut down any discussions regarding it, and as a result are hindering freedom of speech. Besides this, the ECJM focus on women and their rights. In order for a multicultural society to work, they state that Islam has to modernise. Although the movements share these ideals, their approach differs (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013).

The goals of the EDL focus on stopping the Islamisation of Europe. To show the British people that the UK faces Islamisation, they use three themes: the spread of Halal meat, the possibility that Muslim men might rape women, and the construction of mosques. Besides these themes, they focus on economy, the EU, and other possible threats to the British people (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun, 2013).

These threats mainly speak to people who are dissatisfied with the political system. Although many claim that followers of the EDL are mainly young and uneducated, this is not entirely true. Although they might not have a high level of education, most of them have a degree. Moreover, many people over 44 also join the protest, and the majority works either full-time or part-time. They are not less involved in mainstream politics than other people in Britain. Although these people tend to be educated and have work, they also tend to be more prone to violence than other British people (Goodwin, 2013).

3 Methodology

Although right-wing movements exist in many European countries, Germany did not have an effective right-wing movement so far. Therefore it is interesting to understand PEGIDA and the complexity of it. Thus, qualitative research is the most effective method (Bryman, 2008). The research focuses on qualitative interviews and an ideological analysis. To understand the reasons of people to join PEGIDA, fieldwork has been conducted and followers have been interviewed. The qualitative interviews with Edwin Wagenveld and Tommy Robinson aim at understanding the European connections and the identity of PEGIDA. Finally, the ideological analysis helps to understand the connections, identity, and ideology of PEGIDA in relation to Wilders and Robinson as representatives of their movements and political parties.

3.1 Fieldwork

To understand the underlying reasons for people to join PEGIDA, face-to-face interviews have been conducted at the protests. These focused on the reasons, identity, and background of the followers. It created the basis for understanding PEGIDA.

3.1.1 Process

Since the location of the protest was unknown before the research, Vorländer et al. (2015) created the basis for the research process. As they mention, the best point of time to conduct the research is before the protest. One of the reasons for this is that besides the fact that more people are at the location during or after the protest, they are more likely to answer questions before the protest. This is because nothing distracts them. There was also a chance that they might become heated through the speeches and therefore be more aggressive after the protest. Vorländer et al. (2015) suggest that because the police control the entrances, these are the best

spots to conduct the interviews. This was however not possible, since most of the locations were quite large and most people stood close to the stage at the beginning. Therefore, I approached them there. Nevertheless, during the protests it was safer to move back towards the police.

Besides the location, it was important to think about how to conduct these interviews. As many of the PEGIDA followers do not like the press, it was important to distinguish myself from them. Therefore, I ensured anyone I approached that I had no contact to the media. Furthermore, as many wanted to stay anonymous, it would be difficult to use a recording device. Hence everything was written down. A recording device was only used during the protests in Utrecht. The reason was that it was difficult for me to think, write, and talk Dutch simultaneously. However, I first asked the interviewees for their permission.

3.1.2 Questionnaire

The questionnaires for these interviews were adjusted every time to current developments. The questions were semi-structured, except for those that ask about the demographics, these were closed. As most of the questions were semi-structured, I could ask them, but also adjust them if needed (Bryman, 2008). All questionnaires can be found in appendices 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, and 10.5.

3.1.3 Sampling

Anyone who attends PEGIDA Dresden and PEGIDA Nederland belongs to the research population. The sample size of this research depends on how many people were willing to answer the questions. The numbers are:

- Protest in Dresden, March 23, 2015: 18 respondents

- Protest in Dresden, May 25, 2015: 6 respondents
- Protest in Dresden, September 21, 2015: 11 respondents
- Protest in Utrecht, November 8, 2015: 5 respondents.

These people were chosen through a non-probability purposive sampling: only those who were relevant to the research were chosen (Bryman, 2008). “Usually purposive sampling is used which involves selecting participants who share particular characteristics and have the potential to provide rich, relevant and diverse data pertinent to the research question” (Tong, Sainsbury, & Craig, 2007, p. 352). The criteria for inclusion and exclusion were:

- Only people at the location who had joined PEGIDA were chosen;
- People were approached according to vicinity, which means that they were not chosen according to age, gender, or any other demographic goal;
- People who looked right-wing extremist were excluded for safety reasons.

All respondents were information rich cases. This is because they can provide interesting insights to the problem at hand, and on their reasons to participate (Sandelowski, 1995).

3.1.1 Limitations and ethical constraints

The purposive sampling creates some limitations to the research. One of them is that it makes it difficult to arrive at a generalised conclusion. This is because of the few respondents and the use of the semi-structured interviews (Bryman, 2008). Also, parts of the population were neglected; this included the people who looked right-wing extremist. Therefore, a generalised conclusion is not possible.

Part of this issue is the number of respondents. Many did not want to answer the questionnaire, since they either thought I was a journalist, did not trust researchers, or did not want to answer anything in general. Through ensuring that the research was not in contact

with the press or the TU Dresden, this issue was partly eliminated. In some cases this approach was successful, in others it was not.

Besides people not answering, another limitation was the pen-to-paper approach. Although the benefits outweighed the disadvantages, the latter have to be identified. Since the interviews were not recorded, it was difficult to remember every single detail of the interviews. Therefore, they are not as complete as they could be. However, through making notes about the impressions right after the protest this issue was minimalised.

Besides the notes, there were also some ethical constraints. To avoid the possibility of violating ethical principles, all participants knew what they were answering and what this was used for. Furthermore, all respondents agreed to participate in the interview. To ensure their participation they were not asked for their names. This way they can be sure that there will be no invasion of their privacy.

Finally, in the interviews in Utrecht the participants were recorded. Before doing so, they had to agree to it. Those who did not want to be recorded were not recorded (Bryman, 2008). However, to have a backup in case something went wrong with the recording device, which it did, I also used the pen-to-paper approach.

3.2 Qualitative interviews

Besides the followers, the German PEGIDA leadership as well as Wagensveld (leader PEGIDA Nederland), Robinson, and Wilders were approached for possible interviews. This aimed to get a better understanding of the reasons for PEGIDA and connections between these groups. Only Wagensveld and Robinson agreed to an interview.

3.2.1 Process

The PEGIDA Germany leadership was approached on several occasions, including Facebook and talking to members of the *Orga-Teams* before the protest. None of them were willing to answer or contact me. Because of this experience I did not expect an interview with Wagenveld. I met him in Utrecht before the protest on a popular square and approached him. Although he was busy giving several interviews, he agreed to one with me. The interview lasted approximately five minutes and was recorded.

The interview with Robinson however was planned. He was emailed, and after a few weeks' members of his team reached out. The interview took place February 9, 2016 in a pub in Flitwick. The interview was recorded and filmed to ensure that none of the answers were lost. It took approximately 45 minutes. Robinson answered all the questions thoroughly. Four days later Robinson was attacked and ended up in the hospital (Wright, 2016).

Although Wilders had been contacted, no one replied to the interview request.

3.2.2 Questionnaire

The interview guides can be found in appendices 10.6 and 10.7. They aim to understand the reasons and background of the interview partners and served as an interview guide. Because the interview with Wagenveld was unexpected, the interview guide is not as thorough. The interview guide for the interview with Robinson aimed at understanding his reasons for setting up PEGIDA UK, his background, the future, and his general image of PEGIDA and Europe.

3.2.3 Limitation and ethical constraints

First of all, the fact that the interview with Wagenveld was not prepared beforehand was a limitation. It hindered a better understanding of his points. Also the interview with Robinson faced some challenges. During the interview he mentioned some things which could expose opinions of different people and possibly put them in danger.

3.3 Ideological analysis

To understand the ideology of PEGIDA and other right-wing movements in Europe, this section focuses on an ideological analysis. There are several ways to approach an ideological analysis. To get a broad understanding of the ideologies of PEGIDA, Wilders, representing the PVV, and Robinson, representing the EDL, the focus will be on the morphological approach. The goal of the section is to analyse the ideologies as well as to understand possible connections between these ideologies.

3.3.1 Morphological approach

This section will focus on Freedden's approach according to Gillan (2008, p.261): "Freedden's morphological approach to ideologies focuses specifically on the interconnections between ideas by which political concepts are decontested." This includes understanding the concepts, their cultural and logical context, and their shared understanding of these concepts. It also helps in understanding the political thinking of a group and how this influences political behaviour (Maynard, 2013).

The morphological approach identifies several frames. According to Rucht & Neidhardt, (2002) frames are "collective patterns of interpretation with which certain definitions of problems, causal attributions, demands, justifications and value-orientations are

brought together in a more or less consistent frame work for the purpose of explaining facts, substantiating criticism and legitimating claims” (as cited in: Gillan, 2008, p. 249). There are several frames influencing social movements. The orientational frame is the individual frame every human being holds. It consists of “people’s basic beliefs and attitudes” and therefore gives understanding of the surrounding world as well as a direction and belonging (Gillan, 2008, p. 248).

Besides the orientational frame, an important factor to understand social movements is the interpretative frame. This frame creates the basis for action in a social movement. It focuses on the reason to protest, usually a perceived injustice, as well as who the ‘we’ are and who ‘we’ are fighting against (‘they’ or ‘the other’). It is important to analyse this frame, as it provides an understanding of why people join the movement.

There is also the master frame. This frame is the one movements use to motivate their followers. It is usually based on earlier movements and shared with the followers. This frame is not movement specific but cultural. The movement utilizes it to gain support. Using this frame is a strategic alignment process. If the movement does not use it effectively they will not be successful. Furthermore, it differs per individual (Gillan, 2008). This is why this thesis will also focus on the individual motivation through qualitative interviews.

3.3.2 Process

Since the situation influences the meaning of texts, all chosen texts were analysed according to their background, position, and linguistics. Furthermore, the target audience of these texts will be taken into consideration. This is important since it can actively influence the understanding, including the knowledge, attitude, and ideologies of the text (Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

It is also important to understand the different frames used and how they influence the actions of the people. First, the orientational frame was analysed. This is important to understand the beliefs and values of the movement. Then topics from the analysed texts were put into categories. These categories symbolise the frames and create the basis for the analysis (Gillan, 2008).

3.3.3 Sampling

In this method, purposive sampling has been used in order to choose texts that can provide the best background to the research question (Bryman, 2008). The focus will be on several texts from each movement: 12 of PEGIDA, six of Wilders, and six of Robinson. Since Wilders spoke once at PEGIDA and Robinson spoke twice, these speeches will also be reviewed. These can also be called the collective action frames. Collective action frames are those “position papers and policies agreed by the group” (Gillan, 2008, p. 254). This will help understand the differences between Wilders’ and Robinsons’ speeches outside and inside the PEGIDA context.

Following texts will be analysed according to the morphological approach:

- Dresdener Thesen (PEGIDA, 2015b);
- PEGIDA’s six demands (Epoch Times, 2015b);
- Positional paper (PEGIDA, 2014);
- Festerling, November 11, 2015 (Festerling, 2015);
- Festerling, October 19, 2015- first year anniversary (Bachmann, 2015f);
- Festerling, January 18, 2016 (Festerling, 2016);
- Bachmann, January 12, 2015 (Bachmann, 2015c);
- Bachmann, May 11, 2015 (Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015);

- Bachmann, June 22, 2015(Bachmann, 2015d);
- Bachmann, October 19, 2015- first year anniversary (Bachmann, 2015f);
- Bachmann, November 2, 2015 (Bachmann, 2015e);
- Oertel, January 12, 2015 (Oertel, 2015);
- Wilders, Rotterdam-speech (Wilders, 2005);
- Wilders, Fitna (Pimperl & Wilders, 2008);
- Wilders, Debate on ISIS mission in Iraq (Wilders, 2014);
- Wilders, Asylum debate (Wilders, 2015a);
- Wilders, General budget debate (Wilders, 2015b);
- Wilders, On the attacks in Paris (Wilders, 2015c);
- Wilders, PEGIDA (Wilders, 2015d);
- Robinson, Leeds 2009 (Robinson, 2009);
- Robinson, Peterborough 2010 (Robinson, 2010);
- Robinson, European Parliament 2012 (Robinson, 2012);
- Robinson, Birmingham July 2013 (Robinson, 2013);
- Robinson, When Tommy met Mo documentary (McGlynn, 2013);
- Robinson, Oxford Union, March 16, 2015 (Robinson, 2015d);
- Robinson, PEGIDA Dresden October 19, 2015 (Robinson, 2015c);
- Robinson, PEGIDA Dresden November 30, 2015 (Robinson, 2015b).

3.3.4 Limitations and ethical constraints

Besides the issue of limitation, it is questionable whether the information gathered from social media is ethical and needs informed consent. Nevertheless, since the chosen texts were public and not sensitive, this should not be an issue. The latter implies that they are not sensitive in

nature, meaning that they do not include sensitive information about anyone, and can thus not invade someone's privacy. Furthermore, their use is not prohibited by any policy. Therefore this should not be a challenge (Bryman, 2008). Nonetheless, many of the videos of the speeches are on unofficial YouTube channels, which gives the editor some possibilities to change things. However, in Robinson's case these were the only available sources of some of his speeches.

It is not enough to only understand the orientational and collective frames of a movement. Individuals following the movement might have different reasons to support it and therefore different orientational frames. In order to understand the movement, it is important to look at the individual's reasons to join the protest. The qualitative interviews help to understand this, but will not provide a full insight in every protester's reasons to join.

3.4 Strengths and weaknesses

Although this research uses two methods to arrive at a conclusion and answer the research question, several strength and weaknesses have to be discussed.

First, due to the value-loaded matter of this topic, it will be difficult to conduct a value neutral research (Bryman, 2008). Although I will do my best to not let my opinions influence the research, it can be quite challenging. Nevertheless, I try to analyse this topic as objectively as possible.

Furthermore, some of the information available on the development of PEGIDA comes from journalistic sources, since this is a quite current topic. Although there are studies on the topic, they do not include all developments of PEGIDA. However, in conjunction with journalistic sources, they help depict a more thorough image of PEGIDA.

Next to that, the timing of the research will be a challenge. Because this topic changes constantly, I will only report until February 6, 2016. Anything happening after that date will be excluded from the research.

Besides these weaknesses, the thesis will address the most important points to answer the research question. The questions were addressed through different methods. It therefore creates a new understanding of this movement, not only ideologically, but also in the European context.

4 Theoretical framework

This section focuses on the theories used to answer the research question. This is important in order to understand the terms used and the background to the discussion. First, it will give an insight to norms, identity, and culture, then to right-wing movements, and finally to some of the terms needed to understand who PEGIDA are.

4.1 Norms, identity, and culture

To understand right-wing movements, it is important to understand the concept of norms, identity, and culture. The focus will be on the European context. In light of this, this section will introduce the concept of the social construction of norms, identity and culture, European integration, and ideology

4.1.1 The social construction of norms, identity and culture

Culture is defined by “the art, customs, ideas, and social behaviour of a nation, people, or group” (“Compact Oxford English Dictionary for University and College Students,” 2013).

Norms and identity are an important part of any culture. This section explains these in light of social constructivism. This theory aims at understanding culture and its influence on norms and identities.

Norms are present in any society. They help people to understand what is right or wrong. The Cambridge Dictionaries Online (n.d.) defines norms as: “an accepted standard or a way of behaving or doing things that most people agree with”. Rather than influencing the government’s actions, these norms give understanding to what the people want. Power as such cannot actively influence them (Checkel, 1999a). However, just like culture, which is a constantly changing concept (Barnett, 2014), norms can change. This happens through

development and diffusion. This can occur through social mobilisation and social learning. Social mobilisation happens through non-state actors. These non-state actors put pressure on the governments to change. The latter, social learning, spreads through the elites, who influence the norms of the people (Checkel, 1999b).

Another part of culture is identity. Barnett (2014, p. 166) defines identities as “the understanding of the self in relationship to an ‘other’. Identities are social and thus always formed in relation to others.” Because of their social nature, identities form interests and change easily (Barnett, 2014). Moreover, through the identity one holds, one automatically belongs to a group of people with a similar identity (Banchoff, 1999; Checkel, 1999b). Furthermore, identities not only influence a single person or group, but also the actions and interests of the state. A state always needs to act according to its national identity. If a state fails to do so, it might lose the support of the people (Banchoff, 1999).

Since the national identity is an important part of right-wing populism one needs to understand it properly. National identity is defined as “an individual’s intensity of positive attachments to his/her nation” (Carey, 2002, p. 391). This not only includes identification with the state and political system, but also a sense of belonging (Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Carey, 2002). However, this attachment is not always positive. It can lead to a feeling of superiority of the own nation over another. This feeling can lead to negative acts towards foreigners. This is called nationalism (Blank & Schmidt, 2003).

Part of the national identity is the fear of losing it. The creation of the EU threatened this national identity (Collier, 2014). Changing a national identity is a difficult and long-lasting process. Human beings learn about their national identity since birth. The family and government influence this. People who have a strong national identity are therefore more

scared of losing it. Because of that, they tend to be more sceptical of the EU as well as towards foreigners (McLaren, 2002).

However, elite manipulation or argumentative persuasion can change both norms and identities. As they can influence national policies, the elites can, through rhetoric and manipulation, influence norms and identities (Checkel, 1999a). This happens without force. The person or group who is influenced has the choice of whether or not to accept these norms and identities (Checkel & Moravcsik, 2001; McGraw & Hubbard, 2007). A group can influence this through argumentative persuasion. In this case it is favourable if the group comes from similar backgrounds (social or professional), is facing a crisis, meets frequently, and is independent of any political group (Checkel, 1999b).

Besides these two methods, norms and identities diffuse. Diffusion means the “transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and information from one population or region to another”(Checkel, 1999a, p. 85). It is however necessary to understand the norms and values that one wants to diffuse before doing so. This includes both the norms and values having to fit the cultural background of the society. If the “domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system (constitutions, judicial codes, laws), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational ethos and administrative procedures)” fit the international norms, it is called a cultural match (Checkel, 1999a, p. 87).

As soon as a cultural match occurs, there are two ways to diffuse the norms. First, one can use the bottom-up approach. This approach resembles social mobilisation. Here again, non-state actors are involved. They influence the decision-makers through public pressure. Through this, the elites change the state policies accordingly. Nevertheless, as they used pressure, this is not internalised by the elites and therefore not successful with them.

Secondly, one can use the top-down approach, resembling social learning. In this case the elites spread the international norms to the public (Checkel, 1999b).

4.1.2 European integration

The acceptance of the EU is greatly influenced by the national identity people hold. However, before going into detail about European integration, the following looks at the history of the EU. After the Second World War, the European countries were economically dependent on the USA. Besides that, they faced many economic and political insecurities. One of these insecurities was the role of Germany. To tackle these issues they created the European Coal and Steel Community (Stratenschulte, 2014; Urwin, 2010). However, as this developed so well, several countries decided to create a common market space, marked through the signing of the Treaty of Rome (Phinnemore, 2010). This common market space developed further and lead to the European Community in 1967. This collaboration included shared commissions, ministries, a court system, and a parliament (Stratenschulte, 2014). The EU as we know it today, was established November 1, 1993 (Phinnemore, 2010).

