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GHANA'S VULNERABILITY TO THE THREAT OF DOMESTIC AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: REAL, EMERGING OR IMAGINED?

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**Ghana's Vulnerability to the Threat of Domestic and
Transnational Terrorism: Real, Emerging or
Imagined?**

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Abstract

Ghana is viewed as a relatively peaceful country in a sub region characterized by constant cycles of conflicts. Analysts have identified porous borders, drug, arm and human trafficking, terrorism, and other cross border crimes along the increasing levels of Islamist, insurgents and terrorist activities in the region as major security threats. For example, As Mali and Nigeria battle with the insurgency from Ansar din, and BH, respectively, the latter's neighbors bear the brunt of the ongoing incidence.

A survey on global terrorism trends had ranked Ghana as a country with no incidence of casualties from terrorism between 1968-2006 (Sosuh 2011, p.14). Nevertheless, the recruitment of some Ghanaian graduates into the ranks of ISIL in August 2015 seems to contradict the pacifist notions about Ghana and susceptibility to terrorism a high possibility.

Drawing on literature about terrorism and radicalization, the thesis analyzes and discusses the level of Ghana's vulnerability to the threats of domestic and transnational terrorism.

The analysis reveals that Ghana's susceptibility to the menace of terrorism is real, and gradually building up. Using Nigeria-based BH as a referent point, the study identified that Ghana's security is threatened by the transnational aspect of the BH insurgency. The revelations that some Ghanaians could be swayed by the ideological influences and the activities of BH is becoming a reality. Other factors that add weight to the BH risk include but not limited to lack of inter-agency cooperation, the ECOWAS policy of free movement of people and goods, and weak borders.

The study admonish Ghanaian authorities to closely watch current social, political, economic and religious conditions such as poor governance, corruption, unemployment, poverty, and religious radicalization that could light the flames of terrorism in Ghana.

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List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
BH	Boko Haram
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
SPEAR	Socio-Politico-Economic and Religious
LECIAD	Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Service
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISIL/ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
GUTA	Ghana United Traders Association
SALW	Small and Light Weapons
AFAG	Alliance for Accountable Governance and Governance
CJA	Committee for Joint Action
LMVT	Let My Vote Count
AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ECF	Extended Credit Facility
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service (GIS),
CEPS	Customs Excise and Preventive Service
GPS	Ghana Police Service
GIABA	Inter - Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering
AML/CTF	Anti-Money Laundering and the Combating of Terrorism Financing

UNDP	United Nations Development Program
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
CHRAJ	Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice
WB PRG	World Bank's Partial Risk Guarantee Programme

Map of Africa



World Atlas Map of Africa

(WorldAtlas 2015)

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1.1 Introduction

Historical, and current events depict that no state is immune to the threats of terrorism. Terrorists know no borders, no boundaries in their quest to capture the world making almost all continents having a share of the throes of their martyr attacks, hijack gun battles which mostly target innocent civilians. Despite the conception of terrorism as a common security challenge to humanity (Ewi & Aning 2006), threats to states' varies with respect to country, continent or region, (Botha 2008; Davis 2012 p. 1). These variations in threats largely affect perceptions about terrorism and how states, and stakeholders should respond to them.

As a country with no (major) record terrorism, it came as a surprise when news of activities of some groups linked to Boko Haram¹ in certain parts of Ghana came up (Bokor 2014; Ghanaweb 2014). However, such allegations were debunked by the police (omgGhana 2015). As a result, the cause for alarm regarding the prospects of terrorism within the country might have dwindled. Again, the year 2009 witnessed an alleged incident involving a suspected terrorist who transited from Ghana to the United States of America (Captain Brachie 2014; CBS News 2010). It was not long when the country was plunged into a state of desperation by media reports of recruitment of some Ghanaians into the swelling ranks of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS), in late August 2015 (cityfmonline 2015; Ghanaweb 2015b). This situation contradicts the country's credential as one of Africa's relative peaceful and stable democracies². Evidently, a survey on global terrorism trends had ranked Ghana as a country with no incidence of casualties from terrorism between 1968-2006 (Sosuh 2011 p. 14). However, current events in Ghana regarding incidence of terrorism and the limited literature on violent extremism on Ghana puts the country in a state of dilemma. Yet, the few literatures that encapsulate the subject are normally restricted to the northern part of the country. This situation arises from the relatively limited violence within the country turning researchers' attention to other areas in the West African sub- region which are more prone to violence.

¹ See section 3.1 for details on BH

² Even though the country experiences social vices such as religious, political, and ethnic clashes, coupled with chieftaincy disputes, armed robbery, murder, serial killings, and rift between aggrieved groups and the state, Ghana has not experienced any major terrorist activity, and remains relatively peaceful in the sub region)

Nevertheless given Ghana's present situation, there could be little skepticism about its vulnerability to the threat³ of domestic and transnational terrorism⁴ making the phenomenon a key research area. Attempts at this venture will provide insight into the phenomenon for purposes of policies which is paramount to state security, stability and survival.

1.2 Research Question

Against this backdrop, the central research question is *to what extent is Ghana vulnerable to the threat of domestic and transnational terrorism?*

In order to answer the research question, the study would draw on the activities of Boko Haram (BH), and the conditions that occasioned their evolution⁵. This area of focus serves two important purposes; first, it offers the historical accounts of BH, and the factors that gave rise to its emergence as an important exemplary model for Ghana. This stems from the fact that Ghana and Nigeria share similar attributes along socio-politico-economic, and religious lines. And second, whether the existence of BH and its activities within and outside Nigeria could have the tendency to threaten the security and stability of Ghana. This position arises in light of the conscious efforts made by BH in toppling federal government of Nigeria, and its quest for regional expansion as seen in its merger with ISIS (Iaccino 2015; Solomon 2012; Zenn 2015). It is also premised on the simple assumption that BH's activities could affect, and influence citizens beyond the boundaries of Nigeria. Lastly, the choice of the group as part of the research's focus considers the possibilities of how the existing SPEAR conditions have constituted significant cause for BH-inspired insurgency in Nigeria, and the tendency for which they could/could not affect Ghana. The above constitute the medium for measuring the extent of the threat of transnational terrorism vis-à-vis Ghana. This is in line with Botha (2008 p. 34) research on the "challenges in understanding terrorism in Africa..." in which he argued that "the only way to identify factors that contribute to a country's vulnerability is to study conditions in countries... that have been subject to terrorism". In this regard, this research seeks to

³ See definition, conceptualization, and operationalization of the term at Appendix one

⁴ See section 2.1 for definitions, and other details)

⁵ See section 3.1 for details pertaining to the emergence of BH

examine the root causes of the phenomenon in order to offer insight relevant to complement efforts by counter terrorism officials and stakeholders with the view to counteracting it.

Aside BH, and its activities, another important area of focus is the current Socio-politico-economic, and religious conditions of Ghana. Domestic terrorism does not take place in a vacuum but through factors within a given country. As a consequence, same would constitute a significant source of assessing the measure of Ghana's vulnerability to the threat of domestic terrorism.

In light of this, face-to-face interviews, coupled with relevant literature studies and other secondary sources were consulted on the extent to which the rise of the group in Nigeria could affect the possibility for the emergence of similar group (s) in Ghana. Additionally, to achieve the purpose of answering the research question, the study explored efforts at investigating the current socio- politico-economic and religious (SPEAR) conditions in Ghana.

The research's focal point vis-à-vis BH spans the era the group emerged to date (2015). I argue that the choice of BH as a referent terrorist organization for this study stems from the conditions that necessitated its evolution. That notwithstanding, the study also makes inferences to other terrorists groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Al Shahaab. It also draws on events in the entire African region, and beyond. For example, events in Somalia, Mali, and the United States of America (USA) are considered. In this regard, references and inferences were done based on the degree of relevance, and appropriateness.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

The study proceeds with *chapter two* which entails *concepts, literature review, and theories*. It is followed by *chapter three* which highlights factors that occasioned the evolution of BH, and the Ghana government's collaborative efforts at countering it. Additionally, the chapter sheds some light on *religious radicalization and violence in Ghana*. *Chapter four* explores issues relating to *methods and methodology*, including the research's *respondents, reliability, validity and triangulation*. Subsequently, the *empirical*

*findings*⁶ are analyzed and discussed, and some recommendations are offered. This would set the stage for conclusion.

2.0 Chapter two - Concepts, Literature review and Theories

The primary purpose of a *conceptual framework* is to “ensure that everyone is working with the same definition and mental image” of the concepts used in a research (Berg & Lune 2012 p. 39). It is synonymous with *operationalization*, which aids the understanding of readers, and end-users of a research’s concepts as understood, and used by a researcher (Ibid.). It is therefore useful to conceptualize, and operationalize the following terms below since they carry with them some levels of ambiguity, and controversy within academic and policy circles, pitching scholars, policy analysts and bureaucrats against each other on different sides of the argument.

2.1 The concept of *Terrorism*

Terrorism is a concept of controversy which has elicited thorny debate among stakeholders. Hoffman defines terrorism as “...the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change...” (Hoffman 2006 p. 40-41). However, this definition does not capture the actors involved in terrorism. But Cronin does perhaps partly. According to him, terrorism is the pursuit of a political goal by a non-state actor, through the use of violence against civilians with the intention of spreading terror (Cronin 2006). Nonetheless, Cronin’s definition, like that of the U.S Department of State, lacks the complete component of the actors involved in the phenomenon. What is lacking in the above definitions is the fact that they exclude terrorism perpetrated by *States*. State terrorism is undertaken for the very reasons akin to those championed by non-state actors. The difference nonetheless, lies in their make-up. Like sub-national terrorism, States that engage in terrorism are perceived to lend support, and sponsorship to terrorism, and its related incidences.

Additionally, a close look at the definitions above reveal a common theme which terrorists aim to achieve; *political ends*, inter alia. However, the definition by Grob-Fitzgibbon

⁶ Findings are subsumed into two parts, those that relate to transnational sources of threats, and that of the domestic. Additionally, each part is analyzed and discussed

(2005) fills that vacuum. In addition to political terrorism, he identifies three forms namely revolutionary, reactionary and nationalistic terrorism. It could be observed that terrorism takes different forms and can be used for different purposes.

However, despite the absence of a generally agreed definition, there are common definitional elements which feature a number of varied definitions. They include: the use of violence or threat of violence for political purposes (see Gibbs 1989; Hoffman 1999); religious, revolutionary, reactionary, and nationalistic reasons, as well as State and non-state actors as perpetrators (see Grob-Frizgibbon 2005); a differentiation between the victim of an attack and the ultimate target that terrorists seek to influence (see Bergesen 2007; Schmid 1982); and the indiscriminate targeting of civilians (see Goodwin 2006a).

It could be argued that BH, which is a case study in this paper is religiously-inspired. They are therefore involved in religious terrorism explained as “the use of violence for religious means, to religiously convert or cleanse a people or nation, or to bring about revolutionary or reactionary religious change within a single state, region or continent” (Grob-Fitzgibbon 2005). Nevertheless, it could also be observed that BH has political underpinnings which betray their political goals. As a result, the working definition of terrorism for purposes of this research covers all the common definitional elements highlighted above; except that it excludes State terrorism, and terrorism by lone wolves ⁷(That is terrorism perpetrated by States, and lone wolves are beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, the paper does not discount the fact that terrorism could also be pursued for socio-economic reasons (O’Connor 2014).

Similarly, the scope of this paper is limited to domestic, and transnational terrorism, and the factors which trigger their causes. Domestic terrorism involves terrorist activities which take place within a country, or a localized area. Whilst transnational terrorism involves terrorist attacks and activities that transcend beyond national boundaries. Ewi (2013) captures the definition of transnational terrorism as a situation whereby “...an attack may

⁷ These are individual terrorists who prefer to act alone: Eg. Anders Breivik, and Timothy McVeigh.

be planned in country A and executed in country B, and materials for the attack may have come from countries C, D, E...”

It also focuses on domestic causes in the sense that existing conditions within a State could degenerate into terrorism, and terrorist incidence. In the same vein, transnational⁸ causes of terrorism relate to factors that engender the transport of ideologies, and attacks beyond national borders.

The study concerns both domestic, and transnational forms of terrorism because of the internal and external factors that give rise to terrorism. Despite their unique features, and factors that occasion them, domestic terrorism affects transnational terrorism in that the former seldom spills over to the latter (Enders et al. 2011). This partly underscores why potentially targeted countries may have to assist in combating home grown terrorism. Undoubtedly, these varying factors constitute threats, and offer a more nuanced and elaborate study of the threat than would otherwise have been the case if the focus had been on one type of the phenomenon. The literature on terrorism reveals that researchers have mostly focused on transnational terrorism than domestic terrorism (Botha 2008; Enders et al. 2011). Even in their elaborate study on the latter, researchers tend to ignore the root causes of domestic terror acts. Ironically, domestic terrorism poses a more direct threat to state security than transnational terrorism, yet it tends to be relegated to the background (Botha 2008; Enders et al. 2011).

2.2 Literature review

With respect to Ghana, a number of research has been conducted on the country vis-à-vis violence. For instance, (Aning & Abdallah 2013) extensive work have focused on Islamic radicalization and violence in Ghana. The findings of the study suggest that though Ghana suffers from a relative violence arising from religious radicalization, such violence are not directed against the state but targeted within, and among similar and different strands of religious groups. However, Sosuh (2011) research work on *Border Security in Ghana: Challenges and Prospects*, offers a more comprehensive study on the various cross border, and transnational organized crimes which feature terrorism, drug, arm, and human

⁸ it means extending or operating across national borders

trafficking, and a host of others. Without doubt, her research identified that Ghana was beset with a myriad of border security challenges, including transnational terrorism which threatens the security and stability of the country. Nevertheless, her limited focus on terrorism, in comparison to that of a more general focus on border security crimes could arguably have affected the scope, and volume of the findings in relation to the threat of terrorism. However, the fact that the phenomenon of terrorism is (sometimes) operated in tandem with the aforementioned cross border crimes undergirds the status quo. For example, terrorists in Africa have coalesced with al-Qaeda and others, including transnational criminal networks such as drug traffickers, arms smugglers and cigarette traffickers to execute their agendas (Ewi 2013). More so, Ewi and plessis (2012) argue that Ghana and Nigeria are among the few states which have *specific* anti-terrorism centers, at the height of growing terrorism. Nonetheless, (Hutchful 2007) contends the *low profile* and the dormancy of Ghana's anti-terrorism arrangements.

Arguably, the foregoing reveals a limited research bothering on Ghana, and the phenomenon of terrorism. And even the few that have attempted, have ignored an important research focus which spans the area of domestic terrorism. In terms of the transnational aspect of terrorism as it relates to Ghana, as much as Nigeria and BH, the following observations concerning the literature could be made;

First, (Oftedal 2013a; Oftedal 2013b) two scholarly works on BH, offer a unique source of insight into the domestic, and transnational activities and nature of the Islamist sect. Emile maintains that BH is putative for being among the world's most active Islamist groups, and embodies *some transnational*, as well as a some domestic composition. As a result, she asserts that the sect must be regarded as a terrorist organization *in between the two extremes*. Her findings suggest that BH's transnational aspects spans from areas of *training, weapons and recruitment*. Whilst, among other things, its restricted attacks against Nigeria predominantly defines its domestic aspect. To a great extent, Oftedal's findings strengthen those of (Zenn 2012; Zenn 2013; Zenn 2015) in terms of the sect's transnational aspect⁹. The group has evolved from a more locally-based Islamist group to

⁹ The transnational aspect of BH is arguably more relevant for this research than the its domestic aspect, hence the concentration on the former).

a transnational one¹⁰ (ibid.). The transnational aspect of BH stems from its ideology, and modus operandi premised on its quest for a *regional* reach (Abdulai 2015; Connell 2012; Freeman 2012; Iaccino 2015; Kira 2011; Mantzikos 2010; Osumah 2013; Sergie & Johnson 2015; The Economist 2011; Zenn 2015). This is evidenced by its change of name to *Islamist State West African Province*, after its merger with ISIS; and its training, and support from AQIM, AQAP, and Al-Shabaab¹¹ (ibid.). If this observation is anything to go by, there could be little doubt that the threats it poses transcends beyond the borders of Nigeria. Against this background, the research question seeks to find answers in light of the sect's activities, as well as the conditions that elicited it owing to the socio-politico-economic, and religious structural characteristics shared between Ghana and Nigeria.

Furthermore, to underscore the relevance of the juxtaposition, Ismail (2013) contends that the shared SPEAR attributes, in addition to similar structural problems fuel the *contagion* of violent radicalization among countries within the (sub) region. For example, he identifies the twin problems of poverty, and unemployment, in their mix with politically, and religiously discontented and alienated people as factors that could fuel violent radicalization of affected people. Additionally, Botha (2008) in her investigation of the *Challenges in understanding terrorism in Africa...*, she uncovered that adverse SPEAR conditions in African countries amount to domestic and transnational terrorism. Like Ismail, Botha maintained that these *conditions* fuel radicalization, and ultimately culminate in terrorism when they are mostly tied with hostile environments of political, and social marginalization which tend to alienate victims. Other scholarly sources that are germane to the research, and would be consulted include (Agbibo, D. 2013) which explores the typology of the group, its activities, and offers some solutions to the threat they emit, as well as (Osumah 2013) article on "BH insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the vicious cycle of internal insecurity" which expatiates on the ramifications of the group's activities on Nigeria's state security, among others.

To a larger extent, the literature review reveals that a significant research gap exists regarding the phenomena of domestic, and transnational terrorism, in relation to Ghana.

¹⁰ See Iaccino 2015; Solomon 2012- on the transnational aspect of BH

¹¹ They are designated terrorist groups in the Islamic Maghreb, Arabian Peninsula, and Somalia, respectively

The observation underscores the fact that the few research that have been conducted in connection to the aforesaid phenomena have been general in scope¹² or limited to a specific phenomenon¹³. Therefore, this research seeks to significantly bridge the gap that exists within the literature, and the entire field as they relate to Ghana.

2.3.0 Theories

The theories that have been selected for this study have connections with the socio-economic, political, and religious notions which inspire domestic, and transnational terrorism. In this regard, theoretical framework discusses how terrorism connects to poverty, state legitimacy, religion, and social movements. These theories shall be used to illuminate the extent to which Ghana is vulnerable to domestic terrorism.

Additionally, contagion and diffusion, as well as social movement theories are useful for explaining transnational terrorism.

2.3.1 Poverty as a catalyst for Terrorism

In its most general sense, *poverty* is the lack of basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter, etc. Valentine (1968) indicates that “the essence of poverty is inequality. In slightly different words, the basic meaning of poverty is Relative deprivation.”

A considerable number of conflicts occur in poor countries than in rich countries (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Gleditsch 2012) Additionally, the degree of wealth and that of economic progress largely account for differences in support for political violence (MacCulloch 2004). Other supporters of this position include (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Fearon & Laitin 2003) among others. However, poverty, and other socio-economic factors as causal factors of terrorism remain a thorny debate. Though these theories explain social and economic conditions that facilitate terrorism, they lack the ability to provide responses to the question of why some people or groups in the same structurally disadvantaged circumstances choose terrorism and others do not. Better still, not all poor people engage in terrorism. Some rich people are equally engaged in the phenomenon. Osama Bin Laden, and Ayman Al-Zawiri

¹² In terms of research on the subject covering a wider geographical area such as West Africa, and Africa and in terms of a more general research that incorporates terrorism into other transnational cross border crimes)

¹³ In this sense, domestic or transnational terrorism explored unilaterally, or separately).

were rich and highly educated, yet they masterminded the -9/11 attacks. Similarly, Botha (2008 p. 38) asserts that the perpetrators of the 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks were poor, as well as those engaged in similar attacks in the same country in 2007 were less endowed.

It should however, be recognized that poverty, and other socio-economic factors do not necessarily lead to terrorism singlehandedly. Rather, when a considerable number of them exist in their mix, their tendency to influence people to engage in terrorism is higher. For instance, when unemployment, poverty, marginalization, and a wide gap exist between the few rich, and the poor majority, the less privileged may have a sense of hopelessness, and might feel that they have nothing to lose. In the face of mounting unfavorable political conditions, the situation may be worse since it may culminate in alienation, radicalization, and terrorism.

In reference to the definition of poverty by Valentine (1968) it could be argued that Poverty as a phenomenon relates to all forms of *under development*, *unemployment*, *relative deprivation*, and *economic inequality* (see chapter 5 for explanations). This is so because all these socio-economic factors tend to deprive the citizenry of their basic necessities. In this respect, the existence of any one of these factors, or a combination of them, in the midst of extreme views or violent ideology could generate tendencies which could have implications for political violence not limited to terrorism.

2.3.2 State Legitimacy and Terrorism

State legitimacy entails how power is used, and accepted by the citizens (Gilley 2006). Generally, it concerns itself with a mass support for the state, and the acknowledgement of the nature of rule by its subjects as appropriate. Following the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the study of the modern state system and civil violence are well illuminated by the theories of state legitimacy. Legitimacy hinges on state conventions, rules, and the quality of leadership shown by regimes (Forsythe 1993). A state could equally be considered legitimate if it has relevant, and credible political institutions (Lipset 1960). However, a state without legitimacy becomes susceptible to collapse or overthrow (Gilley 2006; Lipset 1960).

Lipset (1960) argues that domestic terrorism also arises when there is an anomaly with state legitimacy owing to unresolved hostilities. Additionally, Gurr and Leggewie (1970) maintain that terrorists design their propaganda to reflect the wider political grievances of the citizenry to champion their interests. Conclusively, Engene (1998) argues that no state is immune to terrorism; even in states which are not burdened with the problems of state legitimacy, domestic terrorism occasionally occur. His study also uncovers that threats from international terrorism may be directed at countries that nevertheless do not have state legitimacy problems as well.

It could be observed that State legitimacy, and its implications for terrorism relates to political issues of incompetent governance, unreliable state institutions, and pervasive political corruption. Each of these cankers, or their combinations generate grievances among the citizenry which (could) give rise to civil strife, rebellion, and all forms of political violence, including terrorism.

2.4 Social Movement theory

This is one of several theories that seeks to engage issues of (counter) terrorism, and radicalization (Borum 2011; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008; Gunning 2009). It helps explain how, and why groups and individuals in one part of the world are influenced by same on ideologies, etc. across the globe.

