



Promised jobs that never materialised:

Forestry investments in Niassa Province, Mozambique – benefits and challenges



**Master's thesis
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Declaration

I, Liv Røhnebæk Bjergene, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been applied. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature

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Abstract

The development of Niassa Province is influenced by historical, cultural, social, economic and political factors. Traditionally, land has not been considered as a commodity by the Mozambican communities, but as the basis for life, regulated through historical lineages and a flexible customary land tenure system.

The main development approach chosen by the Mozambican Government to achieve economic growth and reduce poverty is Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), expecting positive development outcomes in terms of investment and job creation. The Governments of Norway and Sweden have played a key-role in the development of public-private partnerships in Niassa.

Choosing a mixed methods research approach, this thesis obtained the views and analysed the roles of local communities, the investors, government officials and NGOs regarding the effects of large-scale forestry in Niassa related to the investments by Green Resources (GRAS) and the Global Solidarity Forest Fund (GSFF), and their two companies Niassa Green Resources (NGR) and Chikweti Forests of Niassa.

My fieldwork in Niassa during September 2011 and June and August 2014 found that development outcomes had not been delivered as promised and expected, neither in terms of job creation, nor investments in the local communities. Local communities' perceptions were divided: those who felt they benefitted, had benefitted or hoped to benefit from the investments, and the peasant farmers who had experienced losses or feared that future generations would have to struggle with worsened living conditions due to accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003). A majority of interviewees in the household survey reported an unchanged or deteriorated food situation. Even so, a wider majority of informants still felt they would advice other communities to lease out their land, hoping that FDI would be their chance to escape poverty.

If the forest investments are to provide positive development outcomes in the future, there is a need to change strategy away from a neo-liberal, capitalistic interventions towards more human- and ecology-centred approaches. Much larger areas than today are expected to be acquired in the future, so there is a strong need for better planning and monitoring of investments, focusing on their development outcomes. Still, I question the long-term sustainability of the current transformation process in Niassa.

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List of Abbreviations

CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
Cepagri	Agribusiness Promotion Centre
CERs	Certified Emission Reductions
CFS	Committee on World Food Security
CLTSUMB	Centre for Land Tenure Studies Norwegian University of Life Sciences
CPI	Investment Promotion Centre
DNTF	National Directorate of Land and Forests
DUAT	Direto de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra (Land Use and Benefit Rights)
ESAP	Environmental and Social Action Plan
ESIA	Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FPIC	Free, prior and informed consent
ForUM	The Norwegian Forum for Development and Environment
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSFF	Global Solidarity Forest Fund
GRAS	Green Resources AS
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
ILC	International Land Coalition
ILO	International Labor Organisation
LGR	Lúrio Green Resources
LSLA	Large-scale land acquisitions
MF	Malonda Foundation
MZN	Mozambique Metical
NGR	Niassa Green Resources
NOK	Norwegian krone
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
Norfund	Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries

ORAM	Rurual Association for Mutual Aid (by its Portuguese initials).
PEDSA	Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agricultural Sector 2010-2019
tCERs	Temporary Certified Emission Reductions
UCA	Farmer's Union Lichinga
UNAC	National Union of Peasant Farmers
UNCTAD	United States Agency for International Development
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States Dollar
UN	United Nations
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Background

This study examines the effects of forestry investments in the Niassa Province, Northern Mozambique and the transformation that is taking place due to foreign direct investments (FDI). Large-scale land acquisitions (LSLA) and the “new rush for land” is a “hot” and controversial issue, where promoters conceive LSLA as an effective strategy to alleviate poverty due to international transfer of capital and technology, whereas critics argue that this is elite capture of land, causing loss of livelihoods and cultural values and increase food insecurity.

1.2 Research motivation

I have followed the debate since 2010, when I first developed an interest for the subject, working as a journalist for Norad’s development magazine, “Bistandsaktuelt”.

Secondary literature has been an important resource for my work, demonstrating the need for further research. One example of such a ‘research gap’ evident in secondary literature that has influenced this research, is the need for further insight into women’s opinions related to LSLA. Another example is the many different (and sometimes conflicting) figures and potential future calculations of job creation opportunities resulting from forestry investment. With this thesis, I aim to present new, updated information that indicates possible positive and negative outcomes for the various actors.

1.3 Research question

The overall aim of this study is to obtain and analyze the views and roles of local communities, the investors and government officials regarding the effects of large-scale forestry in Niassa Province related to investments by Green Resources AS (GRAS) and the Global Solidarity Forest Fund (GSFF) and their two companies Niassa Green Resources (NGR) and Chikweti Forests of Niassa (Chikweti). On May 1st 2014 a merger

was announced between GRAS and GSFF (Green Resources 2014a). In addition, GRAS took over land from Florestas de Planalto (UPM¹).

Specific research questions:

1. How do local communities, investors, NGOs, researchers and government officials perceive forestry investments conducted by GRAS and GSFF through the Niassa companies NGR and Chikweti (before and after their merger)?
2. Do the forestry investments have an effect (positive and/or negative) on the local people's living condition?
3. Have there been any significant changes in policy and/or implementation by the forestry companies in recent years?
4. How do the various actors anticipate future developments in forestry in Niassa Province?

1.4 Scope of the Study

A range of factors, such as economy, environment, health and politics, can be studied in order to evaluate the impacts of large-scale LSLA. This research project is limited to the socio-economic impacts of the forest investments on local people's lives, and to a less extent the environmental impacts. The study is limited to the Niassa Province and relies on data set from September 2011 and August 2014, as well as data provided in Maputo during September 2011 and in June 2014.

1.5 Conceptual framework

The overall aim of my study is to analyse the effects of large-scale forestry in Niassa Province related to investments by the two companies NGR and Chikweti, based on the views and roles of local communities, government officials and the investors.

I argue that today's development in Mozambique cannot be analysed without including the historical dimension, and that the colonial heritage underlies the European-African relationship of today. A central feature of this relation has been the

¹ UPM is a Finnish pulp, paper and timber manufacturer with production plants in 13 countries. On the 27th of November 2013 UPM decided to terminate their investment in the reforestation company Florestas do Planalto (Blid 2013). This land was taken over by GRAS.

uneven balance of political power. Shivji (2009) argues that the historical ties between Africa and Europe were not based on mutual commercial interests, but on a unilateral plundering of human and natural resources. This history and the colonial period of domination have continued to affect the modern European-African relationship.

It is therefore interesting to investigate whether the Norwegian investments in Niassa also follow this trend of looting, unequal exchange, and where imperial and capitalist forms of enclosures form a constitutive feature of the international expansion of the capitalist world market, integrating common lands into market relationships.

Do today's agricultural investments represent a historical shift, fulfilling the claims of a "win-win" situation that creates positive economical outcomes for the investors AND development for the Mozambican people? Or do the processes in Niassa share characteristics found in other research literature characterised by expropriation of common lands, dispossessions and displacement of people in a neo-colonial form (Federici 2009; Woodhouse 2003; Linebaugh 2009).

This outcome will depend on whether the major goal is to gain profit or to have a holistic investment approach, emphasising a human-centred and people driven development (Shivji 2009). I will demonstrate how this is of particular importance for the majority of Africa's poorest: the peasant. They live in the periphery of today's globalised world. It would have been different if the Norwegian investments in Niassa had represented an alternative as to how capital investments in Africa traditionally have been conducted: Foreign investments in extractive sectors serve to expropriate raw materials, and exploit cheap labour system of super-exploitation where producers lose the capacity to reproduce themselves and where surplus benefits develop the developed countries (the centre) and not the developing countries (the periphery) (Amin 1990; Anyemedu (2006).

A central factor behind capital interests in land is the view of "terra nullius" – land belonging to no-one. Locke (2003) claims how the world initially was empty, awaiting investments and improvement by humankind. A pre-condition for natives to land was if they could enhance it through labour-induced exchange value. This discourse of "terra nullius" has repeatedly harmed Africa, being subjected to various attempts of enclosure long before the current rush for land. This "terra nullius"-narrative is routinely expressed in statistical averages of underutilized land, low population

densities and unproductive labour (Bellamy 2009; Geisler 2010). It is thus interesting to see to what extent this narrative has been applied in Niassa.

As a consequence of the “terra nullius” approach towards Africa there is an on-going shift of institutional support and focus away from smallholder farming to industrialized, large-scale investments and new green revolution approaches, expressed by for instance the World Bank and their report “Awakening Africa’s Sleeping Giant” (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development & The World Bank 2009). According to Hall (2010:6) the Bank here features Africa as a “vast and underused land reserve in the Guinea-Savannah zone covering much of West, Central, East and Southern Africa, and proposes intensive process of agricultural commercialization across the region”.

Shivji (2009) demonstrates how the prejudices against peasantry are based on historical biases, not science. Instead of discussing what kind of agricultural production Africa needs, he highlights the need to look at the character of accumulation. According to Shivji the central question to ask is: do these investments strengthen the peasants (those in the periphery) capacity for self-sustained development, or do the benefits go to the centre (the already wealthy)?

Investors have shown little interest in developing the domestic market. Their focus is on large-scale projects, mainly for export.

“His interest lies in high rates of profits in the first place, rapid returns in the second and accumulation of his profits in a ‘safe’ haven outside in the third place” (Shivji 2009: 138).

Many critical models thus argue that today’s capital investments in Africa constitute the latest phase of neoliberal restructuring of Africa. The plundering continues because Africa, in contrast to the developed countries, could not harvest the benefits created by the development of accumulation through reproduction (Ferguson 2006; Wood 2003; Shivji 2009). What we see today, argue the critics, is a system of super-exploitation, where the peasants are dispossessed of the capacity to reproduce themselves and their land (Harvey 2003; Shivji 2009). This loss is far bigger than an economic loss, creating poorer and less decent living conditions (Sen 2000).

For the critics, a major argument behind foreign investments – job creation – does not soften the critical remarks. Shivji (2009) argues it is the dominant capital that

benefits, not the peasant, who is so oppressed by poverty that job acceptance forms part of survival strategies, where labour in multiple occupations is intensified.

These theoretical, critical aspects and my selected key-concepts will form the basis for my analysis of my findings on Norwegian investments in Niassa. In the following section I will define the two concepts 'The Capability Approach' and the 'Accumulation by Dispossession'.

1.5.1 Accumulation by Dispossession

Accumulation by Dispossession is a term proposed by David Harvey (2003), which is based upon Marx's (1867) concept of Primitive Accumulation. The concept was developed to explain processes of accumulation during neoliberalism and its influence on the historical geography of capitalism (Harvey 2003).

Land lease in order to establish large-scale forestry can be considered as part of neoliberalism and a political-economic response to a capitalist crisis of overaccumulation, referred to as a situation where surplus production and reinvestments are blocked (Harvey 2005; 2011). Aiming for profit, surpluses of capital and labour power are put aside. This creates a situation of capital surplus relative to the options to use the capital to gain profit, and is considered as the inner contradiction of capitalism (Harvey 2005; 2011).

Overaccumulation of capital can be resolved by moving capital or labour to a different territory ("spatial fix") or the opening up of new, non-capitalist markets in order to absorb overaccumulation ("temporal fix"). This circumvention of the barriers of capitalism is what Harvey has labelled Accumulation by Dispossession, indicating a dispossessing of somebody's assets or their rights through a process of commodification and privatization. This process of commodification includes 'unnatural' commodities, such as land (Harvey 2005), and global climate change through the establishment of a carbon market (Shivji 2009; Bond 2015; Harvey 2014).

The role of the Mozambican state is important. During the post-independence years (1975-1992), Mozambique went from a Marxist state with a central, planned economy to a liberalized market economy. The shift was related to the collapse of Soviet bloc countries at the end of the Cold War era and programmes of 'structural adjustment', forced upon indebted countries by international finance institutions. The reforms were

considered essential to create a more open and free economy, rooted in neoliberal theories that replaced the Keynesian policy regime (predominating between 1945 and 1973) (Harvey 2005). This combination of market liberalization and a civil war (1977-1992), paved the ground for unequal power relationships, where the Mozambican elite have accumulated capital and land (Cramer 2006).

1.5.2 *The Capability Approach*

The capability approach focuses on what people are able to do or be: their capabilities or set of opportunities. It is therefore an approach that contrasts with traditional measurement of living standard or welfare, as its focus is on capabilities (the end-results) rather than goods and resources (the inputs). The approach by Amartya Sen represents therefore an alternative way to conceptualize justice and development (Sen 1985; 1999; 2005).

The concept takes into account how rapid economic alone may not create development for all because of structural differences such as gender or class, where women or the poor may loose out (Okin 2003). According to the capability approach, development requires not only an expansion of the economy. It must be accompanied with people's *functionings* – what people are able to do or be. This wide term can include commodities and more complex doings and beings as self-respect, human dignity and participation in community life (Shanmugaratnam 2001).

What is ultimately important for human capabilities to be able to prosper and develop is that people have their freedom to choose what kind of lives they want to live. The concept thus considers the enhancement of freedoms as both the purpose and primary means of development, whereas barriers or “unfreedoms” prevent people from their opportunities (Sen 1999). Sen perceives freedom as the creation of opportunities, and expresses faith in market forces to achieve this. A major critique is the fundamental liberalism of the capability concept, leaving out the fundamental and inherent contradictions of capitalism, creating unequal conditions (Harvey 2005; 2014).

1.6 Thesis outline

This thesis is divided into seven main parts. The first chapter after the introduction presents the historical setting and geography of Mozambique and Niassa Province. After this, I first present an overview of modern land acquisitions as it is elaborated upon in the research literature. Chapter three then continues with a presentation of land acquisitions in Mozambique and the Niassa Province, including the two companies examined in my thesis, NGR and Chikweti, which on May 1st 2014 merged (Green Resources 2014a). Chapter four outlines research design and methods in my research project, before the research findings are presented in Chapter five. The analysis, discussion and conclusions are presented in Chapter six.

Chapter 2 Historical setting and geography of Mozambique and Niassa Province

2.1 The history of Mozambique from colonial times

Mozambique's history has been heavily influenced by commerce, maritime trade and colonialism (Newitt 1995). When Portuguese explorers reached today's Mozambique in 1498, there had been Arab trading settlements along the coast for centuries. The Portuguese traders penetrated the country in their quest for gold and slaves. The interest in Portuguese East Africa from other countries, in particular the British and French during the 19th century, gradually changed the administration from Afro-Portuguese feudalism to domination by large companies, controlled and financed by the British. The companies should foster economic development and maintain Portuguese control in the provinces that so far had been impossible to control. Niassa Province, however, was never controlled directly by the Portuguese Government (Funada-Classen 2012).

A major historical trend for the people of Mozambique has been suppression as a result of various administrations making use of their cheap labour. With the arrival of the British, the building of infrastructure expanded. Large-scale migration of cheap – often forced – labourers to British mines and plantations followed. As the winds of liberalization began to dominate Europe, the existence of slavery became more and more difficult for the colonisers to defend. Without cheap labour, commercial trade and prosperity for the Portuguese regime would be impossible. The colonial regime thus renamed the nomenclature of suppression, changing the word 'slave' to '*liberto*' or 'contract labourer' (Newitt 1995). The colonial regime's need for labour in order to gain wealth and prosperity for themselves was combined with a 'moral' principle: Work would allow Africans to improve themselves "acquiring through work a happier mode of existence" (Newitt 1995: 384).

The inflow of foreign capital had an important impact on Mozambique. Even though the territory could be controlled in theory by the central state in Lisbon, de facto control was through foreign capital and concessions that granted quasi-feudal rights over the population. In the late nineteenth century the Portuguese colonisers dreamt of building a new Brazil in Africa, turning Mozambique into an African metropole. However, with the economic crisis that occurred in Portugal in the 1890s and the

Conquest of Africa, where the Portuguese dominance were challenged by rivalry states, this goal changed (Newitt 1995).

In 1927 the Portuguese colonial regime divided the population into two groups that still influence the Mozambican society: *indígena* (the native, indigenous Africans) and *não-indígena* (the non-native, consisting of Europeans, Asians, and assimilated Africans). The *não-indígena* formed a privileged upper class, with rights such as citizenship. The *indígena* group were considered to be 'uncivilised'; although they came nominally under the direction of tribal law, they were obliged to work under the administration of a *régulo* – a chief appointed by the administration (Newitt 1995). Even though a native policy was evolving and an administrative structure was established, the real power remained in the hands of a local elite of colonial administrators.

Countries in southern Africa, including Mozambique, had a much harder road towards independence than northern countries, being surrounded by white settlers in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. With the cold war and the Western countries' fight against communism, the white settler communities in Southern Africa were considered to be fortresses against communism (Funada-Classen 2012). The war of independence in Mozambique started in 1962, with the country eventually gaining independence on June 25, 1975 (Newitt 1995).

Only two years after independence, the Mozambique civil war began between the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), and the Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo). Fighting ended in 1992. In 1994, Mozambique's first multi-party elections were held. Frelimo was elected as the majority party in parliament and has continued to rule Mozambique since then.

Influenced by the cold war, the independent Mozambican Government adopted a Marxist political orientation, with the state taking over the economy of the country. In the 1970s, the world went through an economic crisis characterised by 'stagflation' – the combination of high rates of inflation and unemployment. This paved the way for anti-Keynesian interpretations of policy and economy in terms of market liberalisation. In the 1980s international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank enforced programmes of 'structural adjustment' to liberalise economies with negative growth. Indebted countries were required to implement institutional reforms as a condition to gaining loans in terms of free market policies. By

1993, Mozambique was described as “the most heavily indebted country in the world” (Plank 1993: 412) relative to the size of the formal economy.

Since independence, Mozambique has gone through decades of economic growth, with significant inflows of foreign aid (Cuanguara & Hanlon 2012). In 2012, for the first time in history, developing countries absorbed more FDI than developed countries (UNCTAD 2013). Mozambique is no exception. FDI inflows into Mozambique increased from \$427 million in 2007 to \$5,2 billion in 2012. The 2012-figure was the near doubling from 2011, mainly due to investments in offshore gas deposits (UNCTAD 2013).

2.2 Forestry in Mozambique from colonialism until the 1980s

The planting of trees to supply local timber needs in Mozambique goes back to colonial times. By independence, there were 20,000 hectares of pine and eucalyptus in seven provinces, including Niassa (Hanlon 2011a). During colonial times, Norway was one of the few non-colonial states that extended the total area of land (Kjerland & Rio 2009). A main target area for Norwegian investments in agriculture was Mozambique, where the largest Norwegian-owned plantation on the African continent of more than 150,000 hectares was established.

The promotion of large-scale plantation agriculture and forestry continued after independence in 1975. Since the late 1980s, foreign investment in forestry has been encouraged, supported by foreign aid and structural reforms to privatise and liberalise the market.

2.3 Niassa Province – history and traditions

2.3.1 *The people of Niassa*

The dominant people living in Niassa are the Makua (47.5 percent of the population), the Yao (36.9 percent), and the Nyanja (8.4 percent). The majority of the people speak their traditional languages. Only 4.3 percent of the population in Niassa has Portuguese as their mother tongue. The majority of the population (60.8 percent) are Muslims, followed by 26 percent Catholics and 4 percent Anglicans (ORGUT, CMI &

COWI 2011; INE 2010). Previous research conducted in the Niassa districts of Majune, Cuamba and Lago found that traditional ancestral cults are still frequently practised in the majority of households (ORGUT, CMI & COWI 2011).

The Makua migrated from Central Africa seeking land, and settled in the northern parts of Mozambique. These areas had been partially emptied of population due to slave raids that started in the 1890s. Here the Makua established small villages and paid tribute to the existing chieftaincies. The Makua exhibited flexibility in their new environment, accepting work and living conditions that local inhabitants would refuse (Newitt 1995).

The Yao took control of the Niassa region in the 19th century. Today, about 40 percent of the population in Lichinga, the regional capital in Niassa, are Yao. The Yao chiefs were influenced by the Arabs, and strongly resisted Portuguese, British and German colonial rule (Newitt 1995). The Yao chief, Mataka, managed to remain independent until 1921. Labour recruitment and collection of taxes from the Yao became possible thereafter (Newitt 1995).

The Nyanja people are a Bantu-speaking population. Around 2,000 years ago they migrated from areas near the Cameroon/Nigerian border, to the Congo Basin, before moving in rolling waves to southern Africa (Oliver 1966). Today, they live predominantly in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (Huhn 2013). In Mozambique, the Nyanja people live mainly in the areas around Lago Niassa. In these communities, traditional institutions still seem to have a strong influence (ORGUT, CMI & COWI 2012a).

2.3.2 The importance of lineage, clan and land

Traditional societies have a decentralised power structure. Lineage and clan form the basis of traditional societies in Niassa. The Makua, Yao and Nyanja societies are traditionally matrilineal. The successor of the *mwene* (traditional chief) is therefore not his biological son, but the younger brother or a son of his sisters (Funada-Classen 2012). Each *mwene* has a female counterpart, the *pwiyamwene*, the matriarch who guards the life of the whole tribe (Frizzi 2008). This responsibility includes “the invisible world” (Arnfred 2011: 3), referring to dead ancestors and children yet to be born.

“Land is the basis for life... Land is like the air you breathe; to think of land as a commodity is an alien idea in the rural areas of Ribáue district”² (Arnfred 2011: 20).

Land belongs to certain historical lineages. In principle, those who are believed to have arrived first in the area decide land ownership (Martinez 1989; Geffray 1991; Medeiros 1995). For a group to occupy land, recognition of the former occupants’ authority is crucial (Funada-Classen 2012). Insufficient access to food has been a decisive factor in the change of power relations among various groups in Niassa (Funada-Classen 2012).

Access to food and land is controlled by matrilineal kinship traditions. Sons are granted land alongside daughters, but when they die the land revert back to their sisters and their children (Arnfred 2011). Patrilineal and matrilineal traditions depend not on fixed rules, but on general principles that are open to interpretation and negotiation (Peters 2009). With the advent of modernity and capitalism, the matrilineal tradition has undergone changes and the traditional power role of women has diminished (Huhn 2013; Arnfred 2011; ORGUT, CMI & COWI 2012a).

According to Arnfred, the flexibility of the traditional land tenure system is impressive. A system of land borrowing ensures that no one was landless.

“Each of the matrilineages had their own land, and everybody knew where his or her family land was located. But that did not necessarily mean that this was where you lived and cultivated. Loans and borrowing of land were very common. Most families processed more land than they actually used. If people who were not family members – neighbours, friends or strangers – asked to borrow a piece of land for cultivation, you didn’t refuse” (2011: 243).

When the Land Law is enacted in 1997 and people are encouraged to register their land, Arnfred’s informants find this irrelevant. They experience an abundance of land and a system of land borrowing that ensures that no one is landless (Arnfred 2011). The same finding is found for Niassa. Research conducted in the province in 2011 finds that 90 percent of informants interviewed do not have any land ownership documents (DUAT declaration to prove land ownership) (Villaneuva 2011).

² The quote is from data from the Makua in the Nampula Province.



Annex 4: Example of a local community in Niassa.

Photo: Liv R. Bjergene 2011

2.3.3 *The traditional role of the miombo forest*

Miombo woodland (*mato*) dominates the Niassa Province, together with other common habitats, such as *dambos* (wetlands), grasslands and riparian forests (Orgut 2006). The miombo woodlands are the main source of wood fuel and charcoal, representing 85 percent of the domestic energy consumption in Niassa. However, the forests are threatened by degradation and deforestation (Church of Sweden 2014).

The miombo forest is particularly essential for traditional medicine, practised by traditional healers (*curandeiro*), (Orgut 2006). When facing a health problem, as many as three out of four Mozambicans seek traditional medicine above institutionalised care (WHO 2013). Furthermore, the miombo forest plays an important role in the performance of traditional rituals, providing among others traditional plants used in rites (Arnfred 2011).

2.3.4 From remoteness to increased external influence and control

“Wars always start here. They never go past here. They come here because we have *mato* (bush) and plenty of food”.

Quote by P.C. Mwapula from the Máua District on 7.9.1999 in Funada-Classen (2012: 391)

One of the main characteristics of the Niassa Province is its remoteness. Niassa is a ‘forgotten’ province, also in terms of research conducted in the area. It was not until 1964 that Valdez dos Santos published the first ethnographic research study conducted in Niassa – aptly titled “O Deschonecido Niassa” (Unknown Niassa).

“Even today the remoteness of Niassa Province seems to make it unattractive to many academicians” (Huhn 2013: 28).

Besides its remoteness, Niassa is characterised by the late introduction of colonial administrative structures and late intervention by colonial authorities. This means that traditional power structures have remained intact, to a large extent. Whereas in other parts of Mozambique traditional leaders were removed and replaced by leaders that were sympathetic towards the regime (Funada-Classen 2012), the colonial regime entrusted *mwenes* (traditional chiefs) in Niassa with the role of administrative officers (*régulos* and *chefes*).

In 1966, when the war of independence (1964-1974) touched Niassa, the legitimacy of the traditional leadership was destroyed (Funada-Classen 2012). Deep divisions were created in the society by having to choose between Frelimo and the colonial regime. Many of the traditional *mwenes* fled to the bush or went abroad (or were killed). Local populations were forced to resettle without their traditional *mwene*, and were forced to elect a *régulo*. According to tradition, this is not acceptable if the current *mwene* is still alive. The consequence was that the new, elected leader lacked traditional legitimacy and therefore often needed the support of the colonial rulers in order to maintain authority. In other cases the double set of leaders – one appointed by the colonial rulers and one following the traditional appointment process – meant that real power in local communities remained with the *mwene* (Funada-Classen 2012). As a whole, the system changed and people who, by tradition, were not supposed to become *mwene* or *pwiyamwene* captured these traditional power roles (Funada-Classen 2012).

Today, many traditional leaders are on the government payroll, together with their advisors. In the Lago District for instance, where traditions have remained largely intact, the number of traditional leaders on the government payroll has increased (ORGUT, CMI & AUSTRALCOWI 2012a) and are recognized as community leaders by the Government of Mozambique through formal ceremonies (Gonçalves 2005).

Chapter 3 What is driving the current rush for land?

'Land grabbing' refers to LSLA, where large pieces of land in developing countries are bought or leased by domestic and transnational companies, governments or individuals (Borras et al. 2010). Expelling local people or communities from their land is, however, not a new phenomenon. Modern 'land grabbing' therefore has to be understood in the historical context of past practices (Margulis et al. 2013; Cotula 2013).

After decades of under-investment in the agricultural sector in developing countries, the late 2000s witnessed an important, historic turning point. The nature of land acquisitions changed and a new form emerged, driven by food security concerns, growing demand for biofuel and the need to curb climate change. Due to the steep rise in commodity prices in 2007/2008, often labelled 'the global food crisis' (IFPRI 2008), governments and companies embarked upon a hunt for land to ensure domestic food security for coming generations. In addition, a market developed for certain goods, such as agrofuels and forest resources. In the latter category, the market is divided in two: a market for timber and non-wood forest products, and one for environmental services.

3.1 Main targets for acquisitions

One narrative which drives the current trend of land acquisition, is the assumption of *terra nullius* – land belonging to no one, routinely described in terms of statistical averages of underutilised land, low population densities and unproductive labour (Bellamy 2009; Geisler 2010). Globally, two continents stand out because they are considered to comprise surplus land: Africa and Latin America. This assumption of surplus land has led to two opposite approaches in the Global South: support for small farmers to increase their land use and land productivity; and foreign plantation investments to bring new technology to develop a local medium- and large-scale local agricultural sector (Arezki, Deninger & Selod 2012). Africa is the most notable recipient of such land-based investments (Deininger et al. 2011). As much as 80 percent of the 'available' areas is concentrated in just ten countries (Fisher, Ven Velthuisen et al. 2002), including Mozambique, as identified by the World Bank (Hanlon 2011a).

The form, substance and meaning of LSLA vary across states (Hall 2010; Borras & Franco 2010). The majority of land deals are not sales, but long-term leases of up to 99

years. According to Cotula (2013), the distinction between a purchase and a lease is blurred, due to the long-term perspective and transferability of the deals. Cotula therefore considers a lease as a 'land acquisition'. This thesis adopts the same approach.

3.2 Who is acquiring land?

Since colonial times and until the 1960s, western companies were involved in agricultural development in Africa. In the recent and on-going rush for land, companies in Europe and North America are again playing a dominant role in acquiring land in Africa. One study found that between 2005 and 2011, western companies accounted for more than half of the total African land area acquired (Schoneveld 2011). The same study ranks Norway as the fourth largest acquirer of African land, particularly investments in plantation forestry, with the largest areas situated in Mozambique's Niassa Province.

According to Cotula (2013), the current transformation of the African countryside should be considered in a wider context than merely foreign pressure – industrial agriculture, conservation for tourism, extractive industries and forestry all contribute to the increased pressure on land. The rush to gain the best land, Cotula (2013) argues, is driven not by investors alone, but also by demographic growth, migration and land acquisitions by elites at local and national levels.