Since this kind of close relations between countries is a new concept in IR, a new theory to explain it was needed, neo-functionalism. This theory focuses on the collaboration between countries and the effect on their national identities. According to Jensen (2010) countries that collaborate in one sector tend to widen this collaboration to others; this is called spillover. Besides collaboration, loyalties can also spillover. This means that the elites of a country can become more loyal to the EU, resulting in a loss of their national interest. Through this, the elites will believe that the decisions made by the EU are more important than the interests of their own nation (Best & Christiansen, 2014; Jensen, 2010).

Although many people believed in the concept of European integration, this support has faded in the last years. Many parties, including some mainstream parties, are becoming 'Eurosceptic' (Mudde, 2013). This has had a strong effect on the right-wing movements. Most of them share the common belief that European integration, at least the social part, is the enemy (Häusler, 2012a). This leads to many people voting for right-wing radical or extremist parties (Fennema & Meindert, 2003).

4.1.3 Ideology

Another point in understanding right-wing movements is their ideology. Anything said has an underlying meaning. This meaning has to be understood. Through the context and culture, people are able to understand each other and the meanings behind words (Gee, 2008).

Ideology can also be part of this understanding. Ideology is "any comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas by which a social group makes sense of the world". This includes the past and the future: Why are we here, how did we get here and what does the future hold for us. In addition, an ideology needs an "overriding belief". This belief is the manifestation to legitimise the actions (McLean & McMillan, 2009, pp. 255-256).

According to Freeden (2006, p.15) "the study of ideology becomes the study of the nature of political thought: its building blocks and the clusters of meaning with which it shapes the political worlds we populate." Through this, one will be able to understand the underlying thoughts and ideas behind political action and thought. A frame analysis can be seen as a part of this. While ideologies show the beliefs and ideas of a culture or group, frames use these thoughts to show what the movement needs in order to incite action. Therefore, frames are more used as instruments to achieve certain results (Gillan, 2008).

4.2 Right-wing movements

Since there is no concrete definition of the term right-wing extremism (Mudde, 2000), this section will focus on different fractions of right-wing movements in general. It will first focus on the terms needed to understand the right-wing movements and then on the theories connected to it.

4.2.1 Terms

One important term when speaking about right-wing movements is xenophobia. Xenophobia refers “literally” to the “fear of foreigners or strangers” (McLean & McMillan, 2009, p. 570). According to Yakushko (2008, p. 1), xenophobia is based on “an underlying set of attitudes based on fear, dislike, or hatred of foreigners.” This leads to the hope to change public policies against foreigners. Xenophobic behaviour mainly occurs in times of economic or political crisis. Another, more neutral term, explaining this behaviour is nativism. Because it focuses only on the behaviour and not on the ‘phobia’ (fear) it is considered to be a better term than xenophobia (Yakushko, 2008).

The definition of xenophobia has however changed over the years and moved away from the fear of the other, to the belief that one nation is superior over another; this is called ethnocentrism (Yakushko, 2008). Prejudice is a part of all three sentiments. Prejudice is “an opinion that is not based on reason or actual experience” consequently leading to “dislike or unjust behaviour [...]” (“prejudice,” 2006). There are several perceived threats that lead to prejudice. First the realistic threat, which includes the fear that the outsider might change the economic and political environment. Second the symbolic threat. Here people are scared of the differences in “values, beliefs, morals, and attitudes.” And finally the intergroup anxiety

and negative stereotypes, meaning that the person does not want to interact with the out-group (Yakushko, 2008).

Xenophobia in relation to the fear of Islam is called Islamophobia. This term has gained importance since 9/11 (Esposito, 2011).

“Islamophobia refers to the unfounded hostility towards Islam. It refers also to the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs.” (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 4)

Another definition by Gardell defines Islamophobia as: “socially reproduced prejudice and aversions against Islam and Muslims, and actions and practices which attack, exclude and discriminate against people on account of these people either being, or being presumed to be Muslim, and to be associated by Islam” (as cited in: Bangstad, 2014, p. 18). As this definition includes the action of exclusion and prejudice, we will understand Islamophobia as such.

This hostility often leads to exclusion, discrimination, and the perception of Islam as an inferior culture (Esposito, 2011). Moreover, Islamophobia is based on the connection between three sentiments: nativism, anti-Muslim prejudice, and general insecurities (Kallis, 2013). However, this term includes any anti-Islamic sentiment from xenophobia to antiterrorism (Cesari, 2011).

People who are Islamophobic believe that Europe will become Eurabia, meaning that Islam will get the upper hand. Eurabia is the result of the fear that Islam does not fit in the Western culture. Especially the religious part worries people. While religion is privatised in the western world, this is not the case for people from Islamic countries (Esposito, 2011).

4.2.2 Right-wing movements

There are several accounts on how to define and talk about right-wing movements. Therefore, this section will focus on right-wing populism, right-wing radicalism, and right-wing extremism. Figure 1 shows the different categories of right-wing movements. Because conservative parties belong to the mainstream parties, this section will neglect them.

	Moderate right	New right		
Orientation	Conservative	Right-wing populist	Right-wing radical	Right-wing extremist (as understood by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)
Argumentation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Immigration sceptical - “traditional” family understanding - Cultural patriotism (“<i>Leitkulturdebatte</i>” [mainstream culture debate]) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Xenophobe - Islamophobic - ‘We’ against ‘them’ - Globalisation/modernisation criticism - protectionist of one’s own culture - Government - sceptical 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ethnopluralist - Democracy sceptical - Xenophobe - Islamophobic - Nationalistic - Historical relativistic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Militant anti-democratic - Openly racist anti-Semitic/ anti-Islamic - ethnic-nationalistic - openly revisionist

Figure 1: Differentiation of the right-wing spectrum. (Based on: Geisler, Braun, & Gerster, 2015; Wodak, 2013)

Populists believe that through the perceived failures of the elites, they need to change society to the better. Besides the ‘we against the elites’ sentiment, they also tend to feel that ‘the others’ are a part of a conspiracy against the greater good (Berlet & Lyons, 2000).

Pelinka (2013) claims that “[...] any kind of populism directed against an ethnically and/or nationally and/or religiously defined ‘other’ can be seen as ‘right-wing’.” Today this focuses on the perceived threat of the “enemy from abroad”. Furthermore, they tend to be against

anyone responsible for “mass migration, Europeanization and globalisation” (Pelinka, 2013, p. 10). They tend to be motivated through insecurities, especially social, economic, and cultural. Because they are critical towards the government, politics label them as paranoid and outsiders (Berlet & Lyons, 2000).

From there right-wing populists tend to demonise and scapegoat ‘the others’. They do this through four steps. First, they marginalise the other individual or group. Driven by prejudice and through their messages they exclude these groups from the mainstream society. After doing so, they tend to dehumanise or objectify ‘the others’. This happens through creating images of ‘the others’ as inferior and bad. Then they demonise them. This step does not only include the creation of a negative image, but it creates an image of the evil other. From there they start scapegoating. Scapegoating leads to a “person or group wrongfully blamed for some problem, especially for other people’s misdeeds.” (Berlet & Lyons, 2000, p.8) Another approach is the use of “arrogance of ignorance”, focusing on so-called facts and the common sense, simultaneously acting against intellectual thinking (Wodak, 2013).

Besides these ways of acting, right-wing populists tend to share their ways of approaching the public. They first and foremost focus on the fear of the public, especially about “globalisation, rise of nationalism/chauvinism, and the failure of current mainstream parties to address acute social problems” (Wodak, 2013, p. 26). To bring these fears to the people they use social media and portrait their own, mainly male, leaders as charismatic. This leader often represents himself as the leader of the people, helping them to free themselves from suppression. Rhetorically, he usually uses terms such as ‘we’ and ‘them’ to insinuate the shared fight against the elites. Their focus lies on their enemies, who are:

“‘They’ are foreigners, defined by ‘race’, religion or language. ‘They’ are élites not only within the country but also on the European (‘Brussels’) and

global level ('Financial Capital'). Cleavages within a society are neglected, such as class, caste, religion, gender and so forth, or are interpreted as the result of 'élitist conspiracies'. The discursive strategies of 'victim-perpetrator reversal', 'scapegoating' and the 'construction of conspiracy theories' thus belong to the necessary toolkit of RWP rhetoric." (Wodak, 2013, p. 29)

They hope that through their actions the people can participate politically and that politics will move away from the elites towards the people (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). People tend to support right-wing populist movements because they believe in their ideologies, but also because they do not want immigration. The EU is only a small part in their decision (Van Der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000). This differs from Pelinka (2013) who claims that Europeanisation plays a great role in their decision-making.

Besides people voting for these parties, the media plays an active role in the creation, but also in the disintegration of right-wing populist movements. Especially in the beginning, they tend to focus much attention on these movements. After a while the groups attain 'public legitimacy'. From that point onwards, the media coverage decreases. During their decline, the media tend to ignore the group (Cherribi, 2011).

Besides right-wing populists, there are also right-wing radical parties. According to Mudde (2007) right-wing radical parties "can be considered to be anti-system, i.e. representing 'an extraneous ideology' (ibid.), in that they oppose (undermine) some key aspects of liberal democracy: most notably pluralism and minority rights" (as cited in: Mudde, 2014, p. 219). They are also defined as "ethnopluralist" meaning that they believe that their ethnicity is superior to others and does not fit with these other ethnicities (Minkenberg, 2011). On top of that, both Mudde (2014), Geisler et al. (2015), and Van Der Brug et al. (2000) believe that right-wing radical movements are nativist and therefore xenophobe, and can be

connected to right-wing populism. Mudde (2014, p. 218) adds that they are also authoritarian. This means that they believe in order “through discipline, law and order-based policies”. They also tend to be historically relativistic, meaning that they believe in the differences of countries and cultures because of their historical context (Schwerdtfeger, 2001).

People who support the radical right-wing parties are those who “potentially lose from contemporary socio-economic change, fear a deterioration of economic fortunes and possess values that support dramatic reforms of the political economy” (Swank & Betz, 2003, p. 216). This is supported by Betz (1998) who claims that economic and social change increases the likelihood of people voting for the populist radical right (as cited in: Fennema & Meindert, 2003).

Besides the right-wing radicals, another term often used in relation to right-wing movements is right-wing extremism. This term is particularly used by the media and in politics (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). The German *Bundesministerium des Innern* (2013, p. 62) [German Home Office] defines right-wing extremism as:

“The scene is unified through a strong ideological connection: xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism and historical revisionism as well as general criticism towards democracy are just a few of the aspects of the right-wing extremist ideology. When origin or race decide the value of a human being, or when there is no place for “strangers” in the “ethnic community”, then certain values of the free democratic constitution are neglected.”

The term ‘historical revisionism’ refers to the right-wing extremist discussion on history. People who are historical revisionists tend to downplay the actions of The Second World War and Germany’s role in it (Benz, 2015).

These definitions create the basis for understanding where PEGIDA belong and how they compare to other movements.

4.3 Terms

This section is important in order to understand certain terms used in this research. The terms used here are important when looking at the discourse about PEGIDA, the EDL, and the PVV.

4.3.1 Wutbürger

The media frequently use this term when they talk about protests in Germany. Since PEGIDA are a protest organisation, it is quite important to understand this term. It is made up by two words: '*Wut*' and '*bürger*'. Which, literary translated, means angry citizen. This term became the word of the year in Germany in 2010 (Rothmund, Baumert, & Zinkernagel, 2014).

The importance of the term lies in the fact that anger makes it more likely that people hit the streets and protest (Rothmund et al., 2014). The changes in democracy and the decreased satisfaction with the ruling parties influence this anger. This shows in the fact that the established parties lose members, lose votes, and lose qualified leaders. People feel that this leads to changes in the modern welfare state and more social inequalities (Leggewie, 2011).

This dissatisfaction is intensified by the changes affecting the average citizens. People are educated, have unlimited access to information, and a lot of free time (Leggewie, 2011). Therefore, they are more interested in politics, but also have more opinions on the decisions made by the ruling parties. The '*Wutbürger*' feel that the government makes the wrong decisions for the people (Kehl, Then, & Sittler, 2011). This leads to people feeling a greater

need to join in on the political discussions. Nevertheless, they feel that they cannot change anything (Kühne, 2010). Therefore these '*Wutbürger*' hit the street with the hope to influence the decision-making process and to create a more direct democracy (Kehl et al., 2011).

4.3.2 Protest vote

Protest voters tend to be connected to right-wing populism. People often cast a protest vote when they do not agree with the current government. This does not mean that they agree with the party they vote for *per se*, but they want to make a statement towards the current political system (Billiet & De Witte, 1995). They make this statement through voting for non-established parties. Through this they hope to show the established political parties that they do not agree with their actions (Arzheimer, 2002). Moreover, because the voters often do not completely agree with the policies of the party they voted for, these votes are not sustainable. People can change their minds and often these parties do not have a lot of support and therefore do not have a lot of influence (Neocleous & Startin, 2003).

5 Right-wing movements in Germany and PEGIDA

After understanding the methods and the theoretical framework, this section offers a short history of right-wing movements in Germany and explains the formation, goals, and members of PEGIDA. This creates the basis for understanding the context of PEGIDA and how PEGIDA came to be.

5.1 Right-wing movements in Germany

In order to understand PEGIDA, one needs to understand the development of right-wing movements in Germany. Although several European countries managed to develop a right-wing populist party, this topic was always difficult in Germany. Several groups attempted to establish a party right of the CDU after the Second World War. However, none of them were successful (Borstel & Luzar, 2015).

Immediately after the Second World War four right-wing extremist parties established in Germany: Deutsche Konservative Partei – Deutsche Rechtspartei [German conservative party- German right party], Sozialistische Rechtspartei [socialistic right party], NPD and the Wirtschaftlichen Aufbau-Vereinigung [economic rehabilitation union]. The Deutsche Konservative Partei – Deutsche Rechtspartei never managed to attract enough followers. The Sozialistische Rechtspartei on the other hand managed to succeed in Lower Saxony in 1951; nevertheless the government prohibited the party in 1952 (Pfahl-Traugher, 2015). In addition, the Wirtschaftlichen Aufbau-Vereinigung managed to get into the parliament. However, because of their leader Alfred Loritz, they failed soon after (Schlieben, 2014). None of these parties managed to attract enough followers in the second elections and therefore ceased to exist. All of these were small parties that failed due to the modern party system (Botsch, 2012).

The only party of the four to have some success was the NPD. This right-wing extremist party was established in 1964. Because of the failure of the other parties, their members soon started following the NPD. Through this, the NPD managed to get into several federal state parliaments in the 1960s. Right after Germany reunited, right-wing extreme parties did not get much support from the former DDR. Nevertheless, this changed in 1998 when the NPD received more votes in the former East than in the West (Botsch, 2012). This support increased and led to the point where the NPD was elected into the federal state parliament of Saxony in 2004 (Pfahl-Traugher, 2015). Despite the government trying to prohibit the NPD several times because of its right-wing extremist views, none of these attempts were successful (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013). Although the NPD continues to exist, it is slowly losing the support of the German people (Borstel & Luzar, 2015).

Besides the NPD, another more or less successful right-wing party in Germany is die Republikaner. The party was established in 1983 in West Germany and managed to be elected into some local governments (Schoofs, 2013). In 1989 it received 7.1% in the European elections (Botsch, 2012). However, after Germany reunited, most of its followers moved to the NPD. Although the party still exists, it does not receive enough votes to be present in any federal or national government (Schoofs, 2013).

Also the Deutsche Volksunion tried to gain popularity through extreme right-wing ideals. It was established in 1971 and became a party as the Liste D. in 1987; since it has tried to work with the NPD in attracting followers with similar ideas. The two parties collaborated in this, by not running for the same parliaments. For example: The Deutsche Volksunion ran for federal state parliament in Bremen, meaning that the NPD would not run there. When the environment for right-wing extreme parties changed, the NPD and Liste D. started an official collaboration in 2005 (Botsch, 2012).

Next to the NPD and Republikaner, another movement was established in 1990, ProKöln. In 2012 it became a national movement called ProDeutschland. Though it is officially a party, it does not have a party program, its views and ideas can only be derived from speeches (Paetzelt, 2014). Similar to the other movements, most of the supporters of ProDeutschland originated from other right-wing movements (Häusler, 2012b). Nevertheless, their leaders soon affiliated with right-wing extremist groups, and many of the local chapters are being investigated, due to their extremist nature. Therefore, the movement did not survive (Borstel & Luzar, 2015; Paetzelt, 2014).

Although none of the right-wing parties succeeded so far, 10% of the population according to Klein & Heitmeyer (2012) identifies itself to the right of the CDU (as cited in: Borstel & Luzar, 2015). Former SPD member Thilo Sarrazin met this need for a right-wing populist leader in Germany in 2010. He published a book called “*Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzten*” [Germany abolishes itself: How we put our country on the line]. This book focuses on the future of Germany and expresses right-wing populist ideals (Sarrazin, 2014). It was very successful in Germany; an Emnid poll, published soon after, shows that 18% of the people in Germany would vote for a party based on Sarrazin’s book (Jüttner, 2010).

People did not have to wait long for a party based on Sarrazin’s ideas; in April 2013, Bernd Lucke established the Alternative für Deutschland. Again, his euro-sceptic, right-wing populist group receives most of their support from other right-wing populist parties. Their goal is to get out of the Euro and re-establish the country’s national currencies. They also want more direct democracy and an immigration law following the Canadian example. The AfD gets most of its support from people in Saxony. According to Forsa most of the AfD

voters are middle class, male, have qualified for admission to university (Abitur), and are employed (Häusler & Roeser, 2015).

5.2 PEGIDA

PEGIDA established only a year after the AfD, in 2014. This section will look at PEGIDA's development, their goals, and their followers.

5.2.1 Formation

PEGIDA established as a result of the nationwide demonstrations against the German military fighting in Iraq and Syria and for more attention to the situation in Kobane. Although none of the founders of PEGIDA were present at any of the demonstrations, Bachmann and Oertel heard about it through a YouTube video. As a reaction to that, they created a Facebook group called "*Friedliche Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*" [Peaceful Europeans against the Islamisation of the Western World]. However, they discussed this name, and as they perceived that this name would indicate a peaceful together, including foreigners, they thought it best to change it to "*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*" [Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Western World]. (Geiges et al., 2015).

After they decided on a name, they founded the *Orga-Team*. This team consisted of Lutz Bachmann, Katrin Oertel, René Jahn, Siegfried Däbritz, Tom Balasz, Hamilton George from Mozambique, Stephan Baumann, Thomas Hiemann, Thomas Tallaker, Frank Ingo Friedmann, Achim Exner, and Bernd Volker Lincke. The two most well-known members of the *Orga-Team* were Bachmann and Oertel at first and then Bachmann and Festerling. Bachmann's fame does not only come from his leadership of PEGIDA, but also from his

famous picture with a Hitler moustache (Beitzer & Das Gupta, 2015; Geiges et al., 2015). The other known member of PEGIDA is Oertel. She gained attention after she represented PEGIDA in Günther Jauch’s popular talk show in January 2015. Besides the leadership, PEGIDA also has its own security team; this consist of Balasz, Hamilton George, Stephan Baumann, and Thomas Hiemann (Geiges et al., 2015).