A social movement constitutes efforts by groups of individuals, and or organizations who are united by similar grievances, and discontentment, inter alia, to challenge the status quo, in a bid to ensuring a political/social change, prevent, or undo same in society (Diani 2004; Kendall 2012; Snow et al. 2004; Tilly 1984b). Several theories account for the explanation of the emergence of social movements. However, this study is limited to the *deprivation theory*, *structure strain theory* and *resource mobilization theory* (McCarthy & Zald 1977).

2.4.1 Relative Deprivation Theory

It states that people who feel relatively deprived compared to others, on the basis of money, etc. join social movements to address their grievances (See Bernstein & Crosby 1980).

2.4.2 The structure strain theory

This theory asserts that existing social structures, and personal strains put pressure on individuals, and groups to engage in deviant/criminal behavior (Featherstone & Deflem 2003). For example pressure on lower economic classes/short expectations of income, quality education, and occupation may inform decisions of individuals and groups to engage in *any* means necessary to meet their economic expectations (ibid.).

2.4.3 Resource Mobilization Theory

The resource mobilization theory is anchored on the acquisition of resources by members and the ability to use same for political, and social actions, owing to existing socio-political grievances (Buechler 2000; Kendall 2012).

Often, Social Movements have de jure and de facto members, making their appeal, and reach expansive. Following the shared sympathy, and support, (un) official members (may) put into practice the dictates of other members given the fact that followers feel their views are well represented in their cause. This is based on the fact that opposing political or social actions taking place in any part of a country, or beyond, could inform others within or without to act similarly. This originates from their shared predicament which reflects itself in forms such as socio-economic problems, punctuated with sympathy, and empathy, and the desire to address the situation. For instance, the activities of BH may be appealing to some people across the globe. These people who become non-official members of BH may be tempted to act in a manner which has semblance with the latter. In this way the theory is very important in this respect; the spread of ideologies of movements beyond national borders. Examples of Social Movements include Al-Qaeda, as well as the *Muslim Brotherhood* (Munson 2001). Beside the social movement theory are the contagion, and diffusion theories of terrorism (Crenshaw 1998).

2.5 Contagion, and Diffusion Theories

In its literal sense, *contagion* refers to *the transmission of a disease by direct or indirect contact, or an influence that spreads rapidly* (Merriam-Webster Inc. 2015a). Google (2015a) *also defines it as the communication of disease from one person or organism to another by close contact, or the spreading of a harmful idea or theory.* Similarly, diffusion, inter alia, *literally means the spreading of something more widely*

(Google 2015b). The defined ‘objects’ above uniquely identify themselves with the *spread of a phenomenon* from one area and or entity to the other. For the purpose of this research, both theories concern themselves with the possible spread of a (violent/radical) ideology from an entity (BH, and others) to the Ghanaian civilian population, including those in the diaspora¹⁴. Also, contagion, and diffusion theories associate themselves with the “spread of radical ideas and ideals, and movements and [their accompanying] government responses and policies [to them] (Ismail 2013 p. 247). Such theories are particularly important for illuminating interactions, exchanges, and influence which take place among terrorists. For example, the perpetration of attacks by one terrorist group may occasion or accompany that of others (Weimann & Brosius 1988), though terrorist attacks may not necessarily follow consistent periodic timelines, and may vary from time to time (Bjørge 2004; Midlarsky et al. 1980; Weimann & Brosius 1988). These simultaneous attacks are partly enhanced by the publicity and media coverage given to (successful) terrorist incidences which partly inform decisions of other terrorists to undertake similar attacks elsewhere (Crenshaw 1998; Weimann & Brosius 1988). This scenario could be illustrated by the upsurge in BH attacks in Nigeria, following same by ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Furthermore, the latter requested an alliance with the former at the height of their attacks. And there were situations where some unidentified suicide bombers had acted in Nigeria in their acclaimed support for ISIS. Additionally, terrorists held hostage, some Australians in a Sydney café as part of their support for ISIS.

Moreover, Crenshaw (1998) asserts that terrorists learn from successes and setbacks recorded not only by themselves but by their counterparts as well. This phenomenon partially explains why a terrorist group like BH has evolved from a relatively low-level, locally-focused Islamist sect to a higher-level, nationally-focused, cum an internationally fledging terrorist group. The sect’s initial use of less dangerous equipment like knives, bows and arrows relatively hindered their quest to inflict more casualties on their victims. But their acquaintance, exposure, and apprenticeship with other terrorist groups, as well as other factors have occasioned their sophisticated evolution.

¹⁴ Potential terrorists – because some may succumb to the influence)

From the foregoing, it is clear that the influence of terrorist groups, and their interactions among one another sometimes sees no boundaries, despite their different geographical locations, and its concomitant barriers. Consequently, it could not be any exaggeration that the above scenarios underscore the possibilities of spread of violent and radical ideologies among terrorists.

Nevertheless, these phenomena may not be limited to terrorists. There is the possibility that terrorists, and their activities may influence (unsuspecting) civilians which tend to be potential terrorists. It is also a fact that terrorists are keen on spreading their ideologies across through recruitments, and other media which makes each and every one a potential victim of their machinations. This possibility which is further undergirded by globalization, and the upsurge of the print, electronic, and other social networking platforms.

3.0 Chapter Three – Background

3.1 The Emergence, and evolution of BH

BH is a Hausa Language which literally means Western Education is forbidden. However, officially, it is known as Jama'atu *Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad*, which in Arabic means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". It is believed to have been formed in 2002, and radicalized in 2009 (BBC 2011). The group is opposed to Western education /civilization¹⁵ and its engaged in strings of insurgency attacks to topple the Nigerian government and replace same with Sharia-based rule, following allegations of bribery and corruption, unemployment, and other socio-politico-economic situations that have resulted in endemic poverty, especially at the northern part of the country (BBC 2011; Walker 2012). The Islamist sect is also of the conviction that western civilization such as democracy, formal education, banking, inter alia, have undermined, and adulterated the Islamic, and Nigerian cultural values, deepened the woes of the Nigerian people by exacerbating poverty, and had interfered in the affairs of same, in favor of 'western powers'.

The narratives of the sect's emergence, and consequent radical evolution is shrouded in controversies. It is believed that the group used to be peaceful until it suffered brutalities

¹⁵ Or in a broader sense western civilization

in the hands of the Nigerian Police and the Military (Madike 2011; Osumah 2013). The clash led to the arrest, and subsequent deaths of its members, notable among them was their leader, Abubakar Yusuf. Therefore, vengeance on behalf of its late leader is part of their strings of horrendous insurgency (Adibe 2012; Agbibo, D. 2013; Agbibo, D. E. 2013; Madike 2011).

Yet other conditions are deemed to be partly accountable to its growth. They are socio-politico-economic, and religious in nature and include the following;

Poverty, (Adibe 2012; Agbaegbu 2012; Osumah 2013), Poor governance and the general lack of credible institutions (Adibe 2012; Gourley 2012; Osumah 2013), Corruption (Adibe 2012; Agbibo, D. E. 2013; Oftedal 2013a; Osumah 2013), Unemployment (Adibe 2012; Agbaegbu 2012; Agbibo, D. E. 2013; Nwachuckwu 2011; Osumah 2013),

Political and Religious Factors

Though little is known about the financial sources of the group, it is believed that some political, and religious leaders, cum charity-based groups in the Gulf provide support to the group (Adesoji 2010 p. 101). Also striking are issues of politico-ethnic, and religious tensions, and disputes owing to Britain's 'artificial' demarcation of the Nigerian state.

3.2 Ghana's current measures regarding threats posed by BH and other Islamist Groups

Ghana has legal, and institutional arrangements which have been established to address terrorism and other transnational organized crimes. It prides itself with institutions such as Counter terrorism, intelligence, Police, Military, Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), the Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), the Police, the Airforce, Navy, and the Army.

In terms of anti-terrorism, Ghana has domestic legislative instruments, and frameworks which include but not limited to Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2012, Act 842, Anti-Terrorism Act 2008 (Act 762), anti-money laundering Act 2008, Act 749, Economics and Organized Crime Act 2010 Act 804, the Directive principle of State policy, and 1992 Constitution. Also, at the (sub) regional, and international levels, it has ratified a number

of conventions, and protocols on terrorism. For example, it has ratified the ECOWAS' Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Convention on Extradition, Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (mutual 2013; extradition 2013; small arms 2013) and Algiers Protocol on Conflict Prevention (ECOWAS 1999 – Protocol relation to), Similarly, it is a signatory to the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, and Protocol to the 1999 OAU Convention (Africa Union 2004 – Protocol to the OAU C; Africa Union 2013 – list of countries who have ratified) at the regional level.

Ghana is engaged in a number of activities at the (sub) regional, and international levels in addressing issues of security, and stability. As a first step, it has, for instance, ratified, and signed treaties, protocols and conventions bothering on terrorism, convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters, the Algiers protocol on conflict prevention, and the 1999 OAU/AU protocol on conflict prevention (African Union 2004; African Union 2013; ECOWAS 2013a; ECOWAS 2013b). This means that Ghana is historically involved in a joint cooperation, and collaboration with ECOWAS, and AU member States in curbing the menace of terrorism. It also commits troops to these organizations for peace keeping, and peace enforcement missions as noted in Mali, Somalia, and others.

In Ghana, terrorism was first criminalized under the Criminal Offences Act of 1960 (Act 29). Hijacking and attack on international communications are considered criminal. Presently, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2008 addresses much wider issues which include provisions for the confiscation and repatriation of terrorist funds and assets.

With specific reference to the current BH issue, the already existing structures between Ghana and Nigeria have been stepped up to facilitate the sharing of intelligence, expertise, and resources to fight BH, and other terrorist groups in the region. Additionally, the Ghanaian president and ECOWAS Chair, is already involved in efforts by way of soliciting support from (sub) regional, continental, and international communities with the view to dealing with the menace (Deutsche Welle 2015; myjoyonline.com 2015; Torny 2015).

3.3. Religious Radicalization (R.R) and violence in Ghana

R.R in Ghana is mainly intra religious, but has also inter religious components (Aning & Abdallah 2013). That is it takes place more within different strands or sects of the same religion, than against opposition to other religious traditions. However, religious radicalization within Islam is relatively rampant than the rest. Aning and Abdallah (2013 p. 102) identify three major radical Islamic religious groups in Ghana which include the Tijaniyya/Sufists movement, Ahlulsunna Waljama'a /Wahhabists, and the Qadyani sect of the Ahmaddiyya Movement . They observe that all agree to the core beliefs of Islam, except that they differ in their approaches. Their different approach reflect the varied interpretations, and applications of their religious texts and teachings. This accounts for situations giving rise to more radicalized sects, whilst others remain none, or less radicalized. Their different approaches are very important in understanding radicalism, and its concomitant violence among the religious groups in Ghana. This is because those that are extremists/radicalized have hostile approach to the moderate Islamic sects, and non-Islamic religious groups. For example, the modus operandi of the Ahlulsunna Waljama'a sect is characterized by vituperations, verbal, and physical attacks (p. 106). This generates hostilities between the moderate Tijaniyyas, and other non-Islamic religious groups (ibid. p. 105). However, though radicalization is much identified with the Ahlulsunna sect, the Tijaniyya sect are seldom involved (Aning and Abdallah, p. 107).

In terms of Christianity, its denominations include the orthodox, charismatic, and Protestants. Like Islam, the Christian sects in Ghana share similar beliefs in the core tenets of Christian religious doctrine which is premised on the existence of the Almighty God. However, their points of departure lie at the heart of their names; orthodox – old practice; charismatic – strong belief in Jesus Christ and his doctrine, and characterized by their revivalism following the baptism of the Holy Spirit; and last but not least, Protestant- the breakaway faction of the orthodox sect. The phenomenon of radicalization within these groups is nil or almost non-existing. This accounts for their relatively general peaceful relationships. Also, they have no known records of violence against non-Christian religious groups.

Last but not least, Ghana has adherents of the traditional religion. Like their Islamic and Christian counterparts, traditional worshippers believe in the existence of the Almighty God, but worship him via ‘smaller gods’. Additionally, they do not have any major confrontational records with the rest of the religious groups, except some few instances of disagreements over their ban on noise making in observing their annual traditional festival, which culminated in some pockets of violence. However, they have no known history of radicalization in Ghana.

Generally, radicalization in Ghana occasionally culminate in pockets of violence, and conflicts. Nonetheless, such violence relatively occur on a smaller scale compared to those in other parts of the sub region. For example, the Ahmadiyyas and the mainstream Muslims engaged in skirmishes in the 1930’s; In the late 1990’s, clashes ensued between the Ahlussunna Waljama’a and the Tijaniyya Islam movements on one hand, and Ahmadiyya Muslim movement on the other hand (Terdman 2007). Tsikata and Seini (2004) give a detailed account of intra religious confrontations among Muslim sects.

Whilst there have been recorded incidents of religious violence between Muslims and Christians, such incidents are relatively on the low. Tsikata and Seini (2004 p. 26) reveal that at a time “when all the intra-Muslim disputes were reported, there were no reports of violence between Muslims and Christians. Rather, a religious conflict which has seen much reportage and controversy is “between the traditional religious authorities of the Ga Traditional State and Christian churches” For instance, the 1998/9 ban on drumming instigated by the Ga traditionalists was met with opposition from some Christian churches. Whilst silence is an essential feature, and observation of the former’s annual traditional celebration, the contrary was true for the latter. Hence, the volatile situation escalated into violence, and recorded some attacks (All Africa 1998; Tsikata & Seini 2004).

Last but not least, some Islamic and Christian groups in Ghana receive funding from external sources. Some sources include States, individuals, and organizations. Their support have been direct or indirect. Religious-based institutions such as universities, hospitals, and NGO’s are evidence of external support. Whilst such philanthropic acts may be informed by good cause, they are equally a means of influencing (potential)

beneficiaries to succumb to certain ideologies, practices, and beliefs which (may) have implications for the State.

3.3.1 Ghana's policy on religious radicalization

Ghana has no specific law (s) instituted to check radicalization. However, it has legal frameworks that bind religious adherents and their conducts. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana notably serves as an important source of recognition of religious rights and freedoms of the Ghana citizenry. Aning and Abdallah (2013 p. 117) indicate that the government does not often institute legal proceedings against culpable elements of religiously-inspired attacks for fear of escalation. However, it explores options to curb the occurrence of radicalization, which take the form of a 'multi-denominational' approach (ibid.).

4.0 Chapter Four - Methods and Methodology

Under this heading, I concisely highlight the data collection methods, and bring to fore, the reasons informing their choice. Subsequently, issues pertaining to *data collection materials, methods used in the data collection, respondents, reliability, validity, and ethical considerations*, as well as *limitations* are explored.

4.1 Methods of data collection

This paper involves the conduct of a face-to-face interview, and analyses of contents of material sources via a qualitative-based research approach. As a consequence, it explored both primary and secondary sources of data for purposes of augmentation, and triangulation. In this respect, face-to-face interviews constituted primary sources, whilst Information from scholarly articles, books, and newspaper sources formed the *secondary sources*.

The primary sources were based on semi standardized (semi-structured) interviews, whilst literature studies constituted a chunk of the secondary data sources. The semi-standardized interviewees, and the literature studies particularly focused on Ghana, and Nigeria, respectively; though literature studies intersected the two approaches given the fact that data obtained from the primary sources were scanty; and not least, the need for triangulation.

Like any research, literature studies ushered in the thesis by providing pertinent background information to the topic. For example, data from sources such as books, and websites facilitated access to preliminary information on BH, and Ghana. This was very helpful in commencing the research since it provided a general overview. More importantly, the use of literature studies was material in that it provided not only preliminary data, but comprehensive information which were used in tandem with the semi-standardized interviews. Information, and intelligence on BH is very much confidential, and therefore restricted to public access. However, the literature survey is based on open sources. Though terrorist attacks such as the -9/11 has elicited a surge in academic research on terrorism and radicalization, they are arguably focused on the Middle East, and the Arab world. In relative terms, a few have written about the subject of BH in Nigeria in academic circles. As a result, Nigerian national newspapers, and other international media provide invaluable sources of information on BH especially on events that have wider international connections. Some notable media in this respect include the Vanguard, the Daily Mail, BBC, CNN, and Al Jazeera, to mention a few. Nevertheless, these sources come with their weaknesses. For instance, information posted on websites by BH have been drafted in propaganda rhetoric to score political points. Additionally, given the fact that most press in Nigeria are based in southern Nigeria, there is the tendency that journalists who report on the northern-based insurgency could be biased, Campbell cited in (Oftedal 2013b). This also arises partly because of threats directed at journalists by the sect (ibid.). These developments tend to affect the quality of information on the group, vis-à-vis electronic media. To compensate for this, I consulted secondary sources such as peer-articles and books. Moreover, given the limited availability of these sources on information that bothered on relevant aspects of my research as they related to Ghana, semi standardized interviews were conducted in the latter.

Semi-standardized interviews involve questions that bother on broad range of issues, and do not necessarily follow any strict sequence (Berg & Lune 2012; Bryman 2008). The selection of the Semi standardized interview type, among other alternatives such as standardized interview; and the unstructured interviews (Berg & Lune 2012) was based on its relative suitability to the study over the others. In terms of standardized interviews, semi standardized interviews are more flexible as their open-ended questions allowed me

to probe further on crucial issues raised by respondents (ibid.). This was useful since it enabled me to obtain comprehensive information I required.

Moreover, the semi standardized interview which was conducted on one-to-one basis largely helped the respondents to possibly provide their responses with ease.

The choice also helped to avoid disruption and cut-ins from other interviewees. This was very critical in my quest for in-depth, and clear responses from the interviewees which would have been relatively difficult to achieve in the case of one-to-many type of interviewees.

Last but not least, the face-to-face dialogue occasioned by the semi standardized interview helped establish rapport between the interviewer, and the interviewee (Leech 2002). This was also against the backdrop that interviewees were related to as people and not merely as sources of data (Taylor & Bogdan 1998). This form of “social interaction” offered me the opportunity to see the body language, gestures, and cues of interviewees which were essential for understanding the quality of their responses. This enabled me to better understand what they said, how they said it and what they meant (Taylor & Bogdan 1998).

In all, about twenty one people were interviewed. They comprised the Police, Military, intelligence official, Security analysts, bureaucrat (at Ghana’s Ministry of Interior, and Foreign Affairs), the immigration, custom, government officials, researchers, and Students. Most of these interviewees had in depth knowledge about counter terrorism, security, and events in Ghana, Nigeria, and the entire African region. Also, they had fairly followed security-related events revolving round Ghana, Nigeria, and BH over time.

In this study, a non- probability sampling strategy was chosen to avoid basing the sample selection on probability theory (ibid.) as characterized by qualitative research. As noted by (Berg & Lune 2012), non-probability sampling is appropriate for the kind of qualitative data needs that concern the social sciences. The research question seek to enquire about the phenomena of terrorism, and its associated threats as it relates to BH and Ghana. The study therefore sought to describe, analyze, discuss, and interpret meanings, and perceptions of interviewees. The choice of non-probability method of convenience sampling was informed by the fact that it is inexpensive, quick, and easily facilitates access to informants

(Berg & Lune 2012 p. 32). More importantly is the fact that it is the most appropriate for the study. Besides, the choice was made because I needed interviewees with relevant expertise (ibid.). Additionally, it could be argued that the selected sampling method had some elements which are symptomatic of purposive sampling in that my “special knowledge or expertise” dictated the choice of the selected informants. Though I acknowledge that researchers occasionally use purposive sampling because of its “lack of wide generalizability” which is an acute limitation (Berg & Lune 2012 p. 32). I contend that the chosen sampling method is mainly *convenience*.

4.2 Data Collection Materials

With regards to the material for the collection of data, I considered various kinds and settled on the type that could be most suitable for the study. Apparently, *note taking, audio, and video recording* are some of the approaches available to researchers in the conduct of their interviews. Therefore, the identification of the merits and demerits of each material dictated the choice I perceived to be most appropriate; Note-taking, is often slow, distractive, and inimically affects understanding, accurate quotations, and uninterrupted flow of interview (Crang & Cook 2007). Video cameras present their own challenges; they create discomfort to the respondents and thus affect how much information they put out, to mention a few. Like the video cameras, tape-recorders hinder and restrict respondents on the amount of information they should give. Ultimately, *tape-recorder* was used for the interview with the informed consent of respondents. This was to avoid the ramifications (Berg & Lune 2012) air when research ethics are violated.

4.3 Ethical Considerations

In terms of ethical considerations, a lot of attempts were made to adhere to them since it is incumbent on every researcher to do so.

All but two scheduled interviews took place as arranged. Though there were few instances where I had to reschedule because of time constraints, differences in schedules and other factors. I did not provide the prospective informants with a consent form. However, during my arrangements with them which was prior to the interview, they consented to grant me audience, hence *implied consent* (Berg & Lune 2012p. 92). Though *implied consent* may

not have been the better option, perhaps it helped to avoid disclosing (all the) important research questions which is a limitation associated with *informed consent*. However, since getting informed consent is an important ethical phenomenon in research, it is always better to adhere to it. In this respect, if the interviews were to be re conducted, an explicit consent of prospective interviewees would be sought via the provision of a consent statement form to make it more formal, organized, and referential.

Nevertheless, issues bothering on privacy, confidentiality, anonymity and responses were discussed with the informants. Two of the respondents were anonymized owing to security reasons. Since they work within the security and the custom units, they were accordingly anonymized as *Security Analyst*, and Custom Official, respectively. *Appendix 2* provides relevant information regarding the date, designations, names and place of respondents. As a result, identities of some informants have been protected, and other related demands of informants adhered to. An informed consent was sought from all interviewees to avoid flouting on their rights.

4.4 Limitations and Constraints

As with any research, this study was conducted with pertinent limitations. Some of which were anticipated prior to its commencement. Firstly, security challenges and concerns apparently made it difficult to conduct interviews in northern Nigeria which has seen much of BH activities.

Additionally, the controversy surrounding the definition of terrorism is an important source of worry vis-à-vis the subject under discussion. Since there is currently no agreed and definite meaning of the term, it makes for open and subjective interpretations by different actors and stakeholders.

Moreover, since the topic bothers on intelligence and sensitive National security issues obtaining relevant data from the security agencies was a bit difficult. Security and other intelligence agencies reluctantly released information for national security concerns. Understandably, this has been the practice and convention.