3.3 Acquisition of land for environmental needs

In the light of the need to curb global warming, carbon markets have become an important part of climate change policies. One such policy tool is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). CDM is an important part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol, adopted in Kyoto, Japan in 1997 and entering into force in 2005 (UNFCCC 2014b). The protocol established binding gas emissions reduction targets for 37 industrialised countries and the European community to reduce green house gas emissions (GHG) by an average of five percent against 1990 levels. In a second commitment period (2013-2020), GHG emissions are to be reduced by at least 18 percent below 1990 levels. To help achieve the targets, three "flexible mechanisms" have been introduced, including CDM. The aim

is to assist countries without emission targets in achieving sustainable development through a system where those countries with emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol are allowed to purchase offsets created by CDM projects. When projects are registered as CDMs, Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) are issued. Each CER-unit equals a reduction of one tonne carbon dioxide equivalent (UNFCCC 2014b; Gillenwater & Seres 2011). Afforestation and reforestation qualify as CDM-projects. Actors can purchase temporary Certified Emission Reductions (tCER), meaning that credits purchased will have to be renewed (Bondevik 2013). In the past few years CER prices have dropped. Some even question whether it will continue to exist, due to the lack of a global agreement after the Kyoto Protocol (Farrington 2015).

The perspectives on the creation of carbon markets to fight global warming vary. Some consider the use of markets as a policy instrument to be a success, providing a flexible and efficient instrument that made the US to ratify the Kyoto protocol (Paterson 2011), whereas critics argue that resources are grabbed for the benefit of the environment (Fairhead et al. 2012).

3.4 Scale and pace of land investments

Estimates of how much land has actually been acquired in the last decade vary considerably. The estimates of scale are contested, often as a result of sources that capture different realities (Cotula 2013). In 2010, the World Bank produced a study of LSLA entitled “Rising Global Interest in Farmland”, which investigated land transfers from 2004 to 2009. The Bank concluded that approximately 56 million hectares of land were involved in large-scale land deals (Deininger et al. 2011). Since then, reports and media articles have warned that the figures are much higher (Cotula 2011; GRAIN 2011; The Guardian 2011). In order to cross-check the situation, 40 partners represented by organisations, researchers and research institutions participated in a global project called the “Global Commercial Pressures on Land Research Project”, coordinated by the International Land Coalition (ILC). They present shocking figures (Anseeuw et al. 2011):

- The total amount of land deals that are under consideration or negotiation worldwide between 2000 and 2010 amounted to 203 million hectares. Of these,

deals for 71 million hectares have been checked by triangulation and cross-referencing.

- Africa is the prime target. Of the reported deals, 134 million hectares are African land, of which 34 million hectares have been cross-referenced.

The total area of African land that has been acquired in the last ten years may thus amount to more than the total land area of South Africa (SouthAfrica.info 2014).

3.5 Lack of transparency

Many land deals are surrounded by secrecy and a lack of transparency.

“The truth is nobody knows. There is no central register; there is little national transparency” (Pearce 2012: 9).

The lack of transparency is a major concern. With no public registry of business transactions, and contracts between the government and investors kept secret, the accountability of companies depends mainly on self-evaluation.

The fact that nobody knows the real figures may have caused exaggeration of the scale of land investments. By August 2012, the extent of triangulated deals in the ILC-matrix was downscaled from 71 million hectares to 48 million hectares worldwide, which may reflect greater scrutiny of the deals presented in the original dataset (Cotula 2013). Due to the lack of transparency and accountability, all figures should be read with caution.

3.6 Dubious local development outcomes

The second narrative that supports land acquisition is the assumption that poor people will benefit from these investments. FDI are strongly needed in Africa. Again, estimates of the amount of money invested so far vary. According to International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), a conservative estimate is that 20 to 30 billion USD have been invested on farmland in Africa in recent years (von Braun & Meinzen-Dick 2009). According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the renewed interest in agricultural investments in developing countries can engender a ‘win-win’ situation. By bringing capital, know-how, market links and infrastructure,

investors can contribute to much-needed agricultural investments in order to feed the world's growing population (FAO 2009a; FAO 2009b; Cotula 2013).

Research conducted to evaluate positive outcomes of resource-seeking foreign direct investments in African agriculture has produced mixed results, due to among other things, vague legal frameworks and procedures governing land acquisitions (Gerlach & Liu 2010). Many of the land transfers are associated with irregularities and corruption, a disrespect of community rights, and exploitation of local populations in terms of, for example, low wages and a lack of compensation for land, causing far-reaching and long-lasting negative effects. This is why some observers have labelled the current land transformation of the African continent as a 'land grab' (Binswanger et al. 1995; Conning & Robinson 2007; Zoomers 2010; Wily 2010). Critics argue that the majority of the investments are not intended to enhance food production, but are based on economic speculation, thus representing a threat to food security (Cotula 2013).

Poverty reduction due to job creation is another main argument used to justify LSLA, with reports claiming that, for example, palm oil production employs 1.7 to 3 million people on 6 million hectares (Deininger et al. 2011). These figures are disputed. Li (2011) claims that field data indicates a much lower level of work creation, and compares figures with the number of jobs created from family farming: 100 hectares of land for family farming generates 35 jobs. On the other hand, the palm oil and sugarcane industries generate ten jobs, eucalyptus two, and soya beans only half of a job per 100 hectares (Holt-Giménez 2007). In Brazil, often used as a role model for Mozambique, eleven agricultural workers are displaced for every new worker employed by soya bean production (Altieri & Bravo 2009). Critical research, in fact, finds that community expectations of indirect benefits due to land investments – such as jobs – have so far been disappointing (Waterhouse et al. 2010). Cotula (2013) questions if one should talk of job creation at all. Instead, Cotula argues, there is a transformation, moving people from their daily occupations of farming, for instance, to salaried work.

“The question is whether this transformation is for the better”(Cotula 2013: 147).

3.7 'Soft international laws' to ensure 'wins'

A third narrative that supports land acquisitions while rejecting the notion of 'land grabs', is the claim that proper regulation ensures that land deals do not violate

acknowledged laws and standards. Several non-legal initiatives have therefore been launched. The aim is that these ‘soft international laws’ can carry a normative legal force. The World Bank has set out principles for ‘responsible agro-investment’ (Deininger et al. 2011) and the United Nations (UN) has established voluntary guidelines and a code of conduct (von Braun & Meinzen-Dick 2009; FAO 2012). In May 2012, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) agreed a set of voluntary guidelines to guide states, civil society and the private sector on responsible governance of land tenure (FAO 2012), setting out principles and internationally accepted standards on how vital resources for the livelihoods of communities should be governed. Central objectives for the guidelines are respect for rights, good governance, and outcomes that secure local people’s livelihoods and pave the way for long-term community-based development (FAO 2014). To achieve these objectives, the respect and protection of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) has emerged as an international human rights standard, aiming to minimise the risk of conflict and ensure a ‘win-win-win’ situation: To protect the livelihoods of local communities, to strengthen viability and sustainability of business operations, and to increase investment opportunities in developing countries (FAO 2014).

Reactions to these normative guidelines have been mixed. Critics argue that the principles are too weak and vague (Daniel & Mittal 2009). The guidelines do not call for a moratorium on large-sale land transactions, or challenge the perceived link between investments and development (ActionAid 2012). FPIC is considered to be an important breakthrough for those who are eager for economic development, since it is based on human rights and social justice (Franco 2014). Still, even if ‘consent’ exists, what real choices do local people have to say “no” to big land deals? (Franco 2014).

3.8 Land acquisitions in Mozambique

3.8.1 *Land Law and associated regulations*

When Mozambique gained independence in 1975, land became state property. Even though there was a shift in 1990 to a market economy and a multiparty system, the principle of state ownership of land has remained in place, and is enshrined in the Constitution of Mozambique of 2004. The constitution does recognise rights to land

acquired through heritage or occupation. This means that land cannot be sold or mortgaged, and all Mozambicans have a right to use and benefit from the land. The Mozambican Land Law of 1997³ is considered to be progressive, recognising the land rights of rural communities. The Land Law, article 12, states how the right of use and benefit of the land, DUAT (Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra, typically translated as 'Land Use and Benefit Rights'), can be obtained by:

- "occupancy by individual persons and by local communities, in accordance with customary norms and practices which do not contradict the Constitution;
- occupancy by individual national person who have been using the land in good faith for at least ten years;
- authorisation of an application submitted by an individual or corporate person in the manner established by this Law" (Frey 1997: 14).

It is the third point in the Land Law that opens up for national and foreign investors to access land, by obtaining concessions (DUATs) on land that is unused, currently used and occupied by others if the occupants are in agreement. The award of a DUAT to such applicants is limited to 50 years, and may be renewed for an equivalent period. A precondition is that the cadastre services, local authorities and local communities together identify the area for concessions for private investment and identify if there are any previous DUATs in place. If so, a plan must be drawn up as to how to govern the partnership between the applicant and the rights holder. A key criterion is to consult with the local community to ensure that the land given is not already occupied by any community, and that there is no risk of exploitation.

Land concessions are given by Mozambican authorities at different levels, depending on the acquisition size: areas less than 1,000 hectares are decided upon by the Provincial Governor, between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares by the Minister of Agriculture, and over 10,000 hectares by the Council of Ministers. A precondition for access to land is a development plan that regulates the use of land and proves the investors' capacity to implement such plans (Hanlon 2011a; Kaarhus & Martin 2012). There is no fixed price for land in Mozambique, since the Land Law prohibits the sale of land and 'lease' only through concession.

³ Land Law, Law no. 19/97, 1 October 1997.

Mandatory community consultations are legally based in the Mozambican Land Law and the Land Law Regulations. In 2011, the government recognised the need to strengthen the principles of prior and informed consent by mandating two meetings for consultations. The first meeting is to inform the community of the applicant and identify the boundaries of the land tract. Within a period of 30 days after the first meeting, a second meeting is to be convened, to hear the pronouncement of the local community regarding the availability of the area.⁴

In principle, the land use rights of a community member over communally held land, as described in the Land Law, are strong and equivalent to co-title rights.⁵ In theory, all co-title holders must agree on decisions affecting their commonly-held rights. In practice, however, this is unclear. The main reason for this has to do with the particular persons or body that actually signs the DUAT applications that affect community land. Originally the Technical Annex to the Regulations specified that the community consultations had to be signed by between three and nine representatives of the community. In addition, title holders or occupants of neighbouring land were required to participate in the consultation process.⁶ The selection process for these representatives was not specified,

“though the implication was that the mechanism for representation was to be determined by, or from within, the community” (Rose 2014: 14).

Important changes, however, came with Decree 43/2010 that amends the Land Law Regulations (article 27, paragraph 2). The decree states that:

“There will be a joint effort involving the District Administrator or his representation, the Cadastre Services, members of the Consultative Councils of the Village and the Locality, members of the local community, the owners or occupants of adjoining land and the applicant or his representative. The result of this work will be reduced to writing and signed by the members of the Consultative Councils of the Towns and Village.”

Even though the decree retains participation of community members, the actual signing of the document is conducted by the Consultative Council in the town or village.

⁴ Ministerial Diploma 158/2011 of 15 June, Article 1.

⁵ Land Law Article 10, paragraph 3.

⁶ Land Law Regulation Article 27 paragraph 2, as originally enacted before amendment.

3.8.2 *A national discourse on FDI and economic growth*

The drive for foreign investments to stimulate agricultural production in Mozambique can be divided in three phases: During the Civil War (1977-1992) and its aftermath, when Negrao (1992) estimates that concessions of 28,000 square kilometres of land were awarded. This was followed by a second concession wave from 1993 to 1997, where large areas of land were provided, this time mainly to Mozambicans (Cramer 2006). What differs these two concessions waves from the one Mozambique has experienced since 1997, is the Land Law, regulating land- and property rights.

In recent years Mozambique has experienced an investment boom: 1,915 large-scale investment projects to the total value of USD 22,2 billion were approved between 2009 and 2013 (Club of Mozambique 2013; 2014). The majority of projects involve mining, agriculture and industry and are above 10,000 hectares, thus requiring the approval of the Council of Ministers.

The real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Mozambique showed a growth of seven percent in 2013 (Almeida-Santos et al. 2013). Despite rapid growth rates and foreign direct investments, poverty reduction has stagnated, or even degenerated in rural areas (Cunguara & Hanlon 2012). Mozambique is ranked 178th of 187 countries on the 2014 Human Development Index (UNDP 2014) and approximately 50 percent of the population live on less than USD 1 per day (Church of Sweden 2014).

The UN has labelled the growth as “jobless growth” (ILO 2014). With an extremely young population and approximately 87 percent of working people in the informal sector (Castel-Branco 2013), job creation is considered a priority challenge for the Mozambican Government (allAfrica 2014a). Whether large-scale investments are the best solution to achieve the aims of job creation and poverty alleviation is disputed – also within the Mozambican Government. The Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agricultural Sector 2010-2019 (PEDSA) was approved by the Council of Ministers on May 3rd 2011 (República de Moçambique Ministério da Agricultura 2010). The plan stresses domestic investment and the development of small and medium commercial farmers. When it was published, the researcher and journalist Josph Hanlon interpreted the plan as a political signal for increased support to small-scale farmers:

“...the era of unquestioned support for foreign investment and the belief that large-scale foreign investment will end poverty is over” (Hanlon 2011a: 47).

3.8.3 *Forest investments*

Mozambique is one of the few African countries with a high level of forest cover (Sitoe et al. 2012), with more than half of the country's land area being forested (Parker et al. 2009). However, the rate of deforestation and forest degradation is high. Between 1990 and 2005 the rate of deforestation was estimated at 0.58 percent – equivalent to 219,000 hectares per year (Marzoli 2007). Even though there are few studies that quantify the specific causes of deforestation and forest degradation, illegal logging and fires seem to be two main direct causes (Sitoe et al. 2012; Mackenzie 2006; Nhantumbo & Izidine 2009). More indirect causes are related to population growth, which increases the pressure on forest resources due to increased urbanisation, clearance of land for small-scale farming and fuel wood consumption, and production of charcoal for sale at local markets. In addition, large-scale mining and the development of sites for permanent agriculture put pressure on Mozambique's forest cover (Marzoli 2007; Cuambe 2010; CIFOR 2012). According to Lambin et al. (2001) and Rudel (2007), economic incentives in the form of state policies and the promotion of business interests also contributes to deforestation and degradation.

Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Government of Mozambique has invited investment from foreign investors. This pro-active and supply-driven process has placed high expectations on the role that foreign investments can play in promoting national economic development. The government guarantees that foreign investments will create jobs and promote local development:

“In the case of private sector investors, investment projects are seen as guarantees of employment opportunities or small-scale infrastructure investments such as providing a school roof or well” (ACIS 2012: 20).

In the National Reforestation Strategy (República de Mozambique 2006), the government aims to establish at least 2 million hectares of tree plantations by 2026, mainly for the purpose of exporting timber. Another 3 million hectares are to be zoned to attract investors (Nuñez & Ribeiro 2006). The government expects to create 300,000 jobs in the forestry sector and related industries (Hanlon 2011a). Niassa is singled out as the province with the greatest land potential, amounting to 2,5 million hectares.

Between 2004 and 2009 the Mozambican Government granted concessions to investors for more than 2.5 million hectares of land. This is seven percent of the

country's arable land. More than 1 million hectares of land went to foreign investors, and as much as 73 percent of the investments were in forestry (Hanlon 2011a). However, such rapid granting of concessions created tensions between investors and the local communities (Justicia Ambiental & UNAC 2011; Norfolk & Hanlon 2012; FIAN 2012). As a result, in late 2009 the Mozambican Government stopped all concessions over 1,000 hectares. Larger concessions were resumed only in late 2011 (Norfolk & Hanlon 2012).

3.8.4 Land in Niassa occupied by forest companies

Today a total of 13 forest companies are present in Mozambique, in the provinces of Niassa, Nampula, Zambezia, Sofala and Manica.⁷ Before the recent process of consolidation, six companies were present in Niassa: Niassa Green Resources (NGR), Chikweti Forests of Niassa (Chikweti), New Forest Company, Florestas de Niassa, Florestal de Massangulo and the Florestas de Planalto (UPM). With the merger in May 2014, the numbers of companies were reduced to four: NGR, New Forest Company, Florestas de Niassa and Florestal de Massangulo.

According to the 2007 national forestry inventory, the forest area of Niassa, estimated at 9,4 million hectares, is dominated by miombo woodland. The potential area for industrial plantations is estimated at 2,47 million hectares (Nhantumbo et al. 2013). The Director for Niassa Green Resources in 2009, Inocencio Sotomane, estimated that over the next 20 years, at least one million hectares would be explored in Niassa (Macauhub 2009a).

All figures on land acquisitions in Niassa should be treated with caution, since their accuracy is questionable. Estimates of the amount of land that is in the process of being allocated vary between 400,000 and 640,000 hectares (Nhantumbo et al. 2013; Church of Sweden 2013; Hanlon 2011a). According to figures from the Cadastre Service in Niassa, the forest companies by August 2014 occupied 266, 867 hectares (Serviços Provincias de Geografia e Cadastro 2014).

Hanlon (2011) demonstrates a lack of transparency in land leases – especially for smaller areas between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares. Whereas all land concessions above

⁷ According to information provided by the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNFTF) on June 13th 2014.

10,000 hectares decided by the Council of Ministers are public, there is no public list of concessions between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares approved by the Minister of Agriculture. Some forest companies, including investors in Niassa, tend to break up their proposals into blocks of less than 10,000 hectares. By doing so, they avoid publicity. This practice is confirmed in a 2013 report written for the Swedish Embassy (Nhantumbo et al. 2013).

3.8.5 The role of donors in public-private partnerships in Niassa

Earlier efforts to attract investors to Niassa were unsuccessful due to, among other things, a lack of infrastructure. So far, a planned railway from the coast to the inland of Niassa has not been realised (Newitt 1995). In 2000, however, a process of rapid change began. Due to Niassa's low economic status, the Mozambican Government designated it a Zone of Rapid Development, providing tax benefits, mainly by reducing corporate income tax rates (Arndt & Tarp 2009; Nhantumbo et al. 2013). Within Niassa, so-called Free Industrial Zones and Special Economic Zones were established that provide further tax exemptions (Nhantumbo et al. 2013; Cruz et al. 2014).

The Swedish Government and an institution called Malonda (which in Nyanja means 'trade' or 'commerce'), have played central roles in the development of the private sector in Niassa (ORGUT, CMI & COWI 2012c; Lambert et al. 2013). The Malonda Foundation (MF) was established in 2005, with the main objective of creating public-private partnerships that are beneficial to local communities. Unfortunately, according to a review of the foundation, this aim was not fulfilled (Lambert et al. 2013). In 2013 the Swedish Government withdrew its support for the MF (allAfrica 2013). Nevertheless, the MF played a decisive role as a facilitator for foreign investors. Taking over old DUATs from the unsuccessful Mozagrius Programme⁸, together with DUATs on new areas, MF gained access to large areas of land suitable for forest plantations (Åkesson et al. 2009):

“Most of the existing companies only started with initial assistance from the Malonda Foundation who streamlined the land acquisition process by applying for all DUATs collectively before transferring these to the companies respectively. Also the EIAs (Environmental Impact Assessment, sic.) were paid for by the Malonda Foundation” (Green Resources 2013a).

⁸ Mozagrius was based on a presidential agreement in the mid-1990s between Mozambique and South Africa to attract white South African settlers to Niassa. Fewer than anticipated arrived, and after some years most had left. Conflicts over land was a main reason why the programme failed (Havnevik 2014).

Two of the companies that were established with the help of the Malonda Foundation were NGR and Chikweti. Since 2008, however, Norwegian donor funding and regulations provided by Norad (the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) and the Norfund (the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries) have played an important role in the development of Niassa:

The funding to GRAS provided by Norad amounts to 4,8 million NOK (\$635,762)⁹, which includes support for GRAS operations in Uganda, Mozambique and Tanzania. For the operation in Niassa, Norad has provided 471,597 NOK (\$62,463). The funding was used to conduct a pre-study with the aim of establishing the Sanga Reforestation and Carbon Project. For pre-studies, Norad funds within 50 percent of the costs. As a pre-project, no further monitoring is required, only a report that shows that the study is conducted according to the application for development funding and consideration for social responsibility (Norad 2010; Bjergene & Piene 2013). In 2014, Niassa Reforestation Project was registered as Mozambique's first afforestation/reforestation project under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), using forest plantations as 'carbon sinks' (Green Resources 2014b).

So far, the Norfund has issued two loans to GRAS:

- In 2009 they issued a ten-year loan of USD 7 million.
- In January 2012 they issued a high-risk loan, the so-called *unsecured mezzanine bullet loan*, of \$15 million with a tenure of six years. Other loan lenders with the same terms are Finnfund (\$10 million) and the Netherlands Development Finance Company (\$15 million).

The loan payment is successively regulated by the fulfilment of the conditions agreed in a long-term action plan, with financial, environmental and social development 'milestones' that GRAS has to achieve. This legally binding loan deal does not only regulate loans issued by Norfund, but for all providers of loans, a so-called 'pari-passu' (on equal terms). Norfund monitors the progress made in the action plan by annual reports on environmental and social performance and annual development performance, field visits and the use of external experts to monitor and follow up the

⁹ \$ to NOK conversion 1:7.55

financial, environmental, social and operational goals. If the milestones are not achieved within the agreed time frame, GRAS is in default, and must ask for a 'waiver'. In business literature this practice is defined as how "under certain circumstances a nonbreaking party may be willing to accept a defective performance of the contract. This knowing relinquishment for a legal right (that is, the right to require satisfactory and full performance) is called a waiver" (Clarkson et al. 2012: 359).

None of the loans provided by Norfund were earmarked for the operation in Niassa. At the time when the loans were provided, the operations in Niassa had not been prioritised. With the consolidation process, this changed. The merger had not been possible without the acceptance from Norfund as investor. With the merger, due diligence of GSFF was conducted and a new chapter in the Environmental and Social Action Plan (ESAP) was added, regulating environmental and social demands for the Niassa operation.



Annex 5: Eukaluptus plantation that soon will be ready for processing. Photo: Liv R. Bjergene 2014

3.8.6 Foreign forest companies in Niassa Province

The Global Solidarity Forest Fund (GSFF) and the Chikweti Forests of Niassa

The Chikweti Forests of Niassa (Chikweti) was established in 2006. Chikweti was the first of five forest companies in Africa run by the Nordic-dominated fund, GSFF. This fund was founded by the Diocese of Västerås, of the Lutheran Church of Sweden, the Norwegian Lutheran Church Endowment and is co-owned by the Dutch pension fund, Stichting Pension Funds ABP (GSFF 2008). In Niassa, the initial plan was to manage a total of 140,000 hectares of “degraded forest land” (GSFF 2007: 3; FIAN 2012) and to establish pine and eucalyptus plantations on 68,500 hectares (GSFF 2008). GSFF’s expected internal rate of return by February 2007 was 13 percent per year (GSFF 2007).

GSFF committed itself to the ten universal principles of the United Nations Global Compact (United Nations Global Compact 2015), which requires responsible policy implementation in the areas of human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption. GSFF also committed itself to relevant UN and ILO conventions. The fund promised to acquire land-use rights only “after extensive community consultation” (GSFF 2008: 2).

“GSFF develops forest-based investments with high potential returns and a strong ethical and socio-economical profile, including community development and FSC¹⁰ certification” (GSFF 2008: 1).

Shortly after the establishment of Chikweti, financial and organisational problems led to internal and external criticism of GSFF. In 2009, the problems became acute and a process of change started in both Chikweti and GSFF (Church of Sweden 2014). In 2011, following denunciations made by the National Union of Peasant Farmers (UNAC) and the World Rainforest Movement, the Mozambican government agency, the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNTF), voiced harsh criticism against GSFF. The DNTF concluded that Chikweti was illegally occupying 32,000 hectares of land, plantings were too close to community areas and the process of community consultations had not been properly conducted – including community consultations

¹⁰ Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is a global, multi-stakeholder, membership organisation that promotes responsible forest management. A FSC-certification is to ensure that products are produced in forests that are well managed and provide economic, social and environmental benefits.

that often were intentionally falsified (Norfolk & Hanlon 2012). In addition, DNTF criticised the lack of compensation paid to local communities and the fact that promises remained unfulfilled (World Rainforest Movement 2011). All allegations were denied by Chikweti and by GSFF (FIAN 2012; Bjergene 2012e).

The number of people employed in Chikweti has fluctuated. According to GSFF, 730 people were employed in 2008 (GSFF 2008). In 2011, the number of workers increased to 3,454, all employed full-time (Bjergene 2012b). In early 2012, this figure was downscaled to 1,500 (Bjergene 2012b), although other sources report lower 2012 figures of 1,100 or 900 employees (FIAN 2012).

According to data provided by Chikweti in October 2013, the company's total planned area comprises 100,000 hectares, of which 15,388 hectares have been planted (Church of Sweden 2014). Chikweti originally had DUATs for 27,000 hectares, but applied for more. On 1st April 2014 the Council of Ministers gave Chikweti DUATs for an additional 52,000 hectares in the Niassa districts of Sanga and Lichinga (Hanlon 2014a). This decision came after GSFF announced that it would dismiss 800 workers due to lack of access to land. One month later, the merger between GRAS and GSFF was announced (Green Resources 2014a; Hanlon 2014b). At the time of the merger, the value of GSFF was \$104 million (Grini 2015).

Green Resources AS (GRAS) and Niassa Green Resources (NGR)

Green Resources AS (GRAS) was established in 1995 by the current CEO, Mads Asprem, under the name Fjordgløtt (Molberg 2012). In 2000, the company was renamed to Tree Farms and in 2007 it changed to the current name (Gaarder 2009). Today, GRAS holds large-scale forest plantations in Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique. With the consolidation process in Niassa during Spring 2014, GRAS has acquired 40,000 hectares of forest plantations in the three countries. According to GRAS this has created the biggest forest company on the continent outside of South Africa (Macauhub 2014a).

GRAS' three largest shareholders by February 1st 2015 were Diversified International Timber (20.6 percent), Phaunos Timber Fund (18.8 percent) and NewAfrica (14.2 percent). Other investors were Steinerud (5,6 percent), Storebrand (4,3 percent). The former founders of GSFF, the Norwegian Lutheran Church Endowment and Västerås Stift had shares of respectively 1.3 percent and 0.9 percent (Green Resources 2015a). In addition, Erik Ling, Managing Director of Västerås Stift Skog, had

become a member of the board of directors, whereas Åge Korsvold, the former CEO of Orkla AS, was deputy chairman (Green Resources 2015b). Other well-known Norwegian investors were Kjell Inge Røkke, Tom Vidar Rygh, Morten Bergesen, Kristoffer Olsen and Erik Bøhler (Jacobsen 2015).

According to GRAS only low value grassland or degraded forestland is used for their plantations. Furthermore, all GRAS' plantations aim to follow "the highest international standards by conserving natural forest and other valuable habitats" (Green Resources 2014).

In Mozambique, GRAS has two companies: Lúrio Green Resources (LGR) in Nampula Province and Niassa Green Resources (NGR) in Niassa Province. NGR was legally registered in July 2007 and is a partnership between Green Resources AS (80 percent ownership and the Malonda Foundation (20 percent ownership) (Green Resources 2011). Through the Malonda Foundation, NGR has a DUAT for 40,360 hectares. As more than 50 percent of this land is natural forest, there is an on-going process of swapping some of these land titles for land that is suitable for forest planting (Green Resources 2014c). According to the former Managing Director for NGR, since the merger second in charge, Inocencio Sotomane, the process has ended with a DUAT for approximately 28,000 hectares.

The company's objective is

"to grow trees and harvest the wood products for sawn timber and utility poles while simultaneously mitigating climate change (Green Resources 2014c).

In 2011, NGR established Mozambique's first forest plantation certified by the recognised standards of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)¹¹ (Green Resources 2014c). As mentioned above, the pre-study supported by Norad for the Niassa Reforestation Project was registered in 2014 as an afforestation/reforestation project under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

The sale of tCER is important for GRAS and its investors in order to provide an expected total return of 25 percent in the long term (UNFCCC 2014a). Based solely on

¹¹ Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is a global, multi-stakeholder, membership organisation that promotes responsible forest management. A FSC-certification is to ensure that products are produced in forests that are well managed and provide economic, social and environmental benefits.

timber revenues, the return rate is calculated as 18.8 percent, whereas a tCER price of \$7.04 is estimated to provide a 24.9 percent return in the long term (UNFCCC 2014a). In the application to UNFCCC for CDM approval of the Niassa Reforestation Project, this additional revenue stream was considered necessary “to make the project financially viable” (UNFCCC 2014a: 53).

The Niassa Reforestation Project necessitates the relocation of some farmers. These farmers will be compensated by the allocation of new land, including the facilitation of land preparation by NGR (UNFCCC 2014a). An agricultural programme – NGRADO – will be implemented to encourage settled agriculture. According to NGR’s project document to the CDM Executive Board, 1,500 peasants are to benefit over the next five years. In order to conserve natural forest resources, NGR plans to establish community woodlots to meet the local demand for forestry products (UNFCCC 2014a). In 2013, 400 producers were engaged in a soya project (Green Resources 2013b).

In addition to the agricultural programme, NGR’s community development programme includes the construction and equipping of an IT classroom at the secondary school in Sanga, and a grant to build a maize mill. The company is also constructing a market place in Lichinga (Green Resources 2014c).

NGR has been criticised for contributing to a substantial loss of land, reduced access to local natural resources, unresolved compensation cases, low salaries, uncertain working conditions, unfulfilled promises of community development, and even accusations of land grabbing (FIAN 2012; Hanlon 2011a; Justicia Ambiental & UNAC 2011; Solberg 2012; Bjergene 2012a).