The *Orga-Team* organised its first demonstration on October 20, 2014; only 350 people joined this protest (Geiges et al., 2015). After the attacks on January 7, 2015 on Charlie Hebdo, PEGIDA reached its follower peak on January 12, 2015, with approximately 25.000 people at the protest (Klose, 2015). However, the increased number of followers, the bigger counter demonstration, and a terror threat to the leaders of PEGIDA led to the cancellation of the protest on January 19 (Geiges et al., 2015). After that, the demonstrations slowly lost their followers. Nevertheless, when the refugee crisis hit Germany in summer 2015, PEGIDA regained support (Fig. 2) (Focus Online, 2015).




Figure 2: Development of the number of people at the PEGIDA protests in Dresden from the beginning until March 14, 2016 (Source: Durchgezählt, 2016)




Figure 3: The first six months of PEGIDA, a timeline (Beitzer & Das Gupta, 2015; Fischer, 2015; Geiges, Marg, & Walter, 2015; Klormann, 2015; Vorländer, Herold, & Schäller, 2016)

However, this movement did not only get attention through their followers. End of January 2015, PEGIDA leader Lutz Bachmann resigned from the leadership because of a picture he had posted on Facebook of him wearing a Hitler moustache (Beitzer & Das Gupta, 2015). Oertel and several others from the *Orga-Team* followed suit. This led to many discussions of whether PEGIDA were over (Reinbold, 2015; Reinbold & Röbel, 2015). Nevertheless, Bachmann returned at the end of February and PEGIDA continue to exist (Klormann, 2015).

Besides their personal development, PEGIDA developed organisationally as well. Since November 14, 2015, PEGIDA are a registered organisation in Germany. This gives it more rights and tax relief (Geiges et al., 2015). It has also started to play a role in German politics; in February 2015, PEGIDA announced that they would put forward a candidate for the mayoral elections in Dresden. Some months later the candidate was named as Tatjana Festerling (Fischer, 2015). She received approximately 10% of the votes in the elections (IVU Traffic Technologies AG, 2015). In April 2015, PEGIDA announced its plan to run for the communal elections in 2016 and the national elections in 2017 (PEGIDA, 2015c).

Between April and September 2015, no one heard anything about their plan of becoming a party anymore. On September 14, 2015, Bachmann announced at the protest that PEGIDA would become a political party earlier than expected (Preker, 2015). According to Bachmann (2015a) this is due to the fact that he expects that the government will fail under the pressure of the refugee crisis. Therefore, he is preparing for possible re-elections before 2017. He believes that PEGIDA can only change something if they become a party. Regarding the AfD, he believes that they used PEGIDA and will fail because of their bad organisation. No other German party would be able to represent the ideas and wishes of PEGIDA. His goal is to work together with other nationalist forces in the EU to ensure that

“in 20 years’ time we can live in a German Germany in an European Europe” (Bachmann, 2015a). The same evening the situation in Leipzig escalated and several PEGIDA members attacked the police (Preker, 2015).

Besides the escalation in Leipzig, the violence at PEGIDA demonstrations seems to have increased in September 2015; the media reported about fights at the demonstrations in the aftermath of almost every Monday. On September 28, 2015, a journalist was attacked during a march. The same evening some darker coloured men were attacked by PEGIDA followers (MDR Sachsen, 2015). At the demonstrations on October 5, 2015, some people were attacked again and the attackers had to be arrested (Sächsische Zeitung, 2015). In addition, Bachmann was sued in October 2015 for inciting racial hatred through posting several derogatory comments about Muslims and immigrants on his Facebook page (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2015).

This criticism of Bachmann and PEGIDA increased drastically in October 2015. After the mayoral candidate for Cologne, who has openly showed her support for refugees, was stabbed by a right-wing extremist, people blamed the new right. The media connects this accident with the hate speeches by PEGIDA and the AfD. In an interview, the German interior minister de Maizière called PEGIDA right-wing extremist. He said:

“By now it is obvious: Those that organise this are strong right-wing extremists. They call all asylum seekers criminals, all politicians guilty of high treason. This is far from all political consensus and everyone that goes there to express their fears have to know that they are following Pied Piper.”
(de Maizière, 2015)

As a response to this, Bachmann wants to sue de Maizière (Bachmann, 2015f) .

Furthermore, the German safety authorities are investigating PEGIDA and with that the possibility to prohibit this organisation. Although some PEGIDA groups in other German cities show signs of right-wing extremism, they do not have a national organisation. Due to this the safety authorities cannot prohibit PEGIDA (Tagesschau, 2015).

This situation became more tense during PEGIDA's first anniversary on October 19, 2015. According to Durchgezählt (2015), between 19.000 and 20.000 attended the demonstration. PEGIDA claim that it was 39.000 people. They were met by approximately 14.000 counterdemonstrators (Reimann & Preker, 2015). Around 1.000 policemen and – women tried to contain the situation (Pollmer, 2015). Speakers at the protest were Marek Černoch (Czech dawn national coalition), Vincenzo Sofo (Lega Nord, Italy), Alicia from the *Orga-Team* (Poland), Ed Utrecht (Wagensveld, the Netherlands), Tatjana Festerling, Akif Pirinçci (German-Turkish populist writer), Horst, and Tommy Robinson (former EDL) (Bachmann, 2015f; Nimz & Pollmer, 2015).

Especially the performance by Pirinçci received a lot of attention. He called the Green party the “children ****er² party”, the refugees “invaders”, and the politicians “*Gauleiter* [a regional leader of the NSDAP] of the people”. He also commented on the refugee crisis: “the concentration camps are unfortunately inoperative”. After 30 minutes the people became restless and started chanting “no hate speech”, “he is spoiling everything”, and “stop”. This made Bachmann remove him from the stage (Nimz & Pollmer, 2015). Bachmann apologised the following day for his mistake and claims that he would have never let this happen if he would have known about it. Usually he reads all the speeches beforehand, but Pirinçci surprised him (Bachmann, 2015b). Because of this, prosecutors are looking into this case as hate speech and it led to Pirinçci losing his publisher (Niewendick, 2015).

² **** refers from now on to “fuck”

German prosecutors are also investigating Bachmann. At the protest on November 2, 2015 he openly compared interior minister Maas with Goebbels (Tagesschau.de, 2015).

Bachmann said: “To me, Mr. Maas, you are one of the worst intellectual incendiaries in this country since Mr. Goebbels in the third Reich or a Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler in the DDR.” (as cited in: Locke, 2015). Also Festerling has been sued, after she claimed that if the elites and journalists do not change, maybe the pitchfork will help (Festerling, 2016).

Besides the prosecutor investigating, the home office also reports on PEGIDA. They claim that right-wing extremist parties, such as NPD, die Rechte, and Pro NRW support the ‘-gida’³ protests in Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (Fürst & Philip, 2015). Furthermore, according to Festerling PEGIDA use hooligans from the group Dynamo Dresden to secure their protests (Dernbach & Meisner, 2015).

Apart from the situation in Germany, PEGIDA also enjoy the support of other right-wing populist groups in Europe. In April 2015 Wilders attended a demonstration as a guest speaker (Hebel, Braden, & Pernack, 2015). Moreover, PEGIDA have held demonstrations in e.g. Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK amongst others (Kremp, 2016; PEGIDA, 2015e; Rucht, 2014). There are also demonstrations held in various German cities. Robinson officially called for Europe-wide protests on the same day at the same time (Robinson, 2015b). The first one was held on February 6, 2016.

³ The German chapters of PEGIDA adjust acronyms according to the city: e.g. LEGIDA (Leipzig)

5.2.2 Goals

PEGIDA base their organisation on nineteen points⁴: These focus on improving the asylum policies and German safety. They want to maintain their own Christian-Jewish culture. As to the refugees, they want to help the ones who need it and help them immigrate. Nevertheless, they demand stricter immigration policies (PEGIDA, 2014). Any official PEGIDA group needs to comply with these 19 points. If not, the *Orga-Team* will not accept them (Geiges et al., 2015).

Besides these 19 points, PEGIDA posted 10 points and demands regarding the German asylum policies on their Facebook page. Their main demand is for Germany to stop accepting asylum seekers now, since there are too many already. Besides that, they want to stop Schengen and introduce border controls. This also includes putting all member states of the Council of Europe on a list of safe country of origin. All refugees that are from safe countries, lie about their origin, are illegal, or criminal, have to be deported. They also demand that Germany has to help Arab countries to solve the problems in their area and to be able to accept more refugees. However, PEGIDA perceive Christian refugees to be acceptable. If the EU does not agree with these statements, PEGIDA demand that Germany should leave the EU (PEGIDA, 2015a).

Looking at the demands of the followers, one can conclude that they want to improve the political situation in Germany, change the asylum law, and stop ideological and religious violence (Daphi et al., 2015; Geiges et al., 2015; Vorländer et al., 2015).

⁴ A translation of these points can be found in appendix 10.1

5.2.3 Members

The members of PEGIDA are mainly male and between 40 and 55 years old and come from Saxony (Geiges et al., 2015; Vorländer et al., 2015). They are married and, according to Geiges et al. (2015), highly educated. Research by Vorländer et al. (2015) suggests a lower level of education. Nevertheless, 28% have a university degree. Most of the respondents are employed (Geiges et al., 2015; Paetzelt et al., 2015; Vorländer et al., 2015). The majority voted for the AfD in the past elections (Geiges et al., 2015). However, Vorländer et al. (2015) suggests that most PEGIDA member have no affiliation with other political parties.

6 Results

After understanding PEGIDA, their background, and the goals of the thesis, this section looks at the results drawn from the conducted research. They include the results from the fieldwork, the qualitative interviews with Wagenveld and Robinson, as well as the ideological analysis first of PEGIDA and then of Wilders and Robinson.

6.1 Fieldwork

This section concludes the results from four field trips: three in Dresden and one in the Netherlands. The demographic information is presented in figures while the answers to the questions are summarised.

6.1.1 Field trip 1: March 23, 2015

This field trip resulted in 18 respondents. Although I expected it differently, the situation was quite calm. It only heated up when the march met the counter-protest. The interview guide for the first protest can be found in appendix 10.2.

Most of the people interviewed are male (Fig.4), between 21 and 30 years old (Fig.5) and from Dresden (Fig.6). Most of them went to more than one protest (Fig.7). Many of them agree with all the points PEGIDA make.

Because they are dissatisfied with the current situation, they hope to trigger political change by going to the protest.

One of the respondents believes that no one does anything for the people. Other reasons




Figure 4: Gender of the respondents interviewed March 23, 2015

for not agreeing with the government are the asylum law, the problems in Germany, such as the difference between East and West, and the problems in the EU and their wrong-doings. The refugees are also a major topic. Some of the respondents fear that the refugees abuse the German system. Several hope instead, that those that need help will be supported. Others are not that open. One asks for the stop of the infiltration of foreigners, another claims that all refugees are frauds. He gives examples on why the refugees do not fit to Germany. The same man also claims that the politicians as well as those who do not go to PEGIDA commit high treason. One other respondent is scared and others worry about the changes they are seeing in Germany because of Islamisation.

Besides their reasons to be here, a majority of the respondents are unhappy with the EU. It appears that most PEGIDA followers feel that the EU hinders German development. They fear losing the German culture and believe that Germany puts too much money into Greece, and that chaos will eventually stop economic development. Others like the idea of the EU, but disagree with its implementation. The reasons for this dissatisfaction conform with




Figure 5: Age of the respondents interviewed March 23, 2015




Figure 6: Origin of the respondents interviewed March 23, 2015




Figure 7: Number of PEGIDA protests the respondents attended by March 23, 2015

the previous statement. One respondent claims that the EU shares similarities with the dictatorship of the DDR. Nevertheless, another respondent likes the EU. However, he also disagrees with stronger countries paying for the weaker and believes that everyone should have kept their own currency. Besides these mainly negative feelings, many of the respondents feel at least partly European. Only a few say that they are not European.

Besides their dissatisfaction with the EU, the majority of the respondents react positively to Wilders. They understand him and agree with his points. One respondent wants a party like the PVV in Germany. Five of the respondents do not know who Wilders is.

Besides the answers to the questions, some respondents shared other opinions. One claims that he faced many issues with foreigners and that they attacked or threatened him or his wife on several occasions. Another is happy that this kind of movement has finally come to Germany. He also believes that churches support Islam as they fear beheadings. One person believes that the anti-protesters never worked a day in their lives and that the government funds them. Finally, one respondent says that he is against both, extreme left and extreme right people.

6.1.2 Field trip 2: May 25, 2015

The second field trip was right before Dresden's mayoral elections. In addition, Paetzelt and Eichardt (2015) had just published their study and many of the PEGIDA followers did not like the results. That is probably why members of the security team approached me twice. The first time the answer that the research was not connected to the TU Dresden satisfied them. The second time they signalled that the research should be stopped. In total the field trip

resulted in six respondents and 12 people not wanting to answer. One of the reasons was that they believe that researchers never tell the truth.

Most of the respondents are between 51 and 70 (Fig.8). One respondent did not disclose her age. Males and females are equally distributed (Fig. 9) and most of them come from Dresden (Fig.10). A majority attended between two and five protests (Fig.11).

The reasons for these people to join differ this time by person. However, most want to stop Islamisation. One of the respondents strongly believes that the media lies and, together with the government, put them into the right corner. However, she would not join anymore if PEGIDA would become right-wing; another respondent agrees and says that he does not want to have Nazis here. One believes that the government forgets the elderly, which she perceives especially negatively, since they rebuilt everything




Figure 8: Gender of the respondents interviewed May 25, 2015




Figure 9: Age of the respondents interviewed May 25, 2015




Figure 10: Origin of the respondents interviewed May 25, 2015




Figure 11: Number of protests attended by the respondents by May 25, 2015

after the Second World War. Two of them mention the asylum laws and claim that refugees are ok, but that there are just too many. Others are dissatisfied with the government and want to change something. Besides that, they want to have their safety and freedom of speech. The opinions on Bachmann differ individually. These opinions are mainly positive. However, one argues that he does not know Bachmann personally, so he cannot say anything. Another says that Bachmann's background is a concern.

Besides these reasons, one respondent says that the topic of immigration is important. There are not too many Muslims in Dresden and therefore the population of Dresden can still protect themselves. She wants to help Muslims, but not like this. She and another respondent agree that Germany and Europe should help them in the Islamic countries. The rest of the respondents agree that all immigrants are the same. One of them claims that all of them are smart and capable of reproduction and are laughing about us and our stupidity.

The majority of the respondents disagree with the current political situation in Germany. Topics include dissatisfaction with the parties and church. Furthermore, one is unhappy with the elderly and childcare. Most of them will vote for Festerling and would vote for a PEGIDA party, since they identify with them and their 19 points. One would not vote for them, because PEGIDA are busy with other things. Finally, one claims that democracy is a lie.

Next to the national government, they are also unhappy with the EU. They claim that Germany has nothing to say anymore and needs to leave it as soon as possible. Two of the respondents like the EU. Nonetheless, they believe that the EU has spread too much and that Germany faces too many responsibilities within it. A solution to this would be following the British example. Again, one mentions the Euro as a negative point. Differently from these

negative points towards the EU, most of them feel European. Only one claims that she is not European at all.

The answers regarding Wilders differ greatly. One of the respondents was scared of a possible attack and therefore did not go, but watched it online. Another also watched it online. Two of them saw him live. They were mainly impressed by his speech, although two of the respondents had previously not heard of him.

Other answers regarded Paetzelt’s study. One of the respondents said that he did not find himself in the answers, although he answered the questions. The same person also ensured me that the protests are peaceful and nothing will happen. Another respondent believes that the elections are a fraud.

6.1.3 Field trip 3: September 21, 2015

There seemed to be more new people at this protest (Fig.15). 11 people were interviewed and 16 rejected to answer the questions. The majority of the respondents are between 41 and 50 years old (Fig.13) and male (Fig.12). Most of them are from Dresden (Fig.14) and it was their first protest (Fig.15).

The main reasons for these people to attend the protests are dissatisfaction with the government, the refugee crisis, and the Islamisation of Germany. The claims regarding the government especially focus on where the money goes. The respondents feel that too much money goes to the asylum seekers, while Germans face




Figure 12: Gender of the respondents interviewed September 21, 2015

poverty. Another point is that Merkel and the media discriminate against PEGIDA and that only the opinions of the government are accepted. This leads to a lack of freedom of speech and a need for direct democracy. One respondent compares this to the DDR.

Besides these concerns regarding the government, the respondents also worry about the refugees. Some claim that Germany has too many refugees, because the “*Bundesmutti*” [Federal mummy] invited all of them in, even those from the Balkans. One claims that Germany therefore needs to put more effort into understanding who the real refugees are, then integrate them, and finally they have to commit to Germany. Other points are that Germany needs to stop sending weapons to Arab countries, because then the war will end. Finally, they claim that PEGIDA are not racist.

Many of the respondents are not sure about Bachmann as a leader. Especially his past seems to be a topic of concern. One respondent claims that he also used to break windows and that he therefore cannot judge him. Two others claim that there were real Nazis in the German government; therefore, they cannot judge Bachmann. Others say that people can change. Two




Figure 13: Age of the respondents interviewed September 21, 2015




Figure 14: Origin of the respondents interviewed September 21, 2015




Figure 15: Number of protests attended by the respondents by September 21, 2015

of the respondents believe that he is a good leader and organiser. One does not want to answer this question.

Most of the people believe that there are too many refugees in Germany. They want to help those who need it, but there is no active control anymore. One says that she believes Syrian refugees are fine, while she does not want those from the Balkans. Some claim that it is difficult to see who is a real refugee, as three quarters of them are not. For most of the respondents, religion does not play a role. Others on the other hand are scared of Islam and fear the developments.

Besides these fears, they also worry about German politics. A majority thinks that the German party system has failed and is forgetting the middle class. Interestingly, besides the majority that voted for the AfD in the past elections, one also voted for the SPD, one for the CDU, and two for Die Linke.

Many of the respondents feel negatively about the EU. They believe that it does not do any good and cheats the people. Others however believe that the idea was good. Nevertheless, they disagree with its implementation. They argue that it has become a dictatorship. Some reasons for that are the Euro, and that too many weak countries joined. Only one respondent perceives the EU positively, especially because of the regulations. Most feel European. Only one does not feel European at all.

Most of the respondents would not vote for a PEGIDA party. They think it is too diffuse and that they should have worked together with the AfD. The others first want to see how PEGIDA will develop. Only one would definitely vote for them and one has no opinion about it. When it comes to other parties in the EU, they would hope that PEGIDA work together with them.

6.1.4 Field trip 4: November 8, 2015

To understand if there is a difference between PEGIDA in Dresden and in the Netherlands, I visited a protest in Utrecht. This protest was not as well attended. It was a challenge to distinguish between hooligans, the media, police, and protesters. Only people who did not look like hooligans were approached. I also left early as the situation seemed to escalate when counter-protesters stormed the demonstration. Several arrests were made. In the end five people answered; one of these was just a bystander, so he will be excluded from the results.