Furthermore, some scheduled interviews could not materialize due to certain factors beyond the control of the interviewer, and the interviewee. The interview with the Nigerian

High Commissioner to Ghana was fruitless owing to time constraints, and his consequent unavailability at the time the interview was expected to take place. Similarly, the futile interview with the academic was on grounds of ethics owing to my inadvertent failure to furnish her with my University's ethical guidelines on *interviews*.

Last but not least is the issue of inadequate funding of the research. As a Self-financing student, I perceived difficulty in financing the cost associated with the research. The success of this research was partly dependent on the acquisition of resource and financial needs. However, per my budget, travelling to Nigeria and Ghana required a considerable amount of financial resources, even far beyond the frugal funding offered by my university. To this end, the acquisition of additional funds could have probably given the research a different boost. Having said that, generally, the research was carried out with the limited funding, and was brought to a successful end.

Notwithstanding the above challenges, there were some corresponding remedies that were identified. They are listed below;

Firstly, since the research concerned Nigeria and Ghana, it would have been appropriate to conduct the research in both countries. However, the research was conducted in the latter country given the insecurity in the northern part of Nigeria. The deficit was therefore compensated for by interviewing people in Ghana, whose expertise fall within the purview the topic. It could however be argued that the overall data derived from the respondents in Ghana constitute primary data.

Nevertheless, the data collection constitute primary and secondary sources. In this way, the data derived from these sources were complementary, and offered much more information which would otherwise not have been possible if only one source was used.

More so, in terms of the constraints regarding the difficulty on the part of security officials to release information that had repercussions for the nation's security, attempts were made to assess relevant data to the extent possible and permissible. For example, I probed further to seek clarification when the occasion demanded it. In this way, the semi standardized interview helped in this regard.

Moreover, the acquisition of relevant data from my respondents was enhanced by the support I received from my University through the latter's official correspondence and protocols.

Also, as it may be evident that the controversy surrounding the definition of terrorism, with its resultant difficulties, is a source of worry in research pertaining to the phenomenon. Nonetheless, the difficulty was addressed by a choice which contains a considerable number of common definitional elements of terrorism. In addition, it was conceptualized to elicit a shared understanding.

Furthermore, the failed interview attempts with the two aforementioned people did not largely affect the study. This is anchored on the argument that the situation was anticipated, hence adequate preparation was made to curtail it. For example, the sampling size of twenty one respondents was enough compensation for the situation.

Last but not least, is the issue of funding. I am grateful to my University for partly funding the research to the tune of eight thousand kroner. This amount undoubtedly assisted at great length in affecting the success of the research. The inadequacy of the funding required effective financial management, and applications to other sources for funding. In these ways, the problem of financial difficulties was partially dealt with.

4.5 Respondents

I identified my respondents in four ways. First, selection was based on the authorship of the literature. Second, I had prior knowledge of the expertise of some of the respondents in relation to the topic. In addition to this, I visited the websites of some of the institutions with relevance for my research, such as the University of Ghana, and that of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Center (KA IPTC), to mention a few.

And last but not least, I relied on personal contacts of some of the earlier respondents for contacts of other potential respondents. I did this by the snowball method. Aware of the bias involved in the use of the snowball method owing to the fact that respondents may direct a researcher to colleagues with similar views and background as their own (Tansey 2007), I tried to limit that tendency by widening the number of my potential interviewees, as well as reducing the number of recommended or referred respondents. In effect, I had

few respondents who were referred to me. This might have helped largely to reduce incidence of bias.

In view of the need to execute the interview on time, I scheduled appointments with some of my would-be interviewees informing them beforehand via email, on my quest to interview them. However, some could not respond due to defunct emails. Nevertheless, upon my arrival in Ghana, I was able to schedule new and further appointments which saw all but two successful interviews.

4.6 Reliability

If a measure produces the same results under the same conditions, there is research reliability. It also entails how precise and replicable a study is when repeated time and again. The phenomenon is also linked to the credence a researcher could associate to a measuring instrument to produce the same results when the measurement is repeated on the same instrument of measure (King et al. 1994). It also goes beyond this “measurement” to include how the data “were created”, collected, “possessed”, and used (ibid.).

I opted for semi-standardized interview since I felt was the most appropriate choice for the study. This type of interview falls between the two extremes, and bridges the gap of the “flexibility” ‘problem’, needed for a more reliable research finding. It also has the merit of facilitating opportunity to compare various responses from a set of standardized questions, though it partly requires the researcher’s discretion to influence the flow of the interview (Bryman 2008). Although its reliability is relatively low compared to standardized interviews, the semi-standardized interview chosen was consistent with the purpose of my research, hence most suitable for same.

Additionally, given the fact that reliability concerns itself with the creation, collection, interpretation, and usage of data, I have provided comprehensive information to that effect. This would also make it plausible for other researchers to conduct assessment of the methods and methodologies, as well as interpretations I employed in the research. The result of which (may) partly strengthens the reliability of my study (King et al. 1994). Nonetheless, the possibility to reproduce the study, and its findings is mitigated/hampered by the fact that one of my respondents was anonymized.

Crucially, and cautiously assessing the contents of the data collected adds to the research's reliability. This is against the backdrop that possibility exists on the part of (some) respondents to skew their responses in order to gain some advantage or advance their interests. For example, in soliciting his views on what he thought of the degree of Ghana's counter-terrorism preparedness for an eventual terror attack within and without its borders, Aning asserted that "if you could talk to the intelligence, and the police, they will say 'oh yes, yes' [we are prepared] but you know, if there is a bomb at Accra Mall, or even not a bomb, something that goes out from a car, and somebody is hurt, how do you evacuate such a place?...In the nutshell, the respondent indicated that some key stakeholders may not provide credible and reliable information to my research questions. This means that respondents may not recognize the impact of their responses to a research question.

In terms of news reportage, some journalists hardly fulfill the requirement of good journalistic practices. This tends to affect the quality of their reportage.

In the face of these challenges, I have cross-checked multiple sources of information, and employed methods to triangulate the findings of the research. For instance, I did not spare the efforts of conducting comparisons, and contrasts of data obtained among my diverse primary, and secondary sources with a view to ascertaining the reliability of the whole research. However, the covert nature of intelligence, and counter terrorism operations, punctuated with the dynamism, and propaganda of BH means that some of the materials may be undeniably arduous to substantiate and therefore remain unclear despite vigorously resorting to multiplicity of sources, and methods.

4.7 Validity

Research Validity deals with accurate, and appropriate choice of concepts, the consistency with which concepts are operationalized, and the measurement of the right research variables.

Concept validity deals with appropriate measurement of the intended object of measurement/variables. A high concept validity means that operationalized variables encompasses all relevant areas of the concepts used in the research. For example, in my study I sought to find out how the emergence of BH, and the current socio-politico-

economic, and religious conditions in Ghana affects Ghana's vulnerability to the threats of terrorism. In the study, much efforts were cautiously channeled into meticulously measuring the operationalized term of *threats*, via in depth identification of varying views of respondents, and other secondary sources, cum methods. It could be argued that since semi-standardized interviews allows for higher concept validity than standardized interviews given the latter's merit of higher flexibility which allows for further probing of questions, it was appropriate to have resorted to its use. However, such position is contestable given the fact that the semi-standardized interviews entails a somewhat opportunity of flexibility which has semblance to the standardized version, and therefore not so much difference is made regarding the efficacy of its concept validity.

5.0 Chapter Five – Empirical Findings

Main Research Question - To what extent is Ghana vulnerable to the threat of terrorism?

In this Chapter, I shall analyze and discuss the various responses from interviewees on how their perspectives on the rise of BH, and the socio-politico-economic, and religious conditions in Ghana affect the possibilities for domestic and transnational terrorism in Ghana. This is to find possible answers to the overarching question of the *extent to which Ghana is vulnerable to the threats of domestic and transnational terrorism*. In order to do this, I shall use the Social Movement Theory which is a useful tool to unearthing, and facilitating understanding of possibilities of the spread of transnational terrorism beyond national borders. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, are the usefulness of the transnational theories of *contagious*, and *diffusion* in this regard. And they would be employed accordingly to achieve this aim.

After considering perspectives on transnational terrorism, I shall turn to how the current socio-politico-economic, and religious conditions in Ghana affects its prospects for domestic terrorism. With respect to domestic terrorism, the appropriate theoretical tool that would be employed would be the social Movement theory which constitutes *deprivation*, *structural strain* and *the resource mobilization theories*.

In an attempt to find answers to the above research question, the following responses were received. They are found below;

According to Mr. Alex Adu, an Assistant Comptroller of the Ghana immigration service, the BH crisis, and threat has the tendency to affect the immediate and distant neighbors of Nigeria; He said the menace “may spread to Ghana”, and other areas of the region given the porosity of the Ghana, and the West African borders.

For Mr. Elvis Kwakye Oliver of the University of natural sciences, the transnational nature of BH posed existential threat to Ghana, since *the sect seems to be a network of terrorist group that do not occupy only Nigeria*. He argued that there was a tendency for them to infiltrate Ghana as well.

Like the positions of the above interviewees, Ms. Emefa Debrie was of the opinion that Ghana is not immune to the crisis in neighboring Nigeria. To her, “...Ghana should be concerned probably for her security because if it is happening there, then it is likely it could happen here [Ghana] too...”

For Ms. Selina Wini, her skeptical concern over the security of the Ghana borders, among others, informed her assertion that Ghana must up her game to avoid a similar situation;

She argued that once Ghana’s borders, and security checks are weak, one must not downplay the possibility of the BH infiltration in the country, given the fact that terrorism is *transportable*, and *extendable*. Additionally, she said members of the sect could *disguise themselves as refugees and penetrate the Ghanaian terrain when the crisis escalate*.

According to a senior official of the Ghana Customs Office, the activities of BH *threaten* the security of the region, and the globe”. He argued among other things that “...once it [terrorism] has happened in Nigeria, and Ghana and Nigeria are Anglophone countries colonized by the British and then looking at the social structure almost the same, it’s likely Ghana too may one day fall into the same crisis ...”

Furthermore, a security analyst with one of Ghana’s National Security agencies had this to say when asked about the rise of BH, and its implications for Ghana;

“... [I am] aware that the activities of BH have spread into Chad, Cameroon, and I believe could lead to other adjoining areas. If you look at the relationship between Ghana and Nigeria, there is nothing that happens in Nigeria and it didn't show some signs in Ghana. Because when '419' began as an economic cybercrime, it was a Nigerian issue. Now, there are Ghanaians who are almost surpassing Nigerians in the business. Because they have associates..., If you come to other activities in the oil industry, even music and culture, showbiz, there is a lot of linkage and co-influence between Ghana and Nigeria. Even religion. I was surprised when somebody told me that a Ghanaian was a Sharia Supreme Court judge in Northern Nigeria. A Ghanaian, born and bred, educated in Ghana, moved to resettle in Nigeria, and has become a member of the sharia Supreme Court judges in Nigeria. He comes for holidays, he shares ideas with people. He has brothers here [Ghana]. They pay him visits. They get educated there. What is the likelihood that they will not transport such ideas to Ghana? The security analyst also highlighted the socio-economic conditions in Ghana;

“...economically we are suffering. And you cannot analyze security without talking economics. Why am I saying so? If your economy is failing, you are failing to meet your social responsibilities to your electorates. You cannot give them economic goods for which they voted you into power. And once your economy is failing, you are going to have internal crisis, agitations, and these are all internal security problems. You can even think about our 'power crisis'¹⁶. We depended a lot on Nigeria for power [but] because of the BH activities, we are not getting the needed gas to fire our thermal plants. And for that matter our industries cannot work. Domestic consumers who need power cannot get it, political agitations are arising, and what else can you call it insecurity? When your people are not satisfied and are questioning whether you are even *governing properly*, whether you are taking good care of them. It is not only when you have guns shooting at you that you are insecure. . Even when the people you are governing are not satisfied and are even threatening to vote you out of power, where lies security? So economically, if the activities create a situation where it cannot let you meet your goals and governance, then you are unsecured. Apart from that, the overflow of violence which can happen. Even if it is

¹⁶ Shortage of hydro-electric power which has led to 'power' rationing, and intermittent power supply

refugees coming into your country alone, the refugees are of different shades and color. They come in and are going to be dependent on you. You have extra things to take care of. And supposing they don't get confined and they go to practice some of the negative things that they use practicing in their country, it happened to us when we had Liberian refugees in Ghana. You go to the central region, crime rate increased, some of them even managed to come down with weapons, and then they were doing their own things. So it has a lot of implications because the West African sub-region is inter-twined in a certain way. Ghana is blessed that we have a lot of accommodating, sober citizenry but this continual interaction with some of these kind of inflow of refugees can change the character of Ghanaians. If you look at even prostitution, it used not to be as prevalent as it is now because of the influence of Nigerian prostitutes, a lot of Ghanaians have joined them and we have that development taking a different dimension. So in so far as we keep interacting, there is a kind of cross-cultural development. The negative, the positive, which come to interplay and that itself, cannot guarantee that we can continue to be what we were. So that is not security.

Nonetheless, despite his perceived threats of the group, he was quick to add that Ghana has no cause to worry so much owing to ongoing security and intelligence gathering among West African countries through the 'ECOWAS framework'; coupled with the distant proximity of Ghana to Nigeria, and the nature of Ghanaians to report strange characters; He said they *were doing their best, and cooperating* with other (sub) regional stakeholders to deal with the situation.

There is West African union of intelligence organization. They share intelligence ...and information, so we are trying to see how we work towards this. It's even within the ECOWAS policy framework and to a large extent I can say that it has been very successful. But I still see BH as a localized problem for Nigeria. Forget about the spillover effect so far in Cameroon, and Chad, and then Niger. Forget about that over-spill. The over-spill is because at least they share that common border and seek refuge as and when the need arises. Those who seek resources, if they can take hostages and bargain for resources, they will do that. That's how I look at it.

In the nutshell, his concerns are that the ongoing efforts of Ghana's security agencies, coupled with Ghanaians' ability to report criminals, their opposition to extremists views, and strong media reportage would "would not allow some of these extreme developments" to gain roots in the country. Also, he said,

"It is very unlikely that you will have BH springing out in Ghana. We know that extreme groups might like to take advantage of what is happening in Nigeria to advance in Ghana, but it is just going to be isolated and be dealt with immediately it begins", he retorted. Nevertheless, the security analyst further indicated that

"You know in Ghana, if you are talking about political disagreements, as a potential for violence, you can have it. We have very sharp acrimonious politics that can create violent problems for it in future. But not terrorism. People can clash politically, but not to the extent of [engaging in] terrorist activities. Because the collateral damage will be too much. If you try to hit somebody, you will hit and hit so many of your own folks because of the extent of intermingling, intertwined nature of our society".

Additionally, the Head of Migration Management Board, Ms. Adjoa Shika, also posited that "...over here in Ghana, there is always the fear of BH invading Ghana. In her view, that fear stems from two perspectives; First, the tendency of the group to evade security and sneak into Ghana, a situation which could be facilitated by the West African 'visa free regime', ; second, the fact that BH, Hezbollah, and others' quest to establishing a caliphate in West Africa was threatening to all states, including Ghana.

Moreover, from the perspectives of Commodore Kojo Osei-Sarfo of the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, "relations and ethnic groups in West Africa cut across so that whatever happens in one country, one way or the other in the long run, may end up affecting others in other countries" He buttressed his position by arguing that since "Somebody is doing it in Nigeria and is gaining popularity, and success", there will be somebody in Ghana who may think that since it can work in Nigeria, it can also work in Ghana, since 'we are all Muslims'. The deputy Commandant cited the "ECOWAS free visa regime", punctuated with "porous' borders", as factors facilitating the spread of events among the West African nations.

Moreover, according to Mr. Conrad Kakraba of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, the threats of BH is wide and “multifaceted”. He argued that once BH wants to establish an Islamic caliphate [in West Africa], you should be looking forward to threats not limited to Ghana owing to BH’s threats of radicalizing “everybody”.

Dr. Colonel Kotia of the Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC), cautioned the inimical effects of the BH issue on security, development, and economics. He indicated the links between the three phenomena; “Without security you cannot have development, and without development you cannot provide the social amenities of your people. Consequently, monies which could have been channeled into developmental activities were diverted towards security”, he retorted. The *Chief Instructor* hinted that the whole of (West) Africa was not secured owing to the (possible) spread of BH elements and their attacks in the region. And that a surge in the situation would carry with it, economic consequences. “Now, if we have BH spreading more, it is going to have effects on businesses, [and] investments; investors outside Africa would not like to come and invest because of the dangers of it”. He discounted the view that Ghana is immune to the BH threat; “...Ghana can be affected because one; BH can spread to Ghana. This also brings to bare, the ECOWAS protocol (1979) which gives free movement of people across our borders. So that one can have effect on Ghana. Nobody knows”. He therefore concluded by cautioning that “we should be ready for everything in this world because terrorism is an emerging security issue so no country can say that it is safe from any terrorist action [since] it can be imported and it can be brought from somewhere ...”.

For his part, Dr. Ahorsu of the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), claimed that, “As a regional hegemon to be seriously endangered by crisis that it cannot manage, possibly threatens the stability of Africa, [and] West Africa since it restricts Nigeria from assisting other African countries”. Also, he argued that no country in the region was *safe* owing to the *transnational security threat*. Furthermore, he indicated that Ghana’s involvement in Peacekeeping missions in terrorist-ridden countries, risked retaliatory attacks. He, however, opined that such threats may manifest themselves in different ways and may not necessarily involve ‘BH fighters who might disguise themselves or march with their weapons to Ghana and start killing. Rather, he opined that

the risk could take the form of a spread in ideology, and the sharing of same; "... whatever is happening in the Middle East, Nigeria, and other places is gradually spreading to all over the world. So there are people in Ghana who share the same ideology". He corroborated his assertion by citing example; "...And not long ago ...a whole [Ghanaian] MP [was] arguing that he would not hesitate to support a bill in parliament which requires the stoning or elimination of women who commit adultery". Dr. Ahorsu therefore stipulated that since *Terrorism...is a struggle of ideas and manifests in violence, Ghana should be worried*. He further asserted that the shared political, economic, and social architectural features of Ghana and Nigeria facilitate and complicate things, especially in the event of major crises; "At the same time, you would realize that our lives today are so intertwined economically, socially [and] politically. If there is a crisis in Nigeria, Ghana can be overwhelmed.... Ghana's population now is probably between twenty five and twenty eight million. Nigeria's population is close to three hundred million. There is a major crisis if one-eighth of that population come to Ghana, our structures and resources would be spread to the limit ...So once Nigeria is in crisis, it affects Ghana". Dr. Ahorsu indicated that *blood relations ...language, culture draw us [Ghanaians and Nigerians] closer..., but then all this form of terrorism again puts us very much apart*.

Moving further, Dr. Nicholas Okai of KAIPTC hinted that Ghana is not immune to the growth of sects similar to BH, and others. He argued that there could be

"... Ghana's version of BH. But what will drive it may not be religion. It can be unemployment ...corruption, perception of corruption ... ethnicity and its impacts. BH is something that has been packaged very early because of the religious element but it is something that is gradually waiting for every country in West Africa if we do not address this issue of unemployment, corruption and exclusionism. Yes. Nigeria's version is 'BH'. It is more of religion. But every country in West Africa can have its package of BH. And it is the youth pursuing an agenda in the name of something. Yes. Theirs is in the name of religion".

Moreover, Dr. Philip Attuquayefio of LECIAD, posited that "Once Nigeria is not secured, you can't say that any country in the sub-region is secured. Nigeria is the largest. Should anything happen in Nigeria, and there is overflow of refugees, can we host them?"

For his part, Dr. Thomas Ajaye of KAIPTC shared similar sentiments that the insurgency caused by BH has affected people's "sense of security", to the effect that "we are all surviving in West Africa, but we are not secured". Dr. Ajaye did not rule out a potential spread of similar radical ideologies among the citizens of the region, with its attendant security implications of attacks, following ECOWAS' Policy which permits the *free movement of people and goods* within the sub-region; "...If we were that secure then many of us will not even be talking about the potential effects of BH in the region. Where young people could use the same method anywhere by borrowing what they [BH] are doing. And because there is a policy of 'free movement' within the sub region, anybody can move from one area to the other and carry their arms with them leaving one country and moving to the next... that potential is there".

Following from this, Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso of LECIAD argued that "If Nigeria implodes, the whole of West Africa has imploded, [and] ...the implosion of Nigeria, is detrimental to Ghana politically, and especially economically", he retorted. Economic-wise, it has detrimental effect on foreign direct investments. The danger is glaring since there is 'gun running' going on in West Africa already. Serious gun running. People are selling arms along the coast in the hinterland, and everywhere. People manufacturing illicit guns are also there. So this trade will boom. And it has serious implications for West Africa and Ghana". This security threat, he said, has culminated in increased security spending on the part of countries. Consequently, the situation has seen some movement of Nigerians to other parts of Africa, including Ghana.

A lot of Nigerians are already moving to other countries quietly. We haven't seen the exodus yet. But in our own Ghana, there are a lot of Nigerians buying properties here. Undertaking all kinds of economic activities. In fact, last year, and two years ago, there were clashes on the streets because they (Nigerians) were engaging in businesses reserved for Ghanaians. So GUTA (Ghana United Traders Association) got up very strongly and physically wanted to move some of such persons from the streets.

Additionally, he indicated that "Abdul Mutallab who nearly blew an American plane, bought his ticket in Accra, came to Accra, lived quietly, bought his ticket and was going to

do his ‘thing’”. As if that is not enough, he indicated that previously, a sizeable number of the members of the *Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta* (MEND), ran to Ghana when they were pummeled by Nigeria”. Also, he said some *Sudanese rebels/refugees* entered Ghana without the knowledge of the border authorities concerned. These enumerated examples buttressed his argument that “BH could come and stay here [Ghana] and then enjoy the freedoms that we have here and prepare from this ground”; A situation which is enhanced by the *porosity* of the Ghanaian borders, corruption, and lack of surveillance, security consciousness and inadequate awareness, among the Ghanaian populace”.