GRAS’ CEO, Mads Asprem, disagrees with the criticisms against the company and highlights the positive gains made in the form of local job creation and investments in infrastructure at the local level. An aim for the company is to be the “favoured African employer within its industry” (Green Resources 2014). Asprem also claims that more and more of GRAS’ forest plantations fulfil the environmental and social demands of FSC, and that GRAS’ plantations are important contributions in meeting Africa’s increased need for biomass (Piene & Bjergene 2012).

If the local population is dissatisfied, a common way for them to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the forest company is to set fire to the forest plantation. In 2013, there were 21 fires at NGRs plantations in Niassa, with a total area of 229 hectares being lost (Green Resources 2013b).

In 2014, GRAS showed a budget deficit of \$19,9 million after taxes, compared with a surplus of \$0,7 million for the first six months of 2013. The company's revenues for 2014 were \$21,7 million (Grini 2015). Due to financial constraints, GRAS has recently asked its investors for fresh money, hoping to raise additional 77,5 million NOK (\$10,3 million) by dumping the price of the shares from 56 NOK in 2010(\$7,4) to 5 NOK (\$0,66) (Jacobsen 2015).

Asprem earned \$1,123,000 in 2014, compared to his previous annual salary of \$401,000. The reason for this substantial salary increase was the merger between GSFF and GRAS, during which Asprem received shares worth \$718,000 (Grini 2015). At the time of the merger, GRAS was valued at \$257 million (Grini 2015).

3.8.7 Joining economic and political forces?

There appears to be strong ties between government officials working with foreign investments in land and forest companies present in Niassa: the Director of the Investment Promotion Centre (CPI)¹², Lourenco Sambo, has worked as the Chairperson of Chikweti¹³; the Director of the Agribusiness Promotion Centre (Cepagri)¹⁴, Abdul Cesar, has been the Managing Director of Companhia Florestal de Massangulo, a business partner of Chikweti (CIFOR 2011); Inocencio Sotomane, the Director of NGR until the merger, now second in charge, was formerly chairperson of the Malonda Foundation (Club of Mozambique 2007); and Arlito Cuco, the Director of GRAS Mozambique, was formerly the head of the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNFTF) (Mozambique Forest Governance Learning Group 2005-2009).

¹² CPI is a government agency established in 1994 "to promote, attract and facilitate national and foreign direct investment" (CPI 2013).

¹³ Information provided in interview with Lourenco Sambo on 19.06.2014.

¹⁴ Cepagri is a government agency established in 2006 to promote agro-business and agro-industry in Mozambique.

Chapter 4 Research design and methods

4.1 Study site

Niassa is Mozambique's largest province, with a surface area of 129,061 km², but it is the least densely populated province, with only about 1,5 million people. With a combination of vast amounts of land and a sparse population, Niassa is considered to have land available for agriculture, forestry and bio-energy production (Orgut 2006). In addition, Niassa is one of two Mozambican provinces with the largest reserves of mineral coal (6 billion tons) (Selemane 2010).

Niassa is regarded to be the poorest among the ten provinces in the country. The great need for development is recognised by both the Mozambican Government and donors (Orgut 2006). During the past few years there have been clear and consistent decrease in poverty levels, with the poverty rate decreasing from 70.6 percent in 1996/97, to 54.1 percent in 2002/03 and 31.9 percent in 2008/09 (ORGUT, CMI & COWI 2013). These poverty levels, however, are not equally distributed (INE 2010; ORGUT, CMI & COWI 2012c).

From 1999 to 2002 the deforestation rate in Niassa Province was 0.22 percent – the lowest rate in all the provinces in Mozambique (Marzoli 2007). The area planted with staple food crops increased by 85 percent from 2000/01 to 2009/10 (INE 2002; INE 2011; Marzoli 2007).

The majority of Niassa's rural population depends on natural resources for survival, particularly traditional subsistence farming. Farmers practice the 'slash and burn' method¹⁵, normally changing their farm every three years (Orgut 2006). The low population level makes it possible to have fallow periods of 20 to 30 years, thus restoring soil fertility between cultivation periods. This traditional system may not be sustainable with an increase in population and large amounts of land now being occupied by forest plantations (Church of Sweden 2014).

¹⁵ A common method used throughout the tropics, also known as 'shifting cultivation'. Fire is used to prepare the fields for cultivation. As productivity declines, those fields are abandoned and allowed to return to a natural state as native plants and tree species reclaim the field. Over time, soil nutrient level recover. If done properly, the method has shown to be sustainable over long time. If done improperly, land can quickly degrade (Cornell 2007).

In a household study conducted in 2006 (Orgut 2006), paid employment was not considered as a solution to improve livelihoods, illustrating the lack of access to jobs in the region and the strong dependency on land.



Source: Wikimedia Commons

Annex 6: Map of Mozambique and the Niassa Province.

4.2 Study design and framework

To gather data required to answer the research questions, a cross-sectional research design was chosen, combining some quantitative and mainly qualitative tools and techniques, so called ‘mixed methods’ research (Bryman 2008). The main reason for using this approach is to gain a better understanding of the complex development context in Niassa Province.

The overall aim of this study is to analyse the roles and obtain the views of local communities, investors and government officials regarding the effects of large-scale forestry in Niassa Province. Choosing a mixed methods approach, the aim is to present a wide and balanced view on the effects of forestry investments, which hopefully will “help challenge the social construction of ideological norms, realities and ‘regimes of truth’ that characterise the dominant development discourses” (Holland & Campbell 2005:18). Weaknesses in the research approach may be compensated for by addressing the research problem using both qualitative and quantitative tools. If the qualitative and quantitative methods lead to the same conclusion, triangulation is achieved (Bryman 2006; Greene et al. 1989; Hammersley 1996).

Thus, when properly conducted, the mixed methods approach may provide credible and robust data to demonstrate the foreseen positive or negative outcomes of forest investments in Niassa by the main stakeholders Chikweti and NGR, which on May 1st 2014 became one company due to the merger between GRAS and GSFF (Green Resources 2014a), the company’s investors (Norfund), donors (Norad), the local communities and the Mozambican Government.

4.3 The data collection process

The field research for this thesis was divided into four parts:

Date and place:	Data collection instrument: Semi-structured interviews with:	Data collection instrument: Household survey:	Data collection instrument: Focus group discussions:
Date: 10-21.9.2011 Place: Maputo, Nampula Province and Niassa Province, Sanga district. 2 communities in Niassa Province visited.	Mozambican government at central, provincial and district level, researchers, NGOs, the Norwegian Embassy, and employees of Green Resources in Maputo, Lúrio (Nampula Province) and Niassa. ¹⁶		
Date: 10-20.6.2014	Mozambican government at central		

¹⁶ Some of the findings from this field trip were published in a special edition of the monthly development magazine published by Norad (Bjergene 2012a; Bjergene 2012b; Bjergene 2012c; Bjergene 2012d; Bjergene 2012e) and in a collection of articles published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Piene & Bjergene 2012).

Place: Maputo	level, researcher, NGOs, the Swedish Embassy, and Green Resources in Maputo. Several of the interviewees were also interviewed in 2011.		
Date: 12-26.8.2014 Place: Niassa Province, Lichinga, Chimbonila, Sanga and Lago districts. 12 communities visited.	Key-informants in the local communities, NGOs, Mozambican government at provincial and district level, Niassa Green Resources. Several of the interviewees were interviewed also in 2011.	Sampling of 55 households, 33 men and 22 women.	Sampling of 12 focus groups, nine with men only and three with women only. Group size ranged from four to 21 members. Total numbers of focus group interviewees: 105 individuals.
Date: 27.8.2014 Place: Maputo	Researchers.		

Table 1: Overview of the four field research parts

4.3.1 *The household survey*

The main data collection tool for this study is a household survey which was used to gather mostly qualitative, and some quantitative data, in order to respond to the research questions. The household survey involved interviewing 33 men and 22 women in a snowball sampling (Bryman 2006) of 55 households in the four districts of Niassa. General household economic data, including household attributes such as sex, age, household size and education level were collected. To gain insight into the food security situation, respondents were asked about their main occupation, agricultural products produced, and possible changes in size, quality or distance to the farm after the arrival of the forest companies. Many of the interviewees found it hard to measure distance in kilometres and preferred to use hours, which was roughly converted into the corresponding distance by multiplying the number of hours by 3.5, as recommended by Orgut (2006).

The survey consists of the following sections:

- Section A presents general information in terms of sex, status in the household, age, numbers of family members in the household and level of education;

- Section B focuses on food security;
- Section C deals with working possibilities and working conditions in the forestry companies;
- Section D investigates the issue of community consultations from company level to local, district and provincial governmental level;
- Section E focuses on community/company relationships and to what extent promises of social and economical improvements have been fulfilled;
- Section F asks about the respondents' perspective on the future situation and whether, based on their own experiences, they would advise other communities to lease land to foreign forest companies.

With the majority of the interviewees, the answers to the questions raised in the household survey were followed up by additional, exploratory questions to gain deeper understanding of what they were expressing.

The data collected from the household survey is both quantitative and qualitative in nature. In order to achieve more robust and reasonable outcomes from the qualitative findings, these findings were ranked. Since ranking does not include quantitatively ranked values, the findings need to be interpreted with care (Maxwell & Barth 1995).

4.3.2 *Focus group discussions*

Focus group discussions were conducted, providing qualitative data to explore the issue of land investments in depth, and to collect people's opinions as members of a group, rather than as individuals (Bryman 2008). In addition, the method is considered useful in obtaining respondents' points of view under a more equitable power relationship between respondent and researcher than in a traditional interview (Bryman 2008). The focus group discussions were also useful for more in-depth information about the effects of the forest investments on group members' life situation and to cross-check information for purposes of triangulation.

All focus groups members had been affected by the forest investments – either due to changes to their plots of land, working relations with the forest company, or simply by being inhabitants in a local community leasing out land.



Annex 7: Focus group discussion with women.

Photo: Mateus João Marassiro 2014

The focus groups were conducted in the interviewees' local community, providing a natural setting. The respondents were in segregated groups of men or women. One reason for choosing this approach was to register possible gender differences in their replies. Another main reason for the gender segregation was to obtain the opinions of the women without being under the influence of men. The use of focus groups for women may create an opportunity for them

“to empower themselves by making sense of their experience of vulnerability and subjugation” (Madriz 2000: 843).

4.3.3 *Semi-structured interviews*

In addition to the household survey and focus group discussion, semi-structured interviews with key interviewees were conducted, to contribute to the substantial information base for this study. As opposed to the household survey, which follows a

fixed set of questions, these interviews were more flexible, true to the nature of semi-structured interviews (Bryman 2008). A list of questions and an interview guide were prepared, to ensure that the research topics were covered. The result is thus a mix of structured and unstructured questions.

The interviewees in the semi-structured interviews were purposively selected. Before my fieldwork I had read secondary literature and was updated on the research subject, and some of the key-authors I contacted for an interview. In addition, I was assisted by the Norwegian Embassy in Maputo and by the Norwegian People's Aid's office in Oslo and Maputo by whom to interview in order to gain a deep, diverse and rich understanding of the research questions raised.

4.3.4 Seminars

In addition to conducting the field missions, I attended five seminars covering foreign direct investments to gain further insight into the research questions:

- Seminar in Oslo 28.11.2012: Large-scale land acquisitions in the South: Commercialization for poverty reduction or marginalization of the poor? (CLTSUMB, Norfund, Statens Kartverk 2012);
- Seminar in Oslo 29.05.2013: Næringslivet som bistandsaktør. Seminar arranged by ForUM and Norwegian Church Aid presenting the report "Bistand eller butikk? Norsk næringsliv som bistandsaktør" (Bjergene & Piene 2013);
- Seminar in Stockholm 3.6.2014: Lärdomar från Niassa – den gemensamma rapporten om Västerås stifts skogsinvestering i Mocambique (Swedish Church and WWF 2014);
- Seminar in Oslo 04.11.2014: Karbon-vold: den mørke siden av grønn, presenting the report "The darker side of green plantation. Forestry and carbon violence in Uganda. The case of Green Resources' forestry-based carbon markets" (The Oakland Institute 2014);
- Seminar in Oslo 06.02.2015: Presentation of the evaluation of Norfund (Evaluering av Norfund presenteres) (Norad 2015).

4.3.5 *Secondary literature*

Secondary literature has been an important guide for this work, demonstrating the need for further research. Before starting the fieldwork, theoretical literature was reviewed to formulate valid and answerable research questions. During the fieldwork I constantly considered whether my findings were in accordance with, or contradicted the theoretical framework chosen for my study.

4.4 Data analysis

I used mainly qualitative tools and some quantitative tools to analyse the data.

Quantitative:

The household survey data contains quantifiable information relating to several aspects of land investments, thus providing a “consistent instrument for gauging differences” (Bryman 2008: 144). In the analysis of this data, the replies were categorised and counted. They were then ranked qualitatively.

Qualitative:

The data collected by means of the household survey was written down and categorised as the fieldwork proceeded. The translation from Portuguese or local languages into English was done in the field and replies were later checked and revised, together with the translators.

Information provided in the semi-structured interviews was written down as accurately as possible during each interview. The only sessions that were audio recorded in addition to writing the statements down, were the focus group discussions. The reason for the lack of other audio recordings was that many informant interviewees expressed some discomfort with being recorded. For the focus groups, however, all respondents agreed after I explained that the record was only for me as a researcher to have the option of cross-checking the information. Since we were using interpreters and talking to many people at the same time, I decided to tape record the conversations. Thus the recorded focus group discussions were not directly transcribed, but were carefully listened to when analysing the data.

I used mainly grounded theory as a framework for analysing the qualitative data. The essence of this method is how data collection, analysis and theory are interrelated. Theory is thus generated from the data gathered and analysed. In the field I was thus constantly revising the interpretation of my findings, seeking more information to properly answer the research questions.

4.5 Strengths and limitations of the selected research methods

To what extent the findings of a study are representative and generalisable may be affected by several aspects, such as financial resources and time available. These constraints affect the number of research sites and interviewees that can be reached. Other considerations are language and the cultural perspectives of respondents, as well as the credibility of the results emanating from the research methods selected (Curnan et al. 1998). All these limitations are relevant to my study, as discussed below.

Limitations:

1. It would have been useful to have more time in the field, but this was not possible. Covering a complex subject, where culture and language are two main challenges for me as a foreigner, it takes time to gain a deeper understanding of the people, their culture and current transformations due to land acquisitions. Finances were also limited and necessary costs included hiring a car, a chauffeur and translators to translate from the local languages and Portuguese into English.
2. In planning the field trip, I originally intended to make a random selection of interviewees for the household survey. In the field, however, I decided that a snowball sampling method was more suitable, due to both the limited time available for the field research, and the time and accessibility of the interviewees. A non-random sample, however, may affect the representativeness of the findings. The external validity of such sampling method may be questionable, and the findings can be generalised only to the population where the sample was taken (Bryman 2008).
3. External reliability may also be a challenge, as the circumstances and setting of a similar study would vary to some extent. In addition, as a researcher, I may have

affected the informant interviewees' replies to some extent, thus causing reactive effects.

4. To gain access to a local community, one needs to obtain the permission of the chief¹⁷. The standard procedure was to ask for this, and then return the next day to conduct the interviews. On our arrival, the leadership in the community had asked for community members (men and women) who would be willing to participate in the focus groups. In interpreting the findings, it is thus important to bear in mind that the findings may be biased, as the selection of the focus group informants was neither random, nor selected by me as the moderator.
5. In one particular community, my translator and I decided that the interviewees in the household survey had been pre-arranged by the chief. We therefore conducted only one household interview, and then went out on our own and arranged a small focus group of men to obtain a more unbiased view of the situation.

Strengths:

- Following up the quantitative findings with further qualitative research made it possible to gain a much more complex and nuanced set of views.
- The quantitative and qualitative findings corroborate each other, which is an indication of internal validity (Bryman 2008).
- The internal validity is strong, as there is a good match between my observations as a researcher and the theoretical ideas developed (Bryman 2008).
- The internal reliability is strong. Throughout the fieldwork, I constantly discussed the findings with my local translators, checking if we as a team agreed on what we heard and saw. As an outsider, unfamiliar with the language and culture, this was invaluable.
- My main translator and organiser for the field mission to Niassa in 2014, Mateus João Marassiro, is a researcher at UniLurio in Niassa. In addition to his knowledge of the local languages and culture, his experience in conducting household surveys in the local communities of Niassa was useful and has most probably increased the value of my research. The same applies to the contribution of the

¹⁷ The chiefs are sometimes traditional leaders and other times régulos appointed by the Government of Mozambique. During field work it was not possible to clarify whether the leader of the community was a chief or a régulo. Throughout the thesis I will use the term 'chief', even though this might include leaders that are régulos.

female translator used, Maira Angelina Mario Silvestre Ilhacoto. Her knowledge of local languages and culture made it easier to access women, in particular the majority who didn't speak Portuguese.

- As the field research proceeded, many interviewees independently repeated the same opinions on the key question, indicating increased reliability of the findings.

4.6 Research Ethics

Ethical issues regarding this study were carefully considered, using the four main ethical principles identified by Diener and Crandall (1978), which are presented as important benchmarks by Bryman (2008). In addition, I add anonymity. I will discuss the ethical principles in the following sub-sections.

1. Harm to respondents:
2. Lack of informed consent:
3. Invasion of privacy:
4. Deception
5. Anonymity

1. No physical or psychological harm was caused to individuals, households or organisations participating in this study.
2. Free and prior consent was given by all interviewees. They were given the option to say "no", but they all accepted the invitation to participate in the research. The purpose and objective of the research were explained to all respondents. This explanation was important also in order to clarify my role as the researcher and the purpose of the survey.
3. When formulating the questions for the household survey and during fieldwork I was concerned about the privacy of interviewees. To make sure that the questions did not invade their privacy, and also that the formulations made sense to the interviewees, without any possible loss of self-esteem, skilled researchers familiar with the local setting provided important input to the questionnaire in advance.

During the field research, I consulted my interpreter before asking questions that might appear to be invasive e.g. about polygamy in Niassa, or possible internal conflicts in the local community. People in the local communities were extremely poor. Coming as a foreigner, asking a number of questions about their livelihoods and private life situation, might be considered invasive. This made it even more important to treat all interviewees with respect and appreciate their contributions. Some questions were asked only when the interpreter and I had spent a substantial amount of time with the informant and only when my interpreter, knowing the local setting, judged it acceptable to ask.

4. According to Bryman (2008: 124), “[d]eception occurs when researchers present their work as something other than what it is”. All information presented in this study is based on my interpretation of the information provided by the interviewees. There is no intention to provide false or misleading information.
5. Land acquisition is a controversial subject. In this thesis, the names of local communities, and respondents in the household surveys, focus group discussions and interviews in the local communities have been anonymised. I have, however, decided to publish the names of the districts, as well as the interviewees’ civil status, sex and, where relevant, age range. This is because I consider some of this information to be relevant to the discussion of the findings. With the many communities present in Niassa, I am of the opinion that the provision of this information will not jeopardise the anonymity of my interviewees. All other key interviewees have been mentioned by names and titles, as I consider them to be official sources of information, representing a government, NGO, company or investor.

5.0 Research findings on the effects of forest investments in Niassa Province

About a decade has passed since the first forest company visited local communities in Niassa and asked if they might be willing to lease out land for forestry plantations. Rows of eucalyptus and pine, often stretching as far as the eye can see, are visible signs of on-going transformation, where bush landscape and small plots of agricultural land are being replaced by LSLA in the form of forest plantations.

This section presents various perspectives on forest investments in Niassa Province, collected during fieldwork in 2011 and in 2014.

5.1 The consultation process

Many of the land conflicts in Mozambique relate to the consultation process (German et al. 2011; Nhantumbo & Salomão 2010). In 2011, central government representatives admitted that 'land grabbing' due to LSLA was taking place in Mozambique, and that the government was working hard to control this.¹⁸ The most common view expressed at central government level in 2011 was that in general, a proper process of consultation ensured that community members' voices were heard and that 'grabbing' of land was an exception. A common point of view expressed by the management in NGR and GRAS, in both 2011 and 2014, was that to proceed with a land lease deal without the consent of the community members would backfire on the company. They had therefore decided to spend sufficient amounts of time and personal resources on community consultations.

In 2011, the management of GRAS in Maputo denied any accusations of land grabbing. They claimed that a proper process of consultation with the communities was conducted in order to lease land. In addition, the GRAS' management considered the land they had leased was 'underused' land.¹⁹ According to the goals of FDI, this land would be 'developed'.

For Chikweti, the deliberately chosen approach included to negotiate with local communities in order to replant on land that traditionally had been used for agriculture. The local government had encouraged the company to change this practice and find

¹⁸ Interview with Director CPI, Laourenço Sambo on 14.09.2011.

¹⁹ Interview with Managing Director of Mozambique Operations at Green Resources, Arlito Cuco on 12.09.2011.

more remote areas for their plantations, due to the high level of conflict created by this approach; however the company did not heed this request and did not change their land approach.²⁰

One objective of the household survey was to obtain the views of local community members about the consultation process, and whether they felt that their voice had been heard in leasing community land to the forest companies. The general reply to this yes/no question was that of 55 respondents, 31 answered 'yes', 23 'no', and one informant gave no reply. The most common explanation given for not being heard was that the community had not been consulted, or that the company had a dialogue only with the community leadership (the chief). 12 of the respondents who replied 'no', were women. The total numbers of women interviewed in the household survey were 22.

In focus group discussions, interviewees elaborated upon a consultation process where local community members' weak power position was a challenge:

"We were not in a good position when we negotiated for land in 2010 because we were very hungry. Malonda Foundation and Green Resources contacted the régulo first. They made promises to him before they got the land. When we people tried to understand, we were promised jobs. But we only had the jobs for three months".

(Focus group men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.2014).

In the household survey, the interviewees were also asked for their opinion about the different hierarchical levels in the decision-making chain of a land lease, ranging from local village government officials, district consultative councils, to district and provincial government levels. Some of these replies seem to have been randomly given, in particular as to whether the respondents felt that their voice had been heard or not by provincial government officials. This was probably simply because in the local communities, members were rarely in touch with provincial government officials, a fact that was expressed openly.²¹

Nevertheless, 32 respondents considered the consultation process to be 'good' at the local community level, followed by: 31 interviewees at the district level, 32 at the forest company level, 14 at the district council level and 28 interviewees at the

²⁰ Interview with Felisberto Muterua at the District Government office in the Chimbonila District on 19.08.2014.

²¹ Interview with woman, widow in community 1, Chimbunila District on 16.08.2014.

provincial level. The most common reason provided for labelling the process as ‘good’, was the hope of job creation:

“The process of consultations was good because we hope we will get jobs.”
(Woman, married, community 2, Sanga District).

Community members’ opinions of the consultation process varied from one community to another. There were also opposite views of the process within the same community, both in terms of whether or not there had been a process of consultation or if a contract had been concluded.

An impression from the fieldwork conducted in 2014 was that the claims of land grabbing were less frequently voiced than they had been in 2011. A reason for this may be that the process of consultation had been changed and become more streamlined. Until the end of 2009, investors had their projects approved at central government level, whereas the provincial level then had to grant the projects. In 2011, the provincial government in Niassa expressed that it was challenging to allocate sufficient amounts of land for a resource-rich province such as Niassa.²² According to district government representatives interviewed in 2011, concessions for land were sometimes granted at central level without any consultations taking place.²³ NGR’s management expressed frustration in 2011 with the practice where the companies, and not the government, had to find suitable land for plantations.²⁴

At the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012, government officials, civil society and local communities in Niassa had several meetings where they reached consensus about areas to be used for forest plantations and areas to be conserved. Common feedback from government officials at district and provincial level, NGOs and forest companies, was that reaching a consensus on land use had decreased the level of conflict. This view was confirmed by some interviewees at the community level.²⁵

However, the Director of the two Maputo-based Mozambican NGOs *Justicia Ambiental* and the National Farmers Union (UNAC) did not share this optimistic view:

“We consider the land situation worse now than in 2011 because there are more projects and thus more land taken from the communities. We worry that peasant farmers end up as labourers for businesses. Small-scale farmers support 81

²² Interview with Provincial Director of Agriculture in Niassa Province, Eusébio Mauricio Tumuitikile on 20.9.2011.

²³ Interview with District Administrator in Sanga, Paulino Hussa on 19.9.2011.

²⁴ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane on 19.9.2011.

²⁵ Focus group men, community 7, Sanga District on 16.08.2014.

percent of Mozambique's food supply. If this changes, we don't know the impact. In our view, the level of conflict is higher.”
(Anabela Lemos, Director Justicia Ambiental on 12.06.2014).

“Niassa is one of the most problematic provinces. The peasant farmers lease out land and are promised work in return, but these jobs are not permanent. The Mozambican Government ought to empower the farmers to produce food. To establish large-scale tree plantations is not a good solution for the local communities”.
(Interview with Louis Muchanga, Director of the National Farmers Union (UNAC) on 19.06.2014).

One effect of the consensus process is that the role of NGOs working in Niassa has changed. In 2011, local NGOs played an active role in informing local communities of their rights, and providing information about possible short-term and long-term consequences of a land lease. In 2011, the leadership in the farmers' union in Lichinga (UCA) expressed the fact that some of the main challenges were a lack of contracts, local communities were given too little time to consider whether or not to lease out land, and there were gaps between promises and outcomes.²⁶

These issues caused tensions between the forest companies and NGOs. In 2011, the management of GSFF expressed their opinion that NGOs made their work harder, and described NGO working methods as “smear campaigns” and “manipulation” (Bjergene 2012e: 20). Three years later, the leader of UCA, Paulino Imede, described the new role of NGOs in the land acquisition process:

“Our role now as civil society is to help the communities to give away land without conflict. We no longer inform the local communities about their rights, but try to force the forest companies to show social responsibility and to help the communities to give away land without conflict.”
(Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer's Union Lichinga) on 15.08.2014).

Another NGO working in Niassa, Rural Association for Mutual Aid (ORAM), confirmed that NGOs are more involved in the process. ORAM is informed in advance about the land acquisition process and provides advice to local communities about whether or not to lease out land. ORAM's view is that investments are welcome, but have to be balanced with the will and needs of the local communities.²⁷

Part of the process of streamlining the consultation process has been to replace local community consultation with administrative negotiations at district and regional

²⁶ Interview with Coordinator UCA (Farmer's Union Lichinga), Paulino Imede on 19.09.2011.

²⁷ Interview with Leonardo Abilio Ant3nio, Programme Officer ORAM (land rights organisation) on 19.08.2014.

levels. The National Farmers Union (UNAC) expressed concern that this meant that a significant part of the local population affected by land leasing was not involved in the consultation process²⁸. The independent research institute Cruzeiro do Sol questioned to what extent the new decision makers would consider what was best for the local community.²⁹ Specialist in land tenure and natural resources issues in Mozambique, Simon Norfolk, envisaged the body undermined the democratic representation of the community members:

“Before it was the community that signed the final agreement. Now it is a body at district level, the Consultative Council, that signs. This means that the body or persons who represent the local community, is not regulated by law”.

(Simon Norfolk, Director/Partner, Terra Firma Consulting on 13.06.2014).

In the household survey, 29 interviewees considered the Consultative Council to be ‘good’, eight said ‘reasonable’, whereas ten answered ‘bad’. Two of the local communities visited for the household survey did not have any Consultative Council.³⁰ Six respondents either did not know or were not present at the time when the consultations were done. Two interviewees in the household survey specifically expressed that a more centralised process was a main challenge:

“The District Council is very bad. They don’t give any information to the community.”

(Man, married, community 1, Chimbonila District).

One informant expressed the view that the increased centralisation of the decision-making process through the Consultative Council was negative and argued that the decision whether or not to lease out land should be made by the chief and community members.³¹

Some of the challenges related to the consultation process have to do with old land lease practice, established more than ten years ago between local communities and the Malonda Foundation. At that time, no regular contracts were necessarily concluded – at best only consultation forms were completed. Due to this complexity of earlier land deals, the NGR management considered it important to maintain a ‘continuous’ dialogue

²⁸ Interview with Luis Muchanga, Executive Coordinator UNAC (National Farmers Union, Mozambique) on 13.09.2011.

²⁹ Interview with Dipac Jaiantilal, Research Coordinator at Cruzeiro do Sul on 13.09.2011.

³⁰ Feedback from household informants in community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; community 12, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

³¹ Interview with woman, married, community 11, Lago District on 21.08.2014.

with the local communities, with details of agreements made.³² This need for ‘renegotiations’ was repeated by NGR in 2014:

“We need to sit down and talk. The companies cannot solve all community needs. The government must take their responsibility.”
(Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Green Resources Niassa on 18.08.2014).

According to NGR, the challenge of the lack of formal contracts belongs to the past. Today, formal contracts regulate agreements made between the company, the local community and the Mozambican Government. The agreements made are not public. Due to this lack of transparency, it is impossible to verify the agreements made and to know the extent to which these are followed-up by the contract partners or not.

In the household survey conducted in August 2014, 36 of the interviewees said that there is no contract that regulates the deal, or that they don’t know if there is one, thus indicating either a lack of contract or simply a lack of knowledge among community members. Others reported that all promises were written down when the land lease deal was agreed, but the community does not have a copy.³³ 19 respondents said that the deal was regulated by a contract.

³² Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane on 19.9.2011.

³³ Focus group interview with men, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; key-informant community 12, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.



Annex 8: Women working at NGRs nursery in Niassa.