The respondents are between 51 and 70 (Fig.17) and mainly male (Fig.16). Most of them come from Utrecht (Fig.18) and attended two protests (Fig.19). They said that they never went to the German protests because of the distance. Some could also not access the first protest, as everything was shut down. However, one of the




Figure 16: Gender of those interviewed in Utrecht November 8, 2015




Figure 18: Age of the respondents interviewed in Utrecht November 8, 2015




Figure 17: Origin of the respondents interviewed in Utrecht November 8, 2015




Figure 19: Number of protests attended by the respondents in Utrecht November 8, 2015

respondents attended the protests in the Flanders four times. The same respondent said that she was a political refugee.

The opinions of Bachmann are divided between 'good' and 'no opinion'. The ones that perceive him positively think that he sees things as they are. The main reason to join the protest is the fear of Islam. One of them claims that he sleeps as badly at night as if he had left the front doors unlocked. Another believes that Islam is not a religion, but a political system and does not fit the Netherlands or the West. Another says that she experienced violence from Muslims. Finally, two of them say that they would like to help, but that there are just too many people in the world. Another reason is to support PEGIDA and get the Netherlands to change their ways. One also mentions that the left-wingers are too aggressive.

Two of the respondents believe that most refugees are "fortune-seekers" who want the economic benefits. Therefore, they need to figure out who the real refugees are. Real refugees and women and children should be helped. Unfortunately, most of them are men. When it comes to Muslim versus non-Muslim refugees, all of them agree that Islam does not fit in the West.

Most of the respondents would vote for the PVV, however one of them claims he only voted for the PVV once but will return to voting for the SP. According to him Wilders exaggerates too much. One claims that other political parties are too naïve. He also believes that PEGIDA resulted from an emergency situation, since too many Muslims will cause a civil war. When it comes to a possible collaboration between PEGIDA and the PVV, two would like it and one claims that it would not work. One does not want to comment on it.

When it comes to the EU, two of them think that the idea was good, but that it grew too much and is now uncontrollable. One of them wants to leave it and one claims that through

the lack of freedom the EU has become a dictatorship like the Soviet Union. Only one of them does not feel European at all.

6.2 Qualitative interviews

Besides the fieldwork, qualitative interviews also aim to answer the research questions. The one with Wagenveld was not prepared, as it was unexpected. Nevertheless, the one with Robinson was prepared and took place in the UK, independently from the PEGIDA protest. The interview guides can be found in appendices 10.6 and 10.7.

6.2.1 Edwin Wagenveld

Before the interviews at the PEGIDA Nederland protest in Utrecht, I went to Neude, a square in the middle of the city centre of Utrecht. Wagenveld was spending time there before the protest to have a coffee and agreed to give an interview.

He started by stating that he is always open for discussion. While the German leadership does not want to talk as much, he is always open for the press. You always need to make sure that there is a lot of press. However, he has issues with certain press, like the Telegraaf. The media system in the Netherlands is different from Germany. He claimed that the media in Germany lie, while the media in the Netherlands are more reliable.

Besides the media, he claims that PEGIDA are the result of a European problem. There are so many PEGIDAs, in the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The problem is the same everywhere. Besides the real refugees, who obviously need help, there is an issue with the abuse of the system. He believes PEGIDA to be important, because

“We have a big problem with Islamisation. We see it almost throughout our daily life. That is the same in all of Europe. It is not as if one country has the problem and the other does not. That is why we need PEGIDA Nederland.”

Although the Netherlands have the PVV, they still need PEGIDA Nederland. He is not a member of any political party. He is against politics and does not want to be bought. He claims that he is a street fighter. They can threaten him with anything, but he will continue to be on the street and be available. The idea with a PEGIDA party is still the beginning and he does not seem to be too enthusiastic about it.

He perceives himself as European, but he does not agree with “the dictatorship of Europe. I do not agree with those two little guys who have one too many, Junker and Schulz. I am for the sovereignty of every country, so Dutch sovereignty and German sovereignty.” He is in favour of economic collaboration.

6.2.2 Tommy Robinson

The interview with Robinson took place on February 9, 2016, two days after the first PEGIDA protest in the UK. We met at the Flitwick train station and drove to a pub for lunch.

He believes that PEGIDA is the new movement for England after he departed the EDL and left them without an effective leadership. PEGIDA proved themselves Saturday February 6, 2016 as a group that will be known for holding silent walks. These walks are very different from the EDL marches as they do not walk into the city centres (otherwise people would have attacked them). Since they avoid pubs, no one mixes “alcohol with passion” which lead to a peaceful protest, differently from the EDL. Although PEGIDA aim to be different, he would not mind former EDL members joining, since they were good people. He claims that they were just “uneducated and they were panicked and angry and upset and scared and fearful.

And they didn't have other ways." Both he and the others needed to learn how to conduct themselves. Germany left a great impression on him and made him feel embarrassed about the way the EDL acted. He admires that they hold peaceful protests and still get the message across.

After the EDL, Quilliam facilitated his exit. However, he thinks Muslims will not be able to solve these issues by themselves, also because "their families would ostracize them and they would come under violent attack." In order "to stop this problem we need to be honest and make everyone realise what bad of a problem we have with Islam in Europe."

After leaving the EDL, he had to go to prison. He heard about PEGIDA just after leaving prison. The mainstream media told him they were Nazis. However, he did not believe the media. Because he was not free to travel then, he asked his friend to go to Dresden and report to him about the actual situation. He came back and reported on how people there had nothing to do with Nazis or racists. When he was finally free to reach out, he did.

This led to a great experience for him. He thinks the leadership of PEGIDA are brilliant and brave. He was not stopped by the attacks on him or the threats to his life. He believes that life threats will not stop the PEGIDA leadership either. They took everything they got "from the media, from the government, from the police, they are going to be hit the same way that I have been hit." They do not stop because of fear. "So what they are is, they are ordinary people doing an extraordinary thing. And I think it's unbelievable and amazing. And I have nothing but, yeah, nothing but respect for them."

The experience and the emotions he got from joining the PEGIDA protest facilitated his idea to create PEGIDA UK. When they sang the German national anthem, he got a feeling that he only had during football matches. He also saw the fear of the people at these protests of losing their country. This imagery influenced his decision to bring it to the UK. "We have

to have this in the UK. What this is, it is something you can't ignore.' What we did with the English Defence League, it was really easy to isolate our voice or tarnish our voice."

Although he introduces PEGIDA UK, he feels that the debate on Islam changed as soon as he left the EDL. People were more open to listen to him. In one of the programs where he appeared, 95% of the people were in his favour. In addition, the things that happened in the UK since he left the EDL made people believe him more. He mentions the Rotherham grooming scandal, Charlie Hebdo, Paris, the Trojan horse school plot, and Lutfur Rahman. In connection with the Trojan horse school plot, he says:

"And they would basically take over the school. Before you know it, the school is promoting non-immigrations, segregation, homophobia, refusing to take by a national curriculum, when it comes to anything around homophobia, around anti-Semitism, around Christmas, they were banning Christmas."

He mentions that these things, including ISIS, are things he and the EDL have been warning about for years. He believes that the elites waited until he was in prison and had left the EDL to talk about it, since they were scared of the sudden support the EDL would get from this. Finally, there is a new group, but he does not want it to be called far-right or extreme, as he believes these terms are ridiculous.

He would not call himself far-right or even right-wing. He showed me the death threats he received that day and mentioned that he tends to receive such on a daily basis. He does not like what the country Pakistan stands for, but he does not mind anyone waving a Pakistani flag during his protests, as he thinks anyone can be proud of their heritage. He was welcomed in Dresden despite the German/English history, so he does not want to be

hypocrite. Besides that, he would call himself a liberal. However, he thinks that everyone has both, some right- and left-wing ideologies. Except for Islam, he does not have any strong view politically. “It doesn’t make you far-right, to oppose Islam. Islam is far-right.”

This fight against Islam started with the EDL. As the EDL was just a movement that resulted from a reaction to the current situation there was no direct link to other movements in Europe. They were not interested in Europe either. They learned from march to march. It had become a social movement, which made it difficult to break. Although everyone tried to destroy the movement, no one managed. He broke it in the end, when it was at its peak.

“But that is not, I did not say I would take myself out of the fight, but the way we fight. It’s only so far you can go the way we were doing it. The way that Dresden are doing it, you can go all the way.”

He hopes that they can be successful through the silent walks, and that Bachmann would join next time.

Differently from the German leadership, Robinson tends to talk to the press. The German leadership does not talk to the media because they think that they are working against them and the interest of the people. He talks to the press though, because he believes that he speaks the truth and therefore hopes that some people will understand that. “Slowly, it will turn people’s opinion. So I do, I talk to any press. Even when I know they are against me.”

He bases his decision to set up PEGIDA UK on the fact that no one else fights against the challenges facing Europe today. He hoped that UKIP would fight this fight. But they did not, so he felt that he had to say something because “there was no one saying what needs to be said.” When nothing happened for two years he went to Dresden, but he did not have the intention to set anything up. However, his visit convinced him and he felt the need to set up

PEGIDA UK. Through seeing all these little groups protesting all over Europe, he felt the need to unite them all, which is what happened on February 6, 2016. Through this protest, everyone in Europe was faced with it and with the discussion around it. “Whether you like it or not, it’s on your news.”

Through this, his goal is to have 10.000 people at his next demonstration. He hopes that these will be like in Germany, orderly and calm. He also hopes that after a few demonstrations they can show that they have established themselves in Britain and can therefore attract mainstream speakers. He would love Wilders to speak. These speakers were never able to speak at the EDL, because of the things it represented.

“Really our main goal is to educate and the people who listen at our demonstrations, the people who watch our videos to tell them what is going on. And open people’s eyes in the UK to what’s happening in Germany, to what’s happening in Denmark, to what’s happening in Sweden, to what’s happening in France. To show people what’s on its way.”

Furthermore, he believes that there is nothing politicians fear more than a mass movement. In May 2016, he plans another Europe-wide protest.

He hopes that PEGIDA UK will continue to be peaceful. The EDL were attacked and the followers were willing to fight. He is not going to apologise for that. “Very early on I think the whole country understood that the EDL weren’t going away. Not through ways of violence anyway.” Both PEGIDA and the EDL have the same goals, only the tactics were different. On top of that there were different followers. The EDL followers were mainly working class and therefore ignored. He hopes they will be more successful by following up

on PEGIDA and attracting more middle class people like Paul Weston and Ann Marie Waters. The government cannot ignore and demonise the middle class.

He tried to get this message across at the EDL and hoped to convince the middle class to look up and understand. He says that they all want the same for their kids.

“What we want for our kids is a safe country, good education. You are not going to get that with what’s happening. You are going to get divide, you’re going to get a polarised community, you’re going to have violence, you’re going to have conflict, have chaos, destruction, all of this. Our leaders are forcing that on us. That doesn’t mean that we haven’t got a heart or don’t understand that some of these people need help. I just don’t think we should destroy our own country in order to help them.”

However, he believes that these protests are easier in Dresden, the Czech Republic, in Poland, or in Hungary, because people are free to come out since they do not work with Muslims and do not have any Muslims around them. In Luton on the other hand this is different. There is no political correctness in these countries. However, he would still protest if he lived in Holland, but he would also have the choice to vote for Wilders. He does not have this option in the UK. This option is also not available in Germany. “Sweden has Swedish Democrat Party, France has Marine Le Penn, the UK has...?” He does not believe that UKIP is a valuable option because they are also against EU immigration. He does not care about that, since he only cares about Islamic immigration.

Because of his issues with Islamic immigration, he only wants Christian or Yazidi refugees, generally minority groups. On top of that he thinks that women and children should also be taken to the UK, just not the men who should stay and fight. He thinks these young

men have a bad view of women and do not adapt to their host nation. However, he also doubts whether to separate families. He concludes that this is a difficult issue.

Besides the issues with Islamic immigration, he opposes the EU and wants to leave it. He believes the EU is a dictatorship that tries to abolish the national identities by governing all European countries. The people of the respective countries would be better in governing their own countries. However, he is not opposed to being united with other European countries, he is just against the EU.

“The problem [...] the German people have is that they still suffer from the guilt, from Adolf Hitler. But I think, I think that now the same people suffer from a guilt of Angela Merkel. So, they need to wake up.”

PEGIDA will help to wake up the people and the government. He completely agrees with the 19-point programme of PEGIDA and believes that it is very similar to the EDL mission statement. However, he thinks that the needs of the PEGIDA chapters differ from country to country, because every country has different issues.

6.3 Ideological analysis

This section aims at explaining the ideology of PEGIDA, Wilders, and Robinson based on several speeches and positional papers by them.

6.3.1 PEGIDA

The frames in this section are based on the positional papers of PEGIDA (Epoch Times, 2015b; PEGIDA, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015d). These frames are:

- The perceived threat of Islam and Islamisation (any comment about Muslims, Islam, or terrorism);
- The perceived threat of refugees and immigration (any comment on the refugee crisis, it partly aligns with the first point, but focuses mainly about the laws);
- National safety (possible threats to national safety, police force, and military);
- ‘The other’ (comments about the government, media, left-wing people, and anyone else that they do not agree with);
- Foreign politics (National and European actions towards other countries);
- The EU;
- Germany (German culture, German people, current German situation);
- Political correctness;
- Call to action (anything aiming at convincing the public of the importance of PEGIDA).

When looking at the speeches, they mainly focus on the people who follow PEGIDA.

They tend to have a similar background and similar opinions as the PEGIDA leadership.

Therefore, their orientational frame consists of those PEGIDA followers described in sections 5.2.3 and 6.1. These sections also give an insight into their background, beliefs, and attitudes.

Although the name PEGIDA implies a focus on Islam, this frame does not appear as important in PEGIDA’s speeches as others. In the first few months, the PEGIDA leadership tried to explain that they are not against Islam and the integrated Muslims in Germany, but against the Islamisation of Germany (Bachmann, 2014, 2015c; PEGIDA, 2014): “PEGIDA is neither Islamophobic nor xenophobic or even racist.” They show this through “peaceful” protests against “any form of extremism,” or “religious fanaticism.” Oertel emphasises this by claiming that they are a “citizens’ movement” who want to show their opinions peacefully (Oertel, 2015). Through this, they try to create a positive image of PEGIDA. However, it also

implies that the elites misunderstand PEGIDA as xenophobic or even racist. The term “citizens’ movement” gives them a ground to exist: they are normal people who are worried about the development in Germany.

This note of the worried people who are sceptical towards Islam started changing after February 2015. Festerling claims that there is no such thing as harmless Islam (Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). Also, they claim that the terroristic attacks in Europe, even that by Breivik, are a reason for PEGIDA to exist, as they will ensure that this will not happen again (Bachmann, 2015c). In line with that, Oertel claims the “religious and fanatic Islam” declared war on Europe through the attacks in Paris (Oertel, 2015). For them, Islam is a “misogynistic, violent, political ideology” (PEGIDA, 2014) they have to defend themselves against; there is “no space for oppression of women, Christians, and Jews. Rape, honour killings and all the gory ways that Islam exports to the world” (Festerling in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). These terms create a negative image of Islam. They aim at showing what Islam represents and the possibility that by taking in more Muslims, Germany might adapt to that.

Besides their views on Islam, they demand stricter immigration rules and through that focus on the refugees. The most important point is that they want to change the laws in favour of a qualitative immigration system, following the Swiss, Canadian, Australian, or South African examples (Epoch Times, 2015b; Oertel, 2015; PEGIDA, 2014, 2015b; Bachmann in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). They demand a peripheral placement of war refugees and those politically or religiously persecuted, and a shortened processing time and immediate deportation of those who were not accepted (Bachmann, 2015d; PEGIDA, 2014). Besides that, they hope for a whole European distribution and the re-imposition of border controls (PEGIDA, 2014, 2015d). Moreover, they want criminal asylum seekers to be

deported immediately (PEGIDA, 2015a). They hope that through these and other points, the people of Germany will be less afraid of the issues at hand (Epoch Times, 2015b; PEGIDA, 2014). The leadership uses these demands to show the world that they do not only demand changes, but also offer solutions.

However, besides these nicely formulated concerns, the opinions towards immigration became more drastic over the last months. In May 2015, Bachmann claimed that they are against this uncontrolled mass immigration forced through “the paedophile party die Grünen and the fascist anti-German Linken” (Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). This is a direct criticism towards Die Grünen and Die Linke. The “paedophile party” refers to the sexual abuse scandals in the 80s and 90ies (Erdmann, 2015). Calling Die Linke “fascist” and “anti-German” implies that any action by them is against the best interest of the people. Worse, they introduce a fascist ideology to regular politics. Both statements imply that any action taken by either party cannot be taken seriously and is against the best interest of the people. This includes the refugee crisis.

In June 2015, Bachmann claimed that de Maizière’s comparison of the current refugees with the refugees after the Second World War is a denigration of the victims of the Second World War. He says that those coming from former German areas were culturally similar. Therefore they differ from those “*Glücksrittern*” [fortune-seekers] and economic refugees from mainly safe countries of origin, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Ex-Yugoslavia, and other Balkan countries (Bachmann, 2015d). With this statement Bachmann refers to the escape and displacement of the people in East Prussia at the end and right after the Second World War. The people were surrounded by the Red Army and saw no other way than to move to the sections of the Allies (Delvaux de Fenffe, 2016). This historical comparison aims at explaining to people what real suffering is and that the current refugees do not share this.

Moreover, some of the followers might have relatives, or, as one person mentioned in one of the interviews, had to flee as well. Through this they have a different understanding of the issues. They feel mistreated, because they feel that the current refugees are not in the same situation as they or their family were.

Festerling (2016) tops this by saying that the discussion about the pitchfork she brought to the stage is just a distraction of the real problem:

“*Umvolkung* of masses of unqualified, unwilling to integrate Young-Muslims and the with it coming destabilisation and finally destruction of German and Europe. Pitchforks are a sign of revolution! And we do not need anything else in Germany- It is high time for a revolution!”

“*Umvolkung*” is a term used by Himmler during the Second World War talking about the forced move of the Polish population out of their homes (Schmitt & Stickel, 1997), now used to talk about the mass relocation of refugees. Through this Festerling claims that the refugees coming to Germany will slowly but steady dislocate the Germans living there.

Therefore, they feel that the refugees pose a threat to national safety. Through bad internal and external politics the perceived threat for Germany from more crime, social focal areas, parallel societies, as well as global conflicts has increased (PEGIDA, 2015b).

Therefore, they believe that it is important to increase the budget for the police force (Epoch Times, 2015b; PEGIDA, 2014, 2015b). Since they believe the police to be important, they thank them before every protest. Through this, PEGIDA tries to create good faith with the police and aim at keeping the followers from hurting them. It also adds to the image that PEGIDA is peaceful.