For his part, DSP Edward Afful disclosed that Ghana is *not far from BH* because of the proximity, and the long-standing relationship between Ghana, and Nigeria. “...our closeness. Even though Nigeria is about two countries from here to the east, you could see that because Nigerians are our closest English speaking country there has been some influx of Nigerians currently into Ghana. Some of them have even come to inter-marry with Ghanaians. You can go to certain parts of the country [Ghana] to see a whole Nigerian community. So that alone tells you that we are not far from BH”

He also hinted that unconfirmed reports suggested that previously, there had been some suspicious elements from Nigeria who had come to Ghana to undertake some “fundraising activities” to fund their cause in Nigeria. Whilst others were *quelled* and *contained* by some of Ghana’s security agencies, the situation was different in certain cases. DSP Afful compared the spread of the phenomenon of terrorism to that of the drug business; “...I can compare it with how drugs sometimes come as transit, [and] before you realize your country becomes consumed. So it’s the same thing terrorism can do. It [can] come as fundraising but before you realize, they have also entered your country”. He added that the activities of *Fulani herdsmen* and their connection with terrorists’ activities within the sub region partly underscore Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of terrorism. He said,

“...during the Mali [insurgency] issue, which partly featured the activities of Ansa dine, and MOJUA, the information was that there were some elements of BH who even went to join, and these people were able to pass through as ‘Fulani herdsmen’. They disguised themselves as Fulani herdsmen, and were able to pass through to join that fight. And Ghana

too has problem with Fulani herdsmen with that issue. So it tells you we are also fragile in those areas”.

Against this background, the *Intelligence Officer* revealed that the development threatened Ghana’s security in the form of *extremism*, and *religious radicalism*.

In terms of religion, he also said there were some detected effects of the wave of the BH crisis in some parts of Ghana. This situation featured “radical preaching by some Al-Sunna Imams’ and this situation is “... also having a little bit of effects on the Ghanaian Muslim”, owing to the fact that the “current terrorist organizations are all Al Sunni and these are the people who have started preaching radicalism” in Ghana. Additionally, their preaching against the Ahmadis, coupled with their quest for a Sunni successor to the outgoing Chief Imam, reflect the religious ramifications of the crisis; he said. Furthermore, according to him, intelligence suggested that a Ghanaian was once an apprentice of the BH sect in Nigeria. “So you could clearly see that a Ghanaian has ever been trained with BH”. To add to that, he asserted that Osama bin Laden enjoyed some support within some Muslim populated communities in Ghana post -9/11. This support was demonstrated by wearing Bin Laden’s paraphernalia, and the purchasing of his videos. Additionally, DSP Afful hinted that there was an allegation to the effect that an AQIM bomb expert purchased a fertilizer from Ghana some time ago,; and the transiting of a Nigerian terrorist, Omar Farouk Abdul Mutallab through Ghana with undetected *improvised device in his coat*, all corroborate the fact that ‘it [terrorism] is not far from us [Ghana].

Afful further argued, socio-politico-economically Ghana tends to suffer “because we are the only English speaking country with Nigeria now. If it happens ... [Ghana will bear the brunt of the] refugee problem.... They [Nigerian refugees] won’t go to Togo, they won’t go to Benin, they will come to Ghana.... Right now, to be very frank, everywhere and every time we travel outside and we go for courses, you see Ghana and Nigeria cooperate more than other countries ...Even whenever we go for this security courses ‘outside’ [Ghana], the moment you see one Nigerian, one Ghanaian, before you realize the two of them are moving together. So that ‘thing’ [cordiality] is there ... they inter-marriage too. now we have Nigerian wives association in Ghana (Ghana armed forces 2012-ghanaian and navy wives assoc collaborate). So it tells you that socially it is happening. Chief

Superintendent Nii Amartey for his part said indeed, Ghana offers a serene atmosphere for Nigerians

Again, Group Captain Kojo Yankah pointed out that poor security infrastructure, moderate rescue measures, insecure public places, among others, reflected the seeming lack of appreciation for the contemporary development on the phenomenon of terrorism. gave much cause for concern should there be some attacks by the sect within the borders of Ghana.

Following from that Mr. Agbenyegah of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asserted that “the situation was more threatening for Ghana given Ghana’s similar attributes, and relationship with Nigeria;

For the fact that being former colonies of Britain aside, we share so many things in common. Culture, inter-marriages, trade and investment. Indeed, Nigeria is a very big economy that if Ghana will be able to export or invest in that country, we don’t need to go outside Africa. So whatever happens there, and you know as a Ghanaian that the surest way for a Nigerian fleeing from BH is to come to Ghana because we have similarities in a lot of things. They can’t speak French. They will look alien. But if they come to Ghana, they speak English. We have people of Yoruba and Igbo descent here, and even they themselves are here. So assuming over the one hundred and seventy million Nigerians we have, assuming just ten percent of them cross to Ghana, are they not more than Accra population? and obviously they will come to Accra first. That alone, we need to protect against. And the fact that not all of them who are coming here will have clear mind or clear intentions. The security ...repercussions are great for us...

Additionally, Mr. Bonaventura Adjavor of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) section of the *African Bureau division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration* emphasized the fact that Ghana faced a potential threat of attacks from BH, Al-Shabaab, and others since “no country is free from the terrorist threat (s), or isolated from terrorist attack (s). His position stressed the fact “you may not know when they will strike on you. You can only be alert. For that matter, I can say whether BH or Al-Shabaab..., it can happen to any country, any time”.

Similarly, Mrs. Afua Yakohene of LECIAD argued that in the face of mounting terrorist attacks by BH, and AL-Shabaab against African countries, coupled with ISIL's attacks in Iraq, and Syria, Ghana's vulnerability to the menace of terrorism remained high, and that cannot be discounted. From this standpoint, he reiterated that "no country is immune to terrorism and its related incidence"

Furthermore, according to Mr. Samuel Amankwah of Ghana's Ministry of the Interior, Ghana is not immune to the implications, impacts, and threats of the Nigerian crisis. He buttressed this assertion citing the *monolithic* nature of the African continent and the fact that *terrorism is transportable and transferrable*. He said *Ghana should be mindful of the fact that they [BH] can come here Ghana*.

For his part, Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning indicated that should the problem linger, Ghana could bear more risks; He said the myriad of problems accounting for the crisis in Nigeria, are equally evident in Ghana, and therefore *this country [Ghana] is ripe for all these things [terrorism, and its accompanying incidences]*. *Every single reason given by terrorist groups are ripe in Ghana*, he said.

Last but not least, Mr. John Pokoo indicated that the ensuing crisis, and its accompanying threats has repercussions for Ghana especially if [BH] should succeed in expanding their territory. He added, "... we are already facing it [the impacts] Politically since Nigeria has been the bank roller of our regional integration efforts and to spend that much on BH affects other important areas as well. A safe West Africa also means a safe Nigeria. So our interest is intrinsically linked to Nigeria. Ghana's relation with Nigeria is cordial and fruitful. I think it's growing as well. We've attempted to base our entire Gas supply in Nigeria. And once again that is the effect. Today there is strike, tomorrow they've blown up the pipe and all that and so we are in a 'dumsor' [intermittent light offs] as the same situation is all part of what is happening in Nigeria. We really start to lose if things don't improve.

**HOW DO THE CURRENT SOCIO-POLITICO-ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS
CONDITIONS (SPEAR) IN GHANA INFLUENCE THE PROSPECTS OF
DOMESTIC TERRORISM IN GHANA?**

Additionally, interviewees gave some perspectives on how Ghana's current SPEAR conditions affect the potential rise of terrorist groups. They are as follows;

First, Mr. Alex Adu indicated that the current economic hardships in Ghana could inform people's decision to engage in terrorism, though he admitted that things were gradually improving, and therefore expressed optimism.

Ms. Debrie on her part cited *dissatisfaction* within the Ghanaian populace owing to the *inequality gap* between the rich and the poor, as an important area where the government of Ghana could consider to prevent or reduce (potential) incidence of terrorism in the country. Nonetheless, she argued that Government was making gradual progress, and expressed the fact that it was impossible to satisfy the needs of all Ghanaians, hence *the inequality gap*.

Moreover, the Security Analyst argued that *problems of corruption and extreme political activity* remain hot beds for political violence in Ghana; *...We have that kind of acrimonious rhetoric in our political system. If you ask me what the biggest threat to Ghana is, I will not talk about BH. I will talk about politicians. Because of their quest for power, they go to certain extreme. Like the use of 'Macho' [strongly built] men, snatching ballot boxes here and there...*

For her part, Ms. Adjoa Shika hinted that Ghana Government's policy interventions must be devoid of exclusionism, and be much more representative; otherwise the tendencies for some Ghanaians to subscribe to terrorism would remain unabated.

Similarly, Kojo Osei-Sarfo reiterated the need to rid the Ghanaian society of all kinds of discrimination. He said there should be *equal opportunities*, and *respect for one another* irrespective of *tribe, ethnicity, or tongue*. As if that was not enough, he advocated for an ethno-tribal-religious-free politics; *National politics* should not be *village-based, ethnic-based, tribal or religious-based*, he argued. Additionally, same recommends a more professional, reliable and credible media (reportage); "The media should not be a platform for casting insinuations, and [preaching] ...despair among people" as it generates division and hatred among the citizenry. Last but not least, he advised that *equity* should accompany

all facets and fabric of the Ghanaian society in order to *bring a lot of satisfaction* among the populace.

For his turn, Kakraba posited that perennial *leadership problem* and *corruption* were important sources for domestic terrorism in Ghana;

Leadership is key. ...Ghana has over the years had leaders who have been so disappointing when it comes to delivering the goods that the people have put them into positions of trust to be able to deliver". Also, he aired that

[Corruption] has taken epic proportions. No government is immune to the problem of corruption in Ghana and many of them have been so blatant and flagrant in their abuse of the national purse and people have been so disenchanted, so disgruntled and we have had a lot of agitations coming from young people ... who feel so peeved by the way that the purse is being plundered. And you see that ...the Committee for Joint Action (CJA), Alliance for Accountable Governance (AFAG), and all of these pressure groups arise as a result of these malfeasance, the economic deprivations that the people are subjected to. And for me the government of the day ought to address this ...and ...for us, all our problems actually rise and fall, on leadership. And so Ghana's leadership systems must be seen as active for the people to be able to have all the necessary things that will help them just to maintain the peace, [and] keep the peace.

Similarly, Okai expostulated that *leadership crisis* and *corruption* are critical areas that should not escape attention [in Ghana] given the current trends; Hence, advocating for quality leadership, and corruption-free Ghanaian society.

For Kotia, '*good governance*', '*liberal democratic tenets*', policy of all-inclusiveness and participation, and '*prudent economic policies*' are key to preventing and or reducing '*discontentment in society*', and for that matter, *terrorism* in Ghana.

From the standpoint of Ahorsu, it was urgent for Ghana to salvage the current situations of relative inequality, poor infrastructure, inter-religious conflicts, and the exclusion of the youth in the engagements of all SPEAR discussions. Hence the need for Ghana to do the following; First, there should be uniform *development* in the country; second,

infrastructures must be enhanced, especially in the impoverished areas; third, the existing inter-religious dialogue must be improved; fourth, the youth representing the various religious communities in Ghana must be engaged in all forms of *education, policy formulation, participation, and inclusion*. He maintained that the youth must be enlightened on SPEAR issues that pertain to all facets of their endeavors; “Economic issues must be explained to them. Why certain things look the way they are, the limitations of the government, [and] their views must be heard”, he said. “These would largely preempt any form of radicalism. Because when people feel that they are listened to, their views are taken onboard, they become part and parcel of the society...But when they are like the forgotten masses, then radicalism, because nobody cares about them, nobody knows about their views”. He observed also that the *National Peace Council*, among other conflict-resolution institutions are living up to expectation, but needed to be more representative by incorporating the youth. He contends that the youth whose views should equally be taken are not represented in the peace council’, and urged a swift correction to be done.

Moreover, Attuquayefio argued that *to the extent that you have radicalized Muslims ... [in Ghana]*, there should be a cause for concerns especially if “*avenues that give opportunity to further radicalize them exist...*”

For Jaye, Ghana needed to tackle the socio-economic issues of *poverty, and unemployment*, whilst improving other areas for good living conditions of the citizenry.

For his turn, Antwi-Danso asserted that the nature of Ghanaian politics, and politicians facilitate terrorism;

If there is going to be any terrorist organization in Ghana, it will come from politics. The way we run our politics. The way we are very profligate, in our spending and in our ways, [and] lifestyle because we are in politics. It generates animosity towards politics. [Additionally], the way we elect our leadership. No matter how fraudulent the thing is, we must accept a leader. ..And I believe if there is going to be terrorist organization; it is going to come from there. When people are so peeved that the only way they think they can frustrate government is to form terrorist organizations. It will come from politics.

He however contended that “it might take a long time for Ghana to go on those lines when poverty is concerned because our social set up is such that everybody cares for everybody”. Last but not least, he downplayed the existence of small and light weapons in the country as a potential catalyst for terrorist activities; “...Gun running in Ghana is minimal...People are manufacturing arms, People are bringing in illicit arms and selling them and others, but they are minimal. So those arms are used for criminal activities like armed robbery, banditry and that kind of thing...”

From his perspective, Afful highlighted the fact that Ghana was struggling to rid itself of corruptible practices. “If we don’t have the political will to combat corruption, we will find ourselves as in Nigeria”, he cautioned. Additionally, he said *unemployment* was rife and could have ill effects on the country. He therefore encouraged the practice of identifying more opportunities to engage the youth. Also, he underscored the need for leaders to be visionary and innovative, and have the “will to implement good policies”.

Moreover, Aning said that the myriad of problems accounting for the emergence of BH in Nigeria are equally evident in Ghana, hence, this *country [Ghana] is ripe for all these things* [terrorism, and its related incidence]. “Every single reason given by terrorist groups are ripe in Ghana...” owing to the lack of “transparency, accountability, and poor governance, inequalities, and poor leadership...”

According to Pokoo, Ghana is still struggling with some challenges that needed to be surmounted; *...As a country, our economic standpoint is not the best. Even the domestic worthy issues that promote our wellbeing and prosperity [such as] education, health, among others, are lacking... We just hope that nothing bad happens.*

In the face of the (perceived) threats to Ghana, some perspectives were professed by the respondents. Asked what they thought of the counter terrorism measures Ghana had (instituted) to curtail, the following concerns were raised;

According to Afful and CSP Amartey, the Ghana Police Service (GPS), in collaboration with the rest of the security agencies are working to the best of their ability. Some of the measures they have taken include the establishment of new counter terrorism units within

the Ghana Police Service (GPS), a *joint operational command* (JOC), and an Emergency Operating Center (EOC); anti-radicalization programs, and regular education, and training.

However, they indicated the following as challenges confronting their work, which include lack of *inter-agency cooperation* and *communication*, equipment and logistics; reluctance of information delivery by some citizens for arrest; and the difficulty in detecting legitimate monies from illegitimate ones; Amartey stressed that *financial terrorism seems to becoming a thing which ...is increasing every day. Because of our oil find, large amount of monies are flowing into the country and therefore it is very difficult to track which money is meant for terrorist activities and those meant for normal business.*

Additionally, the Custom Official revealed that *Ghana has always been ready for such a thing, the National security are on top of that; Regularly, the security agencies have been meeting, and have been having series of training on joint counter-insurgency courses. The security agencies are always ready to confront any such aggression in the country. Ghana is much prepared and well equipped.*

Furthermore, Amankwah indicated that “since we [Ghanaians] haven’t had any overblown incidence [in light of the counter terrorism measures] we would assume that we are being successful”.

Also, *Debrie said ...Ghana is already doing what it can; Ghana is trying.*

Similarly, Mr. Bonaventura Adjavor said Ghana is doing its possible best to continue to be well prepared, to combat any such situation ...[since] its security forces are up to the task, and are very much alert. [Nevertheless], we could only hope and pray that we don’t face such situation.

Furthermore, *Ahorsu indicated that*

Ghana is prepared but whether they are adequately or absolutely prepared against any form of threat ...is something no one can say. ...And to a large extent, while Ghana is not immune to terrorist attacks as we’ve seen that the ‘December bomber’ passed through Kotoka International Airport¹⁷, we have not suffered this issue, apart from the Eastern region, where they say there is a Muslim community which is manifesting signs of these

¹⁷ Ghana’s foremost airport

monotheistic BH manifestations. Much as we say that as a people who are largely tolerant of each other, we must equally give credit to the security agencies that so far they have worked to secure the country.

Similarly, Agbenyegah argued that “preparations against terrorism is a process and event. You take it every day. If they are not able to get you that day, it means you are prepared. So yes! By all standards and everything we [Ghana] think we are prepared. But ...no one is water tight prepared against terrorism or any crime for that matter”.

Nevertheless, Antwi-Danso contended that “*there were adequate [counter terrorism measures in Ghana] in terms of institutional arrangements, but inadequate in terms of awareness, and security consciousness on the part of the citizenry.*”

Kakraba, and Ajaye, posited that Ghana’s preparation is one of moderation. The former said, *Ghana has not really prepared adequately on the score [because] Ghana’s preparation is moderate, in terms of intelligence, personnel, and equipment.* Similarly, the latter said Ghana’s preparation fell “...somewhere in the middle there, but to say ‘adequately’, I will have my doubts. But looking at how West Africa is, and the way things are happening, a lot of countries are still not prepared...Ghana is up to the task but [the preparations] can never be adequate.

However, Awini, Adwoa Shika, Yakohene, Okine, and Aning maintained that Ghana was lagging behind in the area of anti-terrorism preparations.

For her part, Adwoa Shika indicated that she does not see a very strong counter terrorism measure in Ghana; a situation she thinks is partly due to the covert nature of the intelligence work. In addition, Okine argued that “...we [Ghana] are not [prepared]. Terrorism has its phases from the structural to the proximate to the impact. First when it comes to the root causes, we are not addressing the root causes. When it comes to issues of proximate factors that can come to Ghana, we have not addressed it. When it comes to the personnel who can really take care of the impact, reduce the impact, reduce the possible detonation of a bomb and all that, we don’t have it. So we are just waiting, we are just waiting”, he emphasized.

Last but not least, Aning argued that evidence of effective counter terrorism measures were missing in Ghana. He said, *for example, if there is a bomb at Accra Mall¹⁸ or something that goes out from a car, and somebody is hurt, how do you evacuate such a place?* Because to him, *no proper planning or measures have gone into the putting up of buildings, and infrastructure, even after the -9/11 attacks, [and] in countries that are sensitive to terrorism issues, such a sensitive center [the Accra Mall] will be better guarded, [and] better patrolled...* Additionally, he said, *there is really no security consciousness about the need to enlighten people, to make them sharp [in Ghana]. He also bemoaned the “lack of forensic experts, specialized anti-terrorism Judges and Prosecutors...” inter alia, as a demonstration of how “unprepared” the country is.*

5.1 Analysis and Discussion

The findings underscored the fact that BH’s radical ideological influence remain a key source of terrorism threat to Ghana. Generally, the respondents indicated that Ghanaians remain susceptible to BH’s violent radical ideology. Prominent among these respondents include the Security expert, Messrs Ajayi, Ahorsu, Afful, and others. When these assertions are juxtaposed with BH’s quest for a regional reach¹⁹ there could be little doubt that Ghanaians are at the mercy of threats posed by the sect. The findings also noted that events in Ghana are seldom influenced (partly) by events in Nigeria. As a consequence, some respondents asserted that one cannot rule out the possibilities where a section of Ghanaians are influenced by the activities of BH arising from the harshness of shared SPEAR concerns in Ghana and Nigeria since violent radicalization, and for that matter, terrorism does not take place in a vacuum, but partly through the exploitation of adverse conditions by terrorists. These assertions find some expression in the fact that incidences of BH-related activities have taken place in Ghana. This therefore reflects the *contagion* and *diffusion theory* of transnational terrorism which explains the fact that violent radical ideologies, or terrorist actions spread across different locations irrespective of the geographical boundaries and barriers. As posited by the respondents, the adverse similar

¹⁸ One of the biggest Malls in Ghana

¹⁹ As evidenced by its change of name to *Islamist State West African Province*, after its merger with ISIS; punctuated with its bid to annex territories, and expand its network base via recruitments, and consciously calculated spread of its ideology through its propaganda machinery

SPEAR conditions between the two countries boost their influence on each other, hence Ghanaians' susceptibility to embrace BH's radical ideologies, and implement same in their country. This supports the explanation offered by the *structural strain theory* of terrorism to the effect that similar *structural* problems of poverty, unemployment, religious radicalization¹ which are embedded in the Ghanaian state account for the citizens' sense of alienation (relative deprivation), and therefore boost their morale to support, and sympathize with the cause of BH, and its activities since BH's ideology is premised on opposing western civilization, which in BH's views have produced poverty, and unemployment, and have adulterated the cherished culture of Islam, and Nigeria. In this light, those who feel that BH represent their interest and share their concerns, and therefore are influenced one way or the other to support' the *cause* or the *ideology* of BH virtually make them (*unofficial*) members of BH's social movement.

However, not all the respondents indicated that BH's attacks in Nigeria posed a threat to Ghana. This position was taken by the security analyst. Even though he did not discount the adverse security implications of BH's *activities* on Ghana, he nonetheless argued that the sect's terrorist attacks were restricted to Nigeria, and limited to the immediate neighbors of same. These assertions agree with the findings of (Oftedal 2013b) on the *domestic* aspect of BH. To some extent, these observations give lie to the argument that BH has a regional agenda. As a consequence, it weakens the argument that the sect poses a transnational threat to Ghana. This standpoint is boosted by evidence of the former's relatively concentrated attacks directed against Nigeria. Similarly, its incursions against Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Benin result from the joint military attacks the sect suffers from the Nigerian-led coalition. And indeed, there are incidences where some civilian and military persons of Nigeria's immediate neighbors have borne the brunt of the sect through deaths, and injuries, which is not same with Ghana. Against this backdrop, it could be argued that the threat posed by BH is probably confined to Nigeria, and to some extent its immediate neighbors. Nevertheless, whilst these developments lend credence to BH as a domestic phenomenon, same cannot be said in terms of the sect's ideological influence beyond Nigeria's national boundaries. This stems from the prospects of the sect's ideological influence, and impacts in an era where the world is experiencing an unprecedented surge in electronic and print media, social networking platforms, and

globalization. In other words, the proliferated number of networking media, punctuated with globalization render geographical boundaries almost non-existent as they ‘glue’ the world into a global village. From this perspective, BH’s transnational threat to Ghana arguably remains visible, even if the sect is still regarded as a domestic phenomenon in this context. This is because members of the Islamist group may not necessarily need to get into the corridors of Ghana before influencing unsuspecting victims, or perpetrating terrorist attacks against their host country. The attacks could be executed by their *sympathizers* or members of their *social movement* in Ghana, hence the social movement theory of transnational terrorism.