Photo: Liv R. Bjergene 2011

5.2 Job creation

In 2011, government officials at central and district level, and GRAS Maputo recognised the importance of job creation as a positive consequence of forest investments:

“We operate in remote areas where poverty is high and where there is no employment. We were the first to provide employment and a permanent income.”
(Arlito Cuco, Managing Director of Mozambique Operations at Green Resources on 12.09.2011).

The Director for Cepagri suggested in 2011 that ten percent of the jobs created due to FDIs in forest plantations should be earmarked for local community members.³⁴ Figures provided at the Niassa province level in 2011 calculated the number of jobs created by the forest companies in the province to be 5,000.³⁵

³⁴ Interview with Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri (Mozambique’s Agriculture Promotion Centre) on 13.09.2011.

³⁵ Interview with Eusébio Mauricio Tumuitikile, Provincial Director of Agriculture in Niassa Province on 20.9.2011.

Three years later, job creation was still expressed as the main positive outcome of the investments.³⁶ However, both NGR and government officials reported that the situation as of August 2014 had changed in terms of job creation, providing fewer jobs than expected. UCA explained that both employment and social contributions were reduced when the Mozambican Government stopped all new concessions from late 2009 until late 2011, because the companies had to stop planting, as illustrated below.³⁷

In Maputo, Cepagri's director encouraged the forest companies to employ people as planned and according to their financial resources.

"But then the company has explanations why they can't provide jobs as expected."

(Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri on 16.06.2014).

According to the Sanga District Government, the numbers of permanent and seasonal workers have decreased year by year. District government officials expressed dissatisfaction with the total number of people employed; also, that they as local government were not informed in advance of any reductions in employment.³⁸ Due to the heavy downscaling of work related to the closedown of Chikweti and the merger between GSFF and GRAS during Spring 2014, the level of conflict has increased, but was considered to be lower than in 2011.³⁹ Still, working closely with the local communities, local government officials have experienced the job situation in the province as difficult:

"As local authorities, we understand that the companies have their reasons to expel workers. They cannot maintain people if they don't have jobs for them. But the workers should have been better informed when they were recruited. People leave their farm for work. When they lose their job, they ask us: How am I to survive?"

(Maria Betânia Defipo, First Secretary at the District Administrator's Office in the Sanga District, 15.08.2014).

The trend of downscaling employment options was confirmed by local NGOs:

"The numbers of jobs have been reduced. The community leaders have asked the companies to solve this. But the companies seem to have other perceptions; how to get new DUAT's."

(Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer's Union Lichinga) on 15.08.2014).

³⁶ Interview with Simão Pedro Santos Joaquim, Director for the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNTF), on June 13th 2014.

³⁷ Interview with Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer's Union Lichinga) on 12.08.2014.

³⁸ Interview with Maria Betânia Defipo, First Secretary at the District Administrator's Office in Sanga District, Niassa Province on 15.08.2014.

³⁹ Interview with Mateus Simão, district government in Sanga, section for Floresta, Forest and Fauna on 13.08.2014.

The NGR management ratified that the numbers of jobs have been reduced. Before the merger, Chikweti employed 1,200 workers and NGR between 300 and 400, including seasonal and full-time workers. At the time of the fieldwork in August 2014, about three months after the merger, only 600 people were employed across the two companies, a 63 percent downscale. The NGR management gave assurance that the reduction of workers was temporary. They estimated a need for 300 to 400 workers for the planting season and possibly a further increase, as the merger has provided access to more land.

“For the season 2014, the number of workers is a bit lower. This is temporary. Our plan is to increase planting.”
(Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Green Resources Niassa on 18.08.2014).

Information provided from seven of the local communities visited (with two community leasing out land to NGR, the other five to Chikweti) demonstrated a long-term trend of jobs offered to the local communities that leased out land areas, as illustrated below.

Community 1, Chimbunila District, Chikweti: In 2007, when Chikweti started their work, 700 persons were employed. In March 2014, around 600 lost their jobs. By August 2014, less than 30 local people worked for the company. In the communities today, only four people had retained their work.

Community 2, Lichinga District, Niassa Green Resources: In the beginning, NGR offered employment to community members. By August 2014, only 10 community members, all men, still had a job.

Community 6, Sanga District, Green Resources: 101 community members had jobs, first as seasonal workers, but with the promise of permanent work. In March 2010, the company gave long-term contracts to 55 of the workers. Three months later, in June 2010, they were dismissed. Since then, no community members have received any job offers.

Community 7, Sanga District, Chikweti: In 2006, when Chikweti started its activity, 180 community members were employed. Of these, 28 people received long-term

contracts, the rest short-term contracts from three months to 1.5 years. From 2009, the contracts were not renewed, and the number of workers was reduced. By August 2014, no one in the community worked for the company.

Community 8, Sanga District, Chikweti: Initially, 66 community members worked for the Chikweti. The reduction of workers started in 2010, when 43 people lost their jobs. Another 17 lost their jobs in 2013. By August 2014, only a few persons were still employed.

Community 9, Sanga District, Chikweti: Community members started to work for the Chikweti in 2009. Ten community members (7 women and 3 men) had full-time jobs. Twenty community members (7 women and 13 men) worked part time. After one year, the situation changed and the workers had to quit. By August 2014, only two people had jobs.

Community 10, Lago District, Chikweti: In the beginning, from 2007 to 2011, the numbers of workers from this community fluctuated between 30 and 80. By August 2014, three community members had permanent jobs, and four were seasonal workers.

One reason for the downscaling of work has been insufficient access to land. This main challenge was expressed by NGR in 2011:

“We have now planted 2,000 hectares of land and have only 800 hectares left. People want jobs, but then we will need their land.”
(Inocencio Sotomane, Director General Niassa Green Resources on 19.9.2011).

Another reason for job losses is the transformation from manual labour to mechanisation. Instead of preparing the ground manually, this is now increasingly being done by machines. GRAS Maputo argues that the reason for mechanisation is to ensure a stable quality of planting. According to the company, the furrows have to be sixty centimetres deep in order to ensure growth for the seedlings and thus maximise the efficiency of planting.⁴⁰ The GRAS management in London confirms that a result of mechanisation will be fewer jobs.

⁴⁰ Interview with Arlito Cuco, Green Resources Managing Director of Mozambique Operations on 16.06.2014.

“Mechanisation will have to play an important role. This will result in fewer, but better jobs. Our objective is not the exact numbers of jobs, but what kind of jobs we offer”.

(Marek Guizot, Development and Strategi Planning Director Green Resources at Chikweti-seminar in Stockholm 04.06.2014).

GRAS decision to mechanise planting was defended by district government representatives. Even though the number of local workers was reduced, government sources considered it more important for the companies to achieve their goals for planting, to ensure good quality, and to be competitive:

“The use of new technology will help the companies to reach their goals and is necessary, even if the numbers of workers will be reduced.”

(Iassine Alabe Lago, First Secretary, District Administrator’s Office in Lago on 21.08.2014).

High hopes were expressed that community members would be re-employed when the processing phase begins:

“To a large extent, this will depend on the owners of the company. We hope that the companies will ask workers who have lost their jobs to come back to work.”

(Felisberto Mutuera, District Administrator Chimbonila District on 19.08.14).

Government sources, however, were unsure whether processing of the forest products would create any employment opportunities for local community members:

“The company was here to present their future prospects. They told us that they didn’t know what kind of labour they would use in the future. There might be a need for specialised workers who don’t come from the local communities.”

(Iassine Alabe, First Secretary, District Administrator’s Office in Lago District on 21.08.2014).

5.2.1 The perceived interlink between leasing land and jobs

Interviewees in the local communities demonstrated a clear understanding that the creation of work was a promise given by the company in return for the lease of land.

“The first promise given by the company was that people would get jobs. Second, that they would help our community. In what way, we don’t know.”

(Focus group interview with ten women in community 8, Sanga District).

Interviewees expressed how they perceived working for the forest company to be a long-term promise:

“The contract I signed with the company in 2007, was for 50 years. In 2011, I lost my job.”

(Man, married, community 10, Lago District).

“We were promised jobs for 50 years. Now most community members are out of job.”
(Focus group men, community 1, Chimbonila District).

District government sources blamed the understanding of a perceived link between leasing land and jobs expressed by community members, on vague information provided by the companies:

“The companies said they would employ, but did not explain for how long and whether the jobs provided would be permanent or temporary.”
(Pedro Vicente, Province Director Niassa for forest and native plants on 18.08.14).

Looking back, the NGR Managing Director until the merger, expressed the opinion that both forest companies and the government had created expectations that were too high:

“In the past, we oversold the numbers of jobs to be created and our social responsibility. Now we have to sit down and talk.”
(Inocencio Sotomane, former Managing Director for Green Resources Niassa, since the merger second in charge on 18.08.2014).

5.2.2 *Worker conditions*

In 2011, respondents who worked for NGR expressed great appreciation for having a job. For some of the workers interviewed, this was the first time they had salaried work. For women in particular, there were no other options for salaried work. However, the female interviewees questioned the long-term sustainability of their work. In the nurseries for tree seedlings, where most of the women were employed, concerns were expressed about how NGR’s practice of providing short-term contracts made it hard to plan for the future and created mental stress for them.⁴¹

In 2014, interviewees in the local communities and government representatives at the district level expressed the opinion that the forest companies’ practice of short-term contracts instead of permanent jobs had grown even stronger. Government officials were not satisfied with this development, as they were expecting mainly permanent jobs.⁴²

⁴¹ NGR workers interviewed on 19.09.2011. Article published in Bistandsaktuelt 2b 2012 “Luftige løfter på landsbygda”.

⁴² Pedro Vicente, Province Director Niassa for forest and native plants on 18.08.14.

The salary level, working hours and number of working days per week have varied between NGR and Chikweti. According to NGR workers interviewed in 2014, their monthly salary was 1,950 mzn (\$55,37)⁴³ per month for workers who clean the land and plant trees, with working hours ranging from 06.30 to 16.00, Monday to Friday.⁴⁴ Interviewees who used to work for Chikweti reported a monthly salary for the same working tasks of 2,400 mzn (\$68,15), with working hours from 06.00 to 16.00, six days a week.⁴⁵ Workers who guarded the plantations in order to prevent fires or stealing of almost mature trees said their Chikweti salary was 3,010 mzn (\$85,47), working Monday to Friday from 6.00-16.00.⁴⁶ With the merger, the NGR management plans to pay the same amount of money to all workers, following GRAS procedures for salary payments. The amount paid will be “according to or above the law”.⁴⁷

Both in 2011 and in 2014, interviewees stated that they found the salary offered by the companies to be too low, considering the hard work and long working hours.⁴⁸ Despite complaints, some respondents in the sample were willing to accept even worse conditions, because they saw no alternative to escape from poverty.⁴⁹ Others expressed the feeling that they were satisfied with the salary and working conditions, and longed to be re-employed.⁵⁰ Some informants, however, considered that re-employment was not an option for them – they would not accept working for the forest company again because they no longer trusted the sustainability of the work.⁵¹

In 2011, NGR workers expressed frustration because of a delay in salary payments (Bjergene 2012a). The NGR management acknowledged the problem and explained that GRAS was facing financial constraints.⁵² Feedback provided by former Chikweti employees in 2014, indicated that NGR’s challenge with late payments had continued: after the merger, respondents who used to work for Chikweti said that their

⁴³ \$ to MZN conversion 1: 35,22.

⁴⁴ Focus group men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.2014.

⁴⁵ Focus group men, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014.

⁴⁶ Focus group men, workers Chimbonila District on 19.08.2014.

⁴⁷ Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Green Resources Niassa, who became second-in command after the merger on 18.08.2014.

⁴⁸ NGR-workers interviewed on 19.09.2011. Article published in *Bistandsaktuelt* 2b 2012 "Luftige løfter på landsbygda"; focus group men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.2014; focus group men, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group men, community 2, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group men, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014; focus group men, community 7, Sanga District on 13.08.2014.

⁴⁹ Focus group men, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

⁵⁰ Focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group women, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group men, workers Chimbonila District on 19.08.2014.

⁵¹ Focus group men, community 1, Sanga District on 16.08.2014.

⁵² Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane on 19.9.2011.

salaries were no longer paid punctually. According to them, temporary employees have had to wait one, two or even three months for their salaries,⁵³ and permanent employees reported delays of up to six days since the merger. Since this was their only form of family income, permanent workers have had to borrow money to cover their expenses. This meant that a substantial amount of the salary was lost: based on a monthly salary of 3,010 mzn (\$85,47), a loan of 1,000 mzn (\$28,40) has to be repaid in the amount of 1,500 mzn (\$42,59).⁵⁴ NGR has not provided any explanation to the workers for the payment delays.

Another issue raised during the 2011 mission, was the lack of proper protection equipment (Bjergene 2012a). Three years later, this challenge prevailed for some seasonal and permanent workers⁵⁵; whereas others had even received extra equipment from their company, such as a bicycle to get back and forth from the compound.⁵⁶

One concern expressed by community members interviewed in 2014, was the challenge of combining working for the forest company with running their farm.⁵⁷ The planting of both tree seedlings and crops has to be conducted when the rainy season began. This created stress and time constraints. Respondents suggested that this challenge could be solved if:

1. The salary is high enough to enable hiring others to do the work on the farm;
2. The payment of salaries is not delayed, as this made it difficult to hire people to do farm work.

5.2.3 *Consequences of losing a job*

According to Mozambican NGOs, most people go back and farm their land when they lose their job.⁵⁸ Community members who were interviewed confirmed this. In the sample there were, however, interviewees who reported that neither they nor their

⁵³ Focus group interview with women, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; Man, married, community 10, Lago District.

⁵⁴ Interview with key informant in community 7, Sanga District on 16.08.2014; interview with workers in Chimbonila District on 19.08.2014; focus group men, community 7, Lichinga District on 16.08.2014.

⁵⁵ Focus group women and focus group men, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group men, community 2, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

⁵⁶ Information expressed in household survey by woman, married, community, 11, Lago District on 21.08.2014.

⁵⁷ Focus group women, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

⁵⁸ Views expressed by Diamantino Nhampossa, Country Representative/Programme Coordinator and Célia Enosse, Programme Officer, in the NGO 'We Effect' (formerly Swedish Cooperative Centre) on 12.06.2014.

wives have a piece of land any longer.⁵⁹ These families thus depended solely on the forest company salary. The reasons given why the family no longer has a farm, were two-fold:

1. Lack of time to run the farm and lack of need, since they still worked for the company. The workers didn't earn enough money to afford to hire people to do the work needed on a farm.
2. The husbands would not allow their wives to run a farm on their own, because the land available for farms was located too far away from the communities. The husbands expressed fear that their wives might leave them to marry other men.⁶⁰

For other respondents, the timing of the dismissals made 2014 a tough year to get through. Many people lost their jobs in March 2014, two months before the merger was announced. The most intensive period for cultivation in Niassa runs from November to April (Orgut 2006). At the time of the dismissals, it was too late to plant any crops on the farms.⁶¹ In some communities, people had worked as salaried workers for nine years before they were dismissed, and the sudden change was hard to cope with.⁶²

Interviewees questioned the dismissal process – people had been dismissed without receiving any information from the company, but were informed through community members that they no longer had a job.⁶³

To ease the transformation from salaried workers to unemployed, the forest companies offered some form of economic compensation. According to respondents in the local communities, the amounts of money paid ranged from 24,800 mzn (\$704,20) to a maximum of 45,000 mzn (\$1,277,89).⁶⁴ Many informants said that they had not received the compensation.⁶⁵ To survive, people sold assets gained through salaried work, such as bicycles or motorbikes, in order to keep their children at school. Without re-employment, interviewees said they could no longer afford to send their children to school, as what they earned on their farm was insufficient.⁶⁶ The situation was

⁵⁹ Focus group with men and focus group with women in community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group men, workers Chimbonila District on 19.08.2014.

⁶⁰ Focus group men, workers Chimbonila District on 19.08.2014.

⁶¹ Focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

⁶² Focus group with men and focus group with women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

⁶³ Focus group with men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

⁶⁴ Focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014 and focus group men in community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014.

⁶⁵ Focus group men, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014.

⁶⁶ Interview with focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District, on 14.08.2014.

particularly hard for the more remote communities. Here there were few alternatives to subsistence farming, whereas communities closer to the district capital, Lichinga, had possible alternative sources of income.⁶⁷

“People are crying. It is difficult to keep the children in school due to lack of money. Community members ask how to get a job. Still, we gain trust in the forest company and hope they will provide work. We have no other alternatives.”
(Interview with community leader in community 7, Sanga District).

The negative effects of job losses affected not only individuals and their families, but threatened to destabilise whole communities:⁶⁸

“Ninety percent of the people in the community are without a job now. These people do not have a farm. When they worked, we were well off. Now they are suffering. I am afraid that they will steal from my farm because they have no work, no farm.”
(Old widow, community 1, Chimbunila District).

Central government officials interviewed for this thesis said that they were not informed about Chikweti’s plans to close down. They considered Chikweti to be a good investment, not knowing that the company was facing bankruptcy, leading to the dismissal of workers, close-down of the company and the merger.⁶⁹

5.2.4 Consequences of getting a job

In Niassa, the opportunities for paid work for people in local communities were almost non-existent until the arrival of the first forest companies almost a decade ago. An important part of the learning process for peasant farmers provided by the forest companies is the transformation from subsistence farmers to salaried workers, including knowledge of their rights and duties.

Interviewees in the local communities who work, or have worked for the forest companies, highlighted important positive benefit of being employed, such as access to social security, and obtaining a salary even if one is sick.⁷⁰ Others mentioned positive side effects of working for the forest company, such as getting a driver’s licence.⁷¹ The main positive outcome mentioned by community members, was regular access to money:

⁶⁷ Focus group men, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014.

⁶⁸ Interview with key-informants, community 11, Lago District on 21.08.2014.

⁶⁹ Interview with Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri on 16.06.2014.

⁷⁰ Information provided by focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

⁷¹ Woman, married, community 10, Lago District on 21.08.2014. Her husband has the drivers’ licence.

“We could buy what we wanted.”

(Focus group women, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014).

Respondents said they had spent their salary money on more varied food, mattresses, a bicycle, a goat, a motorcycle, better housing, sending their children to school and assisting community members with money for transport or necessities such as soap. Some had bought a piece of land or even got a new wife.

“When we worked, we improved our houses, could afford better food, sent our children to school and helped our community members.”

(Focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014).

NGOs present in Niassa described visible signs of development due to forestry investments.⁷² An important effect was that access to money for some community members created a basis for the development of small businesses in the area (e.g. sale of oil, soap).⁷³ According to community members, even a small number of salaried workers in one community were a great help for the community as a whole.⁷⁴ Spin-off effects, such as the creation of small markets, provided benefits to a large proportion of community members. Conversely, with the majority of the workers without a job, these positive spin-off effects are no longer evident.

5.2.5 From salaried workers to out-growers?

A common framework put forward by GRAS in Maputo, NGR and the Mozambican Government in 2014, was the need for stronger involvement of local communities in forest projects. Out-grower schemes with community members planting and growing tree seedlings or soya beans were considered as one possible solution.⁷⁵

The idea of outgrowing was also mentioned by GRAS Maputo in 2011. Director Arlito Cuco stated that the company intended to plant only 70 percent of the required trees, and to out-grow the remaining 30 percent to local communities.⁷⁶ In addition to improving peasants' agricultural skills, an objective was also to raise community members' awareness of the value of the forest plantations. Forest fires are a challenge.

⁷² Leonardo Abilio António, Programme Officer ORAM on 19.08.2014

⁷³ View expressed by ORAM, Lichinga, on 19.08.2014.

⁷⁴ View expressed by woman, married, community 11, Lago District on 21.08.2014.

⁷⁵ Interview with Green Resources Managing Director of Mozambique Operation, Arlito Cuco on 16.06.2014; interview with Simão Pedro Santos Joaquim, Director for the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNTF) on 13.06.2014.

⁷⁶ Interview with Managing Director of Mozambique Operations at Green Resources, Arlito Cuco on 12.09.2011.

By becoming out-growers of trees, GRAS in Maputo hoped that the peasant farmers might realise “that trees are money”.⁷⁷

Although outgrowing of tree seedlings has begun at the GRAS’ plantation in the neighbouring Nampula Province (Lurio), the practice will only (possibly) start in Niassa in 2015. NGR wants to first expand their soya bean project in Niassa in order to ensure quicker returns, since the growth of tree seedlings is a long-term project, with long-term income benefits.⁷⁸

According to NGR, 600 community members had participated in the soya project by August 2014.⁷⁹ In addition to the possible short-term economic effects of soya production, the aim is to change farming practices from slash and burn to permanent farming. NGR wants to discuss with other actors in the province how to cooperate in order to change farming practices so that the farmers can become permanent farmers.

Few members of local communities had heard about the soya project. In the household survey, only one informant reported that he and about 30 community fellows had participated in the soya project.⁸⁰ The outcome of this learning process was positive. The group had learnt how to plant the seed, fertilize the land, conserve products and achieve increased production. In focus group discussions, some interviewees expressed their opinion that an opportunity to improve their agricultural skills would be positive,⁸¹ whereas others were negative and thought it would be too demanding.⁸²

Initiatives to improve community members’ farming skills were regarded as positive by local government sources, as this could generate income and small-scale business in local communities.⁸³ However, the coordinator of UCA, Paulino Imede, expressed scepticism towards the increased trend of using local community members as out-growers. He perceived that the main vision and need for local community members should be to grow food, not trees. In addition, he questioned whether NGR would actually prioritise the resources needed to establish an out-grower scheme:

“I don’t believe this will happen. The companies want profit. Probably they will not have the funds.”

⁷⁷ Arlito Cuco, Green Resources Managing Director of Mozambique Operations on 16.06.2014.

⁷⁸ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 19.09.2011.

⁷⁹ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in-command after the merger.

⁸⁰ Man, married, community 4, Sanga District on 13.08.2014.

⁸¹ Focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group women, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014.

⁸² Focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

⁸³ Interview with Maria Betásia Defipo, First Secretary at the District Administrator’s Office in Sanga District, Niassa Province on 15.08.2014.

(Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer's Union Lichinga) on 15.08.2014).

5.3 Food security

Even though some of the 55 interviewees in the household survey still had salaried work, all of them said that their main occupation is in agriculture. They reported a wide range of crops produced on their farms, including: peanuts, potatoes, cabbage, sugar cane, sweet potatoes, onions, carrots, bananas, beans, sunflowers, green peppers, pumpkin and papaya. The arrival of the forest companies have had various effects that affected the households' food security:

33 of the interviewees participating in the household survey reported that, with the arrival of the forest companies, the distance to their farm had increased. 21 interviewees described the increase as more than 5 kilometres, with some reporting distances ranging up to 30, 40 and 50 kilometres. The focus group discussions confirmed that most peasant farmers who had to change the location of their farms due to the plantations, had experienced an increase in the distance to their land.⁸⁴

A common view expressed in the household survey, was that the plantations should be located far from the communities, so that the nearby land could be used for farms. Not all agreed, however. There were also interviewees who noted that the land far away should be for farm, because those plots have better soil quality. This was considered important, as community members have no access to fertilizer. Another argument was that by keeping the plantations close to the local communities, it was easier to control fires. One argument expressed for leasing out the nearby land, was easy access to the compound for those who have a job there.⁸⁵ This argument, however, was debated within the communities:

“The community gave the land close to the community to get a salary. We did not participate in this decision. If we had decided, we would have said no.”
(Focus group women community 3, Lichinga District).

Interviewees reported that the forest companies' policy of wanting the land close to the communities, has had a profound negative effect on their daily lives, particularly having to spend more time getting to their land. There were reports that due to the

⁸⁴ Focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.2014; focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

⁸⁵ Focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

increase in distance, peasant farmers now needed to pay for transport to reach their land.⁸⁶ For some respondents, access to their new land is difficult due to lack of proper infrastructure:

“The plantation is very close to the community – only one metre from the farms. It was the chief who accepted this. We left our farm because the company management did not allow us to put fire to clean new land, and said we would be jailed if we did. We need a bridge to cross a river to the area where we now have the farm. So far, the company has not provided this. Because we have no bridge, we cannot travel back and forth between our farm and our community. We must stay at our farm when we work on our land. This means that our children cannot go to school. The farm is too far away and we can’t cross the river without a bridge.”

(Man, married, community 10, Lago District).

“The fertility of my farm is reduced. The land that is fertile is too far away now. If I move in order to get closer to a new and better farm, my sons will not be able to go to school.”

(Man, married community 1, Chimbunila District).



Annex 9: Example of peasant farming in Niassa.

Photo: Liv R. Bjergene 2014

⁸⁶ Focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

In the household survey, 39 of the 55 respondents reported an equal or worse food situation since the arrival of the forest companies. For three respondents, this negative development was not linked to the arrival of the forest companies, but were related to changes in the interviewees health situation or civil status. Even so, 23 interviewees reported that their food situation had deteriorated since the arrival of the forest companies. The main explanations were loss of jobs, reduced soil quality, increase of distance to the macamba, and the challenge of combining working at the forest plantation with farming.

“The soil fertility at my farm is reduced. For me, it is not possible to open a new farm because the company has taken all the land. I fear for the future and worry that the food production will be further reduced. The Mozambican Government should think of preserving land to ensure sufficient food also for future generations.”

(Man, married, community 1, Chimbunila District).

“I had to leave my farm because of Chikweti. My old farm was very fertile. The new produces little, but is very close. My life situation is worse. I am old, and there is no work for me. I am pessimist for my children’s future. I fear there will no be enough land for farms for my sons”.

(Man, married, community 10, Lago District).

In the focus group discussions, respondents gave examples of how Chikweti and NGR assisted to ease the transformation to a new piece of land. In one of the focus group discussions, interviewees reported that Chikweti had provided money for fertilizer to those peasant farmers who had to change to a farm of poorer quality, in order to improve the soil quality. Only a few had, however, chosen to spend the money on fertilizer. For those who did, the quality was good.⁸⁷ In another community, NGR had provided assistance to clean the new land:

“The company ploughed a new area. People didn’t accept this. We have our traditional ways of choosing a new farm.”

(Focus group men, community 2, Sanga District).

16 interviewees said that their food situation had improved since the arrival of the forest companies, whereas 16 considered it unchanged. The main explanations for an improved food situation were access to salaried work, improved soil quality at their

⁸⁷ Focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

new farm (even though distance had increased in most cases), and an increase in the size of the new farm. Several interviewees, however, in the household survey and in focus group discussions specified that their food situation used to be good, but at the time of the field research, their living conditions had deteriorated due to job losses.

The narrative of a more insecure food situation due to the forestry investments is supported by the independent Mozambican research institute, *Cruzeiro do Sol*⁸⁸, but contradicts the narrative provided by the Mozambican Government and GRAS Maputo. In 2011, they both argued that the land used by the forest companies was ‘underutilised’ or ‘used by no one’.⁸⁹

“We never lease out land that is farmed.”
(Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri on 13.09.2011).

Government representatives asserted that at least ten percent of leased land should be reserved for food production.⁹⁰ In 2014, NGR management gave assurances that only between 40 and 50 percent of the available area would be planted – the rest of the land would be for conservation and for agriculture.⁹¹ GRAS Maputo said in 2011 that their investments would develop the land, which would be beneficial for the local community and increase their food security.⁹²

5.4 Social responsibility

According to the Mozambican Government, a company’s social responsibility component is of high importance and must be included in their proposal in order for the project to be approved by the government.⁹³ There are, however, no clear criteria to regulate a company’s social responsibility in the years after planting and before processing begins and they start earning money. When the companies do earn a surplus, 20 percent thereof must be allocated for the benefit of local communities. Mozambican politicians at central level expressed great optimism about the positive ‘trickle-down’ effect of such contributions:

⁸⁸ Interview with Dipac Jaiantilal, Research Coordinator at *Cruzeiro do Sul* on 13.09.2011.

⁸⁹ Interview with Managing Director of Mozambique Operations at Green Resources, Arlito Cuco on 12.09.2011.

⁹⁰ Interviews with Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri on 13.09.2011.

⁹¹ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in-command after the merger

⁹² Interview with Managing Director of Mozambique Operations at Green Resources, Arlito Cuco on 12.09.2011.

⁹³ Interviews with Laourenço Sambo, Director CPI on 14.09.2011 and Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri on 13.09.2011.

“The benefits are so high. Investments create jobs and economic growth. For the last three years, 20 percent of the revenues in natural resources go back to the communities, where the local community committees now are receiving the income of these benefits.”

(Simão Pedro Santos Joaquim, Director for the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNTF) on June 13th 2014).

It is important to note, however, that whether LSLA is the best approach to develop the Mozambican countryside, is debated within the Government of Mozambique. Joseph Hanlon thought that the launch of PEDSA (República de Moçambique Ministério da Agricultura 2010) in 2011 was a major policy shift towards domestic investments and the development of Mozambican peasant farmers. However, since then, the numbers of FDI have increased, illustrating that the government fraction considering FDI as the best development approach, to be the most influential.⁹⁴

Before the company merger, neither NGR nor Chikweti had achieved any surplus income. Both companies did, however, provide resources directly to local communities in order to build a good relationship and to fulfil the government’s demand to include a social component in the investment project. When the companies plant seedlings, an annual fee per hectare was set aside for the local communities’ social fund. The fee varied: in 2011, NGR stated that their annual fee was \$1 per hectare, whereas the 2014 fee paid by NGR was \$5 per hectare.⁹⁵ According to interviewees in the local communities, the annual fee paid by Chikweti was \$1⁹⁶ per hectare. If the local communities set fire to the forest, the amount is reduced.