Although they strongly support the police, they do not support the current political situation in Germany. This is part of their frame ‘the others’. They claim that the government does not listen to the people anymore (Bachmann, 2014; Oertel, 2015). Part of the problem appears to be the “defamation” of PEGIDA. However, they claim that this does not help as the voices are becoming louder. They have been treated like in DDR times (Bachmann, 2015f; Oertel, 2015), called the Pied Piper (Bachmann, 2014), mob, right-wing extremists (Bachmann, 2015f), or “Nazis in pinstripes” (Festerling in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). All of these are examples of what politicians have called PEGIDA.

The claim that PEGIDA are being treated like in the times of the DDR has particular importance. Due to the fact that the protests take place in Dresden it is relatively safe to assume that most followers have lived in the DDR. Because of what the DDR stood for, this statement implies that PEGIDA lives under suppression and a dictatorship. Bachmann (2015f) explains:

“The politicians insult us, defame us, and the most rotten tricks were used to make us all taciturn. We were threatened through ‘mob’, there were attacks on our vehicles and houses. We were dragged through the mire in worst possible way. But, we are still here.”

Through this, Bachmann creates the image that whatever the elites do, PEGIDA will remain.

Because of that, the PEGIDA leadership has a very negative image of the ruling parties. After Maas claimed that a lot is a result from the PEGIDA poison, Bachmann counters by calling him “one of the worst intellectual incendiaries in this country since a Goebbels in the Third Reich or Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler in the DDR.” (Bachmann, 2015e) This statement puts Maas on the same level as two people who actively influenced the

opinions of the people (Echternkamp, 2015; Machill, Beiler, & Gerstner, 2014). It also claims that the current government is as corruptive as the dictatorships of Nazi Germany or the DDR.

Festerling (2016) takes this further and claims that both Maas and Merkel use methods from 1933, she says: “Nazis nowadays are not brown anymore, but wear the colours of the governing parties”, implying that the current government is comparable to the Nazi dictatorship. In the same speech she claims that Merkel is the most dangerous woman in the world. She also compares Merkel to Caesar, again claiming that Merkel is a power-hungry dictator, who lost all her contact with the people. Bachmann has also called the SPD the Sharia party Germany (Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). Thus, he implies that the SPD actively tries to create Sharia in Germany by letting in refugees.

Besides all these comparisons, PEGIDA also have some demands towards the government. They claim that the behaviour of the government is an “inherited sickness” to “not understand the people or do not want to understand them.” Therefore, Oertel asks the government to “enact an immigration law and to introduce direct democracy. And now!” To claim that the government does not understand them or the people, implies that PEGIDA and the greater German population shares these opinions. Therefore, PEGIDA fight for the greater good of Germany (Oertel, 2015). This includes improving the freedom of speech, introducing direct democracy, transparency, and acting according to the rules (Bachmann, 2015d; Epoch Times, 2015b; Festerling, 2015, 2016; Oertel, 2015; PEGIDA, 2014, 2015b).

However, Bachmann claims that some politicians want to make it right again: “There are luckily more and more politicians who would like to do it again, look in the mirror”. This implies that they, differently from the media, can increase their chances again to re-gather support from the people through actions, or, like in this case, words. Although nothing has happened yet, statements and claims by the politicians, especially Seehofer, are becoming

louder. According to Bachmann, Seehofer's claim that "the situation is not approaching the point of no return; it has already passed it" introduces the end to "the politics of *IM* [unofficial collaborator] Erika" (Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). Through mentioning Merkel's name in the papers of the *Staatssicherheit* [Ministry of State Security of the DDR] he puts her into the context of the DDR (Röll, 2015). As mentioned earlier, many people at the demonstrations lived in the times of the DDR and probably some suffered at the hands of the *Staatssicherheit*. Therefore, this claim creates an unfavourable image of Merkel.

Besides the political elites, another enemy of PEGIDA is the press. They claim that the media do not present the facts in the right light. This does not only include the stories about the so-called "Wutbürger" but also the reports about the refugees (Bachmann, 2015e, 2015f). They claim that this has to do with the fact that they are influenced by the government and especially by Merkel. Anyone who criticises the press and the government is shut down, "Which is normal in banana republics" (Festerling, 2016). Through claiming that Merkel's and the press' actions are similar to banana republics, Festerling claims that Germany is a dictatorship. It also implies that Germany has lost control of its own country, and that foreign forces are stirring it now. It also compares Germany to a non-functioning country (McLean & McMillan, 2009). This creates the image that the elites drove Germany into a crisis and are not working on extracting it again. Next to Merkel and the government, they also claim that the SPD runs the press (Festerling in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015).

In the beginning this picture looked different. At the third protest Bachmann welcomed the press, although they had already reported negatively about him. He welcomes them because they are fighting for the same thing: freedom of speech. However, this would not be possible under Sharia. However, the press are increasingly showing who they really are (Bachmann, 2015c).

This was the first step to PEGIDA's current press relationship. One example of that is how the media reported on Paetzelt's study. According to Festerling they cited the study wrongly, and through that hoped for a self-fulfilling prophecy. Furthermore, by withholding information from the study they missed the chance of an open discussion (Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). Part of this self-fulfilling prophecy was the fact that the press tried to take away PEGIDA's "bravery", and therefore hope that PEGIDA disintegrate, by claiming that PEGIDA were going to have a summer break and end soon (Bachmann in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). Again, this implies that whatever 'the others' do, PEGIDA will not cease to exist, it makes them even stronger.

Besides the negative image of the press, PEGIDA also talks about the left-wing protesters. At the beginning, Oertel tried to make them realise that they were fighting for the same thing: an open-minded society (Oertel, 2015). However, again, the tone became rougher. They believe that the Antifa is not only supported by the family minister of the SPD, but also by the whole government (Bachmann, 2015e; Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015).

When children threw paper planes screaming "*Bomber Harris*" at PEGIDA during a protest, Festerling (2015) was very upset with the left. Arthur Harris was the leader on the bombings of Dresden to get the Nazis to surrender (Süß, 2005). Although the left implied through that that PEGIDA are Nazis, she compares the left with Nazis. Furthermore, she claims that they are destroying the German cultural heritage and are not smart in whom they follow (Festerling, 2015).

Foreign politics appear to be a minor point on PEGIDA's agenda. Their main goals are that they want peace with Russia and an end of any warmongering (Epoch Times, 2015b;

PEGIDA, 2015b). They also want Germany to stop sending weapons to the PKK, which was their initial reason to start PEGIDA (PEGIDA, 2014).

Next to foreign policies, they only mention political correctness occasionally. They claim that no one cares about what homosexuals and black people are called in books. While the government should be discussing the family laws or immigration laws, they are talking about “gay or lesbian traffic-light men or women.” Another “crazy” topic they mention is whether or not to call someone “Moor” instead of “*Maximal pigmentierter Kleinwüchsiger*” [maximum pigmented little man] in children’s books. Bachmann claims that “No one gives a damn.” Through these comparisons he first of all wants to explain the useless things the government does instead of focusing on the important things. Through over exaggerating political correctness by calling it a “*Maximal pigmentierter Kleinwüchsiger*”, he supports his claim of its uselessness (Bachmann in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015).

PEGIDA claim that there are real problems in the world that need to be addressed (Bachmann, 2014; Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). They also want to put an end to “*Genderisierung*” [the trend of gender neutralising the German language] (PEGIDA, 2014, 2015b).

According to PEGIDA the future of Germany is the more important topic: “We do this for our country, our culture, and the future of our children” (Bachmann, 2015f). This gives the followers a sense of reason, since they are not doing it only for themselves but for everyone involved, also their children and their future. Here they not only speak of the possible loss of German culture through Islamisation, but also claim that through Islamisation Christmas markets would have to be called winter markets, much like the Nazis attempted or in the DDR (Bachmann, 2014).

In addition, PEGIDA focus on the special history of Dresden. As many of the followers remember rebuilding their city after the Second World War, they know how important it is to ensure that something like this will never happen again (Festerling in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). Bachmann also demands a new family law. So that “our families are being relieved in such a way, that finally German families can think about family planning without economic fears. This is the most important goal. You are challenged here you smarty-pants in the parliaments.” He believes that a new and reformed family law will solve many issues. Through calling the government smarty-pants he challenges them in a childish way to think about these issues (Bachmann in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015).

To achieve all of this, PEGIDA leaders use many things to call for action and get their followers to return. It seems that their strongest argument is that they are here for Germany and to wake up the people. They also aim to be the turnaround and the “counterpoint of the deep division in Germany” (Bachmann & Festerling in: Bachmann, 2015f; Oertel, 2015; Bachmann & Festerling in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). They call their followers peaceful, liberal, democratic, open, honest, trusting, brave, and defiant (Festerling in: Bachmann, 2015f; Oertel, 2015; Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). Festerling’s call to action best describes PEGIDA’s reason to protest and to continue protesting:

“We are standing here because the government does not offer any solutions. We are standing here because the representative democracy is failing and is developing into a political party proportional representation machinery. We are standing here because we want to keep our Germany the way we know and love it. We are standing here because we do not want to be educated by

arrogant know-it-alls. We are standing here because we are opposing the foreign infiltration and extinction of our culture. And we are standing here because our homeland is dear to us. And we want to preserve it for our children and grandchildren. And we are standing here because we have a vision. Dresden is the centre of the Dresden Elbe Valley, in which proud old things are preserved and the future is being created. The friendly and likable people are acting responsibly and helpfully towards all those that have a positive relationship with our culture. German flags, our symbol for ‘*Einigkeit, Recht, und Freiheit*’ are flying in all open spaces” (Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015)

Festerling claims that while the government fails to offer solutions, they are developing into only representing a minority of the people. This aims at calling the government corrupt, but also at claiming that the PEGIDA followers are the majority of the people. This builds up her next argument: PEGIDA, the people of Germany, focus on saving the future of their country. They are smart enough to not believe the lies of the “know-it-alls” and therefore aim to protect the German culture. She puts emphasis on this goal by claiming that they do this for the “homeland” and “children and grandchildren”. Through this claim, the reasons appear more important. On top of that, she claims that anyone should treat those well who act positively towards the German culture. Through referring to the national anthem and the German flags, she claims that Dresden is still German, and not changed by foreigners.

PEGIDA also focus, at least they did in the beginning, on the fact that they are non-violent. In January 2015 Oertel claimed that they are “neither hostile towards Islam or against foreigners, or even racist” but that they are against “any form of elitism and religious fanaticism.” Their goal is to protest against this peacefully, through peaceful marches. This

theme is a comparison of the peaceful PEGIDA protest versus the dangerous “elitism and religious fanaticism.” It creates the image that these peaceful people fight against a stronger, more dangerous power. Furthermore, it works against all the people who believe that PEGIDA are a danger to Germany and to foreigners living in Germany. This theme was not repeated often over the last months (Oertel, 2015).

They also aim to explain that whatever ‘the others’ do, PEGIDA will just become stronger. (Bachmann & Festerling in: Bachmann, 2015f; Bachmann & Festerling in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). As they are becoming stronger they “ask all democratic and liberal people in Germany: come to Dresden! Dresden shows how to do it!” (Oertel, 2015) because “we came to stay and we stay to win and we will win!” (Bachmann, 2015f). This aims to give the followers the feeling that PEGIDA mainly consist of democratic and liberal people. It also aims to get those “democratic and liberal people” to join PEGIDA. Finally, it is a call to action not to be influenced by the media and the government and to continue attending PEGIDA protests.

Festerling’s (2016) only solution to all of this is a revolution. According to her this revolution starts on the election days in March 2016. She compares the PEGIDA revolution with historical revolutions. This aims at giving it more support and showing the people the importance of their actions. Her reasons for the revolution are that the “confident Germans, those without repentance, are completely done with not being asked.” Instead they are getting the “*Mutti* [mummy] politics”. They are hitting the streets because they have no opposition in the government. They are hitting the streets, because nobody cares about Merkel’s wrongdoings. Instead, they are getting an “illegal and uncontrolled flood of migrants from Islamic countries.” These points aim at a call for revolution or at least to action. To vote against the government and to hit the streets until something has changed. “The ONLY opposition in

Germany is the street! That is us, PEGIDA, and that is the AfD”, which is the reason the elites are fighting them.

Although they mentioned the topics of Europe and religious fanaticism in their positional papers, these frames do not return in their speeches.

Based on these speeches, the ideology of PEGIDA seems to be that Islam and the refugees actively influence the German culture and that the elites are not doing anything to stop it. Therefore, the interpretive frame is the perceived injustice experienced through the government and journalists. Both are perceived to be guilty of defaming PEGIDA and their followers. While the media just lie about PEGIDA and their followers, the government is actively trying to destroy Germany. They claim that, although this aims at destroying PEGIDA, it only made them stronger. Moreover, many of the frames aim at explaining the legitimacy of PEGIDA. Thus, joining PEGIDA seems to be a reasonable response to all the perceived issues in Germany.

6.3.2 Geert Wilders

Most of the texts employed here aim towards the government of the Netherlands. This means that the target audience of these speeches are Dutch politicians opposing Wilder’s opinions and thoughts. Therefore, the orientational frame of these speeches is people who do not believe in his opinions, but who have to be convinced of the urgency of this matter.

Furthermore, they can act on his requests and are the people who according to him created the issues he refers to. The target audience for his movie Fitna are all the people who fear Islam.

Through this movie he aims at letting people see “the true nature of Islam”(Pimperl & Wilders, 2008). At the PEGIDA protest the target audience are the followers mentioned earlier.

The frames are: Islam and Islamisation, refugees, national safety (ensure that there will not be any attack on the Netherlands), ‘the others’ (in this case the acting political parties), Dutch culture and people, and Europe. During the PEGIDA speech, the master frame of political correctness was added.

His first frame is Islam and the Islamisation of the Netherlands. His main point here is that mass immigration threatens the Netherlands and will lead to a terrorist attack. He has been warning about this since 2001 (Wilders, 2005, 2015b, 2015c). This implies that Islam equals terror. He legitimises this claim by basing it on the writings of the Quran and that Mohammed was a warlord (Pimperl & Wilders, 2008; Wilders, 2014). This Holy Book, claims that every Muslim needs to fight until everyone is Muslim and those that are not Muslim have to be killed. In addition, he says that honour killings, stoning, loss of liberalism, loss of democracy, and non-acceptance of homosexuality will soon be the reality for the Netherlands (Pimperl & Wilders, 2008). This creates a generally negative image of Islam. It implies that all Muslims follow the Quran completely and therefore all Muslims will do the above mentioned things.

Through this idea of Islam, he claims that the Netherlands are suffering from an “Islamic mass immigration”, or “Islamic invasion” due to the open borders. Through this he creates the image that the people immigrating and ‘invading’ the Netherlands are not human, rather animals or warlords. He believes that two of each 100 Syrian refugees coming to Europe are terrorists. Therefore he believes that Prime Minister Rutte imports terrorists to the Netherlands (Wilders, 2015a, 2015b). This directly criticises Rutte and his politics. It aims at showing that Rutte is not good for the future of the Netherlands, and actively tries to destroy it.

As he believes that the “Islamic invasion” creates more threats for the Netherlands, he is asking for stronger asylum laws. This includes locking up possible terrorists and letting those leave to Syria who want to, but then they cannot return (Partij Voor De Vrijheid, 2014; Wilders, 2015b, 2015c). He claims that he wants to respect Islam, but that they do not respect the West and people who do not have the same belief as they (Pimperl & Wilders, 2008). Because of this claim, Wilders introduces reasoning for not respecting Islam.

To support his point he tends to use strong language such as calling the Muslims at the Hungarian border “Allah Akbar screaming scum who injure the Hungarian agents with bottles, sticks and clubs” (Wilders, 2015b). On top of that, he claims that “Islam wants to rule, submit, and seeks to destroy our Western civilization” (Pimperl & Wilders, 2008). These statements legitimise his claim that one does not have to respect Islam, because they are “scum” and because they want to “destroy our Western civilization”.

He wonders why these people do not remain in their own cultural areas and have to come all the way to Europe. He does not understand why Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, do not help. Instead, a city with 140 inhabitants has to take more asylum seekers than Saudi Arabia. As Saudi Arabia has more money, and because of its proximity to Syria, it seems to be the perfect option for him (Wilders, 2015a, 2015b): “It is their region, their people, they share the same beliefs, the same culture, let them get the people in” (Wilders, 2015a). In his view, this comparison between the little Dutch town and the rich Saudi Arabia establishes a logical conclusion: Saudi Arabia is rich and culturally similar. He therefore asks why the Netherlands have to help.

In comparison to these views, the opinions at the PEGIDA protest seem less harsh. His first comment about Islam at the PEGIDA protest is: “And we don’t hate anyone. We fight for our freedom and therefore have a big problem with the totalitarian Islam, but we do not hate

Muslims.” They only fight against the Islamic countries in which “non-Muslims, Christians, Jews, women, homosexuals and apostates are perceived as inferior, humiliated, prosecuted, or even killed” (Wilders, 2015d). While Wilders claims that they do not mind Muslims, they fight totalitarianism and certain values that some Muslims hold. Through this, he aims to make PEGIDA’s and the PVV’s fight sound logical; because who wants to have any of the issues mentioned above in their own country?

Although this seems reasonable at first, he claims that Merkel is wrong, because Islam does not belong to Germany: “We are not Islamic countries.” He uses several studies to support this argument and claims that they are scared because they have read the Quran. In addition, he claims that 73% of the Dutch Muslims say that they support those fighting in Syria. This led to many people who grew up in the Netherlands or Germany leaving their respective countries to fight in Syria. Here again he demands that those that want to leave can leave, but should not be allowed to return. Finally, he claims that “Europe has been subjected by burkas, honour killings, female genital mutilation, polygamy, and the killings of apostates” (Wilders, 2015d). These statements aim to scare the people and make them understand why they are here. However, they oppose the above statements about them not hating Muslims. They create the image that the majority of Muslims in Germany, the Netherlands, and Europe are bad and have to be fought off.

Besides his views on Islam and Islamisation, Wilders focuses on the current refugee crisis in his speeches outside PEGIDA. He calls the current crisis an “asylum tsunami”, making it sound like a natural disaster that they need to protect themselves from, a disaster that could destroy everything (Wilders, 2015a, 2015b). He wonders how the Netherlands are going to pay for this, as the government is already spending too much money on refugees. He believes that the refugees get too much for free and therefore the Netherlands are

encountering an “invasion of fortune-seekers” (Wilders, 2015b). He supports that argument by claiming that most refugees are strong men (Wilders, 2015a). By arguing that most of the refugees are so-called “fortune-seekers”, he generates the idea that refugees are not really in need of help. Worse, they have just come to Europe to abuse the European system for their own gains.

A solution in his view is to close the borders and to send them back (Wilders, 2005, 2015a). Because “opening the borders is as stupid as leaving the door open in The Hague’s *Schilderswijk* [a bad neighbourhood in The Hague].” This comparison implies that most refugees are thieves. Part of his reasoning is that many people come without papers and that because of that the authorities do not know whom they are letting in (Wilders, 2015c). He worries that if it is going to continue like this, the whole of the Netherlands will become one asylum-seeker home. This implies that the Netherlands are losing their national identity and will become more and more Islamised; a country where the Dutch have to work to feed the “asylum seekers and jihadists”. Only the rich will be spared from this “fast river” overrunning the country. Through that he implies that the politicians who probably live in the rich areas do not have to suffer from this (Wilders, 2015b). In the end, he claims, all of this will lead to more crime (Wilders, 2015b).