To a large extent, terrorism as a *transportable, transferable, importable, and exportable* phenomenon has been strengthened by evidence of attacks around the globe where propaganda by terrorists have influenced, and informed some sympathizers²⁰ to carryout strings of attacks across same. For example, ISIS’ attacks, and propaganda influenced some ‘sympathizers’ of same to carry out terrorists activities in Australia, Nigeria, and the UK. This underscores some respondents’ assertions that events, and activities instigated by BH in Nigeria, and beyond could be ‘practiced’ by Ghanaians within and without Ghana who may be convinced of BH’s approach as probably an ‘effective’ means of addressing their concerns in Ghana. Among other factors, it could be argued that the desire to ‘import’ and implement ideologies of BH by sympathizers of the sect in Ghana could be given further boost by the perceived/real concerns and challenges of Ghana’s unreliable institutions, and other state apparatus which highlights the lost legitimacy of the state. And once the state/its institutions lose their legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects, it paves way for terrorism to thrive. For instance, the transnational threat of BH was evidenced in the recent recruitment of some Ghanaian graduates into the ranks of ISIL. Prominently, the recruitment exercise featured a BH-ISIS collaboration (Global Risk Insights 2015). The report notes that “the Islamic State’s recruits from Ghana are believed to have journeyed to Nigeria to receive training at a BH training camp in Niger before traveling to Turkey or Syria”. Already, two students who had earlier joined the group were heading to Syria from Lebanon, according to a Deputy Minister of Education, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa (ghanaweb 2015f).

²⁰ In this case ‘unofficial’ social movement members

Furthermore, the findings reveal that Islamic religious radicalization add to the list of Ghana's vulnerability to the threat of domestic and transnational terrorism. The assertions by Aning, Ahorsu, Afful, Jayi, Attuquayefio, Amoakohene among others, corroborate research findings by (Botha 2008; Collier 2006; Ismail 2013)Botha (2008). Afful observed that there is rampant religious extremism owing to the propagation of extreme doctrinal sermons by particularly the Sunni sects in Ghana. Whilst Afful contended that the preaching of these extreme sermons accompanied radicalization, and violence in the country, such violence took place among different Islamic sects owing to doctrinal differences. What is more, he indicated that radicalization was not directed against the state but against the different strands of Islam in the country. Nevertheless, he was quick to add that there is a growing incidence of religious radicalization and violence among Muslims. He contended that these developments had inimical repercussions for the security of the state. This observation ties in neatly with Aning and Abdallah (2013) findings *on religious radicalization and violence in Ghana*. The authors assert that R.R in Ghana is relatively minimal; and targeted not at the State but against factions of the same sect on the one hand, and against other different religious groups on the other. Accordingly, they undermine State security (Aning & Abdallah 2013 p. 104). The pockets of violence, which accompany such radicalism pose inimical threats to state's security, and stability given the nature they take. For instance, some churches in Ghana were attacked in 1998, and 1999 following an *annual traditional ban on drumming* (All Africa 1998; Tsikata & Seini 2004) owing to opposition from Christians who saw the ban as unconstitutional, and inimical to their rights of worship.

Again, the extent of Ghana's vulnerability to the threat of terrorism arising from violent religious radicalization is reflected in the external support of funds received from Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States which tend to influence the propagation of extreme versions of Islam in (Northern) Ghana as argued by Afful, and affirmed by (Aning & Abdallah 2013 p. 105). The Ahlussunna, and the Ahmadis are notably reported to be beneficiaries of such support (ibid.). Similarly, Barker (1986) notes that the growing Islamic activities and culture in Northern Ghana is a stark reminder of the congenial atmosphere that has come characterize that portion of the country;

Tamale in particular is becoming an important Muslim center. Saudi and the Gulf States are channeling oil wealth into promoting Islam in Africa, and in recent years a series of new Muslim institutions has appeared on the scene. In Tamale alone there are over a dozen Muslim missionaries at the present time.

These (external) support which are geared towards influencing doctrine, beliefs and practices may have inimical implications for the State's security and stability. This position is similarly informed by (Katanga 1994 p. 27) who asserts that the multiplication of Muslim missionaries in Ghana are increasingly projecting new strands of Islam which are by nature anti-Christian, and militaristically Islam-bias. Though Northern Ghana is more prone to Islamic radicalization and violence, than the southern part owing to the prevalence of Islamic extremism (Aning & Abdallah 2013 p. 108), the tendency of the phenomenon to spill or spread across the length and breadth of the country potentially remain factual rather than fiction. More so, the issue of Nigeria's influence on Ghana, in terms of religion, among others cannot be discounted. Aning and Abdallah (2013 p. 108) posit that the Ahlussunna ²¹Imams in Ghana are influenced by events in Nigeria because they perceive Nigerians to be better devout Muslims than Ghanaian Muslims. What is more, these radical Ahlussunna Muslims in Ghana are characterized by their condemnations of blasphemous acts by individuals, and (secular) States who are perceived to be anti-Islam. For example, they devote their Friday sermons, and other social outings to inculcate in their (potential) members the need to castigate anti-Muslim leaders, states and institutions. Events such as the U.S invasion of Afghanistan, and Iraq, the NATO-led operations in Libya that toppled Colonel Quaddafi, among host of others, were met with scathing criticisms from some Muslims in Ghana (ibid.). However, Aning and Abdallah (2013) maintain that in all these events, no attempt has been identified by any of the Islamic groups to undermine the authority of the Ghanaian state. Neither do they exhibit any intention of annexing political power as is the case in Northern Mali, Nigeria, and Arab countries like Egypt; which therefore underscored the authors' "lead proposition [that] radicalization and violence in Ghana is not targeted at the state" (Aning & Abdallah 2013 p. 118).

²¹ Used synonymously as Sunna by Aning and Abdallah (2013)

Nonetheless, without wholly discounting the salience of the findings by Aning and Abdallah (2013), it could be contended that their position probably has some blind spot which could be remedied by widening the angle of their conceptual lens on *religion* to cover the *instrumental* use of the phenomenon by entities. It is argued that religion as a phenomenon bridges people of similar faiths but from different backgrounds together. Additionally, people who share similar religion enjoy a relatively higher degree of trust and social capital among themselves. As a consequence, the 'bond' between members of similar faiths is relatively stronger than the reverse. However, owing to these merits enjoyed by members of similar faiths, sub national actors such as terrorists (may) explore *religion* from an instrumentalist perspective, and exploit the vulnerabilities of members of same. The '*Instrumentalist Approach to religion*' asserts that people could consciously exploit the ignorance and vulnerability of members of similar faiths with the view to championing their interests via *religion*. That is religion offers a medium through which people advance their diverse interests. Sometimes, some terrorist groups cleverly craft their ideologies in religious terms with the view to achieving their political ends. Against this backdrop, however, it could be argued that Ghana may not be immune to the situations in Mali, Nigeria, and Egypt where attempts by religious extremists at undermining state authority, and consequently annexing political power, are seemingly becoming regular features. This is anchored on the argument that (some) religious extremists in Ghana (the Ahl Sunna sect) share similar ideologies with similar religious extremists in Nigeria (Aning & Abdallah 2013). Indeed, the fact that some Imams in Ghana take a cue from their Nigerian counterparts (*ibid.*) is indicative of the level at which (some) Ghanaians are susceptible to their Nigerian fellows. And since some Ghanaian religious leaders are not entirely immune to the gullibility of extreme ideas (or violent radical religious approach) of their Nigerian counterparts, and beyond, the impact may have wider implications for Ghana. For example, radicalized Ghanaian Imams could influence their followers, families, and friends. In this light, the ideologies could spread across the country, the repercussions for which could be disastrous as evidenced in the Nigerian situation. Not to mention the fact that Ghana receive funding and other support from a pro-Islamic state such as Saudi Arabia, which make the former gullible to implement the latter's extreme religious ideologies. It is striking to note that whilst extreme religious doctrine from Saudi Arabia

or other gulf states may not necessarily lead to violent radicalization of Ghanaians who embrace them, the tendency for unsuspecting religiously-inspired terrorist group like BH could exploit the situation in the face of structural problems ²²besetting Ghana. There could be little doubt that the presence of some or mix of the structural problems could *strain* them to resort to other means ²³ lost legitimacy of state/state-owned institutions becomes of their unreliability. Additionally, the structural problems could lead them to feel *relatively deprived* as they compare themselves with the few ²⁴who enjoy the ‘national cake’ at the expense of the majority. Consequently, they become alienated, and remain susceptible to the influence of good/bad social movements that seem to share their concerns. Owing to their grievances, and in the face of unreliable institutions, they could resort to create or join social movements, whose activities may or may not include terrorist actions. These tendencies make Ghanaians susceptible to the influence of BH, and other terrorist groups, which consequently threaten the security of their country.

That notwithstanding, it could be argued that in as much as (some) Ghanaians remain susceptible to the influence of BH, and by extension events in Nigeria, some remain susceptible to the positive influences of some of Nigeria’s good people and events in Nigeria. For example, if (some) potentially radicalized groups in Ghana derive inspiration from Nigeria, the reverse could be true for some sections of Ghanaians who may emulate the inspiration provided them by ‘moderate’ groups in Nigeria. In this respect, there could be a mixture of positive and negative impacts on Ghana/Ghanaians. However, reliance on historical events should remain key in analyzing events in Nigeria and their (potential) implications, impacts or influence on Ghana. Going by this, Ghana has had to bear the brunt of some of Nigeria’s adverse impacts such as Prostitution, cybercrime, armed robbery, among others, on its soil as posited by some respondents. In relation to the recent reports of recruitment of some Ghanaians into the ranks of BH/ISIL (Global Risk Insights 2015), reports indicate that religion featured prominently in the recruitment. It notes that all the recruits were Muslims. Judging from the ideologies, activities and propaganda of

²² Poverty, unemployment, poor governance, corruption, ethnic and chieftaincy conflicts were identified by respondents as rooted in Ghana

²³ Some may seek legal sources, but here the emphasis is on the structural strain theory) of illegality such as terrorism to address their grievances, owing to the (perceived)

²⁴ Vladimir Antwi danso indicated that most political elites in Ghana become relatively richer few days after taking office, and flaunt their wealth, which elicits discontentment

BH, and ISIL, it may be obvious to conceive these groups as Muslim-dominated or Islam-based. In this light, the shared religions of the recruiters and the recruits may have partly facilitated the recruitment. However, this is not to say that it is impossible for non-Muslims to join the ranks of BH/ISIL. In addition to this is the fact that the recruits showed similar signs of support against western civilization. The report notes that one of the recruits named Nazir, had a conception of *democracy* which is consistent with BH. Nazir said among other things, "...I know it might sound kind of crazy for you but your son really had to take this bold step to get out of the corrupt system of Ghana which has democracy first on its list," (ghanaweb 2015c; Global Risk Insights 2015).

In furtherance to the above, the findings of the research highlighted the 'close' relationship between Ghana and Nigeria as a (potentially) important source of BH-induced terrorist threat to Ghana. This 'closeness' relates to the geographical proximity of both countries, their SPEAR attributes, as well as their "cordial relationship". Nigeria's immediate neighbors include Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and Benin. However, by road, Ghana separates Nigeria by 22 hours, 44 minutes, or 1, 587 km on the average (google 2015c). But the shared socio-politico-economic, historical, and religious attributes, and their long-standing relations make the two West African nations appear closer. Their closeness is equally reflected on the international scene in the realm of politics. In terms of business, both countries have institutions in each other's country, and same has engendered (some) nationals of both countries to merge, and partner one another in the corporate world, and in the world of showbiz. As if that is not enough, this 'Ghana-Nigeria relationship' has enhanced their inter marriages, immigration, and other social affairs. In this light, the influx of nationals of both divide in the other's country accompany positive, and negative effects on each other. Given the subject under discussion, Ghana's vulnerability to the phenomenon of terrorism may not be far-flung, or far from reality owing to Nigeria's influence on Ghana through this "closeness" and "cordial relationship". This partly accounts for reasons why some events in Nigeria seldom find their place in the Ghana. Consequently, it could be contended that the current insecurity situation in Nigeria (could) covertly, overtly, directly or indirectly have harmful repercussions for Ghana; a thought which is informed by the *importation*, and its resultant *diffusion cum contagion* of

cybercrime, and prostitution from Nigeria to Ghana²⁵. The monolithic nature of the sub region which facilitates the spread of events across member states adds weight to the extent to which Ghana is exposed to the threat of domestic and transnational terrorism induced or reflective of BH, or other terrorist groups. This assertion is premised on the shared web of social vices, and criminalities that define the West African sub region, and the interconnectedness of countries along socio-politico-economic, religious, ethnic, and cultural lines. That notwithstanding, if the threats are anything to go by, they could be counteracted by the fact that Nigeria and Ghana collaborate, and cooperate in matters of security; share intelligence, engage in joint military training, and education, among others. Similarly, the threat could be hampered by the fact that there are good Nigerians living within and without Ghana, with socio-politico-economic, and religious ties to Ghana, and may therefore impact positively on Ghanaians due to their ties and ‘interest’ in Ghana. In this view, their transnational relations could concurrently endanger, and secure their national security. Nonetheless, the adverse repercussions that could arise from their *closeness* seems to outweigh the positives given the fact that the “terrorists” in Nigeria are inflicting wounds on their self, family, and fellow countrymen, one cannot discount how much of a casualty they could cause on their relatively distant Ghanaian *relatives* and *friends*.

To add to the above is the threat posed by the influx of refugees in Ghana. This was a concern among most respondents, and are equally highlighted by (Sosuh 2011). The displacement of refugees could be ubiquitous, and could take place at any time, and anywhere. One of the socio-politico-economic challenges of Africa is seen in its area of displacements of nationals. This is so owing to causal factors of political instability, and insecurity, civil unrests, and wars, among others. A UNHCR (2004) global report indicates that Africa identifies with six of the world’s major producing refugee countries, and same has a number of millions of its citizens living in foreign countries as refugees. Given its relative peace, and stability on the continent, Ghana has not been spared of hosting refugees. The country has played hosts to displaced persons from similar West African countries of Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Togo and Mali (UNHCR 2007). As the report noted among other things, Ghana hosted the largest refugee, and asylum-seeking population in

²⁵ That has led to an exacerbation of these social vices in Ghana

the sub region at the end of 2007, totaling 35,000. Apart from formally recognized refugees who seek asylum in Ghana, other groups and individuals who claim to be refugees had entered Ghana through the back door. Notable among them were some “Sudanese refugees” who entered the country in April 2005 (Sosuh 2011 p. 17). Their presence went unnoticed until they personally went to the police to “regularize” their status as residents (Ghana News Agency, cited in (Sosuh 2011 p. 17). Similarly, some residents of Nigeria’s Niger Delta region sneaked into Ghana undetected, until their identities were later established (ibid.). Their presence in Ghana was considered threat to national security given their historical connections to “violence”, and terrorism (World news 2010, cited in ibid.). In her findings, Sosuh (2011 p. 17) has identified a number of deleterious security ramifications of the influx of refugees in Ghana ;

“...They put strain on the economy, environment and social infrastructure, and can be predisposed to crime especially those coming from civil war situation. They could bring their weapons and use them for criminal activities... their prolonged stay could alter the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of a country.

Another source of Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of transnational terrorism lie in the unstable and insecure environmental web characterizing the West African sub region. Kieh and Kalu (2013) similarly observe that the sub region is identified by weak, and ungoverned borders, drug, and human trafficking, political instability, illicit proliferation of small and light weapons, mal development, precariously prolonged conflicts, cross-border criminal gangs, terrorists, Islamist militants, and weak borders, inter alia. To add to that the (sub) region’s proximity to South America via sea, coupled with weak maritime, and air space security expose the coast of West Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea to transnational criminals, and drug syndicates. Additionally, the unemployed (youths) succumb to influence of such groups in their quest to secure wealth, resources, and better lives, and therefore engage in nefarious activities (41 cite). Furthermore, the inter, and intra-religious conflicts and tensions defining West Africa has created divisions which terrorist groups can exploit, and explore. The upsurge in the number of these Islamist groups in that part of the world highlights the fact that the (sub) region is relatively weak, porous, and accommodating for terrorism, terrorists, and terrorist-related activities. These

perennial challenges of the (sub) region make nationals of countries within the geographical area impressionable to exploitation by terrorists. In this regard, there could be little doubt that radicalized individuals and groups could transport similar ideas to their home countries the result of which could be tantamount to no less than the formation of terrorists groups, attacks or terrorist-related incidences.

In a related fashion, Adu, Afful, and Amartey assert that the porous borders of Ghana reflects that of the wider West African sub region and serves as a serious bottleneck burdening the operations of (border) security officials. The repercussions of this challenge cannot be overemphasized; they facilitate transnational organized crimes such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons, drugs, and arms, to mention a few. As Sosuh (2011), and (Kieh & Kalu 2013) note, the consistent conflicts symptomatic of the African continent, with their resultant ramifications of organized cross border crimes exacerbate the transnational threats to the security of states in the region. The fact that Ghana has experienced some impacts of political turbulence from Togo, Cote D'Ivoire and Liberia Sosuh (2011) underscores the fact that Ghana remains vulnerable to the activities of BH, and events in Nigeria. An illustrative example is key to giving meaning to this assertion. The Global Risk Insights (2015) indicate the fact that the BH-ISIL recruits journeyed from Ghana to Nigeria without any detection by Ghana-Nigeria security agencies. This highlights the porosity of the Ghana-Nigeria borders, and by extension, the entire sub region. Nonetheless, this is not deny the difficulties characterizing the sophistication of modern terrorism. If this present-day terrorism is sophisticated, the development also calls for a parallel reflection of counter-terrorism measures.

It must however, be noted that Ghana's risks arising from the influx of refugees into its territory, the unstable, and insecure environment of the West African sub region, and weak borders are issues that bother on border management, and Ghana has institutions to that effect. These institutions work to the best of their ability to ensure the safety, and security of the country. As part of their tasks, they collaborate, and coordinate with national, continental, and global institutions. The effectiveness, and efficiency of these institutions, and their officials have translated into momentous strides in their lines of operation. This has helped to counter some threats arising from transnational, and cross border

criminalities, porous, and unstable environment that characterize the (sub) region. Nevertheless, restraint on too much optimism is prudent. The institutions in Ghana are fraught with capacity challenges which (seldom) jeopardize their efficiency, and effectiveness. For example, issues of *corruption*, *bribery*, and *nepotism* are major problems burdening them. Though legislative, and institutional arrangements have been established to deal with terrorism, and other related transnational organized crimes, commitments by governments, institutional authorities, and stakeholders to implement their provisions have been minimal (Sosuh 2011). There is therefore a gap between policies, and the commitment to implement same. A number of records lend credence to this. For instance, Government's anti-human trafficking *support* translated into 0.7% of its *total capital generated* for such *operations* in 2009 (all Africa.com cited in (Sosuh 2011)). Moreover, the lack of the country's "institutional structures" weakens its compliance, and commitments to the dictates of global border crime legislation (ibid.). Not to talk of the lack of logistics among the various security agencies which tends to hamper their progress. Even when such logistics were in existence, they were either obsolete or in limited use. For example, the strengths of PISCES and Scanners used at the country's borders are limited; and the efficiency of those equipment at major points of entry including those of the country's foremost Airport, and other borders at Aflao, Elubo, and Harbours at Tema and Tarkoradi are poor (Sosuh 2011). These weaknesses are further exacerbated by the reluctance of some citizens to release credible information necessary for arrest, investigations and consequent conviction by the police, intelligence and other security personnel counteract smooth counter terrorism operations. Such practice on the part of the populace has the tendency to jeopardize the security of the state. Other challenges include the lack of prosecution of suspects, bureaucracy, impediments, and interference from high-ranking officials, language barrier (at the borders owing to French-speaking neighbours), poor salary, and honorarium, and the lack of cooperation, and collaboration among national and international institutions (Sosuh 2011 p. 29). Though efforts put by governments, and other stakeholders to arresting the challenges, are commendable, they have not been adequate enough to deal with the situation. As a consequence, their efforts have suffered following the gap between promise and performance, rhetoric and reality since such challenges have been perennial, and deeply-rooted, and that their continuous existence endanger state

security in immeasurable proportions. Given this situation, the scale of Ghana's susceptibility to the threat of terrorism, and other transnational organized crime may not be minimal.

As if that is not enough, the threat is properly projected by the rot of corruption at Ghana's borders (Heritage 2006; Integrity & Feigenblatt 2009; Koranteng & Abdulai 2012; Mark 2015; Modern Ghana 2015). Corruption is "...an illegal payment to a public agent to obtain a benefit that may or may not be deserved in the absence of pay offs" (Rose-Ackerman 2002). Transparency International (2014) defines it "...[as] the abuse of entrusted power for private gain". Corruption at the borders enhance the passage of criminals, and criminalities within and without Ghana. In this respect, terrorists, and other dangerous groups and individuals may find their ways in the country to execute their missions. From this perspective, unsuspecting Ghanaians could be influenced to advance the ends of these terrorists. Despite the endemic corruption canker in the country, some citizens have distinguished themselves by remaining adamant to the temptations that accompany the phenomenon. Furthermore, various private and government bodies have been instituted to nib the canker in the bud. At least, these counter arrangements potentially provide some timely relief, or respite, and probably reduces the incidence of the phenomenon which offers some hope and optimism. However, their existence in great measure may mean that they would remain threat pro tempore, and would require relentless time, and efforts at mitigating, and perhaps eradicating same.

Similar to weak borders, cum corruption is the lack of equipment used by the immigration, customs officials, and other internal and external security authorities. This flaw which was revealed by Adu, Afful, and Amartey is strengthened by observations made by (Sosuh 2011). She asserts that there is the general lack of *infrastructure* and *facilities* needed for effective security operations along Ghana's borders. This affirms Aning, and Yankah's assertions that the poor anti-terrorism infrastructure of the country reflects the lack of appreciation for the threats posed by contemporary terrorists, and terrorism. This limitation renders counter terrorism operations counter-productive owing to ineffective services of border authorities occasioned by the lack of appropriate accoutrements, hence, fostering and festering the activities of terrorists the result of which could culminate in domestic,

and transnational terrorism in the country. However, caution against too much pessimism is prudent. The sophistication of modern terrorism, and its resultant global surge has perhaps informed Ghana to rethink its conception of the phenomenon. As the Custom Official, Adu, Amankwah, and Afful indicated, Ghana is strengthening, and stepping up its measures against terrorism by providing the needed equipment, logistics, and organizing intermittent security training, and courses, seminars, and retreats. Though these efforts are seldom hampered by constraints, they may nonetheless reduce the threats, and incidence of terrorism in the country. However, the rampant spate of contemporary terrorist attacks across the globe means that stringent counter measures are required, and the fundamental problems of inadequate equipment, logistical, operational, and tactical resources will do little to assist when perpetrators of the phenomenon beckon in Ghana.