UCA criticised the lack of clear criteria on how local communities are to benefit from forest investments.⁹⁷ In 2011, GRAS in Maputo said they aimed to contribute to basic development needs in local communities, such as building schools, and providing access to basic health care and potable water.

“We will provide this. This has not started yet because the investments are quite new. We feel we can contribute. We want to improve the life quality in the local communities, as these basic services are not present.”

(Arlito Cuco, Managing Director of Mozambique Operations at Green Resources on 12.09.2011).

⁹⁴ Interview with Joseph Hanlon, researcher and author who has been writing about Mozambique since 1978 on 26.08.2014.

⁹⁵ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 19.09.2011 and 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in command after the merger.

⁹⁶ According to Chikweti’s CSR-documentation the total sum was \$5 per hectare, where \$2 per hectare was a fixed payment, whereas the \$ 3 per hectare were variable payments (Church of Sweden 2014).

⁹⁷ Interview with Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer’s Union Lichinga) on 15.08.2014.

By September 2011, the development outcomes provided by NGR in one community in the Sanga District were roads constructed to the plantations, 50 school desks for the primary school, and \$1 per hectare set aside for the social fund – a total value of \$7,000.⁹⁸ In addition, NGR said they would provide money to construct and equip a computer building. However, the construction of the building was delayed, due to lack of funding in the changeover from GRAS to NGR. The explanation provided was financial constraints.⁹⁹

In 2011, the local government in Sanga characterised the contributions provided by NGR so far as “not too much”, but that “something is happening”.¹⁰⁰ NGR is appreciated for their understanding of development needs and willingness to assist, compared to other companies present in the district in 2011, particularly Chikweti. In Sanga, the district government reported a severe shortage of money to cover basic needs. For example, when the local government lacked fuel for two cars at the hospital, NGR was asked to assist. The district administrator expressed gratitude for this assistance provided by NGR.¹⁰¹

Three years later, district government officials in Sanga expressed their opinion that the contributions provided by NGR have been helpful, both for the government and the communities. NGR is regarded as one of the companies that tries to help local communities.¹⁰² At the same time, local government representatives expressed dissatisfaction with NGR’s lack of fulfilment of social promises:

“We are not satisfied with NGR and have asked the provincial government to tell the company to stop planting until they fulfil their promises. According to the provincial government, the reply from NGR is that they are working to solve this. With the merger, the company has stopped the work. We are waiting for the new company members to tell us how they will solve this.”

(Mateus Simão, Technical Fiscal de Floresta, Floresta and Fauna Bravida de Sanga on 13.08.2014).

Government sources expressed a need for better coordination between the companies and the government to make sure, for example, that the building of schools or hospitals is prioritised, and in accordance with national standards. One suggested

⁹⁸ Interview with District Administrator in Sanga, Paulino Husa on 19.9.2011; Community Development Officer and FSC officer, NGR on 19.09.2011.

⁹⁹ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 19.9.2011.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with District Administrator in Sanga, Paulino Husa on 19.9.2011.

¹⁰¹ Interview with Paulino Rafael Husa, District Administrator in Sanga on 19.9.2011.

¹⁰² Interview with Mateus Simão, district government in Sanga, section for Floresta, Forest and Fauna on 13.08.2014.

solution was that communities could go to the district administrator's office to consider possible development projects for negotiation with the forest companies.¹⁰³

The replies provided in the household survey confirmed the gap between promises and the delivery of social development benefits so far. Of the 55 interviewees participating in the household survey, 11 answered that these promises have been delivered. Four interviewees specified their response and explained that some, not all have been delivered, two interviewees said that the money have been given to the chief, and since then the community members had not seen any money or development outcomes. One informant explained that the only promise made was for job creation, which had partly been delivered during the first phase of the investments. Five interviewees gave no answers. Based on the feedbacks from community members, there were local communities that had leased out land to Chikweti, without receiving any assistance. For NGR some funding and development projects have been provided, but not as promised.

Among the interviewees who answered that the two companies before the merger have kept some of the promises, several mentioned job creation as one example. Focus group interviews and information provided by key interviewees in the communities triangulated the impression of a substantial gap in terms of promised development outcomes, with replies ranging from 'no assistance at all,'¹⁰⁴ to 'some assistance, but far from the initial promises'.¹⁰⁵

With the merger of the forest companies and the substantial increase in the Niassa operation, the NGR management gave the assurance that the insufficient flow of money to the local communities' social funds will be solved:

"Our financial situation will be better. I am convinced that we now will receive money from the shareholders. We will pay the local communities the around \$70,000 that we owe within a month."

(Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Green Resources Niassa on 18.08.2014).

¹⁰³ Interview with Iassine Alabe, First Secretary District Administrator's office in Lago on 21.08.2014.

¹⁰⁴ Focus group with men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.2014; focus group with men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group men, community 2, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

¹⁰⁵ Focus group with men and women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group men, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group men, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014; focus group men, community 7, Lichinga District on 16.08.2014; key informants in community 11, Lago District on 19.08.2014 and in community 4, Sanga District on 13.08.2014.

5.5 Relationship between local communities and forest companies

In 2011, a high level of conflict characterised the relationship between local communities and the forest companies. A common way for community members to express their dissatisfaction was to set fire to the forest plantation. The many conflicts were directed in particular towards Chikweti, where a new company management worked to try and improve the situation.

District government sources interviewed in 2011 considered NGR to be a better company than Chikweti, maintaining closer dialogue with the local communities and local government. The negative behaviour by Chikweti, including the violation of local communities' right to consultations, had created problems for all forest companies present in Niassa.¹⁰⁶

“The Chikweti-name is bad because of the many conflicts. The relation between Chikweti and the local communities has not been good”.

(Maria Betásia Defipo, First Secretary at the District Administrator's Office in Sanga District, Niassa Province on 15.08.2014).

For the forest companies to regain trust, the main advice provided by government representatives at central and district level, both in 2011 and in 2014, was to demonstrate positive socio-economic results.

When interviewees in the household survey conducted in 2014 were asked to describe the relationship between their village and the forest company, 24 of 55 reported a good relationship. Access to jobs was the most dominant reason provided:

“Good because I earn money. For those who don't work, it is not good.”

(Woman, married, community 3, Lichinga District).

Others mentioned good dialogue and an understanding of community members' needs:

“I feel we are developing. The relationship is good. The company tries to talk to the community. They accept that workers go to funerals. When a family member is ill, the company authorises the worker to go and assist.”

(Man, married, community 11, Lago District).

However, five of the interviewees said they had changed their opinion of the relationship from 'good' to 'bad' due to the loss of a job or deteriorated working conditions:

¹⁰⁶ Interview with District Administrator in Sanga, Paulino Husa on 19.9.2011.

“The relation was good when we had work.”
(Woman, single, community 2, Sanga District).

“In the beginning, the relationship was good. The company was paying salary. But now the workers have not received salary in three months.”
(Man, married, community 10, Lago District).

Five respondents found it ‘reasonable’, listing the following as shortcomings: lack of dialogue, low salary, lack of payment to the community’s social fund and uncertain access to future work. 26 interviewees described the relationship between their village and the forest company as ‘bad’. Besides the loss of jobs, reasons provided included the following:

“They don’t respect the owners of the farms. They started to use tractors to plant in the farms used by people.”
(Woman, widow, community 3, Lichinga District).

“The company gave us false promises. They promised to build hospitals, schools, construct roads. But they only gave us some money.”
(Man, married, community 8, Sanga District).

“The company never built the bridge to get across the river to our new farms.”
(Man, married, community 10, Lago District).

When the interviewees were asked whether the relationship between their community and the forest company had improved or grown worse since the arrival, 33 said it had improved, whereas 22 said it had deteriorated. One main challenge expressed was the lack of dialogue:¹⁰⁷

“The chief wrote a letter to the company more than a year ago to ask why the community has not received any money in the social fund. No answer has been given.”
(Interview focus group of men, community 6, Sanga District).

“Our community asked for a meeting, but no one came.”
(Focus group men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.2014.)

The need for more information was expressed as being particularly critical after the merger, in order to be informed about the new company’s future plans and employment prospects for community members. The few interviewees in the sample who still have a job, described their experience that the lack of dialogue from the

¹⁰⁷ Focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

company after the merger had been worrissome. They awaited information regarding future plans for employment and whether or not their job was secure. The workers expressed the opinion that the information flow between the companies and the local communities had been better in the past.¹⁰⁸ Others stated that relations with the company were good, and that they trusted that the company would re-employ people.¹⁰⁹

Whereas almost half of the interviewees contributing to the household survey considered the relationship with the forest company as 'bad', this negative view was not necessarily shared by other, main actors present in Niassa.

In 2014, the UCA divided the relationship between the forest companies and local communities into three phases: Phase for plantation, phase of conflict and phase of claimed benefits. The UCA coordinator, Paulino Imede, expressed the hope that the companies and the communities had now reached phase three. ORAM, district government representatives and GRAS Maputo confirmed this viewpoint:

“Things have begun to change for the better. We see a few steps of development. Something is happening.”

(Leonardo Abilio António, Programme Officer ORAM on 19.08.2014).

“Last year, we received many reports of conflicts between local communities and forest companies. We don't know if the conflicts are solved, but so far we have not received any.”

(Maria Betâsia Defipo, First Secretary at the District Administrator's Office in Sanga District, on 15.08.2014).

“The relationship with the local communities has improved. We need, however, to keep a permanent dialogue.”

(Arlito Cuco, Green Resources' Managing Director of Mozambique Operations on June 16th 2014).

According to GRAS management in Maputo, the company has increased the frequency of meetings with local communities from bimonthly to monthly in order to build trust, solve problems and avoid tensions.¹¹⁰ However, the NGR Director before the merger, since the merger second-in command, said that it was a challenge to keep the many communities informed, especially as the company had gone through such rapid growth. NGR conceded that three months after the merger, many communities had not received any information.

¹⁰⁸ Focus group men, workers Chimbonila District on 19.08.2014.

¹⁰⁹ Focus group men, community 7, Sanga District on 13.08.2014; focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

¹¹⁰ Arlito Cuco, Green Resources Managing Director of Mozambique Operations on 16.06.2014.

“The communities should have been informed ‘yesterday’. A rapid growth of an organisation will always be challenging. Some, but not all, communities have so far been informed about the merger.”

(Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources on 18.08.2014).

5.5.1 *Livelihood impacts*

In the household survey conducted in 2014, the 55 interviewees were asked whether the arrival of the forest companies had affected their daily lives and if it had made them better, equal or worse. 27 answered that their lives had improved. The main reason provided for the improvement was access to salaried work:

“Better, because working for the company provides the possibility to buy things with the salary. More people start a business.”

(Man, married, community 3, Lichinga District).

Six of the community members who considered their lives to be better emphasised how it used to be better, but that this effect was gone due the dismissals of workers. 21 respondents said that their life situation was unchanged:

“My life situation is the same. I only had work for one year.”

(Man, married, community 9, Sanga District).

Seven interviewees replied that their lives had grown worse since the forest companies arrived:

“In 2011 I thought that my life would change for the better. But then it got worse. I had to leave my farm for the plantation. The soil I have now is poor.”

(Man, married, community 9, Sanga District).

5.6 Relationship between community leadership and community members

The relationship between the community leadership, often represented by the chief, and community members is complicated, regarding the application process for jobs, the management of local communities’ social funds, and the decisive role that the chiefs play in the land leasing process. If a decision is made that involves loss of land for community members, the chief also plays an active role in finding new land for them.

Interviewees expressed their opinion that the companies ought to communicate with the whole community, because the chief didn’t involve his community members in

the decision-making process.¹¹¹ Community members warned against the forest companies making the leadership in the communities responsible for the use of community funds, because the chief stole the money or spent it unwisely.¹¹² This created problems in the relationships between the leadership and their community members.

“We don’t trust the chief. He has taken all the money provided by the company. Only he develops.”
(Focus group community 1, Chimbunila District).

Interviewees reported that the social fund money had been spent on constructing or rehabilitating the community mosque without the majority consent of community members. This created tensions within the community from non-muslim members.¹¹³ In one community, the community members had agreed that they wanted to spend the money on school uniforms for orphans, but the community leadership decided to build a mosque, without consulting their community.¹¹⁴ In another community, the company gave the community a maize mill. The chief sold it without informing the community.¹¹⁵

In addition to tensions within communities, feedback provided by informants shows that the social fund procedures also create tensions between communities. In some cases, a common practice has been to provide social fund contributions to one, larger community in order for this community to share the funding with other, minor communities in the area. However, this has created tensions.¹¹⁶

In the 2014 sample, one particular chief didn’t want me to pose any questions to community members about the social fund, because he feared reprisals against himself or the forest company, with the possible consequence of community members setting fire to the plantation. The explanation provided was that only four or five members of the community leadership knew that the community had received 29,000 mzn (\$823) to their social fund in 2013. This small group of people had decided how the money was to be spent. When asked how the money had been spent, only vague answers and

¹¹¹ Man, married, community 1, Chimbunila District on 16.08.2014; woman, married, community 5, Lago District on 22.08.2014.

¹¹² Man, married, community 11, Lago District on 21.08.2014; man, married, community 10, Lago District on 22.08.2014; focus group men, community 7, Sanga District on 16.08.2014; focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group men, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

¹¹³ Woman, married, community 1, Chimbunila District on 16.08.2014.

¹¹⁴ Focus group women, community 1, Chimbunila District on 16.08.2014.

¹¹⁵ Woman, married, community 10, Lago District on 22.08.2014.

¹¹⁶ Focus group women, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

calculations of expenses were provided. The only tangible outcome from the funding provided by the forest company was a brick latrine.¹¹⁷

In the 2014 sample, one particular chief personally contacted the governor in order to lease out land, without informing the community members. This chief explained that he hoped a land deal would benefit him personally.¹¹⁸

To avoid the risk of employing workers who might set fire to the forest, the forest companies have involved the community leadership in recruiting the best workers.¹¹⁹ However, this close involvement of the community leadership in the recruitment process had negative side effects for local community members. The household survey revealed that nine informants from different communities and districts had to pay the chief in order to get a job at the forest company. According to the informants this practice is quite common. The declared amount of money paid varied between 100 and 500 mzn (\$2,84 and \$14,20):

“I tried to pay the chief to get a job, but the chief found the amount of money I offered too low. The second time I went to the owner of the company. Then I got a job.”
(Man, married, community 3, Lichinga District).

“The problem is the chief, not the company. When the company came to offer jobs, the chief said we had to pay him. Now also the good relation with the company is lost due to loss of jobs.”
(Woman, married, community 1, Chimbunila District).

Even though corrupt chiefs were described as a main challenge by many community members, it is not easy for community members to get rid of a chief:

“In our tradition it is very difficult to get rid of a régulo.”
(Focus group men, community 7, Sanga District on 16.08.2014).

The NGR management recognised the many possible negative side effects of working closely with the community leadership. The company considered this challenge to be part of a ‘bad legacy’ and worked with the procedures in order to limit the possible negative consequences.¹²⁰ Acknowledging the challenges, the company found it necessary to involve the chiefs due to their highly influential role in their communities

¹¹⁷ Information given in community 7, Lichinga District.

¹¹⁸ Information given in community 14, Lichinga District.

¹¹⁹ Confirmed in interview with Arlito Cuco, Green Resources’ Managing Director of Mozambique Operations on 16.06.2014.

¹²⁰ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in-command after the merger.

and their in-depth knowledge of the local land situation. Problems arose if the chief wanted a lease and the community members were against it.¹²¹ To further complicate the situation, the same chiefs that were to lead the dialogue in their community as to whether or not to lease out some land, were often employed by the companies.¹²²

5.6 Interviewees' views of the future

GRAS has expansive plans for the future development of the forest plantations in Niassa. With the merger between GRAS and GSFF and the takeover of UPM land, the total amount of land that NGR controls is close to 130,000 hectares, more than a tenfold increase.¹²³ A main outcome of the merger is the substantial increase in the extent of planted land in Niassa controlled by NGR: from 2,000 hectares before the merger to 15,000 hectares of planted land today. Various sources in the company provided different aims for annual planting in the years to come, ranging from 1,500 to 2,500 hectares per year.¹²⁴

Even though local NGOs agreed that the relationship between the forest companies and local communities has improved, they also signalled a strong worry regarding long-term sustainability, including environmental consequences caused by a monoculture. With the plantations, new ecosystems were established. Concerns were expressed that this might harm indigenous and endemic plants, used in traditional medicine and cultural rites.¹²⁵

“The communities may feel happy now for what they receive from the investments, but I am unsure about the future. I feel that the companies gain more than the local communities.”

(Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer's Union Lichinga) on 15.08.2014).

“We fear that access to land will be a big problem in the future due to population growth and migration. At a recent seminar, figures from the government of population forecast for Niassa expected the population to quadruple by 2035.”

(Leonardo Abilio António, Programme Officer ORAM (land rights organisation) on 19.08.2014).

¹²¹ Views provided by community development officer and FSC officer in Niassa Green Resources on 19.09.2011.

¹²² Finding presented at the Chikweti-seminar “Lärdomar från Niassa – den gemensamma rapporten om Västerås stifts skogsinvestering i Mocambique” in Stockholm 04.06.2014.

¹²³ Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in command after the merger.

¹²⁴ According to Marek Guizot, Development and Strategi Planning Director Green Resources the annual aim is 2,500 hectares – information given at the Chikweti-seminar “Lärdomar från Niassa – den gemensamma rapporten om Västerås stifts skogsinvestering i Mocambique” in Stockholm on 04.06.2014; Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources estimated 1,500-2,000 hectares per year in an interview on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in command after the merger.

¹²⁵ Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer's Union Lichinga) on 15.08.2014.

District government officials argued that if local communities are not satisfied with the outcomes of current land leases, the contracts are to be renewed after 50 years, which will provide the opportunity to rethink the potential benefits.¹²⁶

Since the merger, some of the NGR-controlled plantations will soon be mature enough for the processing of pulp. This means that, according to the schedule, the company may start to earn money by 2018.¹²⁷ A key issue for GRAS and NGR is what to do with the raw material. The amount of wood is considered too large to be absorbed by the local market, and the distance to other markets is considerable. The plan is therefore to build a factory to produce panel board, which can be exported to other African countries and to the Middle East.¹²⁸ The aim is to start production by 2017 or 2018.¹²⁹

There are, however, several preconditions that need to be fulfilled: all plantations, including the former Chikweti plantations have to be certified according to FSC; GRAS needs sufficient finances to build a factory for processing; and the infrastructure between Lichinga and Cuemba has to be improved.¹³⁰

The site selected for the factory is close to the old railway connection between Lichinga and Cuemba. This railway line needs to be reconstructed in order for the wood to be transported between Lichinga and Cuemba, as the roads between the two cities are not good. From Cuemba there is good road and railway infrastructure to the Mozambican coast and the port of Nacala. Central government officials confirmed the need for infrastructure, hoping that the railway-line would be repaired soon.¹³¹

Investments in planting and the construction of a factory have to be balanced with funding to provide the promised development outcomes in the local communities. With the substantial increase in land holdings, the current NGR practice of paying \$5 per hectare to the communities' development funds was considered by the management as a possible future challenge. NGR indicated a need for dialogue with the Mozambican

¹²⁶ Interview with Felisberto Muterua, District Administrators Office in Chimbonila on 19.08.2014.

¹²⁷ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in-command after the merger.

¹²⁸ According to information from Marek Guizot, Development and Strategi Planning Director for Green Resources at the Chikweti-seminar "Lärdomar från Niassa – den gemensamma rapporten om Västerås stifts skogsinvestering i Mocambique" in Stockholm 04.06.2014.

¹²⁹ Interview with Green Resources Managing Director of Mozambique Operation, Arlito Cuco on 16.06.2014.

¹³⁰ Interview with Green Resources Managing Director of Mozambique Operation, Arlito Cuco on 16.06.2014.

¹³¹ Interview with Darlindo Pechisso, head of Forest Department at the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNTF) on 13.06.2014.

Government on the calculation of the \$5 per hectare fee, as only around half the area that NGR had before the merger, 28,000 hectares, has been planted.¹³²

“If the local communities don’t get returns, we will not contribute to development. But if we are not profitable, we cannot provide development. We have to do this in parallel, to find a balance. It’s a challenge.
(Arlito Cuco, Green Resources Managing Director of Mozambique Operations on 16.06.2014).

Due to the bad legacy of the past, the management in GRAS-Maputo and NGR considered it a major challenge to rebuild their level of trust with the local communities, acknowledging that both GRAS, NGR and Chikweti had committed mistakes. The legacy challenge was considered as particularly severe for the plantations that used to belong to Chikweti.¹³³

“The legacy from the past is a main challenge. We need to demonstrate comprehensive results. And to constantly keep the communities informed of what is happening with the new, merged company through stakeholder communication schemes”.
(Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Green Resources Niassa on 18.08.2014.)

This view is shared by independent observers:

“The negative effects will follow this project for many years ahead. I assume that there has been a thoroughly due diligence of the new owner since the merger, Green Resources. The main challenge will be if the investors persevere the obstacles, including the economic sustainability, as the company will be needing more money”.
(Lars-Olle Larsson, ESG Senior Manager Swedfund at Chikweti-seminar in Stockholm 04.06.2014).

A thorough due diligence was assured by the managing Director of Västerås Stift Skog, Erik Ling, who since February 1st 2015 has been a member of the board of directors in the merged GRAS.

“Yes, a due diligence has been conducted. GRAS is a company that has been thoroughly checked”.
(Erik Ling, at Chikweti-seminar in Stockholm on 04.06.2014).

Even though there are challenges to be solved, the management in GRAS Maputo expressed strong optimism about the future:

“It will not be easy, but this is a good project. I think we will succeed.”

¹³² The DUAT was originally secured for 40,360 hectares through the Malonda Foundation. As more than 50 percent consists of natural forest, there has been a process of swapping some of these titles for land suitable for planting. According to the Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, the process has ended with a DUAT for approximately 28,000 hectares.

¹³³ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in-command after the merger.

(Interview with Green Resources' Managing Director of Mozambique Operation, Arlito Cuco on June 16th 2014)

At central government level, a change in investment focus seems to have occurred from 2011 to 2014. In 2011, government officials in Maputo expressed a euphoric sense of optimism about the positive effects of forestry investments in Niassa.¹³⁴ Within twenty years, hopes were expressed of a ten-fold return of the forestry investments (Bjergene 2012c). Three years later, the Mozambican Government's optimism of FDI remained strong, emphasising the outcome that, through an inclusive investment model, rural populations are now involved and receiving benefits.¹³⁵ Still, for forestry, the expectations were more moderate, even though Niassa Province was still considered the main province for forestry investments. The government's main attention, however, is no longer directed towards inland investments in forestry and agriculture, but towards untapped oil and gas resources along the Mozambican coast, and valuable minerals such as coal and titanium.¹³⁶ Mozambican NGOs confirmed this policy change:

"The government's main focus is now on minerals. In forestry, the main challenge is to manage the problems that come from the past."

(Diamantino Nhampossa, Country Representative/Programme Coordinator We Effect¹³⁷ on June 12th 2014).

In 2011, better monitoring of forest investments was described as "an enormous challenge" by Mozambique's former Deputy Minister of Agriculture, João Carrilho.¹³⁸ In 2014, monitoring was still described as a major challenge. UCA expressed concern about the long-term environmental consequences of the forest plantations and demanded better monitoring to ensure conservation of national, important plants.¹³⁹ Government representatives at district level also expressed a strong need for better monitoring, including the effects that the investments have on local communities. A main challenge was that forest companies had not provided information requested.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁴ Interviews with Laourenço Sambo, Director CPI on 14.09.2011 and Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri on 13.09.2011.

¹³⁵ Interviews with Laourenço Sambo, Director CPI on 19.06.2014 and Simão Pedro Santos Joaquim, Director for the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNTF) on 13.06.2014.

¹³⁶ Interview with Laourenço Sambo, Director CPI on 19.06.2014.

¹³⁷ 'We Effect' (formerly Swedish Cooperative Centre) is a development cooperation organisation present in 25 countries, Mozambique included, where the organisation has offices in Maputo and in Lichinga in Niassa Province.

¹³⁸ Interview with João Carrilho, Project Coordinator of Land Component of Mozambique Millennium Challenge Account, Ministry of Agriculture on 14.09.2011.

¹³⁹ Interview with Paulino Imede, UCA, in Lichinga on 15.08.2014.

¹⁴⁰ Pedro Vicente, Province Director Niassa for forest and native plants on 18.08.14

In 2011 and in 2014, the leadership in Cepagri and CPI recognised the need for closer follow-up of the investments and their effects.¹⁴¹ In 2014, they foresaw a need for an increase in the number of Cepagri offices from four to ten, and an increase in CPI staff from 66 people to at least 100. According to CPI, monitoring procedures by August 2014 included visits to the companies every four months, although this close monitoring was not confirmed by NGR. At least once a year, NGR is asked to provide information either to CPI or the Ministry of Agriculture.¹⁴²

“There are no standards for the follow-up of the investments. It is the government at district and provincial level that have to deal with the problems.” (Simon Norfolk, Director/Partner, Terra Firma Consulting. Specialist in land tenure and natural resources issues in Mozambique on 13.06.2014).

Another unsolved challenge is the lack of zoning and land use plans, which have often been conflated (Norfolk & Bechtel 2013). Initial zoning at a scale of 1:1,000,000 was finalised in 2008, identifying 7 million hectares of land as being potentially available. Hoping for more available land, a second zoning at a scale of 1:250,000 was initiated (Norfolk & Bechtel 2013). It was promised that this would be finished at the end of 2012 (Club of Mozambique 2011). In August 2014, the DNTF Director, Simão Pedro Santos Joaquim, stated that this agro-ecological zoning was almost finished and would be presented towards the end of 2014.¹⁴³

Not all stakeholders agreed that zoning is the way forward. The director of the Mozambican NGO Justicia Ambiental expressed the fear that if this is being done, even more land might be taken from local communities than is the case today:

“There is no ‘free’ land in Mozambique. Where one community ends, another starts. In claiming that there is land to give away, one takes advantage of our way of living and our culture, to grab our land” (Anabela Lemos, Director Justicia Ambiental on 12.06.2014).

In 2011, the independent research institute Cruzeiro do Sol considered the need for a land use plan as crucial in order to balance the many different activities where land is involved.¹⁴⁴ So far, however, no detailed plan of land use exists in Mozambique:

¹⁴¹ Interviews with Laourenço Sambo, Director CPI on 14.09.2011 and on 19.06.2014 and Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri on 13.09.2011 and on 16.06.2014.

¹⁴² Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in-command after the merger.

¹⁴³ Interview with Simão Pedro Santos Joaquim, Director for the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNTF) on 13.06.2014.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with Dipac Jaiantilal, Research Coordinator at Cruzeiro do Sul on 13.09.2011.

“Mozambique does not have a land use plan. There are no updated, detailed maps.”

(Annlouise Olofsson, First Secretary Swedish Embassy on 17.06.2014)

Sweden and the Netherlands are supporting the Mozambican authorities in collecting updated information in order to build a central register, Cadastre Unico, of all information related to land use. However, this is a long-term aim that will take some time. Also, critics argue, this plan may not serve the interests of the Mozambican elite.

“This is a matter of political will. Mozambique is already ‘zoned’ by the elite who own important areas of land. A real zoning will affect this. We will need a revolution to achieve this.”

(Diamantino Nhampossa, Country Representative/Programme Coordinator We Effect on June 12th 2014).

A major change for Niassa Province since 2008 has been the influence by Norwegian policy makers through fundings and regulations provided by Norad and Norfund, as presented in 3.9.8 and to be further discussed in 6.4. Norad has not played any direct role in the process of consolidation. Norfund, however, has had a key-role as investor.

Norfund considers the GRAS investment to be in line with Norfund’s strategy to support sustainable businesses operation in East Africa. GRAS is considered as one of the leading forestry companies in Africa to serve a global need for biomass.

The negotiations for a merge between GRAS and GSFF lasted for more than year and had to be approved by Norfund’s Investment Committee. The final agreement is confidential. In terms of issues related to the environment, social aspects and governance, the investment is categorised by Norfund as “Risk Category High”, with the most critical issues related to land acquisitions and compensation as well as biodiversity. Norfund considers these risks to be mitigated by the experience and high standards of GRAS and the stringent requirements of Norfund, Finnfund and the Netherlands Development Finance Company in the legal agreement, including a detailed Environmental and Social Action Plan (ESAP). Due to the mistakes made in the past, in particular by Chikweti, Norfund has issued four conditions:

- Within a time frame of one year after the merger, GRAS has to conduct a complimentary Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) of existing and planned Niassa operations. Consultant and terms of reference has to be approved by Norfund. The additional ESIA is to ensure that the Niassa operation

can fulfil standards as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).

- A labour plan, regulating among other GRAS' use of casual labour, has to be made within a time frame of six months after the merger.
- Within the same time frame (six months), GRAS has to develop a social development plan, elaborating possible synergy with other companies present in Niassa and coordination with the Mozambican Government.
- Within two years the forest plantations, including the plantations that previously were Chikweti Forests, have to be certified by the FSC.