This sounded similar at the PEGIDA protest. He claims that there was a 44% increase of asylum seekers last year (2014) and that the number is going to increase much more in 2015. Again, he says that these people should stay in safe areas in their own zones. Those who accept the European laws and culture can stay and should be treated as equals, but those who entered illegally, do not accept the laws and instead want Sharia, should leave (Wilders, 2015d). Again, this argument aims to legitimise the reason for groups like PEGIDA to exist.

Through claiming that they have no problems with those who accept German norms and values, he creates a peaceful image of PEGIDA.

All of these perceived threats lead Wilders to underline the importance of national safety in his speeches in the Dutch parliament. He claims that “we”, the Dutch politicians, have to make the Netherlands safe again, as the politicians have been elected to protect the people from any threat such as a terror attack (Wilders, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Through saying that they have been assigned to do that, and by using the word “again”, Wilders implies that the current government fails at their elected responsibilities which should be a priority (Wilders, 2014). He wants everyone to be safe when travelling and for women to be safe when walking on the street (Wilders, 2015b). This implies that this is currently not possible, because people from other cultures increase the possibility of an attack or might rape women, like in Germany at New Year’s Eve.

He believes that these simple things are not possible anymore because the open borders threaten the safety of the Netherlands (Wilders, 2015a, 2015b). He claims that the reasons for that are that the safety organisations failed and that no one does anything in the 1400-year old war with Jihad (Wilders, 2015c). Claiming that the war with Jihad is already 1400 years old increases the insult of the government’s failure. No one did anything so far, failing to stop a risk and even increasing it. Because of that he says that the possibility of a terrorist attack is “not a question of ‘if’, but a question of ‘when’” (Wilders, 2015b). He hereby claims that a terrorist attack cannot be avoided. He therefore aims at showing them that they are failing to assess the risks for the Netherlands. If a terrorist attack is going to happen, why is the government not doing anything to stop it? His solutions to these issues are more money for the police, closing the borders and internal use of the military (Wilders, 2005, 2014, 2015b, 2015c).

He also addresses these issues at the PEGIDA protest. He does not want them to be scared, but to do something. He claims that fighting ISIS abroad is not the most important thing, instead they have to fight for their national safety: To protect “our home”, “our freedoms, our own people, our own children”. He claims that every citizen is responsible for this. Therefore, they have to continue warning about Islamisation. “Not all Muslims are terrorists, but most terrorist are Muslim”. Through this call for action he not only implies that bringing more Muslims to Europe will endanger national safety, but also that people have to continue coming to PEGIDA. PEGIDA are therefore a measure to maintain national safety. He continues this argument by speaking about the attacks in Kenya, Paris and Copenhagen, and that they have to keep that from happening in Germany or in the Netherlands (Wilders, 2015d).

He does not only blame Islam, but also ‘the others’, in this case the Dutch government, for letting this happen. In 2005 he claimed that the politicians did not wake up after Theo van Gogh was killed or after the 9/11 attacks. Instead they are “drinking tea as means against terror” (Wilders, 2005). Through this, he implies that the government is lazy and does not want to work on finding a solution. And if the political parties claim that the attacks of ISIS have nothing to do with Islam, they are wrong (Wilders, 2014).

Besides this, he claims that there is a huge divide between the needs of the Dutch people and the things the government does. He claims that Dutch taxes are the biggest export in means of development help. Instead of spending money on this and refugees, they should start thinking about their own people again. Because of this, the Dutch politicians are committing “national suicide”, leading to a greater support for the PVV (Wilders, 2015b). This implies that by helping others, the Netherlands fail to support their own people. Because of that the Dutch people do not support this government anymore.

The perceived failures of the government also played an important role in his PEGIDA speech. He claims that most politicians, the media, church, and researchers close their eyes from the danger of Islamisation because they are scared. However, he says that “we” are different than Saudi Arabia or Iran, because “we” can get together and protest. They do not want the scared politicians anymore that do nothing and even lie that the terrors in the world have nothing to do with Islam. This needs brave people, “people like you!” He claims that there are many “brave patriots” in the West. Because of that, he is optimistic. Despite the politicians not doing their job, Europe has “brave patriots” who take an example from Israel, to fight against the “Islamic darkness”. Through this, he gives the people a feeling that although the government does not protect them, they are not alone in their fight (Wilders, 2015d).

He claims that through the failures of the Dutch government they forgot about the Dutch culture and people. He wants this to change and to put the Netherlands first again. This means that Dutch people can also get something out of the taxes they pay. While all the refugees get things for free, the Dutch have to wait for a new apartment, have bad health services, have little support for the elderly, and pay more taxes (Wilders, 2015b). Therefore, the “invasion threatens the welfare system, culture, and identity” of the Dutch people and they start seeing these problems. This aims at showing how unfair the Dutch people are being treated compared to the refugees. While the Dutch pay the taxes, they do not get anything back and those who do not support the economy get everything (Wilders, 2015a).

Because of Islamisation and the issues mentioned before, he claims that the “culture and future of our country and children is in jeopardy.” He believes that all of this will lead to a new country; “*Hollandistan*”, while the elites welcome the invasion “with little flags and teddy bears. Cheering how our people are being exchanged.” This behaviour will lead to an

Islamic state under Sharia and the Quran. Because of this, it seems that he wants to convince the government to stop this behaviour immediately and with it stop the immigration (Wilders, 2015b). This aims at showing the importance of acting now. His solution is to improve the Dutch economy and to introduce stricter asylum laws (Wilders, 2005).

These issues also return in his PEGIDA speech. Here however, he focuses more on maintaining the “Christian-Jewish” society. He claims that there is nothing wrong with wanting Germany to remain free and democratic. He says that “our” culture is the best and that immigrants have to adjust to it. However, PEGIDA do not want discrimination or hatred, but they aim at bringing the change again, just as they did 26 years ago. While the European countries adjust to Islam, there is no effort in the Muslim countries to facilitate Christianity (Wilders, 2015d). Therefore, he asks:

“If you love Germany, then raise the alarm. If you love your husband or wife, then raise the alarm. If you love your children, then raise the alarm. Warn your neighbours, your colleagues, warn your friends of the danger of Islamisation, a danger for your country, your freedom, your children.”

(Wilders, 2015d)

This is an emotional appeal to the people. Anyone should love their country, spouse, or children. Therefore, anyone at this protest should sound the alarm of a coming Islamisation. If they would not, they would put their loved ones at risk. This risk is about “your country, your freedom, your children.” (Wilders, 2015d)

As a part of retaining the Dutch national identity, he wants to leave Schengen and the EU (Wilders, 2015b, 2015d). Because of the EU, countries are losing the importance of their national needs and sovereignty (Wilders, 2005). The EU has failed and therefore the

Netherlands need to leave it soon. To maintain the “unique and beautiful character” of this country “the only country we have”, the Netherlands have to ensure that they do not take care of the needs of the EU, refugees, and Islam anymore, but go back to “only one need, the needs of the Netherlands.” By pointing out the beauty of the Netherlands, it seems that he wants to make it clear to the government that if it does not comply with his demands, this country will cease to exist (Wilders, 2015b).

As part of the PEGIDA protest, he compliments the protesters in Dresden. He claims that they show the world what the problem is and continue, despite facing much resistance, which makes them heroes (Wilders, 2015d).

He does not mention political correctness in any of his speeches except in his PEGIDA speech, where he says that he does not want political correctness (Wilders, 2015d).

Based on the above statements, Wilders ideology is anti-Islamic. Therefore, the danger of Islam is the interpretive frame that unites it all. In the Dutch parliament this perspective is also met with the unfairness towards the own people compared to the refugees.

6.3.3 Tommy Robinson

Each of the selected speeches have a different target audience and therefore also different orientational frames. The speeches in Leeds, Peterborough, and Birmingham focus on the people who follow the EDL. Therefore, the orientational frame is similar between Robinson and the followers. The PEGIDA speeches are aimed at the PEGIDA followers; as mentioned earlier their beliefs and opinions can be found in Section 6.1. Finally, the other speeches are targeted at people who do not share his beliefs. Therefore, they aim at convincing these people about him and his ideas. The frames differ in some ways from PEGIDA and Wilders.

They focus on Islam, national safety, his personal life, UK culture, Europe, ‘the others’, Jews, and history.

When it comes to Islam, Robinson mainly speaks about all the negative things that happened in his town and towns like his because of Muslims. His main argument tends to focus on rape and grooming. He says that not only does it happen frequently, but according to the Quran it is also legal (Robinson in: McGlynn, 2013; Robinson, 2013). He says that he has the right to talk about it, because he is living it (Robinson, 2010, 2015d). Other things he mentions are Muslims recruiting people on the streets, even children (Robinson, 2012, 2015d), and that it is accepted for Muslims to kill people who do not believe in Allah (Robinson, 2013). He says that he can make these claims because he has read the Quran and he wants everyone to read it, so that they understand what they are dealing with. He claims, based on the Quran, that Mohammad killed several people and introduced rape, murder, and genocide (Robinson, 2013). These statements create a generally negative image of Islam. By saying that he has read the Quran and lived with Islam, he implies that those who have not experienced what he has been through cannot voice an opinion.

Although he strongly criticises Islam and its Holy Book, he also wants a dialogue. He says that not all Muslims are bad, and claims “Muslims: no problem; extremist Muslims: big problem” (Robinson in: McGlynn, 2013; Robinson, 2015d). This aims at showing that he and the EDL are not racist, but open for discussion. It also creates an image that they have been misunderstood, because they do not only have negative images of Islam. Moreover, he wonders why Muslims tend to not integrate as well into British society as other religious groups (Robinson, 2013). This supports his argument that the EDL are not xenophobic, but only have issues with radical Islam.

Although he says these things, he also tends to use negative terms in relation to Muslims. He calls Islam a disease and mentions Churchill's quote: "Islam in a man is as rabies in a dog" (as cited in: Robinson, 2010). He believes that Islam wants to destroy the UK and will never be a religion of peace (Robinson, 2010). Finally, he believes that "Islam is a fascist backward ideology. It's not a religion of peace" (Robinson, 2012). All of this creates a generally negative image of Islam. He perceives Muslims as harmful and believes that they want to destroy the UK and create disorder.

In relation to this negative image of Islam, he also mentions the perceived threat to the UK. Here he speaks of terror cells and their actions regarding terrorism. He claims that Luton is the base for many terrorist cells (Robinson, 2012, 2015d). He also thinks that Muslims created a segregation between religious lines in Luton and claims that Muslims actively try to influence British society through creating a Sharia society in Luton as well as wanting to make it illegal to insult Allah (Robinson, 2010, 2013, 2015d). Although Islam rules in fear, he claims that he is not scared (Robinson, 2010). All the things mentioned above aim to explain why the EDL exist. He creates this horrific image of Islam and its influences on British culture. This also creates the feeling that Islam is a threat.

Although he perceives there to be many issues, he claims that only the Muslims can solve them (Robinson in: McGlynn, 2013; Robinson, 2010, 2015d). Moreover, he believes that there should be no new mosques, as they only add to the problem. In recent years the numbers of Mosques has increased so drastically that it is enough (Robinson in: McGlynn, 2013; Robinson, 2015d).

Besides the perceived issues with Islam in the UK, Robinson also mentions these in his PEGIDA speeches. In his speech at the PEGIDA one-year anniversary, he claims that "Europe is at a Crossroads - the like of which we have never seen since the time of the

Crusades.” He bases using the Crusades as an example on the fact that the two World Wars were internal, while the Crusades were external. However, because they were united, the people of Europe were able to defend themselves, leading to the creation of a functioning culture that is not based on Islam. This “Civilisation” is “the envy of the World.” Through this historical connection he implies that Europeans have to save what their forefathers saved and built: the Western civilisation. Therefore, the people need to get together once again to fight off Islam. He claims that the Muslims are ready to attack Europe and create more “chaos, violence, and destruction” as well as more rape. Therefore the refugee crisis is a threat, because it is not controlled (Robinson, 2015b, 2015c).

He bases this belief on the idea that every Muslim is a “Sharia-pusher” and therefore aims at creating a global Sharia society. Therefore, this uncontrolled immigration will eventually lead to a Sharia or a Marxist state. Through this, he claims that there are other, underlying reasons for this “invasion”. To stop this, he wants border controls, since “a country that cannot control its borders will soon not be a country!” All of this implies that the current refugee crisis will lead to the loss of European countries as they were before (Robinson, 2015c). This will destroy Europe. Therefore, PEGIDA are against “Sharia-pushers, the murdering jihadists and the Islamification of all of our countries. We want a Europe free from fear.” Besides that, he also believes that “thousands of jihadists” are preparing a terrorist attack, because “Islam is never asleep to the possibility of terror” (Robinson, 2015b). Through this he connects an increase with Muslim refugees to a decrease of European safety.

Although he has these strong ideas about Islam he says: “We are not xenophobes, or afraid of foreigners, but every country has the right to make decisions based on principles that preserve the country’s integrity, stability and prosperity”. Through this claim he gives

PEGIDA and all the other movements legitimacy and fights those critics who claim that PEGIDA are racist (Robinson, 2015c). Robinson claims that he is not racist, because Islam is not a race (Robinson, 2009, 2015c, 2015d). This argument gives PEGIDA and himself legitimacy and acts against those who call them racist.

These issues with Islam return in his other speeches and lead him to problems with the national safety of Britain. He appears to be a strong supporter of the military. He explains this by saying that they defend this country against the Islamic ideology. Unfortunately for them, when they get back, they see it everywhere (Robinson, 2013). This appears to be a call for action. While the military fight, their own countrymen do not do anything against the local spread of Islam; hence the military are returning to something they are fighting against. Because the military fought and because of their bravery, they need to be respected (Robinson in: McGlynn, 2013; Robinson, 2015d). However, Islam does not respect them, which is one reason for the EDL to exist (Robinson, 2012, 2015d). The frame of national safety does not play a role for him at the PEGIDA protest.

Besides the national safety, his personal safety and personal life appear to be an important issue in his speeches. One thing he has always put an emphasis on, is that he does not welcome Nazis, even stronger, they are the enemy (Robinson in: McGlynn, 2013; Robinson, 2012, 2013, 2015d). This aims to show that Robinson is in no way affiliated with Nazis. However, he feels that he has been demonised, through his role in the EDL and through the national perceptions of the EDL. They want to fight for equal rights and for England, but many treat them unfairly (Robinson, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015d). This creates the image that the EDL are being mistreated although they only want the best for England. However, the fact that they are still fighting shows who the real patriots are (Robinson, 2015d).

“This is what we stand for: We stand for England, we stand for Winston Churchill, we stand for everything that is right in this country, we are demonised, we are demonised by the national media as scum. People that see through that demonization. We are the true voice of England, we are the patriots” (Robinson, 2010).

This statement implies that those people that criticise them do not care about the future of England and do not understand that the EDL represents the people. (Robinson, 2010). During the PEGIDA speeches, he only mentions the EDL once as an important force that speaks out on the issues in Europe (Robinson, 2015c).

These issues are a threat to the culture of the UK. He fights this fight to ensure that future generations are safe, for their children, nation, and freedom of speech. Besides that, he believes that everyone has to stand up to do the same (Robinson, 2010, 2013). Therefore, he claims, it is the duty of every member of the British public to protect the future “for our children, for our nation”. Through this, he takes away the importance of the protest itself, but increases the importance for doing something “against the forces of evil”(Robinson, 2010).

Part of this is that children should be allowed to be proud of Britain (Robinson, 2015a, 2015d). He explains that being English does not mean that one has to be white. If one is born in Britain and proud of it, one is British. Therefore the Sikhs and Hindus are as English as any EDL member (Robinson, 2010). Through this he again shows the world that the EDL is not racist or xenophobic, but that it only fights against the negative sides of Islam. However, he also understands that this is not only a British issue, but also a Europe-wide one. He believes that Islam installs fear and intimidation across Europe. He thinks that Wilders is a courageous man for speaking up (Robinson, 2012).

Not only is Wilders courageous in Robinson's eyes, but also PEGIDA. For him they play a great part in "the salvation of Europe", which implies that Europe needs saving. Currently he sees "a beautiful city. A city built from ruins only 70 years ago." Most people in Dresden put a lot of effort into the rebuilding process. Through this claim he tries to connect with them. On top of that, the word "only" faintly implies that this might happen again. Besides Dresden, he also compliments the people on their strength, "economy, culture and democracy"(Robinson, 2015c). According to him, the threat Europe is facing is as big as the one from the Crusades, and every country needs to defend itself. To do that, the countries need to work together as one movement for Europe, to save Europe (Robinson, 2015b, 2015c).

However, there is no free speech in Europe, which is why movements like this are important. Therefore, "from within our own resources we call forth a European Union of 'We the People'". "We need but one banner: save our culture, save our country, save our future. Unite to save a future for our children." This is a strong call for action. It does not only imply that PEGIDA will save the culture, Germany, and the future, but it also creates hope for unity between all the movements in Europe. This is the first step to the Europe-wide PEGIDA protests (Robinson, 2015b, 2015c).

His goal is not only the salvation of other European countries, but also of Britain and with it against 'the others'. 'The others' in this case are the police, media, and government. Especially the police seem to be the enemy in many cases. He perceives that there is a "two-tiered system" at hand where people who speak up against the supposedly obvious problems with the Muslim population are prosecuted, while the Muslims who did committed crimes can leave (McGlynn, 2013; Robinson, 2012, 2015d). This implies that the police let the Muslims do whatever they want, while the followers of the EDL and Robinson are being victimised.

However, this sounded different in the beginning when Robinson still hoped that he could win the police over. As they see “the true face of Islam”, they should be on the side of the EDL (Robinson, 2010). He believes that the police do not act against Muslims, because they are scared of being called racist (Robinson in: McGlynn, 2013; Robinson, 2012, 2015d), thus claiming that Islam has the upper hand over the police. However, this makes the people turn against the police and towards the EDL (Robinson, 2015d). He also claims that the police tend to threaten people in the worst ways (Robinson, 2012).

Besides the police, he also tends to talk about the government. In his Peterborough speech he says that the EDL are not the people of the government, but of the Queen (Robinson, 2010). This aligns with his criticism towards the actions of the government and his lost hope in them. He says that the government needs to realise that the EDL support the British poppy. Through that he implies that what they do, they do for England. Moreover, he claims that the government failed in supporting those girls who were victims of grooming gangs (Robinson, 2013).

Besides the government, he also has a negative image of left-wing supporters. He believes that those that protest against the EDL want to destroy the country. He calls the people who defaced the statue of Winston Churchill “Communist scum” (Robinson, 2010).

During his speech at PEGIDA ‘the others’ comprise the government, the “Muslims, Leftists, and the State.” He claims that Merkel gives out “the birth-right of German citizens like she is handing out candy to children.” Merkel’s actions are irresponsible and she gives something away that is not hers to give away. Because the politicians are responsible for the perceived mess they are in, he does not want to rely on them anymore. In addition, he claims that they, the right-wing movements, are being silenced (Robinson, 2015c).