Additionally, the ECOWAS protocol border policy (979) which was designed to foster integration within the sub region is viewed by almost all the respondents as being counterproductive, which further exposes Ghana's vulnerability to the threat of terrorism. This thinking is pivoted on the fact that the *protocol* has turned into a *white elephant* facilitating cross-border crimes in the sub region. The ill functioning of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of people and goods is hampered by lack of education, and poor functioning of state institutions negatively affects its implementation (Sosuh 2011). This undoubtedly undermines border security, and paves way for criminals including terrorists into the country. How does a policy which was initiated on good grounds to facilitate, for example, integration and trade, among member states serve to defeat the very purpose for which it was established? In the first place, despite the fact that the policy abolishes visa requirements of citizens of member states, it nonetheless requires same to possess a valid travel document and an international health certificate (Protocol A/P.1/5/79, 1979) cited in (Bamfo 2013). In this respect, the violation of the policy does not take place in a vacuum but suffers the scourge of corruption by (some) border officials, who seek their selfish interest at the state's expense. In this light, these officials, and their accomplices threaten the security of Ghana.

Furthermore, the lack of inter-agency collaboration, cooperation, and communication at national and transnational levels, as highlighted by Afful, render Ghana's counter

terrorism, and other security efforts ineffective. Sosuh (2011 p. 29) notes that the “lack of collaboration and cooperation between the (border) agencies [in Ghana] and their [Nigerian counterparts] impedes their ability to provide fast and efficient services”. Similarly, the lack of same ultimately jeopardizes Ghana’s counter terrorism measures. Nevertheless, the fact that the country has transnational, and global counter terrorism collaboration and cooperation is a step in the right direction since the nature of terrorism requires collaborative efforts. However, once Ghana has formally initiated the need to collaborate to achieve set targets, it must live up to expectations, especially when it is an issue of national security. Notwithstanding that, one cannot lose sight of the challenges such institutions battle with. These institutions are managed by man and are therefore prone to errors, and are (seldom) beset with logistical, resource, and other constraints which fall far short of their control. However, these challenges do not entirely excuse the level of inaction, and rhetoric by some government officials, professional authorities, and other key holders. In this light, the lack of institutional cooperation and collaboration between Ghana, and say Nigeria, threaten their counter terrorism efforts.

The findings also identified money laundering and financial terrorism as security challenges underscoring Ghana’s vulnerability to the phenomenon of terrorism. Amartey indicated that the difficulty in combatting financial terrorism in Ghana hampered the fight against terrorism. His observation was strengthened by the findings by (Sosuh 2011). “Money laundering is the generic term used to describe the process by which criminals disguise the original ownership and control of the proceeds of criminal conduct by making such proceeds appear to have derived from a legitimate source” (ICA n.d) . The term has nexus with any illegitimate profit generating-venture such as financial terrorism, illegal trafficking of drugs, arms, and people, extortion, and kidnapping, tax evasion and fraud, and especially corruption”(Chaikin & Sharman 2009). The menace is difficult to combat given the subtle, secrecy, and the perpetrators involved (Chaikin & Sharman 2009; Sosuh 2011). This corroborates the assertion made by Amartey to the effect that combating financial terrorism in Ghana is difficult owing to the difficulty in detecting legitimate monies from illegitimate ones. Sosuh (2011 p. 6) observes that money laundering constitutes a relatively minimal threat in Ghana. Juxtaposing the ‘difficulty in detecting the phenomenon’ in Ghana, and its perceived minimal threat in same raises the question of

how the two affect each other. If it is difficult/easy to unravel the nature it takes, it may partly affect the level of perceived threat it poses to Ghana. Which probably holds that the easier it is detected by the mandated authorities, the more credible its threats' assessment may be. However, the fact that it is recognized globally as a phenomenon which has proven difficult to combat underscores the assertions of both sources²⁶. Nevertheless, its sophisticated form requires a corresponding significant, and rigorous counter measures. Despite its rather lower threatening level as argued by (Sosuh 2011), a report produced by GIABA ²⁷on Ghana's efforts in Anti-Money Laundering and the Combating of Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) in 2008, paints a different picture. The report revealed the following, inter alia; First, Ghana witnessed an upsurge in the buying of dear residential apartments which followed instant payment of US dollars in cash; second, Ghana had a weak Anti Money Laundering, and financial terrorism measures, and poor public knowledge on same (Sosuh 2011). Though Ghana has anti-money laundering, and counter terrorism institutions which "...carry out day to day coordination and investigation of terrorist crimes" (Ewi & plessis 2012 p. 1021), such institutions are dull (Hutchful 2007 p. 118). This lack of public knowledge on the phenomenon, coupled with the lax, poor, and low profile measures leave Ghana at the mercy of terrorism, and its threats.

Additionally, Ghana's involvement in foreign (military) interventions is identified by Kakraba, as an avenue which exposes the latter to security threats, and heightens the country's risks to the pangs of terrorism. The country has troops in Mali, Cote D'Ivoire South Sudan, Liberia (ModernGhana 2013; UN DPKO 2010). UN DPKO (2010) ranked Ghana sixth among the top twenty troop contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations as at February 28, 2010. Whilst Somalia-based Al-Shabaab, and Mali-based Ansar dine, have a history of launching attacks against countries whose troops oppose them, it is not impossible for Ghana to be among those countries probably listed as (potential) targets by the terrorist groups. Though not directly related to terrorism, the early stages of Liberia's civil war witnessed what could be viewed today as an Al-Shabaab strategy of retaliation in response to foreign ('military') intervention. In August 1990, in retaliation for Ghana's

²⁶ Amartey, and (Sosuh 2011)

²⁷ Inter - Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa (GIABA)

participation in a West African peacekeeping force (which had tried but failed to stop the fighting), Taylor's troops slaughtered 1,000 Ghanaian immigrants in one day in the Liberian village of Marshall (Boutwell & Klare 2000). Though Taylor's troops were not terrorists, they adopted a strategy and style that is consistent with modern day modus operandi of terrorists. From the foregoing, Ghana could be said to be predisposed to retaliation by terrorists²⁸. This assertion is underlined by a security analyst in Ghana, Emmanuel Sowatey who has argued that "Once you are sending troops, you'll have to have an intense change in national security structure because if the president makes certain commitment and comments at the UN, the AU and the (ECOWAS), and makes pronouncements against certain terrorist groups, there are likely implications" (ModernGhana 2013). He therefore stressed the need for adjustment in Ghana's domestic security arrangements to reflect current security developments in the face of growing attacks from Al Shabaab "...since the country [Ghana] was contributing to peacekeeping efforts across the world", in addition to efforts and pronouncements made by former ECOWAS Chair, and current President of Ghana against BH. It could be argued that Ghana's vulnerability to (retaliatory) attacks by terrorists is heightened in terms of its foreign interventions when argued from the standpoint that countries who may not be involved in military interventions have one way or the other suffered some casualties in the hands of terrorists or their activities. This stems from the fact that ISIS captured and brutally murdered some Japanese and Chinese citizens, whose countries are not belligerent parties to the anti-ISIS joint strikes in Syria, and Iraq.

From the foregoing, it could be deduced that terrorists could strike at any country at any given time. The situation highlights the fact that terrorism has undoubtedly featured as an international phenomenon which threatens global peace and security. From this perspective, it may be essential for countries to take proactive measures to combat the crime via means not limited to foreign interventions, even if those countries may not have immediate strategic interests. This is because whether countries intervene militarily or otherwise, they still face threats by terrorists except that the extent of the threat varies.

²⁸ Such as BH and Al Shabaab

Furthermore, the lack of education, sensitization, awareness and security consciousness among the citizenry, identified by the respondents further expose Ghana to the horrors of terrorism. This general weakness among the populace evidences itself in the lack of appropriate anti-terrorism infrastructure, lack of visible national and public discourse on the issue of terrorism, and the seeming lack of interrogative nature among Ghanaians on counter terrorism, and other security-related issues. Among other things. To a large degree, these speak volumes of the lack of general appreciation of the threats and throes of terrorism on the part of particularly counter terrorism officials, policy makers, and authorities of state security institutions. The result of this shortcoming may not be far-fetched; first, it (could) enhance the fostering of terrorism, and terrorist-related incidence in the country; second, it could heighten the susceptibility of the citizenry to the menace; third, it could give grounds for terrorists and their associates to exploit the ignorance of the people, to say the least. However, when the citizenry are sensitized, and informed of the phenomenon, their awareness may prompt them to be more meticulous, remain security-conscious, equip them to question suspicious characters, and events, and these may largely help save lives, and properties in the long run, all things being equal. However, it could also be argued that the lack of sensitization, public education, and discourse on the phenomenon is perhaps the result of conscious restriction of information flow as a strategic approach adopted by counter terrorism officials in dealing with the issue. This may be true given the fact that issues of terrorism, and its related incidences could spark public fear, and insecurity. And these may have repercussions for activities of the state, and the citizens. If this stance is anything to go by, the ensuing public fear when not handled properly might jeopardize state security and render anti-terrorism operations self-defeating to some extent. In this light, it may be proper for counter terrorism efforts to remain covert for purposes of intelligence, and national security concerns. That notwithstanding, the fact that civilians exclusively remain targets of terrorists' attacks should underpin the former's engagement in all counter terrorism measures and policies. This would to a greater measure inhibit the occurrence of the phenomenon, and its pangs. In this way, it could be contended that a good anti-terrorism measure/policy has an important feature of involving the citizenry in all material matters of human, and state security. The concern that public education could instigate fear within the country could be settled by a cautious dissemination of

information, and public education, sensitization and discourse. And for the fact that at present, poor preparation in areas of public broadcast concerning the phenomenon partly defines the country's response to same and underscores its very vulnerability.

In addition to the above is the issue of the desirability of Ghanaians to report criminal and criminal activities to security agencies. According to Afful, the lack of cooperation, and the reluctance of some Ghanaian citizens to relay credible information to effect arrest of criminals posed a serious security threat to the country. However, his observation conflicts with that of the security analyst who posits that Ghanaians are generally enthused to report criminals and criminal activities. Notwithstanding these disparities, it is worthy to recognize the fact that state security and stability requires collaborative efforts by all and sundry. Arguably, a self-policing state may be more secure than the reverse given the joint cooperation among security agencies and the citizens towards averting the occurrence of crime. To the extent that security bodies are battling with institutional challenges, coupled with the lack of security consciousness among the populace, there could be little pessimism about the safety and security of the Ghanaian state in the face of challenges such as weak borders as posited by Afful, and underscored by (Sosuh 2011).

Last but not least, the successful infiltrations by members of BH into Yemen, Mali, and Somalia accentuate the threats Ghana faces with respect to the former. For example, some respondents indicated that an AQIM bomb expert, a supreme sharia court judge of Ghana-Nigeria descent resident in Nigeria, and the Nigerian failed panty-bomber of a US-bound plane (Captain Brachie 2014; CBS News 2010; Ghanaweb 2015e) successfully entered the country [Ghana] without detection by security officials. These infiltrations raise several security questions, and further heighten Ghana's vulnerability to the threat of terrorism. Firstly, it shows how porous, and lax the security checks at the Ghanaian borders are. It also stresses the lack of Ghana-Nigeria cooperation and collaboration vis-à-vis security and intelligence. Third, their successful entry into Ghana arguably sheds some light on the issue of corruption/underhand dealings on the part of (border) security officials. Additionally, it could be argued that the mere presence of these terrorists in Ghana had prospects of endangering the State's security. For example, they (might) have influenced, trained, or radicalized their acquaintances in Ghana; second, they could have perpetrated horrendous

attacks in Ghana. However, the research findings do not have any evidence that these personalities acted in a manner that tragically impacted Ghana's Security. Nevertheless, in the case of the US panty bomber, Omar Farouk Abdul Mutallab detonated his suicide vest with bomb when he mounted his Detroit bound-plane. This perhaps shows clearly that he could have probably detonated the bomb during his stay in Ghana if he had rescinded his decisions based on any possible circumstance or reason.

That notwithstanding, Omar Farouk Abdul Mutallab evaded advanced border security measures in Amsterdam and successfully enplaned to detonate the Detroit-bound Plane but to no avail. This speaks volumes of the sophistication of present day terrorism which accordingly calls for stringent measures. Nevertheless, whilst mounting searing and scathing criticisms, and condemnations of the rots, and inefficiencies that expose the country to surmountable security deficiencies, Ghana's security personnel deserve a pat on the back for the monumental feats they have chalked in their operations as evidenced in the interception of weapons by Ghanaian security officials following the recent Cote D'ivoire crisis (Ato 2011). This underpins the need for proper training, equipment, and motivation of security personnel for the provision of better effective and efficient services. Additionally, since some of these success stories are kept from the public domain for intelligence, and national security concerns, the public become oblivious of them, and therefore tend to lack a good appreciation of efforts made by these personnel.

Similarly, the fact that BH members had in previous times successfully disguised themselves as Fulani herdsmen and had entered Mali, and Niger, to execute their missions threaten Ghana's security in the area of terrorism as asserted by Afful, and corroborated by (Sosuh 2011). This assertion is made following Ghana's infiltrations by Fulani herdsmen from Niger, Mali and Chad through illegitimate routes (Bamfo 2013; Sosuh 2011) sometimes without detection by border authorities. Again, such phenomenon predominantly takes place at the northern part of the country, which has seen increasing levels of Islamic religious radicalization, chieftaincy disputes, ethno-tribal tensions, cum endemic poverty, and other socio-economic, and political challenges.

In the face of illegal entry by the herdsmen, Ghana's (border) security officials have been able to make some strides in averting incidences of such. The border between Ghana, and

Togo witnessed the arrest of five Fulani herdsmen and their 700 cattle, and were consequently returned to Togo on charges of illegal entry by the Ghana Immigration officials (IRIN 2010 cited in (Sosuh 2011). Nevertheless, the short comings of the security agencies in dealing with the phenomenon of Fulani herdsmen owing to their adverse security implications on the country prompted the nation's law-making body to delve into the issue. At the floor of Parliament, one Member of Parliament (MP) reacted

“If our national security has not been able to handle this problem, then one day if a country invades Ghana, what will they do? Because these are untrained Fulani herdsmen taking care of cattle, holding AK-47, raping our women, killing our people and we cannot handle that situation. So why should this House continue to approve budget and many other things for people who claim to be handling security? Please this is a serious matter and we should demand that a special action program is put before us for people to explain why they are unable to handle this matter” MP for Okere, Dan Botwe suggested (Ghana-mps.gov.gh 2010).

Therefore, given the fact that some members of BH have been successful in penetrating the borders into Mali, Nigeria, and Niger; punctuated with the difficulties in detecting the entry of these herdsmen in Ghana, as well as their possibility to influence Ghanaians upon their successful entry, inform the thinking that Ghana is potentially at risk of BH infiltration, ideological influence and terrorist attacks.

SPEAR Factors Influencing the prospects for Domestic Terrorism in Ghana?

At this juncture, it is necessary to deliberate on the SPEAR factors indicated by the respondents, on how they affect the possibilities for domestic terrorism in Ghana.

Respondents indicated a number of factors which are not limited to (*poverty, relative and economic inequality, poor economic development*), *poor governancel/leadership/lack of transparency and accountability, corruption, unemployment*, dangerous politics (political sponsorship to cause mayhem, vituperations, flaunting of wealth, “winner-take-all”), *Gun running*, (violent) religious radicalization issues pertaining to the electronic and print media.

Analysis and Discussion

Respondents identified poverty as one of socio-economic factors which could partly influence domestic terrorism in Ghana. Aning and Abdallah (2013) have identified Poverty as a phenomenon which is generally thriving in Ghana. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is relatively rife in the Northern part of the country and has persisted since colonial era (ibid.). Lipton and Ravallion (1993) define Poverty as a situation which "...exists when one or more persons fall short of a level of economic welfare deemed to constitute a reasonable minimum, either in some absolute sense or by the standards of a specific society". The World Health Organization (2014) considers the phenomenon as an umbrella term which encompasses all manner of problems that threaten the health, and survival of humans. The July 2013 report on population and housing census suggests a higher poverty level and widespread deprivation in Ghana, particularly in the three northern regions. The overall proportion of multidimensional poverty in Ghana is around 20% (UNDP 2014) and about 28.5% live below the poverty line (The World Bank 2014). Nevertheless, various interventions have been made by the incumbent, and previous governments to arrest the poverty situation through job creation, and other interventions. The National Health Insurance Scheme, the National Youth Employment Program the Savanna Accelerated Development Authority (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 2015) are evidence of such interventions. However, efforts by government have proved inadequate given the fact that the country has been declared HIPC by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

It could be argued that whilst the mere presence of poverty may not necessarily generate terrorism, it offers fertile grounds for the less endowed to be exploited through financial assistance offered by unsuspecting terrorists. In this regard, the rising incidence of poverty in Ghana constitutes threats since it has the potential to influence poor people in to it. Contrarily, it could be contended that the rising poverty levels in Ghana could do little to affect some less privileged people to engage in the phenomenon. This position is predicated on grounds that not all poor people could fall for financial inducements to engage in terrorism. At the same time, the rich in Ghana could engage in the phenomenon as well. However, in relative terms, it could be argued that poverty in Ghana could heighten the poor's vulnerability to exploitation than the rich. Given the rising levels of religious radicalization in the midst of growing incidence of poverty, there is the tendency for Ghana to suffer from the pangs of terrorism if care is not taken. A critical consideration of events

in Northern Ghana offers some credibility to the assertion. The relatively rife poverty levels, ethnic clashes, and a fledgling religious radicalization provides potentials for domestic terrorism in the country. For instance, the BH-ISIS recruitment incidence in Ghana offers a striking example of poverty as a catalyst for terrorism. The report by Global Risk Insights (2015) does not underestimate the role of poverty in the incidence. It notes that “While youths from both rich and poor backgrounds are known to have been recruited by ISIS, ‘the recruits’ are purportedly promised luxurious lives when they get to Syria and Iraq, as well as assurance of quality life for their immediate family members back at home. This is an offer Ghanaian young men and young women are finding difficult to refuse, especially youths from the majority: northern Ghanaian Muslims...”

Another bottleneck burdening the country, and affecting its tendency for domestic terrorism is poor governance. The Business Dictionary (2015) defines ‘governance’ as ‘the establishment of policies, and continuous monitoring of their proper implementation, by the members of the governing body of an organization. It includes the mechanisms required to balance the powers of the members (with the associated accountability), and their primary duty of enhancing the prosperity and viability of the organization. Fukuyama (2013) defines the term as {... as government’s ability to make and enforce rules and to deliver services ...’”. This means that the term extends to the quality of leadership, nature of policies, and the political will to execute laid down policies. It also involves transparency and accountability. Werlin (2003) asserts that there is a general weakness in Ghana’s governance. Sandbrook and Oelbaum (1997) argue that the widespread cronyism in Ghana’s governance have resulted in “corruption” thereby affecting government institutions. Similarly, Adarkwah-Yiadom (2013) asserts that poor governance in Ghana amplify “poverty”, and “corruption”. Following the conduct of a project in Ghana by “Democracy International” on behalf of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the project’s findings indicated that the domineering power of the executive arm of Ghana’s government which is engendered by the Supreme Law of the Land, hampers “accountability, transparency, and responsiveness” (Democracy International 2011). Despite these concerns about the current nature of Ghana’s governance, a report on Ghana’s performance of Africa’s Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), by the Renewal (2006), gives mixed accounts. It observes that “The report praises Ghana for holding three successful elections since the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1992, including a peaceful transition between parties and presidents in

2000. [Praised Ghana's] "Unique institutions" of governance, among other things. Nevertheless, the "...report criticized the large size of the cabinet...which undermined the separation of powers between members of parliament, between the executive and the legislature; ...restricted the independence of the judiciary, and [featured] the "interference" of the executive in court cases...". The report was premised on a wide range of components constituting the "APRM's notion of governance" which cut across all segment of the country such as "political power to business, the media, civil society and local communities".

However, poor governance could generate distasteful results for the country. It could lead to the loss of trust and legitimacy of the state and its institutions in the eyes of the citizenry. This may result in situations where affected individuals could resort to illegitimate means to address their discontentment. Such discontentment may also arise from their sense of politico-socio-economic alienation. As a consequence, they could be exploited by terrorist groups. Since the mere existence of poor governance may not be enough to influence terrorism, it could be argued that the rising incidence of radicalization could fan the incidence of domestic terrorism in Ghana. (Botha 2008 p. 39) has argued that [poor] governance does not only have a "direct" effect on domestic terrorism, but it impacts remotely on transnational terrorism as well. His assertion gives credence to the Nigerian situation where the lack of credible institutions, and poor governance have partly given grounds for BH to take the law into their own hands by opposing, and fighting to unseat the government rather than resolving its grievances with the appropriate state institutions. Though frantic efforts put by the Ghana government to improving its governance record is commendable, a lot needs to be done.