Norfund, however, finds it unlikely that most of these agreed deadlines would be reached within the agreed time frame. The consolidation of the three companies is a time consuming process, in particular juridicially. Due to mistakes made in the past, the demand of FSC-certification for all plantations may be a challenge for the former Chikweti-plantations in terms of sufficient documentation. Financilly, the situation for GRAS is difficult. Insufficient cash flow has been a challenge for GRAS, as forest plantations demand large investments whereas the expected economic returns only come when the trees have grown and are logged. Norfund therefore keeps a close dialogue with GRAS to assure that the operation is conducted according to the agreed standards, stressing the strict demands in the ESAP.

How then, should local community members think about the future? Do they consider that more land was available for leasing and will they, based on their experiences so far, lease out more land to forest companies? Interviewees' feedback as of August 2014 differed. In the focus group discussions, four communities said that their community had no more land available for investors.¹⁴⁵

“We have no more land available for forest companies, and hope to preserve the land for agriculture.”
(Focus group men, community 2, Sanga District).

¹⁴⁵ Focus group men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.2014; focus group women, community 1, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group men, community 2, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

Two communities stated that more land is available, if their community members can be assured of work opportunities.¹⁴⁶ One community was willing to lease out land, but only if the company negotiates with the community, and not solely with the chief.¹⁴⁷ Four other communities had land available, but not for forest plantations, only for food production.¹⁴⁸

The district government confirmed this awareness of possible increased competition for land between forest companies and companies that want to establish large-scale food production, e.g. Pro-Savana¹⁴⁹:

“In Niassa, we have more land. The challenge is that people don’t want to lease out land to plantations for forests. They want plantations for food.”
(Maria Betásia Defipo, First Secretary at the District Administrator’s Office in Sanga District, Niassa Province on 15.08.2014).

The focus group discussions revealed not only how the perceptions of local communities varied, but also the split in perceptions within communities: In one community the women declared that there is no more land available for forest plantations, whereas the men said ‘yes’ because of potential job opportunities.¹⁵⁰ In another community, the men, especially the older men, wanted to lease out land for food production, not forestry, whereas most of the women accepted the offer from the forest company.¹⁵¹

In the focus group discussions, great disappointment and lack of trust were expressed due to the gap between promises of job creation and outcomes; lack of fulfilment of promises to develop local communities; lack of respect for the chief and his community members; and concern about sufficient access to agricultural land in the future:

“We will not give away more land. The company did not show respect to the chief or us as inhabitants of this community.”
(Focus group men, community 2, Sanga District).

¹⁴⁶ Focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

¹⁴⁷ Focus group men, community 7, Lichinga District on 16.08.2014.

¹⁴⁸ Focus group men, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group women, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group women, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014; focus group men, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014.

¹⁴⁹ Triangular Co-operation Programme for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique (ProSAVANA). The vision is to improve the livelihood of inhabitants of the Nacala Corridor through inclusive and sustainable agricultural and regional development.

¹⁵⁰ Focus group men and women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

¹⁵¹ Focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

“We are not satisfied. We have lost our jobs and the area is covered with forest. We will not give away more land.”
(Focus group interview women, community 3, Lichinga District).

After almost ten years of experience with the forest companies, community members were asked what advice they would give to other communities that might consider a land lease deal. Bearing in mind the many complaints and disappointments expressed, it was rather surprising that as much as 43 of the 55 interviewees answered that their advice would be ‘yes’. The main reason for their response was the possibility of work opportunities:

“I want people to get a job. Even if I am too old to get one, I will not say no to others to get this chance.”
(Woman, single, community 8, Sanga District).

“Before people lost their jobs at the forest company, our community experienced positive spin-off effects, such as the creation of local markets. Instead of going to the central market the local farmers were able to sell their crops here. Even if I have lost my job and the situation in our community now is negative due to lack of jobs, I can’t give an advice so that other communities do not get this opportunity.”
(Man, married, community 3, Lichinga District).

11 of the interviewees asked said that their advice to other communities would be not to lease out land, whereas one informant did not know what to answer. The main reasons provided were that only the community leadership, not the community, benefits from it; and there is a need to preserve land for agricultural purposes:

“My advice would be ‘no’. First I want to see what the company can bring to the community. I want more than talk in terms of results of jobs and development. These promises should be written down in a contract before the community decides to lease out land.”
(Woman, single, community 2, Sanga District).

The last question in the household survey was whether the interviewees considered the future for their community to be ‘optimistic’, ‘neutral’ or ‘pessimistic’. As many as 41 of the 55 interviewees answered that they were optimistic, mainly due to opportunities for salaried work:

“I am optimistic and hope that it will be possible to process the timber from the plantations, get fabrics. This will create work.”
(Man, married, community 6, Sanga District).

“The future for our sons will be good. They will have a job, electricity, wood and so on.”

(Man, married, community 8, Sanga District).

Six respondents were neutral, expressing a 'wait-and-see' attitude:

"Chikweti has stopped their work. I don't know what will happen with the new company."

(Man, married, community 11, Lago District).

Eight were pessimistic because they fear that there will be insufficient land in the future:

"Our children will not have land for farms."

(Man, married, community 8, Sanga District).

The various responses from different actors have demonstrated some of the complexity in the transformation process taking place in Niassa due to LSLA. The perspectives of the effects varied, depending on whether or not the actors found that the forest plantations had proven to be gainful, or expected them to be gainful in the near future, and this will be further analyzed in the discussion chapter.

Chapter 6 Discussion

6.1 Changes in policy and implementation by government, NGO's and forestry companies in the recent years

In Mozambique, land has been granted to investors based on a policy that investments are the best way to approach poor savings, lack of human and physical capital and a limited domestic market (Cruz et al. 2014) and that vast areas of land are unused, waiting to be developed (Locke 2003). Since the 1990s, the government has established an investment-friendly regime. In 1994 the Investment Promotion Centre (CPI) was established to attract investors. This was followed by the creation of free export zones and rapid development zones, which included Niassa (Arndt & Tarp 2009; Nhantumbo et al. 2013). This means that investors are offered generous tax incentives in terms of tax exemptions and profit repatriation (Nhantumbo et al. 2013; Cruz et al. 2014).

Mozambican politicians are, however, divided on whether the government's main focus should be on large-scale foreign investments and an expected "trickle down-effect", or to empower small-scale farmers. When the Mozambican government in 2011 launched PEDSA (República de Moçambique Ministério da Agricultura 2010)¹⁵², there was a belief that this signalled a policy shift of increased focus on the country's small-scale farmers (Hanlon 2011a). Since then, there has been a rapid increase of investments. In my interview with Joseph Hanlon in 2014, the social scientist with an in-depth knowledge of Mozambique confirmed that the political shift he thought would take place when the Mozambican government launched PEDSA, had not happened.¹⁵³

The policy changes that have formed the basis for land acquisitions in Niassa Province, are thus in line with the characteristics of a neoliberal state (Harvey 2005). Based on the perception of a "trickle-down"-effect, a policy allowing accumulation by dispossession is expected to provide high economic returns and development outcomes. So far, only the first aim has materialized in terms of a seven percent rate of real gross domestic product growth for 2013, projected at 8.5 percent in 2014 and 8.2 percent in

¹⁵² PEDSA (Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento do Sector Agraria) was approved by the Council of Ministers on May 3rd 2011.

¹⁵³ Interview with Joseph Hanlon, researcher and author who has been writing about Mozambique since 1978 on 26.08.2014.

2015 (Almeida-Santos et al. 2013). Still, Mozambique is ranked as 178th on the 2014 Human Development Index (UNDP 2014). Poverty reduction has stagnated, or even degenerated in rural areas (Cunguara & Hanlon 2012). The income gini coefficient for Mozambique between 2003-2012 was 45.7, where a value of 0 represents absolute equality and a value of 100 absolute inequality (UNDP 2014).

As this thesis demonstrates, the perception that Mozambique has large areas of unused land is based on questionable assumptions. No agro-ecological zoning or detailed land use plan was made prior to the Government's solicitation to invest in land. For agro-ecological zoning, there was an on-going process of mapping. Norfolk & Bechtel (2013:17) states that "relative little land appeared to be 'available'". This raises questions about the expansive plans for plantations in Niassa, which may create future conflicts caused by a policy of accumulation by dispossession. In the focus group discussions, four communities said that their community had no more land available for investors,¹⁵⁴ two communities stated that more land was available, if their community members can be assured of work opportunities,¹⁵⁵ one community was willing to lease out land if the company negotiates with the community, and not solely with the chief.¹⁵⁶ Four communities had land available, but only for food production.¹⁵⁷

Whether zoning or detailed plan of land use is the best further approach to ensure local communities' rights to land, is disputed. Critics fear that detailed mapping of possible available land might create an even higher pressure on land resources for the local communities.¹⁵⁸ The donor community considered detailed mapping as important in order to strategically plan how land was to be used, as the pressure for access to land is high and involves various actors and sectors.¹⁵⁹ The same need for a strategic plan is expressed by the management in NGR.¹⁶⁰

Representatives for the Mozambican government, however, did not differentiate between agro-ecological zoning and a more detailed, over-all land use-plan. This

¹⁵⁴ Focus group men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.2014; focus group women, community 1, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group men, community 2, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

¹⁵⁵ Focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

¹⁵⁶ Focus group men, community 7, Lichinga District on 16.08.2014.

¹⁵⁷ Focus group men, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group women, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group women, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014; focus group men, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with Anabela Lemos, Director Justicia Ambiental on 12.06.2014.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Annlouise Olofsson, First Secretary Swedish Embassy on 17.06.2014

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources on 19.09.2011.

conflation is confirmed by Norfolk & Bechtel (2013). One explanation expressed may be that a detailed plan is not be in the interest of the Mozambican elite.¹⁶¹ This is confirmed in literature. Hanlon (2002) describes a Mozambican political elite who “is obtaining land concessions of several thousand hectares”. Cramer (2006) relates this to post-independence years (1975-1992), where the Mozambican elite took advantage of wartime shortages. Combined with market liberalisation this made it possible for a number of persons to accumulate capital and land.

In recent years Mozambique has experienced an investment boom (Club of Mozambique 2013; 2014). An important finding, however, is that the Mozambican government’s investment focus has shifted from 2011 to 2014, confirmed also by Blid (2014). Whereas the Director of CPI in 2011 expressed how investments in forestry and agriculture was of core focus, the discovery of more profitable investments in terms of untapped oil- and gas resources in Mozambique’s Northern coast areas seems to have changed this.¹⁶² To be discussed in 6.5, this shift can influence on the forest investments in Niassa in terms of need for government investments in infrastructure. Following a neoliberal approach, however, it is not surprising that the Mozambican Government’s main focus is now on profitable oil- and gas resources. This confirms the drive for profit as an inherent characteristic of capitalism:

“Once capitalism found its own feet, so it engaged in a perpetual revolutionary movement across all spheres to accommodate the inevitable stresses of endless capital accumulation at a compound of growth” (Harvey 2011: 135).

A main challenge for large-scale land investments in Mozambique is sufficient and fast access to land. I argue that in order to ease access to land, a main policy change that has taken place is centralization.

An important pre-condition for a land-lease agreement, legally based in the Mozambican Land Law, is mandatory community consultations. According to the Land Law Regulations, the local communities affected were to decide “by a minimum of three and a maximum of nine representatives of the local community, as well as by the owners or occupiers of neighbouring land”.¹⁶³ Before amendments were made to the Land Law Regulations, the involvement of the local communities and the local individuals affected

¹⁶¹ View expressed by Diamantino Nhampossa, Country Representative/Programme Coordinator in the NGO ‘We Effect’ (formerly Swedish Cooperative Centre) on June 12th 2014.

¹⁶² Interview with Laourenço Sambo, Director CPI on 19.06.2014.

¹⁶³ Land Law regulations article 27, section2.

by a land lease was considered a key-issue. This is in line with Amartya Sen's capability approach, based on the important link between people's freedom to choose the kind of life they want to live, and development (Sen 1999).

Amendments in the Land Law have weakened this right, as the decision of a land lease is to be decided by the Consultative Council. This is a body chosen for four years, with the aim to devolve administrative powers down to local level. The representation of the council members is an extension of the state apparatus – regulated from above – and thus not self-determined (Rose 2014). Norfolk and Bechtel call the construction of the Consultative Council “a fundamental error” (2013: 22).

The 55 community members interviewed about the consultation process, provided various responses: 29 respondents found the Consultative Council to be ‘good’, eight answered ‘reasonable’, whereas ten said it was ‘bad’. Two interviewees specifically explained that they experienced the establishment of the Consultative Council to be negative, feeling left out of the decision-making process due to the lack of information.

“The District Council is very bad. They don't give any information to the community”.

(Man, married, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014).

Two respondents said that their community did not have a Consultative Council, whereas six interviewees either did not know or were not present at the time when the consultations were done. In my discussions with interviewees about the consultation process, the role of the chief was put forward as a problem, not the Consultative Council. I will discuss the role of the chief later in this section.

Still, analysing the changes made to the Land Law according to Sen's theory, I consider moving the final decision away from those affected as an example of unfreedom, which may negatively affect their human development. In my sample there are examples of community land leased out against community members' will.¹⁶⁴ 23 of 55 respondents participating in the household survey said that they felt that their voice had not been heard in the consultation process, whereas 31 interviewees answered ‘yes’. One informant gave no reply.

A main objective for my thesis has been to get the opinions of women, and not only the men. Knowing the important role women traditionally have had in terms of land and food, I had expected that women would be more negative of a land lease than

¹⁶⁴ Focus group women community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

men. There was, however, no indication of a significant gender difference found in my material, except from the consultation process: 12 of respondents who said that they felt that their voice in the consultation process had not been heard, were women, 11 were men. Since the numbers of women in the sample were 23, whereas the numbers of men were 33, the replies indicate that women to a lesser extent than men were involved in the process where future land use was decided. My findings therefore confirm that the advent of modernity and capitalism changes the traditional power role of women in terms of the traditional control of access to food and land (Arnfred 2011; Huhn 2013; ORGUT, CMI & COWI 2012a). I fear that centralizing decision-making will make it even harder for women's voice to be heard, and therefore further deprive women of the control of land and food which traditionally have been women's domain (Arnfred 2011).

To gain access to land, the Mozambican Government has not only changed their legal system, but also established a process of decentralisation of political control. Six years after the Land Law was approved in 1997, the Mozambican Government initiated a process of decentralization (Tanner 2011). This has given government officials at district level an increased responsibility in the land acquisition process in terms of finding available land for investments and to monitor. Tanner (2011) questioned the resources and skills available at district level to properly do this, whereas Locke (2009) described the State's capacity to monitor as "extremely weak". According to German et al. (2013) it was mainly high-profile projects and those that are located near Maputo that were monitored. My interviewees working at the district governmental officers in Niassa confirmed that monitoring the effects was a challenge, due to among others lack of information from the forest companies.¹⁶⁵

Feedbacks from local politicians demonstrate also the challenge of promoting a neoliberal policy based on accumulation by dispossession, and at the same time witness the consequences:

"As local authorities, we understand that the companies have their reasons to expel workers. They cannot maintain people if they don't have jobs for them. But the workers should have been better informed when they were recruited. People leave their farms for work. When they lose their job, they ask us: How am I to survive?

(Maria Betânia Defipo, First Secretary at the District Administrator's Office in Sanga District, Niassa Province on 15.08.2014).

¹⁶⁵ Pedro Vicente, Province Director Niassa for forest and native plants on 18.08.14.

Local government officials' attitude towards the investments was often more nuanced than at central level, caught in the middle between wanting to serve their local community and being loyal to a policy they are to implement (Hanlon 2011b). Still, even though they acknowledged that there were challenges and severe negative effects, I find that their main sympathy was towards the investors, being loyal to the policy they were to implement and having faith that in the end the outcomes will be beneficial also for the local communities. This tendency for government and ruling elite to choose foreign investors' side is confirmed by other researchers (Deininger & Byerlee 2011; German et al. 2011; Nhantumbo & Salomão 2010; Wily 2011).

To include traditional power structures in the process to get access to land is a newer phenomenon, with the recognition of community leaders through formal ceremonies since 2002 (Gonçalves 2005) and an increased number of traditional leaders on the government payroll (ORGUT, CMI & AUSTRALCOWI 2012a). This policy is considered negative by academics (Dinerman 2004; Gonçalves 2005).

The roles that the chiefs have been given in the investment process was considered a main challenge by local community members, both related to the consultation process, access to work and in the management of the social funds. For communities with a 'bad' chief, driven by personal gains for profit, the consequences were severe. To replace a chief is not easy, as this role is regulated through clan and lineage (Funada-Classen 2012). This challenge was confirmed by community members:

"In our tradition it is very difficult to get rid of a chief".
(Focus group men, community 7, Sanga District on 16.08.2014).

I argue that the complex role of the chief illustrates the complexity of the situation in Niassa, where old power structures are mixed with new (Funada-Classen 2012). This policy change is an example of 'unfreedom', creating negative effects for individual's options for development (Sen 1999). This has a potential to destabilize the local communities, due to community members' anger of the situation. Nine community members participating in the household survey had to bribe the chief to be recommended as applicant for work. Informants expressed that they felt deprived of funds that were to develop their community, or they disagreed with the way the funds

were being spent.¹⁶⁶ I witnessed how the funds in many local communities were used to construct mosques. In a mixed, religious society, this created some dissatisfaction among Christians. Åkesson et al. (2009) confirm that the forest companies' approach to work with the highest level of traditional leader instead of grassroots leaders further down the hierarchy is a challenge that creates marginalisation.

The last example found in my research which adds to this process of decentralization and control, is role of local NGOs. Whereas the local NGOs during the field visit in 2011 challenged if long-term lease of land for forestry investments were a wise approach, their role in 2014 had changed from 'watchdogs' to mediators, with the prime aim to convince the communities to lease out land and to keep the investors accountable of their promises:

"Our role now as civil society is to help the communities to give away land without conflict. We no longer inform the local communities about their rights, but try to force the forest companies to show social responsibility and to help the communities to give away land without conflict".

(Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer's Union Lichinga) on 15.08.2014).

Harvey (2011) considers the double role of NGOs to be their only option due to the political and policy standpoint of their donors. This is in line with Shivji (2004) elaborating on the role of African NGOs working in a context he considers a neoliberal hegemony. According to Shivji it is not possible for NGOs both to be 'partners' of the state and the donor community and at the same time "hold a stake in, the very system which oppresses and dehumanises the large majority" (Shivji 2004: 691). Shivji therefore questions to what extent the NGOs are:

"contributing to the great cause of humanity, the cause of emancipation from oppression, exploitation, and deprivation? Or are we, consciously or unconsciously, dancing to the tune played by others?" (Shivji 2004: 698).

I have demonstrated key-policy changes that pull in one direction: further accumulation by dispossession. Due to this, I question what real choice the local communities in Niassa have to say "no" to land deals (Franco 2014). Knowing the expansive plans that the forest companies have for future planting in the province, I share the concerns expressed by Harvey (2011) and Shivji (2004). With the inclusion

¹⁶⁶ Man, married, community 11, Lago District on 21.08.2014; man, married, community 10, Lago District on 22.08.2014; focus group men, community 7, Sanga District on 16.08.2014; focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group men, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

also of local NGOs, in particular UCA, in this process of policy consensus to accumulate more land: who are then to speak up for local community members who disagree?

For the forest companies present in Niassa, the most important change in terms of policy and implementation that has taken place in the recent years is the process of consolidation during Spring 2014. GRAS' merger with GSFF and the taking over of land from Florestas de Planalto has created a company that aims to be the "leader in African forestry" (Green Resources 2014a). This vision stated by GRAS is a clear signal that the process of accumulation by dispossession will continue. Rapid expansion is confirmed by my findings, with an estimated annual planting in Niassa ranging from 1,500-2,500 hectares.¹⁶⁷

Another forestry company policy change is the transition from manual labour to mechanisation. Whereas the clearing of land and planting was conducted manually during the field visit in 2011, these tasks were mechanised to a large extent in 2014, ostensibly to increase efficiency and ensure stable quality of the tree seedling.¹⁶⁸ The GRAS management in London has confirmed that there will be "fewer but better jobs".¹⁶⁹ This demonstrates a profit-seeking company policy, theorised by Harvey:

"Machines cannot produce profits by themselves. But those capitalists with superior technologies and organisational forms typically gain a higher rate of profit than their competitors and eventually drive them out of business" (Harvey 2011: 88).

This proves that the argument of a "trickle-down" effect in terms of job creation might not necessarily be materialised when the principal priority is to make profit, not development. If the forest investments in Niassa are not to be another example of "jobless growth" (ILO 2014), a more human-centred and people driven approach is needed (Shivji 2009).

With fewer jobs offered to local community members, the introduction of outgrower-schemes is a policy approach introduced by GRAS. The aim is to strengthen relations with local communities by helping to invest in cash crop development

¹⁶⁷ According to Marek Guizot, Development and Strategi Planning Director Green Resources the annual aim is 2,500 hectares – information given at the Chikweti-seminar "Lärdomar från Niassa – den gemensamma rapporten om Västerås stifts skogsinvestering i Mocambique" in Stockholm on 04.06.2014; Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources estimated 1,500-2,000 hectares per year in an interview on 18.08.2014.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Arlito Cuco, Green Resources Managing Director of Mozambique Operations on 16.06.2014.

¹⁶⁹ Marek Guizot, Development and Strategi Planning Director Green Resources at Chikweti-seminar in Stockholm 04.06.2014.

(Nhantumbo et al. 2013). In 2011, district government officials expressed a more positive attitude towards NGR than Chikweti due to a more inclusive process towards local communities and government (Bjergene 2012a). The need for investments in agricultural skills in order to resort farmers to more permanent forms of cultivation is confirmed in research literature (Orgut 2006; Church of Sweden 2014) and the fact that rural poverty in Mozambique is increasing (Cunguara and Hanlon 2012). In addition, with the current low agricultural output, with no access to input factors such as fertilizer, there is strong need for investments that directly benefitted smallholder farmers and improved food security (Resnick 2004; Mittal 2009; Haggblade & Hazell 2010).

GRAS policy approach to introduce outgrower-schemes demonstrates a will for an inclusive, human-centred approach (Shivji 2009). According to NGR, 600 community members had participated in the soya project by August 2014.¹⁷⁰ For this thesis, however, only one informant reported of a positive outcome of the scheme.¹⁷¹ Others would like to get the chance to become outgrowers,¹⁷² whereas some thought it would be too demanding.¹⁷³

To invest in the local farmers in order to improve farming skills and get access to input such as fertilizer is positive and needed to decrease the pressure for land in terms of today's farming practice of slash and burn. Still, the dependency that will be created if the peasant farmers give up their land to become outgrowers may create challenges. Just as interviewees interviewed in this thesis demonstrated a dependency of salaried work, the same dependency may be created in a transition to outgrowers. Knowing the gaps between promises and de-facto outcome in terms of job creation and development in the communities, I also question to what extent a practice of outgrower-scheme will be extended so that it can make a difference for a majority, and not only the few, reflected upon also by UCA's coordinator:

“I don't believe this will happen. The companies want profit. Probably they will not have the funds”.

(Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer's Union Lichinga) on 15.08.2014)

¹⁷⁰ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in-command after the merger.

¹⁷¹ Man, married, community 13, Sanga District on 13.08.2014.

¹⁷² Focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group women, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014.

¹⁷³ Focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

With GRAS financial constraints (Jacobsen 2015; Grini 2015) it depends on the investors' willingness to raise additional funding and GRAS' management commitment to prioritize the local community members.

6.2 Forestry in Niassa by NGR and Chikweti as perceived by the government, the companies, and NGOs.

The Mozambican government argues that through an 'inclusive business model' – linking local communities and foreign investors – positive development outcomes in terms of job creation and social and economical development at community level will be created. The argument is thus that by combining a policy of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003) with human-centred and people driven development (Shivji 2009), there will be a 'win-win' both for investors and the local communities.

“The benefits are so high. Investments create jobs and economic growth. For the last three years, 20 percent of the revenues in natural resources go back to the communities, where the local community committees now are receiving the income of these benefits.”

(Simão Pedro Santos Joaquim, Director for the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNTF) on 13.06.2014).

The 20 percent of the revenues has so far not been actualised neither for NGR nor Chikweti, as neither of the companies before the merger had started to earn money. This expectation is therefore dependent on possible future revenues.

Whereas central government officials expressed hopes of a ten-fold return of forestry investments within twenty years in 2011 (Bjergene 2012c), feedbacks provided by the same sources in 2014 were more moderate. A time-consuming process for acquiring access to land and the local resistance towards the process have had a negative effect on prospects for an economic profit (Blid 2014). This has led to a consolidation of companies. Government sources said that Niassa Province was still considered a stronghold for forestry investments. As discussed in 6.1, however, for the accumulation of capital, other investments, such as oil and gas (Macauhub 2014b), were considered more profitable.

Government sources expressed that they considered development outcomes as 'payment' for land. Central Mozambican government sources interviewed for this thesis

therefore urged forest companies to fulfil their promises made to local communities.¹⁷⁴ I question the extent to which central government officials interviewed were updated on the situation in Niassa. In my interviews with government officials at central level, there was little room for reflection on how the forest investments in Niassa Province might harm the local communities, for instance in terms of food security as forest companies and peasant farmers strive for the same land. Central government officials, however, assured that farm land was not leased out.¹⁷⁵ This illustrates a lack of understanding of the many challenges related to land lease, including how companies and peasant farmers tend to want the same agricultural land (Norfolk & Hanlon 2012). For vulnerable groups, this policy represents a risk that their living conditions will deteriorate. For Chikweti, the approach chosen has been to negotiate with local communities to replant, creating a number of conflicts. Local government officials tried to change Chikweti's land approach, but without success.¹⁷⁶ The Mozambican government could, however, have regulated the investments to avoid the disputes of access to agricultural land, in line with the advice provided by De Schutter (2006) and Wilson (2006) of the need for a responsible State.

As discussed in 6.1, monitoring of the investments was considered a main challenge by central government officials, emphasised in interviews both in 2011 and 2014.¹⁷⁷ I argue that the combination of insufficient monitoring and a servile policy towards the investors harms the local communities, both because the Mozambican government has insufficient knowledge and because they are not willing to use sanctions if the companies don't deliver as promised, or if their actions harm the local communities. I will use Chikweti as an example:

Despite the strong criticism of Chikweti put forward by the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNTF) in 2011 (World Rainforest Movement 2011), Chikweti was given additional 52 000 hectares in Sanga District on April 1st 2014 (Hanlon 2014a). The critique from 2011 included grabbing of land in terms of illegal occupation of 32,000 hectares of land. The Chikweti management argued for more land in order to ensure

¹⁷⁴ Interview with Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri on 16.06.2014

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri on 16.06.2014.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Felisberto Muterua at the District Government office in the Chimbonila District on 19.08.2014.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with João Carrilho, Project Coordinator of Land Component of Mozambique Millennium Challenge Account, Ministry of Agriculture on 14.09.2011 and with Laourenço Sambo, Director CPI on 19.06.2014 and with Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri on 16.06.2014.

employment. The Council of Ministers gave Chikweti more DUATs in the Niassa districts of Sanga and Lichinga.

As interviews in this thesis illustrate, no more jobs were provided. Instead, the workers experienced dismissals of jobs when Chikweti closed down. At the time of my field research, community members were waiting to know whether they would be reemployed by the new, merged NGR.

Central government officials interviewed for this thesis said that they were not informed about Chikweti's plans to close down. They considered Chikweti to be a good investment, not knowing that the company was facing bankruptcy and therefore was unable to provide any positive development outcomes.¹⁷⁸ The same lack of information between forest companies and government was found related to UPM's decision to terminate operations in Niassa (Blid 2014). The decision by the Mozambican Council of Ministers to give DUATs to Chikweti may illustrate a severe lack of monitoring and flow of information between companies and government, or a passive willingness to please investors. That the option to cancel land user rights is rarely used, was confirmed by Deininger & Byerlee (2011).

Knowing the enormous impact the forest investments have on local community members' lives, I argue that the Mozambican government should monitor the process and provide sanctions if the companies don't deliver development outcomes as expected.

“Certain corporations now possesses power that approaches or even surpasses that of many States, with a capacity to affect human rights depredations to match. In this setting, then, a simple rule of reason dictates that they should also bear similar human rights obligations” (Wilson 2011).

Whereas central government officials were based in Maputo, distanced from the realities in Niassa, the process of decentralisation described in 6.1 ensured government representativeness at district level. These local politicians were thus better positioned to see the various effects of the forest investments.

Both in 2011 and in 2014, district government officials expressed how they considered the bad legacy of Chikweti as a main challenge.¹⁷⁹

“The Chikweti-name is bad because of the many conflicts. The relation between Chikweti and the local communities has not been good”.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Abdul Cesar, Director Cepagri on 16.06.2014.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with District Administrator in Sanga, Paulino Husa on 19.9.2011

(Maria Betásia Defipo, First Secretary at the District Administrator's Office in Sanga District, Niassa Province on 15.08.2014).

By 2014, the lack of fulfilment of promises also by NGR was expressed by district government representatives:

“We are not satisfied with NGR and have the provincial government to tell the company to stop planting until they fulfil their promises. According to the provincial government, the reply from NGR is that they are working to solve this. With the merger, the company has stopped the work. We are waiting for the new company members to tell us how they will solve this”.

(Mateus Simão, district government in Sanga, section for Floresta, Forest and Fauna on 13.08.2014).