However, he believes that it is not only they who are treated unfairly. He claims that the Jews also suffer from the Muslims, as they are threatened by them. He actively supports Israel (Robinson, 2012, 2015c, 2015d).

Finally, he also speaks about history. He claims that if the same attitude would have persisted in 1933, England would speak German today. He says that Churchill was a patriot and prophet and symbolised the English culture (Robinson, 2010). During his PEGIDA speech he said that the Germans need to stop feeling guilty: “Germany is not obliged to solve the refugee crisis!” (Robinson, 2015c).

Based on this, Robinson’s ideology can also be seen as anti-Islamic. He frames this ideology by talking about the dangers of Islam and Islamisation, as well as the fact that those who fight against it are perceived as the evil ones. Nonetheless, he frames this according to his own experiences.

7 Discussion

This section analyses the results based on the theoretical framework and the background chapters. Through this, this chapter aims to answer the research question: *Who are PEGIDA?* and the sub-questions: *What are the reasons for people to join PEGIDA?; What are PEGIDA's identity and norms?; What is the ideology of PEGIDA and how is it comparable with other movements in Europe?; What roles do other European right-wing movements play in the success of PEGIDA?*

7.1 Reasons to join PEGIDA

To understand PEGIDA, one must understand their followers and their reasons to protest. This section focuses on them and aims to answer the sub-question: *What are the reasons for people to join PEGIDA?* Similar to the studies by Daphi et al. (2015); Geiges et al. (2015); Paetzelt et al. (2015); and Paetzelt and Eichardt (2015) most of the respondents are male and middle aged. Nonetheless, this age differed on the first field trip, as a group of young friends was interviewed. Most of the respondents are from Dresden, however, some also come from other places in Germany. One of the respondents, who originated from Dresden, travelled from Thailand to attend the protest (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September 21, 2015).

The main reason for these people to join PEGIDA is the dissatisfaction with the current situation. People feel especially ignored because of the European Debt Crisis and the increase of refugees. According to Häusler and Roeser (2015), this dissatisfaction can lead to people looking for solutions elsewhere, for example at a PEGIDA protest. The fact that two of the respondents voted for Die Linke and many for the AfD in past elections supports this argument of political dissatisfaction (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September

21, 2015). I therefore propose that these people can be described as protest voters, since they join PEGIDA as a response to their political dissatisfaction and because they voted for Die Linke and AfD (Billiet & De Witte, 1995).

Especially national issues appear to be of great importance. People feel that the government forgets about them. Berlet and Lyons (2000) argue that people who suffer from economic challenges are more likely to join similar movements. In Germany, elderly people are becoming poorer and poorer (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). Since most of the followers belong to that age category, it seems logical that they feel a stronger need to join PEGIDA. Some of the respondents support this argument by claiming that the asylum seekers get everything, while they, who worked their whole lives, get nothing (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September 21, 2015).

This feeling of inequality also tends to influence their opinion of the government. They tend to feel that the government undermines their safety and freedom. The refugee crisis, and with it the asylum laws, play a role here. Although many of the followers claim that they want to help those in need, they also fear that the refugees abuse the German system. In addition, they believe that there are too many refugees. Although they lost followers in the summer of 2015, the refugee crisis led to more support from new and returning members after the summer (Durchgezählt, 2016). The fact that there were many new people on the third field trip supports this observation. This indicates that people felt more dissatisfied because of the refugee crisis, and therefore felt they needed to join PEGIDA to address their concerns (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September 21, 2015).

Another point of interest for the people is the EU. Many perceive the EU as a “dictatorship”, hindering German development. Nonetheless, they believe that the idea of the EU was good. Only the implementation failed, because it ignored the people. This is in line

with Best and Christiansen (2014) and Jensen (2010) who claim that European integration could lead to people feeling that the elites ignore their national interest. According to Van Der Brug et al. (2000) this feeling only plays a small part in the decision to join a right-wing movement. My results support this argument; although the followers hold a generally negative image of the EU, they only talked about it when asked. This indicates that the EU is not one of their main concerns. Nonetheless, most of them have issues with the social part of the EU, which is in line with Häusler (2012a) who claims that the social part of the EU is the main reason for people to be against it (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September 21, 2015).

The reasons for people to attend PEGIDA Nederland were similar to those in Dresden. However, as the Netherlands have a functioning right-wing populist party, the PVV, this influenced the protest. It led to a different public who seemed to consist of only the most dissatisfied and the most radical people. Therefore, it was difficult to find people who did not look intimidating. Furthermore, many of the respondents use arguments similar to Wilders; an example can be the feeling that open borders feel like leaving the door open at night (personal communication, November 8, 2015).

7.2 PEGIDA's identity and norms

One reason for the different atmosphere can be the background of the people in Dresden and their identity. One can assume that because most of the people are around 40 and 50 years old, they lived during the DDR (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September 21, 2015). Because Dresden is still relatively uninfluenced by the West and the West-German multiculturalism, people still have a strong positive attachment to their hometown (Geiges et al., 2015). This strong attachment and the fear of losing their national identity make them

more likely to join. The refugee crisis creates the feeling that their national identity is under threat. In order to maintain their identity they feel the need to stop this process (Banchoff, 1999). This and their strong negative ideas about the actions of the politicians make them more likely to join this kind of movement. Therefore, they can be defined as *‘Wutbürger’* (Kehl et al., 2011; Kühne, 2010).

Aside from the identity of the followers, the leadership and some of the interviewed followers show certain parts of nationalism. Through implying that their beautiful country will be negatively influenced by the new cultural input, they assume that the German culture is better than that of the newcomers (Bachmann, 2015c, 2015d; Blank & Schmidt, 2003; Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015).

Both the leadership and the followers disagree with the so-called “dictatorship” of the EU. This is because they feel that the EU challenges the national identity and has a too strong influence on Germany (Fennema & Meindert, 2003; Häusler, 2012a; Mudde, 2013). These feelings make them more likely to join a movement such as PEGIDA. People with a strong national identity are generally more likely to be against the EU (Ansari & Hafez, 2012; McLaren, 2002).

Nonetheless, PEGIDA chose to call themselves “patriotic Europeans” which implies a certain affinity with the European culture. Wagensveld and Robinson claim that the issues PEGIDA approach are part of Europe-wide problems with the politics and the refugees (personal communication with Wagensveld, November 8, 2015; Robinson, 2012; 2015b; 2015c). The fact that most followers feel European supports this argument (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September 21, 2015). It seems that their dislike of the EU does not influence their feeling of belonging to Europe. It implies that most European countries face similar issues and need to work together in order to eliminate them.

PEGIDA also challenge the German norms regarding the refugee crisis. Although there is no direct research on these norms, it appears logical that Merkel can influence them through her position (Checkel, 1999a). Through her general positive attitude towards the refugees (Merkel, 2015) she created positive norms in Germany. When someone challenges these ideas, such as PEGIDA, she tends to openly shame them, like in her New Year's Eve speech in which she asked no one to join PEGIDA "because often they have prejudice, coldness, yes, even hatred in their hearts" (Merkel, 2014). Through this she aims to influence what is right and wrong; supporting and helping refugees is right, being against uncontrolled immigration is wrong.

PEGIDA seem to feel that Islam is not a cultural match for Germany and therefore aim to change these norms through social mobilisation (Checkel, 1999a). They have the best conditions for that, similar backgrounds and they meet every Monday. Through repeating the negative sides of refugees and especially Muslim refugees they aim to challenge the norms on this topic, which seems to attract many followers. The strong identity of the people and the fact that Merkel acts against this identity, create a basis for people to feel that they need to act against Merkel. Therefore Merkel has lost the support of these people (Banchoff, 1999).

This can also lead to an increase in nationalism and ethnocentrism. Some people, such as the left politician Petra Pau, claim that the number of right-wing extreme actions in Germany has increased (Kämper, 2016; Pau, 2015). Although there is no direct correlation between the one and the other, it can be an indication that groups like PEGIDA are able to influence the norms of the German population in ways they probably did not aim for. However, this research cannot confirm that claim, as it does not include many interviews with possible right-wing extremists, due to the reasons mentioned in Section 3.1.4.

Besides their norms, it is important to understand where PEGIDA belong on the political spectrum. Pelinka (2013) argues that populist strategies against, for example, another religion, define a movement as right-wing. Therefore, the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West are right-wing populist. Wodak (2013) argues that most populist leaders are male. This, although they have several female leaders, is also true for PEGIDA; Bachmann acts as the main leader. Although he has a negative past, PEGIDA almost broke when he left the group. Besides his importance for the success of PEGIDA, some of his followers perceive him negatively. Nevertheless, the great majority believes that he does a good job, as a result of which they want to forgive his past (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September 21, 2015). This shows the desperation of the followers with the current situation; they follow a leader they cannot trust completely. One of the respondents agrees with that and says that although she does not trust him, Germany faces more pressing issues. Therefore, she feels the need to follow him (personal communication, May 25, 2015).

PEGIDA also tends to use the ‘us’ against ‘them’ theme (Berlet & Lyons, 2000). They feel that the elites, in this case the government and especially Merkel, conspire against PEGIDA. Because of this feeling, PEGIDA scapegoat this group. First, they exclude the government, by claiming that they forget about the people. Next, through talking about the government’s wrong-doings they dehumanise it. From there, they demonise the political parties; they compare Merkel and Maas to dictators, call the SPD a “Sharia party”, die Grünen a “paedophile party”, and Die Linke a fascist party (Bachmann, 2015e; Pegida in Dresden-Die Dokumentation, 2015). Finally, they claim that the new colours of the Nazis are the colours of the government (Festerling, 2016), leading to scapegoating, claiming that if the government continues to act this way, it will destroy Germany.

Next to scapegoating, they also use the arrogance of ignorance by using news reports and changing them so that the political parties appear in a negative light (Wodak, 2013).

Examples are the term “paedophile party” for die Grünen (Erdmann, 2015; Bachmann in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015) as well as calling Merkel “*IM Erika*” based on a news article that she was in a *Staatssicherheit*’s paper (Bachmann in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015; Röhl, 2015).

Besides their focus on the government, they also use the people’s fear as rhetoric (Wodak, 2013). These fears include the fear of economic decline, fear of Islam, fear of refugees, and fear of losing their culture. This aims at showing them why it is important to join their protests, but also at giving them legitimacy. Cherribi (2011) claims that the media play a great role in the success of a populist movement. Although the media played a great role in PEGIDA gaining interest, they actively tried to create the image that PEGIDA were disintegrating. However, they did not manage and PEGIDA still exist. This means that the media played a success in creating the group, but did not manage to stop it.

This however leaves the question whether they are right-wing radical, or even right-wing extremist. Although PEGIDA are definitely Islamophobic, it is more difficult to say whether they are openly xenophobic. PEGIDA fear that people misuse the German asylum system.

This counts for the people from Islamic countries, as well as those from the Balkans (Bachmann, 2015d). This suggests that PEGIDA do not have a general issue with foreigners, but with the refugee crisis and the way it is handled. Also, the leadership claimed in the beginning that everyone is welcome at the PEGIDA protests (Bachmann, 2015c).

Nonetheless, some of the respondents were openly xenophobe and most studies imply that at least a part of the PEGIDA population is xenophobe or even right-wing radical (Daphi et al., 2015; Geiges et al., 2015; Paetzelt et al., 2015; Paetzelt & Eichardt, 2015; Vorländer et al.,

2015). Nonetheless, I cannot make a generalised conclusion, as I only interviewed those who did not seem radical (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September 21, 2015).

However, while PEGIDA tried their best in the beginning to stay out of the right-wing radical spectrum, this changed over time. Through the fact that the media tried to put PEGIDA down, it seems that PEGIDA feel the need to scream louder. They gave up on believing that they can convert the press and let them see their side of the story. The followers mirror this emotion of mistrust towards the press. While people originally were more than willing to answer my questions, they became more and more sceptical in the field trips that followed.

Another reason for the increase of radicalism in the PEGIDA leadership can be connected to the fact that Oertel left. Oertel's speeches were generally open towards anyone who opposed radical Islam. It appears that Oertel got the feeling that PEGIDA were moving into the wrong direction. She claimed that although the ideas of the members of the leadership were similar, their ideas of how to implement them differed greatly (as cited in: Vorländer et al., 2016). It also seems that the choice of speakers became more radical since Oertel left (Vorländer et al., 2016). Therefore, it appears that she influenced the directions of PEGIDA greatly. Her leaving led to PEGIDA becoming more radical. Although these points can lead to PEGIDA being put in the right-wing radical spectrum, these issues do not appear to be the most important points. It seems that the fear of the future overwhelms most followers, leading to them following PEGIDA and the right-wing radical leadership.

Interestingly, Wagenveld and Robinson appear to differ from the German leadership. In the interviews, both appeared reasonable and willing to speak to the press. Moreover, Robinson appears to be open for discussion with anyone. It seems that the need for a

European protest movement appears to be greater than actually understanding what the movement is about.

The fact that the followers are mainly fearful makes it difficult to call them right-wing radicals. This also counts for Robinson. Both, most of the followers and Robinson, oppose Nazis and right-wing extremists (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September 21; November 8, 2015, February 9, 2016). Therefore, a new term is in order. Because of their focus on fear, I would call them fearful patriots. This indicates their patriotism towards Germany, the Netherlands, or the UK. However, it also puts emphasis on the fact that they are scared. Therefore, this term seems best to describe Robinson and the majority of the people interviewed.

7.3 PEGIDA's ideology and its comparability to similar European movements

Besides understanding PEGIDA and their followers, this section aims to answer the question about the ideology of the leadership and its comparability to other European movements.

PEGIDA's main reason to protest changed over the months. While Islam and the possible Islamisation of Germany initially played the main role for PEGIDA, this theme lost importance over time. Now PEGIDA focus on how unfairly the government and the media treat them. The main argument here is the fact that the government lost its connection to the people (Bachmann, 2014, 2015f; Oertel, 2015; Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). The followers repeat this frame (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September 21, 2015). They, the leadership and the followers, feel that the only way to change something is to hit the streets and protest.

In addition, PEGIDA also focus on the media. They believe that the media are closely linked to the government and therefore do not report independently (Festerling, 2016;

Festerling in: Pegida in Dresden- Die Dokumentation, 2015). However, this picture differed in the beginning; PEGIDA believed that they and the media were fighting together against the loss of freedom of speech. However, Bachmann stopped believing that fast and therefore argues that the media created the basis for this negative relationship (Bachmann, 2015c). PEGIDA use this perceived defamation to claim that they are the victim of the actions of many groups. These groups ignore the importance of PEGIDA's existence. Therefore, PEGIDA need to exist in order to fight the changes in the country.

PEGIDA's master frame seems to be the fear of the past becoming the future, i.e. they are fighting against Germany becoming a dictatorship again like in the DDR. This explains their use of the term "*Wir sind das Volk*" [We are the people], a term used during the protests in 1989 to fight against the DDR, and the image of the Monday demonstrations from the same context (Judt, 2006). Because of that, it seems that the fear of change is the reason for them to protest.

Part of this fear of cultural loss is Islam. PEGIDA create a generally negative image of Islam. While this image differed in the beginning, due to the fact that the leadership claimed that all people, also Muslims, are more than welcome to join (Oertel, 2015), it changed over time. The topic received less attention and became only a side story of what is yet to come.

Again, when it comes to refugees, PEGIDA appear to change their opinion over time. While they used to be open to people in need in the beginning and in their positional papers (Bachmann, 2014, 2015c; Oertel, 2015; PEGIDA, 2014), this image became more negative. An example is the belief that refugees are "fortune-seekers" (Bachmann, 2015d). Because of the changed importance of Islam in their speeches, it appears that the master frame focuses more on the possible loss or change of culture in general than on the actual effects of Islam.

While Islam does not play the main role at PEGIDA, Wilders' main topic is the dangers of Islam. In his case, Islam plays the role of the interpretive frame. He focuses on the danger of Islam and the inability of the government to act on that. He insists that Islam is the worst threat the Netherlands currently face, and that the government fails to act, even increases the threat (Partij Voor De Vrijheid, 2014; Wilders, 2005, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). He bases this on the fact that he read the Quran and thinks that the things said in the Holy Book create the cultural basis for an undemocratic culture. While PEGIDA mainly focus on scapegoating politics, Wilders drastically scapegoats Islam. He claims that he wants to respect them, but they do not respect the West (Pimperl & Wilders, 2008). He does not see them as humans, more as "scum", trying to destroy the West (Pimperl & Wilders, 2008; Wilders, 2015b).

Although the interpretive frame remains the same at the PEGIDA protest, Wilders tone is very different. While he does not distinguish between militant Islam and peaceful Muslims in his speeches in the Netherlands, in Germany he starts off with that and claims that he does not have a problem with Muslims in general. Although he claims that, he still explains the negative sides of Islam and the need to protect their own countries from that. He claims that through the failures of politicians, Germany is becoming an Islamic country (Wilders, 2015d).

While PEGIDA focus on the actions of the government and through that, the developments in Germany, of which Islam is one, Wilders focuses more on the negative sides of Islam and the effects of the ineffectiveness of the government to do something against it. While PEGIDA focus on the negative effects of the refugee crisis on Germany and the fact that people from the Balkans come to Germany, as well as the fact that they want to help those that need help, Wilders focuses mainly on the threat of refugees. He thinks that they are thieves and that most of them are "fortune-seekers". PEGIDA agree that many are "fortune-seekers", but they do not focus on that term, more on the fact that Germany needs to figure

out who is who. PEGIDA only focus on uncontrolled immigration, and Wilders focuses on the effect of it: “*Hollandistan*” and criminality. With that he follows the Islamophobic image of Eurabia (Esposito, 2011). This image of the refugees differs greatly at his speech at PEGIDA, he implies at PEGIDA that there are also peaceful refugees (Wilders, 2015d).

Next to the interpretive frame and the dangers of Islam, his master frame focuses on the loss of Dutch culture through the actions of the government. He claims that the government fails to answer the needs of the Dutch people. Here again, he talks about Muslims and refugees and that they get more money than the Dutch people who are working for it. Also, he believes that the inactivity of the government will eventually lead to a threat to national safety. Therefore, he believes that most Dutch people are dissatisfied and that the government does not act according to the wishes of the people. Through his claims about Islam and the fact that the government fails to answer the needs of the people, he hopes to change their opinion and get them to work for the Dutch people again (Wilders, 2005, 2014, 2015a, 2015b). In Germany the government fails too, but PEGIDA fight against this failure (Wilders, 2015d).

Also Robinson focuses mainly on the negative sides of Islam. However, he does not adjust his rhetoric at the PEGIDA protest. He uses different frames from both PEGIDA and Wilders to explain his sentiments. Moreover, while PEGIDA support the police, Robinson tends to have a negative image of the police, based on his own experience. Also, while PEGIDA use historical rhetoric only to explain why the government fails, Robinson uses it to create an argument.