In addition to the above is the issue of *corruption*. Corruption is a socio-economic problem that has crept into the inner core of the Ghanaian society despite proclaimed attempts by successive governments in dealing with the problem since time immemorial. Corruption is "...an illegal payment to a public agent to obtain a benefit that may or may not be deserved in the absence of pay offs" (Rose-Ackerman 2002). Transparency International (2014) defines the term "... [as] the abuse of entrusted power for private gain". Although the World Bank data on corruption indicator suggests Ghana's progression from the 50th to the 75th percentile in the last five to six years, other indicators like the Bertelsmann Transformation index and Afro Barometer indicate no remarkable improvement (Agbele 2011). Consequently, varied sources have indicated that there is lack of trust

in the incumbent government's handling of corruption-related issues, just as the business industry deems the menace as a hindrance to conducting business in Ghana (Business Anti-Corruption Portal 2014). The overt display of corruption and the willingness to corrupt, both at the lower and higher levels (Tweneboah-Koduah 2014) makes the canker even more serious since the environment in Ghana facilitates corruption (Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition and the National Governance Programme 2006). Socio-economic policies initiated by governments, both past, and present, have been hit by strings of corruption scandals (Modern Ghana 2015; Multimedia Group Limited 2014; MYJoyonline.com 2014). According to a recent research conducted by the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), "three-quarters of Ghanaians regarded corruption as a serious problem, with 80 per cent feeling it had worsened over previous years" (CDD cited in (Renewal 2006). These, and many others lend credence to the fact that the canker takes several forms, at several areas, in different institutions. That notwithstanding, a number of anti-corruption agencies and institutions have been established by way of curbing the malady. They include the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), the Ghana Integrity initiative (GII), and a host of others. Nevertheless, recent allegations of corruption scandals in the judiciary is probably a clear indication that the phenomenon is deeply rooted in the country (Ghanaweb 2015d; Modern Ghana 2015). The ramifications of the phenomenon cannot be overemphasized; first, it hampers a country's growth and development; it makes institutions lose credibility, and legitimacy; it widens the gap between the rich, and the poor; and not least, it fosters criminal activities, and violence. Owing to these negative developments, there could be little doubt that the adverse phenomenon could lead some individuals in the country to feel relatively deprived as they compare themselves with others, owing to the gap that has been created by the structural problem of corruption. They may therefore be influenced by individuals, and groups who identify themselves with common grievances to join hands, and resort to illegitimate means of addressing the problem since they might have lost trust in the institutions which had been established to deal with the canker. By committing their human resource, strategic and tactical expertise arising from their de jure and de factor membership, they are set to champion their socio-politico-economic and religious actions to press home their demands, thereby giving credence to the theory of *social movement*. This is buttressed by events in Nigeria which has been partly attributed to *corruption*. For instance, Global Risk Insights (2015) and (ghanaweb 2015c) report that one of the Ghanaians recruited into ISIL , Nazir Nortei Alema, cited endemic *corruption* and *democracy* in Ghana, as

factors informing his decision to join the terrorist group; the extract read in part, "...I told you a lie to please my Allah. The deception was to go do some research work in faraway Prestea while the main idea was to move far away from you all to the Islamic State (IS). I know it might sound kind of crazy for you but your son really had to take this bold step to get out of the corrupt system of Ghana which has democracy first on its list," (ghanaweb 2015c). The incidence affirms *corruption* as a factor facilitating Ghana's vulnerability to threat of terrorism.

Furthermore, the unemployment situation in Ghana has the prospect to aid domestic terrorism in the country. Unemployment is defined as "the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment" (The World Bank 2014). In the year 2000, the unemployment rate in Ghana equaled 11%, (U. S Central Intelligence Agency 2014), and it averaged from 12.05% in 2001 to a record high of 12.90% in 2014 (Bank of Ghana 2014). The unemployment situation is widely evident in geographical locations where there are disparities and inequalities (Adarkwa 1992) . "...the major spatial inequalities in Ghana are the north-south, the rural-urban and the rural-rural dichotomies Tsikata & Seini cited in (Aning & Abdallah 2013). The situation is at its worst in the three northern regions of Ghana (ibid.). "Whereas employment has been relatively low in Ghana, there is potential for increased unemployment given that macro-economic growth has dropped below the average of at least 8% since 2013 and currently stands at 3.9 per cent" (Global Risk Insights 2015). However, despite the situation, a number of interventions have been introduced by successive governments, to curtail the problem. Especially in the three northern regions where poverty is endemic, Scholarship schemes have been instituted, jobs have been created, and a number of them, including the incumbent President, enjoy enviable positions in all spheres of the (Ghanaian) life. Nonetheless, unemployment still remains a major issue in Ghana. It could be argued that whilst unemployment in itself may not necessarily push people into terrorism, unemployed people could be influenced by elements to engage in terrorist activities. This could be seen from the standpoint where unemployment culminates in poverty, which makes some poor people gullible to influence in their quest to satisfy their ends. Commenting on the recent incidence of terrorism in the country, a retired captain indicated that "When you have between 50% and 60% of the unemployed being the youth, who are between 24 and 35, it's a huge risk..." (ghanaweb 2015a; ghanaweb 2015f).

A major concern shared among the respondents pertained to the issue of the youth and unemployment. A couple of definitions have been given for what constitutes *youth*. However, a common component of the definition underlines the fact that the youth are relatively younger than their adult counterparts. The Oxford Dictionaries (2015) defines youth as *the period between childhood and adult age*; or simply, *a young man*. The youth have been important targets, and source of recruitments for terrorists groups. A close observation may reveal that the youth form a good component of terrorist cells. Arguably, it may be difficult for some youth to resist or remain intractable to the various strategies employed by terrorists owing to the fact such strategies are cleverly crafted to expose unsuspecting victims to succumb directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, electronically, or otherwise, and in no small measure, socio-politico-economically, and religiously. Since terrorism does not necessarily take place in a vacuum, it could be contended that the youth who are relatively less endowed ²⁹ as compared to their adult counterparts, ³⁰fall preys to terrorists' recruitments, and propaganda easier. It comes as no surprise that consistent calls are being made to engage the youth meaningfully, and productively through national discussions, provision of employment, education, among other interventions. The phenomenal engagement of the youth in violence poses an existential threat to the security, and stability of West African countries, where same is rife with needlessly naked violence, and civic unrests arising from political rivalry, and personal vendettas, which remotely facilitates the festering of terrorism. The 'youth in violence' phenomenon has been explored among some scholars; Braungart (1984) observes that most youths in West African countries have little to lose during [violence such as] civil wars because they are relatively less endowed compared to their older counterparts. Beyond Ghana, the conflicts in Sierra Leone, La Cote D'Ivoire and Liberia were sustained by the large number of young people who comprised about 95 percent of the nation's populations (Aning & Atta-Asamoah 2011). During the civil conflicts between 1987 and 1997, the estimated number of weapons which were handled by the youth below eighteen years totaled between 6,000 and 15,000; a factor attributed to political, social, and economic marginalization (ibid.). Though Ghana has no such horrible experiences, it may nonetheless be gullible to similar situations when the existing conditions in Ghana are compared with the following observations made by Cincotta, cited in (Aning & Abdallah 2013). He observes that the different conceptions

²⁹ Owing to poverty, unemployment, illiteracy

³⁰ Especially those in Africa

of the “youth” pertaining to Jihad which include the desire ‘To die in defense of Islam’; ‘To establish Sharia Law in Muslim-dominated states’, ‘To kill a non-Muslim for making derogatory remarks against Prophet Mohammed’, in addition to socio-economic problems such as alienation, poverty, and unemployment, inter alia could undermine the peace, tranquility, and stability of Ghana. Similarly, Moller (1967/68), cited in (Aning & Abdallah 2013) argues that a skyrocketed number of youth could possibly threaten their respective countries on their way up into adulthood, especially in countries where opportunities for the youth is rare or almost non-existing. As a consequence, the youth in Ghana could fall prey to recruitments of terrorist organizations who seek to spread their ideologies of Jihadism, and Islamic extremism within the West African sub region, and beyond. This assertion is underlined by a disturbing (youth) unemployment situation, poverty, and the lack of other opportunities³¹. A fruitful institution of operational, and human resource capacities of BH within the sub region could influence the sections of the Ghanaian citizenry to engage in terrorism both within and without Ghana. This proposition finds some strength in the fact that BH’s merger with ISIS widens the group’s network base, and its propaganda machinery in their resolve for a potential regional agenda. In this case, Ghana, as well as others is not immune to their threats. Nevertheless, it could be contended that though such threats (potentially) exists, key institutions, and stakeholders are working tirelessly round the clock to remedy the situation. For example, the police, the intelligence, and perhaps more importantly the counter terrorism units, cum others are not relenting in their efforts to curtailing such incidence. Additionally, the government not unaware of the repercussions of (youth) unemployment, and poverty in general have, and continue to intervene socio-economically through the establishment of jobs, educational institutions, and other opportunities. However, so far as the country battles with pervasive SPEAR problems, they could spell doom for same if extreme caution is not taken. This contention finds some strength in the fact that the BH-ISIL recruits from Ghana were all youth, and the fact that “unemployment played an important role in their decision to join ISIL.

Additionally, the nature of politics, and politicians in Ghana fan the possibilities for incidence of terrorism in the country. First, the “winner-takes-all” political system in Ghana where political parties that have been declared post-election victory take in charge of the governance and the management of all the states structures is a recipe for disaster. And especially when the victory

³¹ Detailed discussions appear later in the research

was premised on fraudulently tainted elections, much pessimism would persist about the state's ability to continue enjoying its relative peace and stability.

In a similar vein, the conduct of politicians is risky to the country's security. When (some) politicians engage themselves in numerous corruptible ventures, and flaunt their wealth soon after assuming their political positions, relative deprivation, discontent, and grievances, inter alia among the less privileged and poor become woefully affected. Such practice by politicians only deepens the woes of their subjects, and makes conspicuous, the widening gap between the rich and the poor; where the rich minority enjoy at the expense of the poor majority.

As if that is not enough, politicians in Ghana are noted for engaging in acts that tend to hostile their relationship with other opposing politicians, and political parties. This same conduct of some of Nigeria's politicians, and political parties, as well as religious leaders, are known to have partly accounted for the emergence, and evolution of BH. With respect to Nigeria, some politicians, and religious leaders were believed to have championed their colloquial political, and religious interests via the provision of support, and funding to some Nigerian citizens who have evolved, and radicalized over time to be known at present as BH. Hence, the latter's contribution to the evolution of the group.

Moreover, in terms of Nigeria, observations of events pertaining to the realm of politics, and religion in Ghana point to a similar direction. Political parties and politicians are seen to organize groups of physically built youths/men during national, and parliamentary elections. Their act stems from their quest to advance their political interests; these 'employees' (are to) provide all forms of 'dirty' 'strategy', 'security', 'support', and 'defense' for their 'employers' (political parties). As a consequence, the former engage in the snatching of ballot boxes, physical, and verbal assaults of opposition political parties, inter alia. What is striking is that the hiring of these 'private security' by almost all the political parties is illegitimate, and illegal in the eyes of Ghana's constitution. And not least, needless. Besides, the state (is obliged to) dispatches its relevant security apparatus to provide the needed security, support, and monitoring to achieve a free, fair, and transparent elections. Nevertheless, the (general) lack of trust in State institutions, including the electoral commission, coupled with (perceived) corruption, underhand dealings, among others, possibly inform the decisions of politicians to contravene the rules, some of which have faced the full rigors

of the law. Nevertheless, the implications of the aforesaid conditions for the nation's security cannot be far-fetched.

In terms of religion, some Sunni Muslims in the country are said to be propagating radical Islamic teachings, and doctrines. Not to mention the clashes and the friction that are generated owing to the propagation of different doctrinal precepts. And not least, the quest to dominate. As noted earlier, these developments have dire implications for the state especially when genuine grievances with political, and religious roots thrive. Radicalized groups may exploit the situation; influence their family, and friends. Some could as well be influenced by elements, and events in Nigeria to practice in Ghana, what they have learnt. This view is underscored by Botha, who has asserted that "Religion has a particular impact on the threat of transnational terrorism, for it enables disenchanted persons to recruit members across borders to their extreme views and actions" (Botha 2008 p. 39). And since religious doctrinal differences and rivalries within West Africa constitute catalyst for (violent) radicalization (Ismail 2013 p. 239), Ghana could arguably be said to be at the mercy of the throes of terrorism.

Last but not least, the influx of (SALW) in Ghana arguably exposes the country to incidence of terrorism. The threats partly lie in the fact that some of these weapons are locally, and illegally manufactured (F.A Nyarko, 2007 cited in (Aning & Abdallah 2013), whilst others are transported from other countries illicitly. Relatively, it could be observed that the amount of such weapons in the Ghanaian society is minimal compared to other States in the (sub) region (Aning & Abdallah 2013); coupled with the fact that it is limitedly used in Ghana for social vices such as banditry, armed robbery, serial killings, and the likes (Antwi-Danso, interviewee). Therefore, their limited number, and usage for purposely perpetrating vices in Ghana inform Antwi-Danso to conclusively discount, and discredit their 'huge' impact or influence on the possibilities for terrorist actions in Ghana. However, Aning and Abdallah (2013) note that "contrary to an initial estimate of 10,000, a 2006 baseline survey report in Ghana reported about 100,000 small arms circulating in the country (p. 115)". The findings by Aning and Abdallah (2013 p. 116) further indicate that "in every second house, [in Tamale, northern Ghana] SALW were available ...".

One cannot underestimate the effects of SALW on a State's security and stability. Among other things, they are used violently in conflict situations, the result of which are deaths, and displacements. Doubtlessly, it could be argued that the influx of SALW in Ghana have possible

implications for incidence of terrorism in the country since they could be exploited by extremists, and terrorist groups to advance their cause. Relatively, this is perhaps possible especially in (Northern) Ghana where poverty, ethno-tribal conflicts, and SALW are pervasive, and precarious. Aning and Abdallah (2013 p. 116) note some repercussions of *violence* accompanying the use of “small arms” in Ghana; They contend that “It will lend credence to the view that Muslims are terrorists, and since they represent a section of Ghana’s population, Ghana may be tagged as a terrorist breeding ground, hence detrimentally affecting Ghana’s relations with the international community”. In connection with the above, Antwi-Danso argued that the limited number of SALW, and their use for domestic purposes in Ghana does not serve as a source of terrorist threat to Ghana. Whilst Antwi-Danso contends that the relative illicit number of Small and illegal arms in Ghana are limited in number, and are used for are small in number and in the hands of few people. In Ghana, most of the illegal arms are manufactured locally. However, the few advanced ones are those that have fallen into bad hands, or are used by some quack security personnel to meet their ends. These illicit weapons are used for robbery, banditry, and private protection. Whilst these developments arguably pose lesser threats, they nonetheless offer favorable grounds for aggrieved, and radicalized elements to exploit, and champion their interests to their advantage. And that could have some diverse security ramifications not limited to terrorism for the country.

These situations have produced opposing groups/movements who are disquiet about the existing socio-politico-economic conditions in Ghana. They include Alliance for Accountable Governance (AFAG), Committee for Joint Action (CJA), Let My Vote Count (LMVC), and other politically aggrieved pressure groups. To a larger degree, whilst the springing up of these groups with similar concerns portray the democratic dispensation of the country, nonetheless, it also speaks loudly of the general agitations with which the citizenry are battling with. A closer look leads to a cautious conclusion here. It cannot be ruled out that other elements with radicalized ideas, cum other factors that give grounds for further radicalization, and violence could exploit the situation in a way that could endanger the state’s security and stability through political violence which may not be limited to terrorism. Again, the unfavorable SPEAR conditions in the country constrain people’s prospects for the future, and might provide breeding grounds for recruiting the aggrieved to the terrorist cause. This finds some expression in the view that the proliferation of politically aggrieved groups, and the spate of agitations on the labour front are a true manifestation of the

many challenges besetting Ghana, and that government must swiftly arrest them to avert possible escalation of incidence of civil unrests, and terrorism (ghanaweb 2015f).

In a related development, the varying views of respondents on how they thought about the effectiveness of Ghana's current counter terrorism measures deserve equal analysis, and discussion. This stems from the fact that effective anti-terrorism measures is key to assessing degrees of vulnerability, and threat levels. As it turned out, there were varied views regarding the effectiveness or otherwise of Ghana's counter terrorism measures. Whilst others indicated the effectiveness of the current measures, the reverse was equally expressed.

It could be argued that the covert nature of counter terrorism operations makes it difficult for the citizenry to acquaint themselves with operational details. This is underpinned by the fact that information is restricted to the public for purposes of intelligence, and security. As a consequence, 'civilians' may be oblivious of the current covert (operations), successes and setbacks recorded by intelligence, and counter terrorism officials. For instance, how do the public know if an imminent terrorist attack have been averted by officials? In this respect, since information about some of these measures are restricted to the public for security concerns, it leaves civilians oblivious of the situation. Nonetheless, since counter terrorism measures are not exclusively restricted to 'covert' actions and measures, but it is visible in areas of infrastructural developments/preparations, (public) education, and sensitization, it offers opportunity for assessments by security analysts, students, and other nonprofessional anti-terrorism officials. Against this background, Ghana's counter terrorism measures, though thought to be encouraging, needs to be upped especially when no amount of preparations could be deemed "adequate"; but a reasonable amount of preparations could possibly reduce the occurrence of the phenomenon, or mitigate its casualties when they occur.

The findings in conjunction with the theory revealed that the presence of these structural problems (factors) in the country put undue *strains or pressure* on individuals or groups to engage in any means necessary to meet their expectations owing to their sense of relative deprivation, as compared to the political elites some of whom flaunt their wealth as they swim in corruption. This development elicits discontentment and grievances, which culminates in a sense of socio-politico-economic alienation, and marginalization. At this point, unreliable institutions, poor governance, and corruption, which translate into loss of state's legitimacy and or its institutions inform

decisions of the affected individuals to join or create social movements (including terrorism) to press home their demands. Given their vulnerability, others may also fall prey to the ideology, or recruitment, or propaganda of social movements, including terrorist organizations, whose ideologies, and cause may seem representative of their victims' concerns. Subsequently, they virtually emerge as de facto members of the 'social movement', sympathizing, and supporting the cause and ideology of their movement, and willing to execute same in their respective geographical locations. As a movement with de jure and de facto membership, they thrive on their collective human, logistical, operational, tactical and strategic resources to champion their socio-politico-religious actions to achieve set targets, hence the theory of resource mobilization. Though the resource mobilization theory explains the springing up of strings of politically-aggrieved groups like AFAG, CJA, LMVT in Ghana, such groups are not terrorist groups, and do not possibly constitute threats of terrorism. Nevertheless, the theory is wholly reflective of the case in Nigeria where BH falls on diverse expertise of its de jure and de facto membership to advance their cause. This is seen in their merger with ISIS, training with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQAP), and Al-Shabaab.

Analysis and Discussion of incidence of BH/ISIS-induced terrorism in Ghana

In analyzing the situation, it is important that attention is given to the circumstances leading to the rise of BH, and factors leading to the recruitment of some graduates of the Kwame Nkrumah University Science and technology. Both scenarios highlight similar issues of corruption, poverty, unemployment, the insecurity of the West African sub region, and the transnational activities of BH, and ISIS, as factors leading to the success of the recruitment.

The issue raises a number of concerns which reflected the findings. Firstly, the recruit's reason for joining his ISIS expedition stems from his claims of endemic corruption, in Ghana which has been aided by "democracy". His position could be linked to claims by BH which purports to be fighting to rid the Nigerian governments and beyond, of social ills including corruption, democracy, wide spread poverty, and unemployment. These are but a few problems which BH attributes to western civilization/education. The groups claims that formal education has rendered majority of uneducated Nigerians unemployed, and poor. This circumstance shows clearly that the Ghanaian ISIS recruits have been influenced by the ideologies of BH, its activities, and events in Nigeria.

Also indicative is the fact that socio-politico-economic, and religious problems could generate domestic, and transnational. In the above case, recruitments were made possible partly because such challenges were already existing in Ghana. Though, in the run up to their recruitment, there were no (major) evidence of incidence of terrorism in Ghana, nevertheless, some of the current domestic issues in Ghana facilitated the recruits' decisions to engage in transnational terrorism. This probably speaks volumes of the prospects of home grown terrorism in Ghana. At the transnational level, it has shown that existing challenges in Ghana made the recruits vulnerable to exploitation by the terrorists; a situation which was enhanced by the shared religion, the shared domestic challenges, and other similarities, not least, their influence on each other given their shared social and political outlooks. It has been established that the recruits were all Muslims that have been influenced via Islamic 'doctrine' by the seeming Islamic dominated groups of BH and ISIS. Since terrorists (may) use 'religion' as part of their propaganda machinery to achieve their 'instrumental' aims of garnering, and gaining support, motivation, and influence (Collier 2006), it is similarly difficult to tell whether BH's activities are informed by genuine Islamic doctrine, teachings, and practices. Additionally, the homogenous challenges of corruption, poverty, poor governance, etc. burdening Ghana, and Nigeria perhaps made the recruitments easier. And last but not least, the shared social, and political structure cum their cordial relationship, and proximity of Ghana and Nigeria were key to the rare success of the recruitment.

Moreover, the fact that recruitment, and recruits came from Ghana, and their prospective training by BH is scheduled to take place in Niger, after which they would join the swelling ranks of ISIS in Iraq and Syria (Global Risk Insights 2015) betrays the transnational nature of the threats and vulnerability of Ghana to the phenomenon of terrorism. Niger is an immediate neighbor of Nigeria, and Ghana is relatively a little farther away from the former. Therefore, the recruitment from Ghana, and training of recruits in Niger underline the distant, and immediate threats, and susceptibility of those countries, respectively.

Furthermore, it epitomizes the intensity of the risks owing to the insecurity situation in the West African sub region. Given its history of human, arms, and drug trafficking, as well as porous borders, there could be little doubt that such conditions facilitate, and exacerbate the risks of domestic, and transnational terrorism to Ghana.

Also, the situation deepens the transnational threats posed by BH, and the Islamic State groups in the (sub) region. Like ISIS, BH's aims is to establish a state ruled by a single political and religious leader 'according to Islamic law'. In this regard, the alliance, and support shared among these groups (Abdulai 2015; Hansen 2012; Iaccino 2015; Sergie & Johnson 2015) in their quest to topple 'secular' legitimate governments and replace same with Islamic regimes further heighten the danger posed to Ghana³²

The *report* also confirms the fact that northern Ghana remains relatively volatile, and a hot spot for domestic, and international terrorism.

However, it must equally be noted that the government of Ghana is not relenting in its efforts to salvage the situation. Key interventions that have been employed include the creation of jobs, and schools. Also typical of the intervention employed by the government to alleviate the socio-economic problems of poverty, and cost of living include the government's successful assistance from IMF's support for Ghana's financial and economic programs via the former's Extended Credit Facility (ECF) mechanisms, and the World Bank's Partial risk Guarantee (PRG) programme to support investment in the Sankofa Gas Fields (Ghanaweb 2015g). These are geared towards reducing unemployment, and poverty situations following the onset of the "energy crisis" which occasioned redundancies, and retrenchments in the business sector of the country.