Still, despite severe shortcomings and discontent, the local government in Sanga District said that by August 2014 they had not received any complaints from local community members, whereas the year before they had received many complaints.¹⁸⁰ At the same time, the local government representative in Sanga District reported a tendency where local communities no longer wanted to lease out land to forest companies because they felt that promises have not been kept and feared for future food security.¹⁸¹

The future will show if increased competition will increase the company's accountability towards promises made in return for land and compel companies to be good employers (Orgut 2006). Also, to what extent the bad legacy created in the past, will be possible to turn, as the new, merged NGR depends on a good relationship in order to expand the plantation. In the further rush for land I question to what extent the local government officials will be able to speak up for local community members' rights, even though they register negative outcomes. As elaborated upon in 6.1, the feedbacks received through interviews demonstrated a main sympathy towards a policy of continuous accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003). Even so, the extent to which local government officials will have the mandate and resources to choose otherwise is questionable, as they are a part of a political system that is strictly controlled from central level and downwards (ORGUT, CMI & COWI 2012a).

¹⁸⁰ Maria Betásia Defipo, First Secretary at the District Administrator's Office in Sanga District, Niassa Province on 15.08.2014.

¹⁸¹ Maria Betásia Defipo, First Secretary at the District Administrator's Office in Sanga District, Niassa Province on 15.08.2014

The main objective for GRAS' forest plantation in Mozambique is to contribute to the growing, global need for biomass and to fight deforestation. The deforestation rate in Niassa Province from 1999-2002 was 0,22 percent. This is the lowest of all provinces in Mozambique (Marzoli 2007). It is, in other words, not primarily the need to fight deforestation in Niassa Province that is the main objective of the investments. Even though timber products produced at the forest plantations most probably will benefit also local and national needs for timber products, the main market is outside Mozambique. This is what Samir Amin (2011) and Harvey (2003; 2011) describe as dispossession of peoples in the peripheries in order to ensure growth and prosperity of richer nations in the centre.

Both NGR and Chikweti have struggled with two main challenges; insufficient access to land and lack of funding. These challenges are not unique for the two companies. According to Blid (2014) a process where return on the investments was pushed further into the future explains the process of consolidation of forest companies present in Niassa.

For the local communities in Niassa, the immediate consequences of the companies' economic constraints and insufficient access to land have been loss of jobs and an insufficient flow of money to the local communities' social funds. NGRs management expressed how the lack of money flow from GRAS to NGR Niassa had prevented the fulfilment of payments to local communities' social funds, proper working equipment for their workers, salaries paid according to schedule and promised contributions to the local communities.¹⁸² It is the local management in NGR that has to face and explain these delays to the local community members.

For the forest company, there is thus a constant balance between the amount of money to be spent on development, and investments needed to ensure economic sustainability and profit goals. This has created an "evil circle", with increased resistance expressed by community members of leasing out land to forest companies. A statement that was expressed in 2014 by the former Director for NGR, who became second-in-command after the merger was that; companies and government in the past had promised too much in terms of job creation and social responsibility. He therefore considered a need to renegotiate terms:

¹⁸² Interview Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in command after their merger.

“In the past, we oversold the numbers of jobs to be created and our social responsibility. Now we have to sit down and talk.”

(Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Green Resources Niassa on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in-command after the merger).

Interviews conducted in the local communities for this thesis showed how only a few had jobs at the time of my fieldwork, and that the trend had been negative over time. As will be further discussed in 6.3 there are wide gaps between promises of development and outcomes. Instead of “sit down and talk”, I argue for promises to be kept. If not, the sustainability of the plantations might be threatened in terms of fires, a common way for the local communities to demonstrate their resistance and anger. I will emphasise how the power balance between the local communities and the actors that may benefit from a policy of accumulation by dispossession is unequal, a fact that needs to be considered in a political economy analysis of the situation in Niassa (Melim-McLeod et al. 2012), and which is confirmed in other research literature about LSLA (von Braun & Meinzen-Dick 2009; German et al. 2011; Nhantumbo & Salomão 2010). The following quote from one informant by one of the local communities where NGR leased land, illustrates the unbalance in power:

“We were not in a good position when we negotiated for land in 2010 because we were very hungry. Malonda Foundation and Green Resources contacted the régulo first. They made promises to him before they got the land. When we people tried to understand, we were promised jobs. But we only had the jobs for three months”.

(Focus group men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.2014).

As elaborated upon in 6.1 the NGOs role in Niassa, in particular for UCA, has changed during a process to reach consensus on land use. During my field visit in 2011, the conflict level was high, with aggression particularly directed towards Chikweti. I interviewed both NGOs present in Niassa, UCA and ORAM, and they expressed that the conflict level by August 2014 had decreased. At the same time, they were concerned about the numbers of jobs offered being lower than promised, and of mainly short-term contracts instead of permanent jobs. The peasant farmers who had given up their land for jobs, were now in a difficult situation.

The NGOs also expressed concern that the funds promised to the local communities, were not paid according to schedule. UCA’s coordinator criticised the lack of clear criteria on how local communities were to benefit from forest investments, and found

that the companies gained more on the investments than the local communities, prioritising accumulation of more land than the development of the communities.¹⁸³

“The communities may feel happy now for what they receive from the investments, but I am unsure about the future. I feel that the companies gain more than the local communities”.

(Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer’s Union Lichinga) on 15.08.2014.

The same concern about an unbalanced development outcome is expressed in the research literature (Cotula 2013).

I argue that the NGOs present in Niassa are in a difficult squeeze. On the one side they realize the many challenges caused by the accumulation of land, but on the other hand they see no alternatives to continuous land acquisitions if jobs are to be created.

6.3 The effects of forestry investments on local people’s lives

As illuminated in this thesis, forestry investments are not a new phenomenon in Mozambique, but date back to colonial times. Due to its remoteness, Niassa was less influenced by colonialism than many other parts of Mozambique (Funada-Classen 2012). This meant that traditional power structures to a large extent remained intact until the war of independence (1966-1974), where deep divisions were created in the society (Funada-Classen 2012).

Since then, foreign capital has had an enormous impact on Mozambique and its people (Newitt 1995). Increased access to job is considered as the most important and mediate benefit of foreign investments (Aabø & Kring 2012), reflected in the feedbacks from my interviewees. 49 of 55 interviewees in the household survey said that the possibilities to get a paid job had improved, five respondents said ‘no’, whereas one interviewee did not reply. The high score reflects the fact that there were hardly any alternatives for salaried work in the region.

When the interviewees were asked to characterise the working conditions provided, 30 respondents described them as ‘good’, 14 as ‘reasonable’, nine as ‘bad’, whereas two interviewees did not reply. The feedbacks provided in the focus groups, demonstrated more varied replies, ranging from informants who were satisfied with

¹⁸³ Interview with Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer’s Union Lichinga) on 12.08.2014.

salary and working conditions,¹⁸⁴ to interviewees who had lost faith and would not accept further job offers.¹⁸⁵ A third group saw no other alternatives due to the deep poverty, and would accept even harsher conditions.¹⁸⁶ Challenges that were issued during fieldwork in 2011 and 2014 included decreased use of permanent workers, delay of salaries and lack of proper equipment.

In the household survey, 27 out of 55 interviewees said that their daily lives had become better since the arrival of the forest companies, whereas 21 said there was no difference. Seven respondents found their situation to be worse. Six of the community members who considered their lives to be better emphasised how it used to be better, only while there were jobs available.

The most common reply provided from community members when I asked why they considered their lives to be better, was the increased possibilities of salaried work, when this was available.

“We could buy what we wanted”.

(Focus group women, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014).

Harvey (2011) theorises capitalism’s revolutionary impulse and describes how we as humans “are clearly fascinated by novelty”(Harvey 2011:89). I found this reflected in community members’ descriptions of how access to salaried work, when this was available, provided options for an increase living standard in terms of a bicycle, mattresses, a television, a better house, a motorcycle or even a new wife. Others had invested in a new piece of land, or have afforded to send their children to school. A reply provided from community members who considered the forest investments to be positive, was that even though not all members had access to salaried work, there were beneficial spin-off effects in terms of the creation of local markets.¹⁸⁷

The process of accumulation by dispossession in exchange of salaried work has created accumulation of wealth for some community members, driving the transition to capitalism (Cramer 2006). But is this development? The Orgut-study (2006) raises the issue, finding that the salaries are mainly used to cover basic needs instead of for

¹⁸⁴ Focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group women, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group men, workers Chimbonila District on 19.08.2014.

¹⁸⁵ Focus group men, community 1, Sanga District on 16.08.2014.

¹⁸⁶ Focus group men, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

¹⁸⁷ View expressed by woman, married, community 11, Lago District on 21.08.2014.

instance investments in the farm. Hanlon & Smart (2008) discuss whether raising incomes actually equals development.

“There is electricity, mobile phone, more schools, better roads and more business. And yet, people remain desperately poor”. (Hanlon & Smart 2008: 86).

A majority of the community members interviewed explained that the salary income had been spent on utilities, whereas a few said that access to salaried work had enabled them to send their children to school, indicating a positive outcome in terms of increased capabilities (Sen 1985; 1999; 2005). For the other half, those who considered that their lives had deteriorated or remained unchanged from the investments, a frequent response was that access to jobs was only for a period of time and therefore did not make a difference, or that they were not qualified for salaried work due to age.

My findings indicate that there is a split in Niassa, where around half of the community members consider that they benefit from the transition caused by forestry investments, whereas the other half did not consider the land lease as beneficial. In addition, I consider that there is a split between those community members who hope and want to become part of a modern, capitalist society, and the other half who fear for the future, acknowledging the traditional importance of land (Martinez 1989; Geffray 1991; Funada-Classen 2012). For many interviewees the process of land acquisition has been coercive, where community members have had to lease out community land, or even give up their land against their own will, creating a situation which by definition is conflictual (Cramer 2006).

A finding that 27 interviewees out of 55 had improved their daily lives since the arrival of the forest companies appears like a positive finding. However, when analysing the other specific questions asked in the household survey and information provided through focus group discussions and from key-informants, the situation becomes more complex.

One of the most serious findings found in my research, is the effect the forest investments have had on community members' food security. In the household survey, 23 interviewees answered that their food situation had deteriorated since the arrival of the forest companies. For 16 interviewees there was no change, whereas 16 interviewees said that their food situation had improved.

The poverty level in Niassa is very high. Even though there has been some progress made, 31.9 percent of the population lived in poverty in 2008/09 (ORGUT, CMI

& COWI 2013). These poverty levels, however, are not equally distributed (INE 2010; ORGUT, CMI & COWI 2012c). A further decrease in livelihoods options caused by the people being dispossessed of their land (Harvey 2003) is therefore critical.

According to Tanner (2013: 13) there is a lack of “hard data” that measure the impact on food security due to LSLA. Tanner points out the importance of knowing whether or not the households were food insecure also before land acquisitions. My findings are not “hard data”, but illuminate the situation as experienced by the peasant farmers.

In 2011, the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition came to the same negative conclusion as my findings: rather than improving agricultural productivity and rural livelihoods, large-scale investments had negative consequences for local people’s food security and livelihood (HLPE 2011). Access to food is a human right. Through the commodification of land, this fundamental right is weakened for those who must bear the negative consequences of the investments (Sen 1999). The former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (2008-2014), Olivier De Schutter, expressed concern of a processs where land is commodified:

“We treat it as a commodity, when it means social status and a lifeline for the poorest rural households” (De Schutter 2011: 274).

One of the reasons why my interviewees experienced a worsened food situation was that due to the land lease, they had to find a new farm. Since the land closest to the local communities was occupied by the forest companies, 33 interviewees had experienced an increase in distance to their land. Two respondenets had received pieces of land closer to their communities due to health and age. One interviewee did not reply. For 19 informants the distance to their piece of land was unchanged.

For the 33 who experienced an increase in distance, as many as 26 said that the increase was from four to 50 kilometres. The increase in distance due to the forest plantations was confirmed in the focus group interviews.¹⁸⁸ The negative effect is found also in research literature, where local community members experienced longer distance to walk to their agricultural land or grazing areas due to land acquisitions (Justica Ambiental & UNAC 2011; Hall & Paradza 2012).

¹⁸⁸ Focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.3014; focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

For the informants, the increase in distance had consequences, such as having to spend more time to get back and forth from their land, and to pay for transport to get to their land.¹⁸⁹ In one community, the combination of distance and the lack of a bridge to cross a river to get to the new farm-area had negatively affected children's education. Without a bridge, the river was too dangerous to cross.

“We need a bridge to get to the areas where we now have farms. So far, the company has not provided this. Because we have no bridge, we cannot travel back and forth between our farm and our community. We must stay at our farm when we work on our land. This means that our children cannot go to school. The farm is far away and we can't cross the river without a bridge”.
(Man, married, community 10, Lago District).

I argue that these are examples of a situation that is the opposite of development, but pushes poor people deeper into poverty and even deprives coming generations of the option to get education, a factor considered crucial by Sen (1985; 1999; 2005) for development.

Another factor that negatively affected interviewees' food situation, is that their new land has poorer quality. In the household sample, 34 interviewees had experienced a change in quality of their farm after the arrival of the forest companies, for 20 respondents it was unchanged and one informant gave no reply. Seven interviewees experienced that the quality of their land had improved, whereas 27 explained that the land they now had produced less. A main worry expressed was what to do when they had to change land, as the areas close to the local communities was occupied by the forest companies, forcing the peasant farmers to find land further from their local communities.

“The soil fertility at my farm is reduced. For me, it is not possible to open a new farm because the company has taken all the land. I fear for the future and worry that the food production will be further reduced. The Mozambican Government should think of preserving land to ensure sufficient food also for future generations”.
(Man, married, community 1, Chimbunila District).

The decision to lease out the land that was close to the local communities was, however, supported by a few, arguing for easy access to salaried work.¹⁹⁰ This

¹⁸⁹ Focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.2014; focus group men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

¹⁹⁰ Focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

demonstrates again the deep split in the local communities. Still, I argue that the price a majority have to pay in order for a minority's option for salaried work is far too high.

What makes the situation even worse, is that a key promise and expectation from the investments – job creation – has not been materialised as promised. As interviews with community members showed, jobs were mainly available in the beginning of the investments. Since then, there has been a steady decrease, combined with a shift from permanent jobs to mainly short-term contracts. By August 2014 hardly anyone in the local communities visited had salaried work. The situation was particularly hard for community members without a farm. In the focus group discussions, respondents explained that many had found it too hard to combine salaried work and keeping their farm. As they experienced the salary too low to hire people to run their farm, they had counted on salaried work solely.¹⁹¹ With the loss of jobs, the consequences were severe:

“Ninety percent of the people in the community are without a job now. These people do not have a farm. When we worked, we were well off. Now they are suffering. I am afraid that they will steal from my farm because they have no work, no farm”.

(Old widow, community 1, Chimbunila District).

The tendency of a gap between initial expectations of job creation and de-facto materialization is confirmed also by other researchers (Waterhouse et al. 2010). The effect loss of jobs have had on community members' security in terms of increase of theft, creating a more insecure situation, is confirmed in literature (WRM 2009).

I argue that the situation I witnessed during my fieldwork in August 2014 demonstrates the vulnerability caused by the dependency of the peasant farmers on the forest companies. Community members hoped to replace or combine farming activities with salaried work. When this coping strategy was blocked, their vulnerability increased (Le Billon 2000). In line with Shivji (2009), my findings show that the outcome of the forest investments to a large extent depend on whether or not the forest companies have a holistic approach, emphasizing a human-centred and people driven development. For NGR, and particularly Chikweti, I found a lack of such an approach: people were dismissed at a time when it was too late for them to plant on their farm.¹⁹² People who had worked for nine years were dismissed without receiving any information from the

¹⁹¹ Focus group with men and focus group with women in community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group men, workers Chimbunila District on 19.08.2014.

¹⁹² Focus group women, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

company, but were informed through community members.¹⁹³ Informants experienced a lack or delay of economic compensation to be paid when they were dismissed.¹⁹⁴ To survive, assets gained as salaried workers were sold. In line with Oxfam (2011) I found that poverty and food insecurity had aggravated due to the dismissals of workers. People had not only lost their land, but also their salaried income. Options for future salaried work will now depend on the new, merged NGR's business approach, which again depends on the approach chosen by the top management of GRAS, to be further elaborated upon in 6.5.

Adding to the disappointment due to lack of jobs, was the gap between promises and deliveries of investments to develop the local communities, both in terms of payments to the social fund and promises made in terms of providing basic infrastructure: of the 55 interviewees participating in the household survey, only 11 answered that the promises had been delivered. Four informants explained that some, but not all, had been delivered. One respondent explained that the only promise made was for job creation, which had partly been delivered during the first phase of the investments. Two informants explained that money had been given to the chief. Since then the community members had not seen any money, nor development outcomes. The gaps between promises and real outcomes were confirmed by focus group members, with replies ranging from 'no assistance at all'¹⁹⁵, to 'some assistance, but far from the initial promises'.¹⁹⁶

At the time of the field research in August 2014, NGR owed the local communities \$70, 000. According to the Managing Director of NGR, who became second-in command after the merger, Inocencio Sotomane, the money should be paid within three months from August 2014. I have repeatedly tried to contact NGR and GRAS's head office in London for an update of the situation, including whether the funds have been paid as promised, but I have received no reply. Through one of my contacts in Mozambique at the Lurio University, researcher Mateus João Marassiro, I received updated information on 14.4.2015 about the status of the payment for the communities in the Malulu parcel

¹⁹³ Focus group with men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014.

¹⁹⁴ Focus group men, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014.

¹⁹⁵ Focus group with men, community 6, Sanga District on 13.08.2014; focus group with men, community 3, Lichinga District on 14.08.2014; focus group men, community 2, Sanga District on 15.08.2014.

¹⁹⁶ Focus group with men and women, community 8, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group men, community 9, Sanga District on 15.08.2014; focus group men, community 1, Chimbonila District on 16.08.2014; focus group men, community 7, Lichinga District on 16.08.2014; key informants in community 11, Lago District on 19.08.2014 and in community 4, Sanga District on 13.08.2014.

in Sanga District, which is part of the project area: they have received funds for three years (2011, 2012 and 2013), but were still waiting for the funds for 2014. The promises made in terms of infrastructure to provide development outcomes for the local communities are only partly delivered and have much taken longer time than promised.

Compared to the value of the land leased out and the expectations raised by the Mozambican Government and NGR, I therefore question whether the communities have received development outcomes that reflect the value of their land. This view was shared also by local NGO's¹⁹⁷ and is a main concern in the research literature (Cotula 2013; Binswanger et al. 1995; Conning & Robinson 2007; Zoomers 2010; Wily 2010).

In the research literature, there are case studies where foreign investments have had positive impacts in terms of e.g. social infrastructure (Deininger & Byerlee 2011; The Oakland Institute 2011; Waterhouse et al. 2010). If the top leadership in GRAS and GSFF, being responsible for a sufficient cash flow to Chikweti and NGR, had chosen a human-centred development approach (Shivji 2009), the development outcomes could have been delivered as promised. The race for profit, however, characterises the way the forest investments before the merger have been conducted: An expansive approach, accumulating more land and investing in a more mechanised production to achieve efficiency and stable quality of the plantation. This approach will be beneficial for the targeted export markets in the centre and the investors. Based on my findings, I question, however, to what extent a majority of the local community members in a periphery such as Niassa have benefitted. In view of the new, merged NGR's expansive plans, combined with the GRAS' financial constraints (Jacobsen 2015), the prospects for the long promised development returns made towards the local communities in Niassa are even more unlikely to be fulfilled.

One group that seems to gain on the investments, are the chiefs. As elaborated upon in 6.1 they form part of a process where power is decentralised to get access to land. Based on Harvey (2011) I argue that the process that has taken place in Niassa, is an example of capitalism growing

“within the interstices of the old society and supplant it bit by bit, sometimes through force, violence, predation and seizures of assets, but at other times with guile and cunning” (2011: 135).

¹⁹⁷ Interview with Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer's Union Lichinga) on 12.08.2014.

Had the old, traditional power structures remained intact to a larger extent, perhaps the situation in Niassa would have been different. With capitalism taking over, the traditional values of land have been exchanged for profit. As demonstrated in 4.5 and elaborated upon in 6.1, the negative consequences of a 'bad' chief ranged from loss of land due to lack of consultation process to personal enrichment and even sale of equipment provided by the forest company. When pointing out the negative behaviour conducted by 'bad' chiefs it is, however, important to bear in mind that the deep poverty in Niassa includes also the chiefs. When local community members had to bribe their chief to be recommended as workers, the declared amount of money paid varied between 100 and 500 mzn (\$2,84 and \$14,20). For the chiefs who were accused of stealing the social fund-money, one sum mentioned by a chief was that his community in 2013 had received 29,000 mzn (\$823).

The tensions created by the some of the chiefs' negative behaviour harmed also the forest companies. Conducting investments in a region where traditional power structures are intact to some extent, the forest companies (and the Government of Mozambique) had no alternative but to include the traditional leaders in the accumulation of land process.¹⁹⁸

6.4 The role of Norfund and Norad

Norwegian policy makers, through Norad and Norfund, have had an important role in the development of forestry in the region.

Norad has provided donor funding that paved the way for the Mozambique's first afforestation project under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), with the overall objective to assist in achieving sustainable development through mitigating climate change. This main objective is to be combined with sustainable production of wood, community development and poverty alleviation (UNFCCC/CNUCC 2013).

Carbon financing is an important part of GRAS business plan in order to provide an expected total long-term profit to investors of 25 percent (UNFCCC 2014). An aim for

¹⁹⁸ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 18.08.2014 and views provided by community development officer and FSC officer in NGR on 19.09.2011. Sotomane became second-in command after the merger.

profit is thus combined with 'green' aims of producing wood to alleviate pressure on forests and reduce global warming. A precondition for these aims is a relocation of peasant farmers, in line with what Harvey (2003) labels accumulation by dispossession. The Norad-supported project is established in a 'periphery' area and is thus an example of "a 'spatial fix' in order to relocate a crisis of climate, food and energy to frontier areas in the periphery (McCarthy 2012; Anyemedu 2006; Amin 1990).

The Niassa Reforestation Project was registered as a CDM-project in 2014. This is a mechanism regulated under the Kyoto Protocol that allows a country with an emission-reduction or a commitment for emission-limitation to implement projects in developing countries intended to reduce emissions (UNFCCC 2014b). It is too early to judge whether or not the Niassa Reforestation Project will meet the objectives in terms of future carbon revenues generated, where ten percent of these potential benefits are supposed benefit the local communities. The market for price of CERs has dropped and some even questioning whether it will continue to exist, due to the lack of a global agreement after the Kyoto Protocol (Farrington 2015). There is thus a risk that the promise of funds generated from CDM will be jeopardized.

The planting in the area that today forms Niassa Reforestation Project started in January 2007, one year after the establishment of a nursery (Green Resources 2010). Norad's approval to support the project was made in June 2010 (Norad 2010). Based on interviews from my field visits in the area in 2011 and 2014, I cannot not see that GRAS and NGR had delivered on their promises in terms of job creation, tree planting- and reforestation activities, funding to the local communities' social funds and contribution to the development of local infrastructure such as roads, bridges and public buildings, even though some contributions have been provided.

According to my interviews with various actors, the jobs provided in terms of tree planting and reforestation activities are far less than initially promised, recognized also by the management in NGR.¹⁹⁹ According to NGR the reduced numbers of jobs found in 2014 was mainly due to the merger. However, I argue that this is part of a long-term trend, a situation that is also reflected in the research literature (Li 2011; Holt-Giménez 2007; Altieri & Bravo 2009).

¹⁹⁹ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in command after ther merger.

As elaborated upon in 6.3, there are wide gaps between GRAS' and NGR's promises of development and outcomes. I argue that Norad has funded a company and a project where profit and further expansion, not development, has highest priority (Harvey 2003) and where there is a lack of a human-centred policy (Shivji 2009). I therefore question the basis for Norad's decision to support the project, acknowledging that Norad's mission is to contribute to development through wise spending of development aid.

Since the funding provided was for a pre-study, Norad's follow-up of the project is limited to a report from the company after the pre-study was finished. In this study, GRAS is required to document that the study is conducted according to the application for development funding. In addition, Norad requires considerations for social responsibility (Norad 2010; Bjergene & Piene 2013).

What I see as most critical is that Norad through their support to the carbon project legitimises a process of accumulation by dispossession, including land and the commodification of 'second nature' (climate), where global climate change is to be reduced through the establishment of a carbon market. David Harvey calls this "a speculative venture" (2011: 187). Norad's influence on the development of the province has thus been substantial, even though the amount of money provided is quite low.

I argue that the Niassa Reforestation Project is an example of 'green grabbing' defined by Fairhead, Leach and Scoones (2012) as a process where resources are grabbed for the benefit of the environment. The main outcomes of the project are geared towards benefits for investors and consumers outside Mozambique (the centre), and not the local communities in Niassa (the periphery), as reflected in theory by among others Anyemedu (2006) and Amin (1990). Low local benefits from commodified, traded nature are confirmed in other research studies (Benjaminsen & Bryceson 2012).

Whereas Norad's role in Niassa is relatively limited in terms of the amount of money provided as a pre-study, they have paved the way for today's large-scale investment, of which Norfund has a decisive role as investor and monitor. With the merger, the area of land that GRAS now controls is more than tenfold, with expansive plans of planting between 1,500 and 2,500 hectares in the years to come.²⁰⁰ The

²⁰⁰ According to Marek Guizot, Development and Strategi Planning Director Green Resources the annual aim is 2,500 hectares – information given at the seminar "Lärdomar från Niassa – den gemensamma rapporten om Västerås stifts skogsinvestering i Mocambique" in Stockholm on 04.06.2014; Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources estimated 1,500-2,000 hectares per year in an interview on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in command after the merger.

consequences of an investment approach based on accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003) are most likely to increase and represent a challenge for further sustainability: The population in Niassa is expected to increase due to population growth and migration.²⁰¹ A minority of informants participating in the household survey, shared this worry:

“Our children will not have land for farms”.
(Man, married, community 8, Sanga District).

Concern of future access to land was raised by researchers already in 2006 (Orgut 2006). Since then, the transformation of land use has accelerated. According to different sources, the amounts of land that is in the process of being allocated vary between 400,000 and 640,000 hectares (Nhantumbo et al. 2013; Church of Sweden 2013; Hanlon 2011a). Figures provided by the land cadastre (Serviços Provincias de Geografia e Cadastro) in Niassa in August 2014, showed that the forest companies in Niassa occupied 266, 867 hectares of land.²⁰² With the merger, 130,000 of the hectares belong to GRAS.²⁰³

The large amount of land that the merged NGR now controls raises high demands and expectations on Norfund as the “single most important tool for Norwegian support to Private Sector Development” (Norad 2015: preface). Critics argue that with the increased power that many international corporations now possess, there is a need for more control (De Schutter 2006; Wilson 2006). I argue that this control must demonstrate development outcomes, because there is not necessarily an interlink between economic growth and development, which is also reflected upon in an evaluation report on Norfund (Norad 2015).

As presented in this thesis, Norfund has categorised their investment as risk category High, and considers issues related to land acquisitions- and compensation and biodiversity as most critical. Norfund has therefore issued four conditions for the Niassa-investments in terms of various plans to be made to measure environmental and social impacts, labour and social development. A major question to ask, however, is to

²⁰¹ Leonardo Abilio António, Programme Officer ORAM (land rights organisation) on 19.08.2014

²⁰² Accurate figures that show how much land that is controlled by the forest companies is a main challenge due to transparency (Hanlon 2011a). Acknowledging that the amounts of land might be higher, I have decided to use official data collected during field research and figures provided by Niassa Green Resources.

²⁰³ Figure expressed in interview with Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in charge after the merger.

what extent the many indicators provided in the various plans are able to grasp the reality on the ground (Norad 2015).

Based on my empirical data, I argue that development outcomes are down-prioritized by the forest companies at the expense of investments that can provide profit. Due to the merger, GRAS CEO, Mads Asprem, earned \$1,123,000 in 2014, compared to his previous annual salary of \$401,000 (Grini 2015). Harvey explains this drive for further capital investments:

“The survival of capitalism, in short, depends upon the organisation and financing of material infrastructural investments appropriate to a compounding rate of growth” (2011: 86).

The question is if Norfund, in a situation where GRAS has to choose between investments that can increase profitability or investments to provide development, will demand the latter. The same challenge is emphasised by the team that evaluated Norfund, recommending for Norfund’s owner, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to establish more detailed aims to balance profit and development (Norad 2015; Rønning & Speed 2015). I wish to add that as investor, Norfund has the possibility to freeze or even cancel loans provided if the development terms that form the basis for their loans are not fulfilled or too delayed. Today, this is not the case, since the practice explained by Norfund is to ask for a ‘waiver’, where Norfund accepts a defective performance of the contract. In this way Norfund protects the investor, not the people affected by the investments.

Based on the statements from Norfund’s Director, Kjell Roland²⁰⁴, more documentation of development outcomes seems unlikely. Instead, Norfund’s Director wants to invest more, arguing that investments automatically provide development. To spend time on documentation is therefore considered unnecessary.

Roland may be right that investments to create economic growth can provide development. If one is to interpret the term ‘development’ in line with Peet & Hartwick (2009) to mean “making a better life for everyone”, more documentation of development effects certainly are much needed.