Robinson uses the threat of Islam as the interpretive frame. However, different from PEGIDA and Wilders, Robinson talks about his own experiences with Islam. He talks about

the negative things he encountered during his life and how they have made him dislike extremist Islam (Robinson in: McGlynn, 2013; Robinson, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015d).

He argues that he is open to discuss Islam and other opinions with people who do not agree with him. This is shown in the documentary “When Tommy met Mo” and in the fact that he left the EDL to join the ‘counter-terrorist think-tank’ Quilliam, led by former extremist Muslims (Robinson in: McGlynn, 2013; Robinson, 2015a, 2015d). Nonetheless, his experiences created hateful sentiments in him. He perceives Islam as harmful to Britain and the people (Robinson, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015d). He also talks at PEGIDA about his negative image of Islam. He believes that they have to fight against the possibility of Islam taking over. He believes that every Muslim aims for Sharia and that Islam controls the police (Robinson, 2015c).

Besides this idea of Islam, Robinson also uses the master frame of the elites. Robinson was demonised by the political elites, the media, and the police. However, he believes that in order to save the country and show patriotism the EDL need to continue fighting for England and the safety of England. This image is the same at the PEGIDA protest (Robinson, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015c, 2015d). Through this claim, he gets people actively involved, as it creates the image that England, Germany, and Europe will be lost if they do nothing about it.

All three, PEGIDA, Wilders, and Robinson have an anti-Islamic and anti-refugee ideology. However, they frame these ideologies differently: PEGIDA believe the government destroys Germany because of their failure to answer to the refugee crisis; Wilders believes that all Muslims are bad; Robinson frames these sentiments from his own experiences.

Interestingly, while Wilders and Robinson appear to have educated themselves about Islam, PEGIDA do not seem to know much about it. PEGIDA started as a result of a protest against Germany supporting the PKK with weapons. Because they opposed that, they started

the anti-Islamic movement (Geiges et al., 2015). Nonetheless, since the PKK focuses on a Marxist ideology and not Islam, it seems that PEGIDA's anti-Islamic resentments are not based on knowledge, but on the fear of the unknown (Karakas, 2007).

7.4 The role of other movements in the success of PEGIDA

Besides their ideologies it is interesting to understand the connections between PEGIDA, the EDL, and the PVV. Robinson (personal communication, February 9, 2016), the former leader of the EDL and current leader of PEGIDA UK, believes that while PEGIDA influenced his way of protesting, they also saw what went wrong in the EDL and adapted accordingly. This means that while the EDL learned from protest to protest, PEGIDA could learn from the mistakes of other movements. This gave them the possibility to become a peaceful protest without fighting, unlike the EDL. Robinson believes that this is the way forward. Moreover, he claims that the EDL and PEGIDA share the same goals, but approach them differently. Robinson believes that since the EDL consisted mainly of working class members, they were not successful. However, PEGIDA approach the middle class, leading to more success, as the government cannot ignore them.

Besides Robinson's opinion, it seems that the general right-wing sentiment in Europe amplified the success of PEGIDA. Although the rhetoric points out similar issues, the people at the PEGIDA protests seem to be unaware of other European movements. Many of the people interviewed did not know Wilders (personal communication, March 23; May 25; September 21, 2015). Another example refers to the fact that the Epoch Times live ticker, which supports PEGIDA, misspelled Robinson's name at the one-year anniversary (Epoch Times, 2015a). All of this implies that although PEGIDA probably learned from other movements, these movements did not actively influence the people's decision to join the

protest. Wagensveld (personal communication, November 8, 2015) rather claims that the success is based on the Europe-wide refugee crisis, due to which all European countries need to stand up and fight. The choice of PEGIDA to call themselves “patriotic Europeans” supports this argument. Also in 2012, Robinson claimed that Islamisation is a European issue (Robinson, 2012).

Another reason against the argument that PEGIDA’s success comes from similar movements, focuses on the different ways of framing their ideology. While PEGIDA focus on the elites as their interpretive frame and the threat for national culture as their master frame, Wilders and Robinson argue the other way round. This leads to the assumption that the needs for the different countries differ greatly. But also, the German discourse on right-wing ideas does not allow so much hatred towards Islam. If they would use that, they would risk that people would not follow them, as they would perceive PEGIDA as Nazis. Through using the elites as the real enemy and only using the cultural aspects to get people moving, they create more legitimacy for their movement.

This discourse differs from the Netherlands. Wagensveld (personal communication, November 8, 2015) points out that although the Netherlands have the PVV, they still need a movement like PEGIDA. He claims that Wilders acts like a politician and that the Netherlands also need a European street movement. People need to relieve their anger and fear and show that besides voting for the PVV, they do not agree with the current government. However, since this movement is relatively small in the Netherlands, it appears that most dissatisfied people will vote for Wilders and not join PEGIDA. Although this implies that it does not matter which movement or political party to support, it also shows that there is no direct correlation between the movements. Nevertheless, as Robinson suggests, they still influenced each other indirectly.

Finally, it seems that the other right-wing movements and parties in Europe only support one another when they have gained legitimacy. While Wilders never spoke at the EDL, he decided to speak at a PEGIDA protest. Robinson claims that this is because of what the EDL represented and how they conducted themselves (personal communication, February 9, 2016). This implies that these movements do not play a role in the creation of each other, but if they are not too extreme, they will help each other to continue existing.

One movement that appears to play a great role in the success of PEGIDA is however the Monday demonstrations from 1989. Through the use of similar terms and the fact that PEGIDA protests every Monday, it seems that they try to create the same imagery. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, most of the protesters are from an age group that most likely experienced these protests. Paetzelt et al. (2015) claim that around 40% of the PEGIDA followers took part in these protests. These connections seem to play a major role in the success of PEGIDA. It creates the feeling that Germany is a dictatorship and these PEGIDA followers are ready to turn it over, as they did in 1989.

7.5 Challenges and the future

This thesis aimed to explain PEGIDA and their European connections. Although the ideological analysis and the interviews with the leadership gave a good insight into PEGIDA, it is lacking full insight into possible right-wing radicals or right-wing extremists. Therefore, this would be an interesting topic to analyse in the future. However, this was not feasible for me alone.

In addition, finding a proper term for a movement like PEGIDA is difficult. I believe that there should be more research on finding a term defining a diffuse movement like PEGIDA. Simply calling them right-wing populists or radicals is too simplistic. It works for the old

right-wing parties and movements like the PVV, the EDL, the FN, and others, but it seems that PEGIDA are different. This is especially because of their focus on the dissatisfaction with the government.

Apart from the difficulty of defining PEGIDA, their continuing existence can be seen as a result of the refugee crisis. Therefore, the question remains: Will PEGIDA cease to exist when the refugee crisis is resolved? One thing speaking for that can be the fact that most of the PEGIDA followers are protest voters, and more joined the protest when the refugee crisis hit Germany. Also, will PEGIDA cease to exist if the government would help the fearful patriots? These are questions that need further attention in the future.

Furthermore, the German government as well as Europe have to understand that besides their sometimes xenophobic ideas, these movements are a part of the modern political spectrum. Through neglecting to engage them, PEGIDA only gains strength. Arguments by Robinson (personal communication, February 9, 2016) and Wilders (2015b) support this point. In order to stop these types of movements from gaining momentum, the government should start a discussion with the concerned citizens, the fearful patriots, of these movements.

8 Conclusion

PEGIDA have existed for more than one and a half years now and it seems that there is no end in sight. Having become stronger, they spread to other German cities, to Europe, and even to Australia. Because of their strength, this thesis aimed to understand who these patriotic Europeans are. To do so, followers and members of the leadership were interviewed and their ideologies and frames were analysed. This created several conclusions about PEGIDA and predictions for the future.

First, people who follow PEGIDA tend to be afraid of a future influenced by refugees and the perceived mistakes of the government. They feel that the government and media mistreat them and ignore their fears and worries. Because of this, they feel that their only solution is to join PEGIDA. Because of their fear, I would call the majority of those interviewed fearful patriots. While PEGIDA were relatively moderate in the beginning, their leadership has become more radical since and claims stronger things. Therefore, I would define the leadership as right-wing radicals. The followers are more differentiated and consist of mainly fearful patriots, but also right-wing radicals and even right-wing extremists. It would be interesting to investigate this development in further research.

Therefore, PEGIDA are a versatile movement with many different aspects and people. It is a movement led by right-wing radicals in Dresden and fearful patriots in the Netherlands and the UK. PEGIDA in Dresden have a strong attachment to their national identity, which is influenced by Dresden's past. This identity influences their decision to join PEGIDA and their attitude towards foreigners, the elites, and the EU. However, they also identify themselves as European. This makes them perceive Islamisation as a European issue and gave way to Europe-wide demonstrations.

Another point in understanding PEGIDA is their ideology. To describe this better, their ideology was compared to that of Wilders and Robinson. While PEGIDA focus mainly on the perceived unfair treatment towards them, the EDL and the PVV focus on Islam. In addition, they all use different frames and explain them differently. Each movement has a unique way of framing Islam: PEGIDA focus on the perceived threat of Islam, Wilders focuses on the, as he perceives it, evil Islam, and Robinson frames it according to his own experiences with Islam. PEGIDA further distinguish their ideology by focusing on the fight against the elites, who aim to introduce a new culture. Therefore, they perceive this change negatively and because of that they are afraid.

This ideological understanding of PEGIDA led to assumptions of how other movements contributed to PEGIDA's success. Wagensveld and Robinson argue the roles of other movements differently. Robinson believes that PEGIDA learned from the EDL. However, Wagensveld claims that PEGIDA resulted from a bigger European problem. The latter claim seems more reasonable, because right-wing movements in Europe rose from a general right-wing sentiment. These movements only support each other after they have gained legitimacy. An example is that Wilders never spoke at an EDL protest, but spoke at PEGIDA. These groups know of each other, but are only the answer to the perceived needs of their respective countries.

As mentioned earlier, PEGIDA appear to become more right-wing over time. An example for this is the speeches. It appears that the fact that the government and the media do not talk to them increased their chances of success. This is because it is their main reason to protest. Furthermore, they get a lot of support from other European movements. The future development of these movements will be interesting to watch.

To conclude, although people thought PEGIDA would not last, they still exist. It is a movement made up of different people, fearful patriots and right-wing radicals, who come together every Monday to address their fears. It is not only a German movement, but also a European movement supported and carried on by people from many different countries. They are the answer to a greater European trend in increased right-wing sentiments. If these sentiments will not be addressed soon, PEGIDA will not only continue to exist, but might also gain in strength.

9 Bibliography

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10 Appendices

10.1 Appendix 1: Translation of PEGIDA's 19 points programme [translated from German by the author]

- “1. PEGIDA is FOR the admission of war refugees and political or religious victims of persecution. This is a human obligation!
2. PEGIDA is FOR admission of the right to and the obligation to integrate into the constitutional law of the German Federal Republic (up until now, this is only integrated into the right of asylum)!
3. PEGIDA is FOR the decentralised housing of war refugees and victims of persecution, instead of putting them into sometimes inhumane houses!
4. PEGIDA is FOR a Europe wide allocation formula for refugees and a fair allocation for all members of the EU! (Central registration points for refugees, which will, similarly to the German *Königsteiner Schlüssel*, allocate the refugees to the EU-member states)
5. PEGIDA is FOR lowering the service policy for asylum seekers (amount of refugees per social worker/ caretaker- currently approximately 200:1, practically no care for the partly traumatised people)
6. PEGIDA is FOR an asylum application process similarly to the Dutch or Swizz model and till then, FOR increasing the resources of the BAMS (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge* [Federal agency for migration and refugees]) to decrease the duration of the asylum application and process and to ensure faster integration!
7. PEGIDA is FOR increasing the supplies of the police and AGAINST downsizing the same!
8. PEGIDA is FOR the exhaustion and implementation of existing laws regarding asylum and deportation!

9. PEGIDA is FOR zero-tolerance-politics regarding delinquent asylum seekers and immigrants!
10. PEGIDA is FOR the resistance against a sexist, violent political ideology but not against the here living and integrated Muslims!
11. PEGIDA is FOR immigration following the example of Switzerland, Australia, Canada, or South Africa!
12. PEGIDA is FOR sexual self-determination!
13. PEGIDA is FOR the conservation of our Christian-Jewish culture!
14. PEGIDA is FOR introducing referendums following the Swiss example!
15. PEGIDA is AGAINST delivering weapons to anti-constitutional and illegal organisations, such as the PKK
16. PEGIDA is AGAINST the acceptance of parallel societies/ parallel courts in our midst, such as the Sharia-courts, Sharia-police, justice of peace, and so on
17. PEGIDA is AGAINST the crazy “gender mainstreaming”, often also called “*Genderisierung*”, the almost compulsive, political correct gender neutralisation in our language!
18. PEGIDA is AGAINST radicalism no matter if it is religious or political!
19. PEGIDA is AGAINST hate preachers of hate, no matter which religion!” (PEGIDA, 2014)

10.2 Questionnaire: field trip March 23, 2015

1. Age
2. Are you from Dresden? If not- where are you from?
3. Is this your first time?
4. Why did you come today?
5. What is your opinion of the EU?
6. Do you feel like a European? Why?
7. Do you know who Geert Wilders is? If yes- what is your opinion on him visiting the PEGIDA demonstration April 13?

10.3 Questionnaire: field trip May 25, 2015

1. Age

2. Are you from Dresden?

Yes No

3. Is this your first time?

Yes No

4. What is your opinion regarding Lutz Bachmann?

Good Bad

5. Why did you come today?

Goals Islamisation Europe Politics

Immigration Asylum laws Misuse of asylum

Changes East/West problems

6. What is your opinion regarding Muslim refugees in comparison with non-Muslims?

Good Bad Others are ok If they are in need

7. What is your opinion regarding the political parties in Germany?

Good Bad No opinion

8. Will you support Tatjana Festerling?

Yes No No opinion

9. Would you vote for a PEGIDA party?

Yes No No opinion

8. What is your opinion regarding the EU?

Good Bad No opinion

9. Would you identify yourself as European?

Yes No No opinion

10. Did you hear the speech of Wilders? What was your opinion?

Yes No

11. Did you know Wilders from before?

Yes No

10.4 Questionnaire: field trip September 21, 2015

1. Age

2. Are you from Dresden?

Yes No

3. Is this your first time?

Yes No

4. What is your opinion of Lutz Bachmann?

Very good Good neutral Negative very Negative

5. What is your reason for coming today?

Main points Islamisation Europe

Politics Refugee crisis Asylum laws

Asylum misuse Immigration To change something

Change East/West problems

6. What is your opinion regarding the refugees?

Too many Ok if they need help Germany should not let anyone

in anymore Europe should not let anyone in anymore

Germany has to help

7. What is your opinion towards Muslim versus non-Muslim refugees?

Good Bad Others are ok No difference

8. What is your opinion regarding the political parties in Germany?

Good Bad No opinion

9. Whom did you vote for in the last national elections?

AfD CDU/CSU SPD Die Grüne Die Linke

NPD FDP No one No comment

10. Will you vote for the PEGIDA party in the next national elections?

Yes No No comment

11. What is your opinion regarding the EU?

Good Bad No comment

12. Would you call yourself a European?

Yes No No comment

13. Should PEGIDA work together with other European parties in the European Union that have similar views?

Yes No No comment

10.5 Questionnaire field trip November 8, 2015; Utrecht

1. Age

2. Are you from Utrecht?

3. Is this your first time at PEGIDA Nederland?

4. Did you ever visit the demonstrations in Germany?

5. What is your opinion of Lutz Bachmann?

Very good Good neutral Negative very Negative

6. What is your reason for coming today?

Main points

Islamisation

Europe

Politics

Refugee crisis

Asylum laws

Asylum misuse

Immigration

To change something

Change

7. What is your opinion regarding the refugees?

Too many

Ok if they need help

The Netherlands should not let anyone in

anymore

Europe should not let anyone in anymore

The Netherlands have to help

8. What is your opinion towards Muslim versus non-Muslim refugees?

Good

Bad

Others are ok

No difference

9. What is your opinion of the quality of the current political parties in the Netherlands?

Good

Bad

No opinion

10. Whom did you vote for in the last national elections?

VVD

PvdA

PVV

CDA

SP

D66

GL

CU

PvdD

SGP

11. Whom will you vote for in the next national elections?

VVD PvdA PVV CDA SP D66 GL

CU PvdD SGP

11a. If not PVV: Why don't you vote for PVV?

More right More left Doesn't like Wilders No comment

11b. If PVV: Why do you also support PEGIDA?

12. Do you think PEGIDA and PVV should work together on a European level?

Yes No No comment

13. What is your opinion regarding the EU in general?

Good Bad No comment

14. Would you call yourself a European?

Yes No No comment

10.6 Interview guide Wagenveld

1. Do you have a better contact to the press than the leaders of PEGIDA Germany?
2. Why did you establish PEGIDA Nederland?
3. How do you see the relationship with PEGIDA Nederland and the PVV?
4. What do you think about the idea for PEGIDA to become a political party?
5. Would you want PEGIDA to work together with the PVV on a European level if they became a party?
6. What is your opinion about the EU?

10.7 Interview guide Robinson February 9, 2016

How should I call you: Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, or Tommy Robinson? Is it okay if I film and record the interview?

This interview will be used for my master thesis and published there. In case there is anything you do not want me to publish, please tell me. The aim of this interview is to understand the connections between the EDL and PEGIDA as well as your reasons to establish PEGIDA in England. The research question of my thesis is: Who is PEGIDA? The sub-questions are

- What are the reasons for people to join PEGIDA?
- What roles do similar movements in Europe play in the success of PEGIDA?
- What is the ideology of PEGIDA and how is it comparable with similar movements?

1. How would you describe your journey since you left the EDL?
2. Do you think that something changed in the political debate about Islam since you left the EDL?
3. In what way did similar movements in Europe influence your role first in the EDL, then in Quilliam, and finally in PEGIDA?
4. In the speech to the Oxford Union you said you dislike the far right, while in your book you mention that you have always been put in that category: How would you describe the far-right and where would you place yourself on the political spectrum?
5. How did your experience with the EDL and Quilliam influence your decision to set up PEGIDA UK and what have you learned from these experiences?
6. What do you hope to achieve with PEGIDA UK?

7. What do you think are similarities or differences between the EDL and PEGIDA? Is PEGIDA similar to what you intended to achieve with the EDL?
8. In your Brussels speech, you mentioned that “it would never be going to be doctors and nurses that takes on militant Islam.” (Robinson, 2015d) Also, you mentioned several times that Nazis and extremists are not welcome. How are you going to ensure that in the following protests only the concerned citizens of Britain continue to show up and not the neo-Nazis and extremist that went to EDL protests?
9. You spoke several times at PEGIDA protests, once in the Netherlands and twice in Dresden as well as some others. What have you learned from this and how do they differ from each other?
10. PEGIDA leadership as well as the people on the streets believe that the EU was a good idea, but is not effective in its current way: what is your opinion on that?
11. What are your views/impressions in general about PEGIDA in Germany and its leadership?
12. How do you perceive the current refugee crisis?
13. Do you agree with the 19 points programme of PEGIDA, is there anything you would like to add or change?



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