Similarly, counter terrorism officials, security agencies and other appropriate bodies and stakeholders have stepped up their game since the issue broke out. For instance, the National Security has confirmed the report and raised an alarm of an agency in Ghana that was targeting and recruiting young Muslims from tertiary institutions to join ISIS (ghanaweb 2015c). The National Security Advisor said his outfit has unraveled that "...ISIS had a training base in Niger where recruits were trained as foreign terrorist instructors, adding that those who had joined the ISIS went through Burkina Faso or Nigeria" (cityfmonline 2015). Identification of the source of the problem is paramount to solving it. Additionally, it had warned the various media to exercise circumspection in their reportage revolving round the issue as it had repercussions for the State's security and stability. These, and other covert preparations and operations are underway to salvage

³² See (Ogbonnaya et al. 2014) for the security implications of BH, and other terrorist groups for the (West African) sub region.

the situation. These and other counter terrorism measures which are ongoing corroborate responses from the security official, Alex Adu, Afful, Aku Shika Anim, and others.

Additionally, the question of why Ghana has not yet recorded a (major) incidence of terrorism since time immemorial in the face of the aforesaid threats, and the fact that it has remained relatively peaceful and stable in West Africa perhaps underline the country's relatively lower degree of vulnerability to the threats and throes of terrorism. Probably, the 'secrets' to its seeming success may partly be found in some of the assertions identified by some respondents; To paraphrase them, the Security analyst, and Antwi-danso, asserted that the close interconnectedness and the cordial relationship among Ghanaians make it difficult for some to harm themselves hence their restraint to terrorism.

More so, is the fact that unlike Nigeria, Ghana's 'artificial' demarcation of borders by the British seems relatively minimal, the result of which is the relative lower ethnic, religious, and political divisions, cum their corresponding levels of lesser ethno-politico-religious skirmishes across the country. However, it could be contended that the current surge in global terrorism is a threat to all, including countries who have yet to experience the pangs of the phenomenon. And the fact that a country has not yet experienced a terrorist attack does not necessarily mean that it is under no threat. Against the background of this reasoning, it may be risky for Ghana/Ghanaians to live under the notion that they are adequately fortified against threats arising from terrorism.

Also, the fact that social vices such as serial killing, cold-blood murders, domestic violence, and verbal/physical political attacks, to mention a few, happen in Ghana is an indication that Ghanaians are equally capable of perpetrating terrorist acts against fellow families, and friends, irrespective of their 'close' interconnectedness and 'peace-loving nature'. Besides, the pockets of violence resulting from religious radicalization, the monumental socio-politico-economic hardship conditions, weak borders, and the influx of refugees, for example, could spell doom for Ghana with the passage of time. And the fact *that no situation is permanent* gives extra weight to the possibilities of a change in status quo where citizens may succumb or subscribe to acts of terror to address their problems. However, whilst these concerns may arguably be far from reality, one cannot entirely rule out the possibility that the phenomenon could occur. For example, despite his skepticism about the risk of BH attacks against Ghana, the security analyst acknowledged the fact that *certain groups could take advantage of what is happening in Nigeria and advance their cause*

in Ghana. Similarly, despite his argument that poverty-induced terrorism could take a long time to happen in Ghana, Antwi-Dasno, however acknowledged that the tendency was as ‘real as the star’. More importantly, northern Ghana’s relatively rife poverty levels, unemployment, chieftaincy clashes, inter-ethnic violence, in the midst of pervasive and fledgling religious radicalization, and political upheavals, underpin the concerns of terrorism tendencies, and the need for stepping up counter terrorism efforts.

The findings in conjunction with the theory revealed that the presence of these structural problems (factors) in the country put undue *strains or pressure* on individuals or groups to engage in any means necessary to meet their expectations owing to their sense of relative deprivation, as compared to the political elites some of whom flaunt their wealth as they swim in corruption. This development elicits discontentment and grievances, which culminates in a sense of socio-politico-economic alienation, and marginalization. At this point, unreliable institutions, poor governance, and corruption, which translate into loss of state’s legitimacy and or its institutions inform decisions of the affected individuals to join or create social movements (including terrorism) to press home their demands. Given their vulnerability, others may also fall prey to the ideology, or recruitment, or propaganda of social movements, including terrorist organizations, whose ideologies, and cause may seem representative of their victims ‘concerns. Subsequently, they virtually emerge as de facto members of the ‘social movement’, sympathizing, and supporting the cause and ideology of their movement, and willing to execute same in their respective geographical locations. As a movement with de jure and de facto membership, they thrive on their collective human, logistical, operational, tactical and strategic resources to champion their socio-politico-religious actions to achieve set targets, hence the theory of resource mobilization. Though the resource mobilization theory explains the springing up of strings of politically-aggrieved groups like AFAG, CJA, LMVT in Ghana, such groups are not terrorist groups, and do not possibly constitute threats of terrorism. Nevertheless, the theory is wholly reflective of the case in Nigeria where BH falls on diverse expertise of its de jure and de facto membership to advance their cause. This is seen in their merger with ISIS, training with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQAP), and Al-Shabaab.

From the above, it could be seen that the extent of Ghana's vulnerability to the threat of terrorism reflective of BH ³³ is high. The paper argues that the strengths of the country in terms of counter terrorism is woefully minimal as compared to its shortcomings. Though the paper admits that countries could fall prey to terrorist incidence irrespective of their concrete preparations, it is argued that reasonable amount of preparations are key to reducing such incidence, and their aftermath repercussions. From this perspective, as noted above, the threats posed to Ghana could be considerably categorized into two groups; territorial, and ideological threats. Therefore, attempt at finding lasting solutions to the menace should feature operational, and SPEAR, and mental/psychological approaches. The first part relates to threats triggered by weaknesses in internal, and external/border security operations; whilst the second relates to the general lack of socio-politico-economic, and religious interventions. Below offers a list of pragmatic proposals, and some strategic solutions to the threats, with the view to reducing them.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

In looking to the future, Ghana has an opportunity to learn from countries that have suffered strings of terrorist attacks since it has not suffered any major terrorist incidence yet. Countries who could serve as a models include Nigeria, the US, and UK, to mention but a few. Ghana must spare no efforts at tapping from the wealth experience of these countries since it would go a long way to assist them [Ghanaians] gain broader insight and perspective on the phenomenon.

Additionally, the current development means that government authorities, counter terrorism officials, security, policy makers, and all Ghanaians must rethink their conception of the phenomenon of terrorism. This may affect the approach of key stakeholders in tackling the rising incidence of threats.

What follows below is a list of counter terrorism recommendations which are deemed effective. This list is not intended to be comprehensive but merely indicative of the measures.

³³ The study also contends that Ghana's vulnerability to the threats of terror is not limited to BH alone but its existence could be threatened by terrorists from around the world. BH was just used as a case study because of its uniqueness (in terms of the factors that occasioned its emergence, and the fact that it originated from Nigeria which shares similar SPEAR structures with Ghana)

The SPEAR recommendations should include but not limited to Anti-corruption, good governance, transparency, and accountability, job creation, economic development, poverty reduction, policy of all-inclusiveness, increased monitoring of NGO's, and vigorously pursuing de-radicalization programs. Other recommendations include effective implementation of anti-terrorism programs, public education and sensitization on terrorism and security consciousness, provision of adequate logistics, and equipment, Effective Inter-agency communication, collaboration and cooperation, regular training of counter-terrorism stakeholders such as Judges, Prosecutors, forensic personnel, financial analysts), Effective border control, ensure responsible media coverage, enhance national, and inter-tribal dialogue

5.3 CONCLUSION

Summarily, in an attempt to explore Ghana's vulnerability to the threats of domestic and transnational terrorism, I explore the factors that give rise to the emergence of BH, and its insurgency, and juxtapose it with the current situation in Ghana. This attempt is to gain some understanding of how domestic factors could affect the occurrence of domestic terrorism in a particular country by using the Nigerian situation as a model for Ghana. The use of Nigeria as an exemplar and the juxtaposition stems from the similar social, political, economic, geographical, historical, and the religious composition shared by both countries. The study finds that a considerable number of factors that give rise to the emergence of BH, and its insurgencies are taking place in Ghana. Such factors include poverty, unemployment, poor governance, corruption, and political alienation in the midst of rising levels of religious radicalization. Nevertheless, the findings do not expose grave evidence of mass radicalization among the Ghanaian populace. Contrarily, it shows that northern Ghana remains a hot spot for (Islamic) religious radicalization owing to rampant wave of violent activities over there. Juxtaposing the relatively low number of radicalized people in Ghana with the fact that radicalization is a precondition to terrorism, it may be argued that the extent of Ghana's vulnerability to the threat of domestic and transnational terrorism may be minimal. This is anchored by the series of processes through which radicalization progresses. This may partly account for the reasons the country has not yet recorded a major incidence of terrorism despite the assertion that some few Ghanaian Muslims in the northern region have been radicalized or undergoing some series of radicalization processes. That notwithstanding, it could be argued that the few radicalized people constitute a threat in no small measure to the

state. This is because they could attack alone (lone wolves) and could influence their families and friends to take similar path. More to this point is that they may remain more susceptible to terrorists' influences and events across the globe and could succumb to violent innovations and perpetrate them in Ghana. Additionally, the study shows that the adverse current SPEAR conditions in Ghana could be exploited by BH and other terrorists groups to cause violence in Ghana. In another vein the condition could trigger socio-politico-economic grievances which could necessitate the formation of social movements similar to terrorist groups to press home their demands.

Moreover, the study identifies lapses within the state security structure in conjunction with inter-agency cooperation and collaboration with Nigeria. The lack of effective institutional counter terrorism cooperation and collaboration between Ghana and Nigeria, capacity challenges, weak borders controls leading to ease of entry of criminals, further undermine the security and stability of Ghana.

The findings in conjunction with the theory revealed that the presence of these structural problems (factors) in the country put undue *strains* on individuals or groups to engage in any means necessary to meet their expectations owing to their sense of relative deprivation, as compared to the political elites some of whom flaunt their wealth as they swim in corruption. This development provokes discontentment and grievances, which could culminate in as a sense of socio-politico-economic alienation, and marginalization. Unreliable institutions, poor governance, and corruption, which translate into loss of state's legitimacy and or its institutions could form basis for the decisions of the affected individuals to join or create social movements (including terrorism) to press home their demands. Given their vulnerability, others may also fall prey to the propaganda of terrorist organizations, whose ideologies and cause may fall in line with the concerns of their victims. Subsequently, they virtually emerge as de facto members of the 'social movement,' sympathizing, and supporting the cause and ideology of their movement, and willing to execute same in their respective geographical locations. As a movement with de jure and de facto membership, they thrive on their collective human, logistical, operational, tactical and strategic resources to champion their socio-politico-religious actions.

The rise of politically-aggrieved groups like AFAG, CJA, LMVT in Ghana do not possibly constitute threats than BH who has become more transnational and their recent merger with ISIS,

training with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQAP), and Al-Shabaab. The study highlights the fact that countries with similar structural features of particularly close geographical location, language, and religion, similar colonial masters, in addition to “close relationship,” may be confronted with similar challenges, and virtually influence each other by conscious calculations or otherwise.

This research reveals that Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of terrorism is not “imagined”, but “real”, and “emerging” at a higher degree. This is evidenced from threats posed by corruption, unemployment, poverty, poor governance, dwindling economy, unreliable institutions, transnational organized crimes, and religious radicalization which affect the bulk of the youth. The study finds that such factors could be exploited by terrorists groups (eg. BH et al); in their quest for global expansion. The results of the research further strengthens the potency of current terrorism and terrorists activities in Nigeria spreading to Ghana. It therefore adds weight to Botha (2008) and Enders et al. (2011) findings which reveal that domestic terrorism in one country could influence the occurrence of same in another country (transnational terrorism); Botha (2008 P. 39) observed that “...Algeria and Egypt serve as good examples of the exportation of domestic terrorism into a transnational network. Also notable, are political instability, the illicit proliferation of small, and light weapons, terrorist groups, refugee crisis, and weak borders in the (West) African region are fertile grounds for a phenomenal increase in the menace. In addition, the external influences from pro-Islamic states and individuals who propagate religious extremism, punctuated by the transnational activities of terrorists across the region make Ghana much more vulnerable. The study finds that although Ghana is generally at risk, the northern part of the country remains the most exposed to these threats. The study identifies that Ghana’s continuous engagement in military interventions across the globe adds to its lists of vulnerability as evidenced in reprisal, and retaliatory attacks by Al-Shabaab, BH, and ISIS.

It may be clear that the country has earmarked a number of legislative, and institutional instruments, structures, and frameworks to apparently counter all forms of terrorism, and its related incidences. Aside its anti-terrorism mechanisms, conventions, and protocols of domestic, and international standards, it could boast of anti-terror agencies, and their close collaboration with transnational security apparatus not limited to the Police, the Military, and the intelligence services. Ghana also has a number of conflict-resolution, and inter-religious bodies and institutions

that work to arresting the aforesaid threats. The *Ghana Peace Council* is worthy of mentioning. Whilst not denying the salience, and relevance of these measures, and their immense contributions to counter terrorism operations, their efficacy could be hampered by corruption, and other ills of the Ghanaian society, which might render the nation's anti-terror efforts redundant, and counter-productive. Besides, victims of terrorist attacks such as the US, among others have very sophisticated security measures, yet they seem inadequate in the face of the successful terrorists' attacks. This highlights the fact that no preparation could be enough to counter terrorism, given the terrorists' the asymmetric nature of terrorist warfare. Yet, proper measures could largely assist in reducing such incidence, if not eradicate them.

The study argues that since a "sound strategy is a prerequisite for success" (de Wijk 2005), key stakeholders, and institutions in Ghana are to develop a set of strategy that reflects the ever increasing sophistication of terrorism. Consequently, identifying strategic solutions to the aforesaid socio-politico-economic, cum the growing religious radicalization challenges of Ghana is key in this regard.

Appendix One - The concept of Terrorism - Continued

The term *terrorism* is sometimes used interchangeably with *radicalization*. Like terrorism, the definition of *radicalization* is problematic and controversial because there are diverse views and interpretations to its meaning. Borum (2011) argues that radicalization' is used relative in two broad areas in people's quest for changes in society. It involves the use of violence or non-violence in the attainment of set objectives. Hence, the term *violent radicalization* negates the presence of any nexus between *radicalization*, and *violence* (Mandel 2010). The conflicting positions therefore account for different counter radicalization/terrorism approaches. For example, some school of thought views socio-politico-economic problems as compelling causes of radicalization and by extension terrorism. This has formed basis for their recommendations for socio-politico-economic interventions such as anti-poverty, development, education etc, as remedies to terrorism (Taşpınar 2009). Nevertheless, the engagement of the rich, and educated people in *terrorism* inform other schools of thought to reject the notion that radicalization, and to some degree, terrorism is borne out of poverty, unemployment, etc.

Silber et al. (2007) outline four main 'stages' under which radicalized people evolve. They include pre-radicalization, self-radicalization, indoctrination and Jihadization. Arguably, these findings

reveal that radicalization largely serves as an important precondition through which all terrorists undergo - one must be *radicalized* before becoming a terrorist. Approximately, sixteen theories have been propounded in a bid to explaining the causes of radicalization and terrorism (Crossett & Spitaletta 2010). Borum (2011) posits that *radicalization* becomes *terrorism* when the radicalized group adopts extremist beliefs in support of violence. Borum's conception of the term parallels definitions offered by a number of Western Intelligence agencies. According to Dutch Security Services (2005) cited in (Borum 2011), radicalization involves "growing readiness to pursue and/or support - if necessary by undemocratic means – far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to the democratic order. The Danish intelligence Service, (PET 2009) defines it as "a process by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective. Additionally, the term involves the process by which people support terrorism, and in some cases, join terrorist groups (UK Home Office 2011).

For purposes of this study, *radicalization* means the processes, events, or conditions through which people undergo and to adopt 'extreme' ideas that motivate them to champion their cause, beliefs or ideologies via acts of violence. The term could also be understood as the use of violent means in meeting political or religious ends. In a broader sense, this study therefore acknowledges all the aforementioned definitions of radicalization as such. From this perspective, *to get radicalized* is to violently pursue a political/religious agenda through extremism. In this light, radicalization is an important contributory factor to terrorism and the recruitment of people into terrorist organizations. It is for this reason de-radicalization programs ³⁴ has emerged as a major counter-terrorism policy ³⁵especially in North America, and Europe. To this end, this research recognizes groups that resort to violence in addressing their concerns as terrorists owing to their extreme ideas that result in violence and insurgency.

³⁴ Means programs performed by security agencies, and civil society organizations which focus on working with individuals or groups that are involved in radical social movements, terrorist organizations, or clandestine political, religious or ideological violence " with the view to 'purging' them off violent radical ideas, and re-integrating them into society – (International Relations and Security Network 2015)

³⁵ The introduction of de-radicalization programs as an addition to other counter terrorism programs has sparked debate among some scholars. For example,maintains that despite its significance, the fact that it has been *securitized* by policy makers, might undermine some functions of other counter terrorism programs – ISN 2015)

Insurgency is “a usually violent attempt to take control of a government: a rebellion or uprising.” Or, “a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency” (Merriam-Webster Inc. 2015b). Since BH is bent on toppling the government of Nigeria and introduce a sharia-based regime, the group could be considered to be insurgent. However, since both parties to the conflict recognize themselves as belligerent factions engaged in (asymmetric) warfare, punctuated with the fact that BH³⁶ engages in more than an “organized revolution,” and adopts the strategies of terrorists, identifies BH as a terrorist organization. In this regard, the terms *insurgency*, and *insurgents*, are used interchangeably with *terrorism*, and *terrorists*, respectively. Other terms such as *extremism/extremists*, *militancy/militants*, and *Islamism/Islamists*, inter alia, were used sparingly, and synonymously with *terrorism/terrorists* in the research.

Threat

The Cambridge Dictionary Online (2015) defines threat as *a suggestion that something unpleasant or violent will happen, especially if a particular action or order is not followed*. Also, google (2015d) defines the term as *a statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile action on ³⁷someone in retribution for something done or not done*. The definition also covers *a person or thing likely to cause damage or danger (ibid.)*. For the purpose of this research, *the threats* relates to the extent of measure or tendency on the part of Ghana to suffer terrorist attacks, and the degree of susceptibility of its citizenry to ideological influence of terrorists. In other words, how prone is Ghana to terrorist attacks, and ideological influence? This study identifies potential sources of threat to Ghana arising from terrorism to include but not limited to activities, actions and inactions of people violent ideologies, beliefs, ideas, doctrine, porous borders and proliferation of small arms and light weapons which have the tendency to undermine Ghana’s security and provide avenues for terrorist attacks. This includes a situation where Ghanaians and non-Ghanaians consciously or unconsciously embrace, and import violent, and extreme ideas with the intention of perpetrating them against Ghana.

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Appendix Two – Interviewees’ Details

Interview Venue	Interviewees	Designation of Interviewees
Accra	Custom Official	Customs Excise and Preventive Service
Accra	Mr. Alex Adu	Ghana Immigration Service
Accra	Ms. Adwoa Sika	Ghana Immigration Service
Accra	DSP Edward Afful	Criminal Investigations Department (Counter terrorism Unit)
Accra	CSP. Nii Ammaa Amartey	Ghana Police Service (Investigation and Counter terrorism Unit)
Accra	Security Analyst	Bureau of National Investigations
Accra	Commodore Osei-Sarfo	Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College
Accra	Group Captain John Ankah	Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College
Accra	Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning	Kofi Annan International Peace keeping and Training Centre

Accra	Dr. Thomas Jaye	Kofi Annan International Peace keeping and Training Centre
Accra	Dr. Colonel Kotia	Kofi Annan International Peace keeping and Training Centre
Accra	Mr. John Pokoo	Kofi Annan International Peace keeping and Training Centre
Accra	Dr. Nicholas Okai	Kofi Annan International Peace keeping and Training Centre
Accra	Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso	Legon Centre for International Affairs & Diplomacy
Accra	Dr. Kennedy E. Ahorsu	Legon Centre for International Affairs & Diplomacy
Accra	Dr. Philip Attuquayefio	Legon Centre for International Affairs & Diplomacy
Accra	Mrs. Yakohene	Legon Centre for International Affairs & Diplomacy
Accra	Mr. Conrad Kakraba	Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
Accra	Ms. Debie Emefa	University of Ghana
Sunyani	Elvis Oliver Kwakye	University of Natural Resources
Sunyani	Ms. Selina Awini	University of Natural Resources

NB: The interviews took place between January 17, 2015 and February 17, 2015

Appendix Three – Interview Guides

1. What is terrorism? Could you give example (s)?
2. What accounts for terrorism?
3. What is radicalization? Could you give example (s)?

4. Briefly describe Nigeria's Boko Haram in one sentence.
5. In what ways could Ghana help to combat 'Boko Haram' or help resolve the 'Boko Haram crises'?
6. Briefly narrate the origin of Boko Haram.
7. What factors do you think have accounted for the 'terrorism' engineered by the 'Boko Haram' Islamist sect?
8. What are your views on the political, religious, social, economic and cultural dimensions to the Boko Haram crisis?
9. Is the 'Boko Haram problem' exclusively Nigeria's, and why?
10. What are the (perceived) effects of the 'crisis on West Africa, Africa and the World'?
11. What does the 'Boko Haram insurgency' in Nigeria mean for ECOWAS, AU, and the UN?
12. How should the necessary organizations/institutions, and stakeholders deal with the situation in Nigeria?
13. Does Ghana have a special responsibility in assisting Nigeria to combating 'Boko Haram'? If yes, why?
14. Is there a need for Ghana to support Nigeria in the fight against 'Boko Haram'? Why?
15. Is Ghana's foreign policy towards Nigeria favorable or otherwise? Why is it so?
16. Is there any provision in Ghana's foreign policy that reflects its counter-terrorism measures? If yes, how?
17. To what extent are Ghana's counter-terrorism measures effective and efficient?
18. Could you give examples of situations where countries depend on one another for assistance in the fight against terrorism?
19. Does Ghana have an effective domestic counter-terrorism measure in place?

20. How would you assess the level of competence of Ghana's security agencies (military, police, intelligence, etc) in curbing the spread of terrorism, and terrorist groups in Ghana?
21. In your view, is there any relationship between poverty and terrorism, and why?
22. How could Ghana handle its political, social, religious, economic and cultural issues in order to prevent domestic terrorism?
23. Do you perceive Ghana to be under a possible threat of a terror attack and why?
24. Do you think Ghana is adequately prepared for any eventual terror attack within and without its borders?

ⁱ With a mix of marginalization and political alienation