Findings in my thesis demonstrate how forest investments create “winners” and “losers”, exemplified by statement from a female informant explaining why her relationship with the forest company is good:

²⁰⁴ Norad-seminar where the evaluation report of Norfund was presented on 6.2.2015.

“Good because I earn money. For those who don’t work, it is not good”.
(Woman, married, community 3, Lichinga District).

In my sample there are worrying feedbacks from informants that the forest investments have had a negative effect on their food situation. Loss of jobs and the timing for dismissals have had a tremendously negative effect for the living conditions in the local communities. How is this to be avoided or adjusted without good documentation of development effects? And when Norfund’s investments create positive development outcomes at local level, is it not in the interest of Norfund to document these effects?

I argue that the need for documentation to avoid harm is particularly important to ensure that the vulnerability of groups such as women and elder does not increase as a consequence of the investments. The need to reflect on the effects that capitalism has on women in general is reflected in literature (Sen & Grown 1987; Tiano 1987). A research report on the effects that large-scale investments had for women in Niassa, concludes that “women’s rights and gender equality have not been prioritized in settings where large-scale investments for economic development are at stake” (Kaarhus & Martins 2012: 6). In my sample, there are examples of women who experienced that the community land closest to their community was leased out because there were community members who wanted easy access to salaried work.

“We did not participate in this decision. If we had decided, we would have said no”.
(Focus group women community 3, Lichinga District).

In my research, I found peasant farmers were dispossessed of the capacity to reproduce themselves and their land in ways that match with the analyses of Harvey (2003) and Shivji (2009), and they also expressed that their living conditions had become worse than before the arrival of the forest companies in a manner that fits with Sen’s (2000) conceptualization. I therefore question whether Norfund’s and GRAS’ investment approach, based on accumulation of dispossession to produce biomass for export, is beneficial for a majority of the peasant farmers in Niassa. If a majority of the peasant farmers are to benefit from the investments, I argue that a fundamentally different investment approach is needed. Such an approach would have to be more human-centred and make sure that future food security and the environment are not jeopardized. Norfund as an investor could influence towards such a policy.

6.5 How various actors anticipate future development in forestry in Niassa

The main intention of this thesis has been to grasp the views of community members to understand how they consider their life situation before and after the arrival of large-scale forestry plantations. Despite many challenges and complaints of already experienced negative outcomes, a surprising finding emerged when informants in the household survey were asked to describe the future perspectives for their local communities: as many as 41 informants said they were optimistic about the future for their community. Six informants were neutral and eight informants were pessimistic. This strong belief in a better future was shared by men and women, young and old. A vast majority of community members interviewed for this thesis longed for more investments, as they considered market integration and options for salaried work would pave the way to a better future. Even if informants realized that they themselves might not benefit from the investments, they expressed hope that others – for instance their children or grandchildren – might opt for a better future:

“I want people to get a job. Even if I am too old to get one, I will not say no to others to get this chance”.

(Woman, single, community 8, Sanga District).

This distinction between ‘well-being freedom’ and ‘agency freedom’ is theorised by Amartya Sen (1987; 1992). In my sample, there were community members who were willing to sacrifice their personal well-being, hoping to serve a larger cause: that the leasing of land would provide a better future for generations to come.

When the informants were asked whether or not they would advise other villages to lease out land to foreign forest companies, the same positive views were repeated: 43 informants said they would advise other communities to lease out land, 11 said no, whereas two informants did not know what their reply would be.

I relate this optimism to the remoteness of Niassa (Funada-Classen 2012; Huhn 2013). With isolation and a lack of political will to invest in the peasant farmers, there have been no options to escape poverty. The lack of alternatives to develop Niassa’s agriculture except for FDI was expressed also by the local NGOs.

“If the investors leave, then we have to provide other opportunities for the local communities”.

(Leonardo Abilio António, Programme Officer ORAM (land rights organisation) on 19.08.2014).

The main approach chosen by the Mozambican government to develop the countryside is through foreign investments and accumulation by dispossession (Club of Mozambique 2013; 2014). With these investments, community members I interviewed had gained hope for a better future. Some had even attained a “taste of a life” as salaried workers. One feedback provided from community members was that they considered the investments to be their chance to advance, even though they had to live with negative consequences caused by leasing out their land:

“People are crying. It is difficult to keep the children in school do to lack of money. Community members ask how to get a job. Still, we gain trust in the forest company and hope they will provide work. We have no other alternatives”. (Interview with community leader in community 7, Sanga District).

I question to what extent there will be jobs available for local community members. In the research literature, findings demonstrate a trend where there is a need for workers primarily in the initial phase. After a few years, the requirement for workers decreases (Overbeek et al. 2012; Cotula 2013). Using Brazil as case, De’Nadai et al. (2005) found that in a modern, capital-intensive pulp mill, there was a need for only a few hundred relatively well-paid workers, mostly externally recruited. According to the District Administrator’s Office in Lago District, the forest companies had expressed doubts as to whether needs of future labour would include the local communities.²⁰⁵ As elaborated upon in 6.1, the management in GRAS has confirmed that due to mechanisation there would be fewer, but better jobs.²⁰⁶ The question is whether unskilled peasant farmers are be qualified for the ‘better’ jobs or to what extent NGR will have the will and human and economic resources to educate community members in order for them to be qualified.

At the time of my field research, community members’ hopes for future salaried work were still strong. Three months after the merger, community members expressed a lack of information regarding future plans for employment or whether their job was secure or not as worrying. If community members’ expectations for jobs are not fulfilled or compensated, I fear that the situation might destabilize.

²⁰⁵ Interview with Iassine Alabe, First Secretary District Administrator’s office in Lago on 21.08.2014.

²⁰⁶ Marek Guizot, Development and Strategi Planning Director Green Resources at Chikweti-seminar in Stockholm 04.06.2014

As elaborated upon in 6.1, the NGOs had become part of consensus process of land use. I argue that the NGOs interviewed in Niassa were in a squeeze between a development approach that they hoped would turn out to as positive, and worries of possible future, negative consequences. These future worries were both related to possible environmental challenges caused by a monoculture, creating loss of biodiversity²⁰⁷ and whether there would be sufficient land available also for future generations.²⁰⁸ ORAM urged the local communities considering leasing out land to think at least 50 years ahead, as population growth and migration might increase the future pressure on land. The Director of the Mozambican NGO Justicia Ambiental, Anabela Lemos, was convinced that the transformation of people from peasant farmers to salaried workers might jeopardize Mozambique's food supply situation.²⁰⁹

The pressure for land in Niassa does not only come from forest investors. An increased competition for land from e.g. Pro-Savana²¹⁰ was expressed by community members and district politicians. A main concern, though, was the lack of planning and coordination of the many activities involving natural resources and access to land (Deininger et al. 2011). As elaborated upon in 6.1, detailed plans for land use and monitoring are two main challenges. With further expansion of land, there will be more areas and more communities to follow-up. If the investors are to be made accountable, the Mozambican Government will have to spend much more resources on proper planning and monitoring to ensure a human-centred policy that create the promised development outcomes for the Mozambican peasant farmers leasing out their land, and not only high economic growth.

With the merger, the management in GRAS Maputo and NGR expressed a renewed optimism.²¹¹ The expectations were that with the take-over of the Chikweti plantation, the new, merged NGR would have access to mature forest plantations. The aim is to earn money by 2018, when some of the plantations are expected to become mature

²⁰⁷Interview with Paulino Imede, coordinator UCA (Farmer's Union Lichinga) on 12.08.2014.

²⁰⁸ Leonardo Abilio António, Programme Officer ORAM (land rights organisation) on 19.08.2014

²⁰⁹ Interview with Anabela Lemos, Director Justicia Ambiental on 12.06.2014.

²¹⁰ Triangular Co-operation Programme for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique (ProSAVANA). The vision is to improve the livelihood of inhabitants of the Nacala Corridor through inclusive and sustainable agricultural and regional development.

²¹¹ Interview with Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, after the merger second-in command, on 18.08.2014 and Arlito Cuco, Green Resources Managing Director of Mozambique Operations on 16.06.2014.

and can be processed.²¹² Before processing can begin, however, several preconditions have to be in place:

- A certification by the FSC of the plantation, including the former Chikweti plantation, within two years.
- The building of a factory for processing.
- A railway connection between Lichinga and Cuemba.

The agreed deadline for the FSC-certification is considered unlikely because the merger process had taken longer than expected and because it might be challenging to meet FSC's requirements for documentation, in particular for Chikweti.

The site for the factory has been selected. A principal challenge that remained to be solved, however, is infrastructure in order to transport the processed wood to the Mozambican coast. The lack of infrastructure was expressed as a main challenge by central government officials in Maputo working with the forestry investments in Niassa.²¹³

On GRAS' homepage, this challenge is not recognised. GRAS reports that "a railway line runs from Lichinga to the port of Nacala 795 km away" (Green Resources 2014c). This is a railway that is no longer in use, and where funding is needed to reconstruct the line, at least to Cuemba, 337 km away. From Cuemba there is good infrastructure by road and railway to the Mozambican coast and the Nacala port, paving the way for timber export.

²¹² Interview with Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in command after the merger.

²¹³ Interview with Darlindo Pechisso, head of Forest Department at the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNTF) on 13.06.2014.



Annex 10: Infrastructure is a challenge in Niassa. This is the railway that used to run from Lichinga towards the Mozambican coast. Photo: Liv R. Bjergene 2014

Mozambican politicians have promised to prioritize the infrastructure in Niassa for years. In 2010 the Mozambican Government said that a working railway branch line was a main concern (Macauhub 2010). Two years later, there was news that the railway was to be rebuilt (Macauhub 2012). In May 2014, there were protests against the lack of railway and good roads between Lichinga and Cuemba. Armando Guebuza, who was President of Mozambique from 2005 to 2015, replied by asking for patience (allAfrica 2014b).

As was elaborated upon in 6.1, the Mozambican government's main investment focus has changed from agriculture and forestry to promising oil- and gas resources along the coast.²¹⁴ For the expansive plans for the merged GRAS, I argue that this change of focus from the Mozambican government might represent a main challenge for the sustainability of the investments.

²¹⁴ Interview with Laourenço Sambo, Director CPI on 19.06.2014.

With more than a tenfold increase of land, from 28,000 hectares²¹⁵ to close to 130,000 hectares,²¹⁶ a relevant question to ask is whether the investment plans might be too ambitious for Niassa. This was the judgement made by the management in UPM when on the 27th of November 2013 they decided to terminate their investment in the reforestation company Florestas do Planalto. UPM's director found the project to be "too ambitious" and that "the community in Mozambique is not prepared to receive an investment of this size" (Blid 2014: 19). The leadership of UPM also questioned as to whether it would be possible to gain access to sufficient amount of land to supply a pulp factory (Blid 2014). Now all these challenges are taken over by GRAS and NGR and their investors. As pointed out in 6.1, due to financial constraints GRAS has already started their hunt for more money (Jacobsen 2015; Grini 2015). I envisage that financial constraints again will jeopardize what is considered to be a main challenge for the new, merged NGR: to 'clean' the bad legacy created in the past.

The bad legacy was considered a key challenge by the former Managing Director for NGR, Inocencio Sotomane. He expressed hope that since the Niassa-investment with the merger had changed from a minor to a major investment for GRAS, there would be an increased flow of money from the investors, making it possible to fulfil the promises made to the local communities.

"Our financial situation will be better. I am convinced that we now will receive money from the shareholders. We will pay the local communities the around \$ 70,000 that we owe within a month".

(Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Green Resources Niassa, who became second-in-command after the merger, on 18.08.2014).

As elaborated upon in 6.4, the money has not been paid to the communities in the Malulu parcel in Sanga District. I argue that my findings demonstrate an investment approach whereby investments to ensure promised development outcomes for the local communities have constantly been delayed, only partly fulfilled or not fulfilled at all. Further expansion is prioritised by the company management at top level more than to fulfil promises made to the local communities. The need to fulfil these promises is strongly recognised by the management in GRAS Maputo and even more so in NGR.

²¹⁵ The DUAT was originally secured for 40,360 hectares through the Malonda Foundation. As more than 50 percent consists of natural forest, there has been a process of swapping some of these titles for land suitable for planting. According to the Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, the process has ended with a DUAT for approximately 28,000 hectares.

²¹⁶ Interview with Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources, Inocencio Sotomane, on 18.08.2014. Sotomane became second-in command after the merger.

Again and again, however, they experience that the promised development for the local communities has to be down-prioritised due to lack of money.

The local communities in Niassa have given away the most valuable they possess, their land, for 50 years that may be renewed for an equivalent period. Due to the long-term perspective, Cotula (2013) considers a lease as 'land acquisition'. To carry the hopes of a better future for the impoverished local communities in Niassa is a great responsibility. I argue that if these hopes are to be fulfilled, the development of humans has to be prioritised (Shivji 2009; Sen 2000). I question, however, to what extent the local community members in Niassa will benefit from an export-oriented investment approach, where the prime aim is to serve the centre to gain profit, not to develop the human beings living in a periphery (Amin 1990; Anyemedu 2006). I find that the investments conducted by Chikweti and NGR have been characterised by a policy of dispossession (Federici 2009; Woodhouse 2003; Linebaugh 2009). Still, a majority of the community members interviewed wanted the investments, hoping that in the end the outcomes would be positive. I therefore hope that shareholders, the management in GRAS and NGR and the Government of Mozambique eventually fulfil their promises of development in terms of job creation for the peasant farmers and promised investments in the local communities. As elaborated upon in my thesis the situation in Niassa is complex. Development is never easy. A good start for the new merged NGR would be that their shareholders provide funding so that they can pay the communities the \$ 70,000 that they owe them.

GRAS' CEO, Mads Asprem, earned the staggering amount of \$1,123,000 in the single year of 2014 alone (Grini 2015). At the time of the merger, the value of GSFF was \$104,000,000 and GRAS was valued at \$257,000,000 (Grini 2015).

Conclusion

The development of Niassa Province has been influenced by historical, cultural, social, economic and political factors. Historically, Niassa was characterised by the late introduction of colonial administrative structures and intervention by colonial authorities. This meant that traditional power structures and cultural traditions remained intact to a large extent. Even so, since the war of independence (1964-1974) there was a process of decentralised, political control of the Mozambican countryside, where traditional power structures were replaced with new, politically appointed leaders. With the Mozambican Government's national discourse on FDI, this need for control grew even stronger in order to ensure investors' access to land.

In Niassa, the conflict level between forest companies and local has been high. The process of consultations has been particularly demanding, regulated by Mozambican Land Law. To 'smoothen' the accumulation process, several initiatives have been taken, including the formation of Consultative Councils. Whereas DUAT application that affects community land was formerly signed by the community, it is now signed by this Council. In practice, this means that community members' democratic rights have been reduced, as the decision on a land lease might be decided by a body at district level, consisting of people who may not even live in that particular community. This issue was raised by a few community members. In general, however, the community members' views of the consultation process were divergent and often contradictory, reflecting the complexity of the process. Women were generally less involved in the decisions than men, even though the control of land and food has traditionally been the women's domain. With the commodification of land, this has changed, and women have become more marginalised.

The forest companies in Niassa had further expansive plans for planting, but were dependent of the local communities to gain access to land. In order to reduce the level of conflict and ease a time-consuming process of negotiations, a consensus process had taken place. Main actors, including the local NGOs, had reached an agreement on land use. Through this process, the role of the local NGOs, UCA in particular, had changed dramatically. Whereas UCA used to be the peasant farmers' 'watchdog', their role had become to convince the local communities to lease out their land and to keep the companies accountable for their promises. This shift undermined even more the

unequal power balance between impoverished, local communities and powerful investors wanting their land.

The creation of jobs had been presented as a key outcome of the forest investments by the Mozambican Government and the forest companies. This was the number one expectation presented by community members. A large majority hoped that access to salaried work would ease their poverty, or the poverty of future generations. For those who had previously had or still had a job, there were reports of improved living conditions, as well as positive spin-off effects for the community. The jobs provided, however, were only for a few, as the numbers of jobs had dramatically decreased since the initial plantation phase. In addition, there had been a transition from expected and promised permanent jobs to low-paid, short-term contracts. During August 2014 hardly anyone was employed and personal gains as well as positive spin-off effects were gone. Future prospects of work were unsure due to mechanisation of the planting process and a need for qualified personell when processing was to start, which according to GRAS would provide “fewer but better jobs”.

The consequences of job dismissals caused by the dependency on salaried work were dramatic, in particular for community members who no longer had a farm. To combine the two tasks, salaried work and farming, had proven too demanding. A majority experienced the salary to be too low to hire extra help to continue the farming. The dismissals were conducted at a time when it was too late to sow crops. As a consequence, more people were food insecure than before the arrival of the forest companies. The local communities were also less secure due to an increase in thefts.

Reduced food security was not only related to loss of jobs. Community members who had to give up their land experienced reduced living conditions and even tougher situation as farmers, due to increased access to their new land and/or poorer soil quality. The forest companies' tendency to acquire the good land close to the communities was expressed as a key reason for conflict and for the deterioration of individual's living conditions. There were reports of decreased access to school for children due to the increase in walking distance and the lack of infrastructure for the new farmland. Using a practice of slash and burn, the farmland available was distanced further and further away from the local communities.

Forestry is a long-term investment, where the expected returns might take decades. Financial constraints had therefore been a challenge and one of the reasons

why Chikweti had to close down. The lack of funding from GRAS to NGR has repeatedly caused delays of salaries, lack of proper equipment for workers, insufficient payment to the local communities' social funds and a wide gap between initial promises and outcomes in terms of investments to develop the local communities leasing out land. Whereas there has been sufficient funding to invest in e.g. expensive planting machines that mechanise and increase the efficiency of the planting, and time consuming processes to negotiate for access to more land, the top leadership in GRAS has not chosen to prioritise the many individuals who made their investments possible: the peasant farmers.

Due to the lack of respect towards the local communities in terms of promises of job creation and investments in the local communities, there was a tendency in Niassa of local communities turning away from the forest companies. Many had lost faith. Even though their community had more land, they no longer wanted to lease out to forestry investors. This might become a challenge for the further expansion of the merged NGR. Even though there had been a consensus process to ease access to land, the forest companies will still have to negotiate.

In addition to the lack of trust towards the forest companies from community members, they also expressed a worry for future access to land. This concern was shared by local and national NGOs and by Mozambican researchers. According to Government figures presented to ORAM, the population in Niassa is expected to quadruple by 2035. Still, a large majority of community members that participated in the household survey were positive to lease out their land to investors, hoping that this eventually would develop their community. Only a few expressed that they were pessimistic about the future. Strong hopes were expressed that when processing would begin, there would be new jobs available.

For the new, merged GRAS, however, several preconditions will have to be met if their expansive plans for export oriented panel production are to be fulfilled, including the lack of infrastructure. With the discovery of profitable oil- and gas along the Mozambican coast, it remains to be seen if infrastructure investments in Niassa will be prioritised by the Mozambican Government. Norfund as an investor has demanded that all plantations have to be FSC-certified. This condition might be demanding to meet, in particular for the plantations that used to belong to Chikweti, where sufficient documentation might be a challenge. With the rapid expansion of the plantation and the

need for more investments, including a planned factory, GRAS has already asked investors for more money. The scale of the investment proposed for a poor province like Niassa might be too ambitious. This was the assessment made by UPM.

The fact that Norwegian policy makers have a different view, gives them a responsibility in terms of monitoring. Norad has played a key-role in the establishment of Niassa Reforestation Project and therefore ought to follow-up to keep GRAS accountable for their development promises.

Before the merger between GRAS and GSFF, NGR used to control 28,000 hectares of land. On May 1st 2014 this was increased to almost 130,000 hectares. This expansion would not have been possible without the acceptance from Norfund as an investor. Close monitoring, including development outcomes, should be prioritised due to the bad legacy created in the past, the enormous increase of the investment since the merger, and – as demonstrated in this thesis – the severe consequences of the investments for the local communities.

FDIs tend to be presented as a panacea to achieve ‘development’. In Niassa, it was hard to see this expected ‘trickle-down’ effect for the majority of community members. If the forest investments are to provide positive development outcomes in the future, there is a need to change strategy away from neo-liberal, capitalistic interventions towards more human- and ecology-centred approaches. With the further expansive plans for planting, however, I question the long-term sustainability of the current transformation process in Niassa – both financially, for the environment and for the development and stability of the local communities.

GRAS’ CEO, Mads Aspren, however, earned \$1,123,000 in the single year of 2014 alone. At the time of the merger, the value of GSFF was \$104,000,000 and GRAS was valued at \$257,000,000.

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Annex 1: Household survey, English version

HOUSEHOLD RESEARCH

Impact of Forestry plantations in Niassa Province, Mozambique: Benefits and challenges

The present research aims to understand the form the households the real socioeconomic impact of forest plantations in Niassa province. It will help the forest companies the real situation that household fill as impact of plantations in Niassa and to meet de best ways to reduce conflicts.

District: _____ Community: _____ Date: ___/___/___ Nr of interview: _____

SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION

<p>1.1. Sex of the interview : <input type="checkbox"/>Man <input type="checkbox"/>woman</p> <p>1.2. Status: Status:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/>Single <input type="checkbox"/>widow</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/>married <input type="checkbox"/>widower</p> <p>1.3. Relation with AF/ Who is the head of the household:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Chefe of AF</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> wife</p>	<p>1.4. Age:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> < 18 <input type="checkbox"/> 18 -35</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> 36 -65 <input type="checkbox"/> > 64</p> <hr/> <p>1.5. Family members in the household:</p> <p>Children ____ <input type="checkbox"/>Female <input type="checkbox"/> Male</p> <p>Jovens ____ <input type="checkbox"/>Female <input type="checkbox"/> Male</p> <p>Adultos ____ <input type="checkbox"/>Female <input type="checkbox"/> Male</p> <hr/> <p>1.6. Level of education</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> alfabetization <input type="checkbox"/> primary <input type="checkbox"/> secondary <input type="checkbox"/>hy level</p> <p>1.6. How many years have you lived in this community:</p>
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SECTION B: FOOD SECURITY

<p>2.1. main occupation</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/>Griculture <input type="checkbox"/> Emprego <input type="checkbox"/> another</p> <p>_____</p> <p>If agriculture, what the main crops you produce</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/>maiz <input type="checkbox"/>beans <input type="checkbox"/>cassava <input type="checkbox"/>horticolos <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>another _____</p> <p>2.2. Before the arrival of the forest companies, did you have your own 'machamba' to grow</p>	<p>2.3. Do you have your own 'machamba' today to grow food? <input type="checkbox"/>YES <input type="checkbox"/>NO</p> <p>2.3. If yes. The size of machamba</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <1/4 of ha <input type="checkbox"/> ¼ a ½ of ha <input type="checkbox"/> between ½ - 1ha</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> 1ha <input type="checkbox"/> 1ha – 2ha <input type="checkbox"/> >2ha</p> <p>2.4. Quality of the 'machamba' changed after the arrival of the forest companies? <input type="checkbox"/>YES <input type="checkbox"/>NO</p>
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food? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
<p>2.5. Distance from your home to the 'machamba'</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> reduced <input type="checkbox"/> incised <input type="checkbox"/> is the same</p> <p>2.5.1.if incised, how many km?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <1km <input type="checkbox"/> between 1 -3km <input type="checkbox"/> 4-5km <input type="checkbox"/> >5km</p>	<p>2.6. Have you experienced a change related to surplus or shortage of food after the forest companies started their planting of trees in Niassa? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO</p> <p>2.6.1. Since the arrival of the forest companies has the food situation for you and your family become:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> better <input type="checkbox"/> equal, <input type="checkbox"/> worse</p>

Section C: working possibilities

<p>3.1. Has there been a change related to access to work since the forest companies started their work in Niassa? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO</p> <p>3.1.1 6. Since the arrival of the forest companies has the possibilities to get a paid job become:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> better</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> equal</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> worse</p>	<p>3.2. Did you have to pay money (bribe) to get a job in one of the forest companies? YES/NO</p> <p>3.2.1. How will you describe the working conditions that the forest companies provide:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> good, <input type="checkbox"/> reasonable, <input type="checkbox"/> bad (<i>replies to be followed up in individual interviews regarding e.g.: short-term/long-term contracts/permanent work, working hours, salaries, working equipment etc</i>). _____</p>
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Section D: community consultation

<p>4.1. Do you as a villager feel that your voice has been heard in the leasing of community land to the forest companies? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO</p> <p>4.1.1. To what extent will you say that your opinion on how the community land is to be used has been heard by the forest company:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> good <input type="checkbox"/> reasonable <input type="checkbox"/> bad</p>	<p>4.1.2 ... by local village government officials:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> good <input type="checkbox"/> reasonable <input type="checkbox"/> bad</p> <p>4.1.3... by district government officials:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> good <input type="checkbox"/> reasonable <input type="checkbox"/> bad</p> <p>4.1.4... by the Conelhos Consultivos de Posto Administrativo e de Distrito</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> good <input type="checkbox"/> reasonable <input type="checkbox"/> bad</p> <p>4.1.5...by province government officials:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> good <input type="checkbox"/> reasonable <input type="checkbox"/> bad</p>
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Section E: Relationship between community/company

<p>5.1.How will you describe the relationship between your village and the forest company: <input type="checkbox"/>good <input type="checkbox"/>reasonable <input type="checkbox"/>bad</p> <p>5.2.Has the expectations/promises by the forest company related to social and economical improvements for the communities been fulfilled? <input type="checkbox"/>YES <input type="checkbox"/>NO <i>(what expectations/promises to be followed up through individual interviews/focus groups).</i></p>	<p>5.3.Have expected improvements for the community in return for the leasing of land been written down in a contract? <input type="checkbox"/>YES <input type="checkbox"/>NO</p> <p>5.4.Has the relationship between your community and the forest company improved since the arrival? <input type="checkbox"/>YES <input type="checkbox"/>NO</p> <p>5.5.Has the relationship between your community and the forest company grown worse since the arrival? <input type="checkbox"/>YES <input type="checkbox"/>NO</p>
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Section F: Future perspectives/advice:

<p>6.1.Has the arrival of the forest companies affected your daily life and made it: <input type="checkbox"/>better <input type="checkbox"/>equal <input type="checkbox"/>worse</p> <p>6.2.If you should give advice to other villages that consider to lease out community land to foreign forest companies, what would your advice be? <input type="checkbox"/>YES <input type="checkbox"/>NO</p>	<p>6.3.If you are to describe the future for your community, are you: <input type="checkbox"/>optimistic <input type="checkbox"/>neutral <input type="checkbox"/>pessimistic</p>
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7.0. for as is all, do you have something to add?

@Liv&Marassiro

Annex 2: Household survey, Portuguese version:

PESQUISA A AGREGADOS FAMILIARES

Impacto das plantações Florestais na Província de Niassa, Moçambique: Benefícios e desafios

A presente pesquisa visa perceber os impactos socioeconómico das plantações para os agregados familiares da provincial de Niassa.

Districto: _____ Comunidade: _____ Data: ___/___/___ Nr da entrevista: _____

SECCÃO A: INFORMAÇÃO GERAL

1.1. Sexo do entrevistado: <input type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> H	1.4. Idade:
1.2. Estado:	<input type="checkbox"/> < 18 <input type="checkbox"/> 18-35
<input type="checkbox"/> Solteiro <input type="checkbox"/> Viúva	<input type="checkbox"/> 36 -65 <input type="checkbox"/> > 64
<input type="checkbox"/> Casado <input type="checkbox"/> Viúvo	1.5. Numero de membros do AF:
1.3. Relacao com AF	Crianças _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Feminino <input type="checkbox"/> Masculino
<input type="checkbox"/> Chefe do AF	Jovens _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Feminino <input type="checkbox"/> Masculino
<input type="checkbox"/> Esposa	Adultos _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Feminino <input type="checkbox"/> Masculino
	1.6. Nível de educação
	<input type="checkbox"/> Alfabetização <input type="checkbox"/> Primário <input type="checkbox"/> Secundário <input type="checkbox"/> Superior
	1.6. Há quanto tempo vive nesta comunidade:

SECCÃO B: SEGURANCA ALIMENTAR

2.1. Principal ocupação	2.3. Actualmente ainda tem machamba própria para produzir comida? <input type="checkbox"/> Sim <input type="checkbox"/> Não
<input type="checkbox"/> Agricultura <input type="checkbox"/> Emprego <input type="checkbox"/> Outras _____	

Se agricultura, quais são as principais culturas que produz?	2.3. Se sim, qual é o tamanho actual da machamba?
<input type="checkbox"/> Milho <input type="checkbox"/> Feijão <input type="checkbox"/> Mandioca <input type="checkbox"/> Hortícolas <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> <1/4 of ha <input type="checkbox"/> ¼ a ½ of ha <input type="checkbox"/> between ½ - 1ha
Outras _____	<input type="checkbox"/> 1ha <input type="checkbox"/> 1ha – 2ha <input type="checkbox"/> >2ha
2.2. Antes da chegada de empresas florestais tinhas machamba própria para produzir comida?	2.4. Será que a qualidade da machamba mudou com a chegada de empresas florestais? <input type="checkbox"/> Sim <input type="checkbox"/> Não
<input type="checkbox"/> Sim <input type="checkbox"/> Não	

<p>2.2.1. Se sim, qual era o tamanho da machamba:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <1/4 of ha <input type="checkbox"/> ¼ a ½ of ha <input type="checkbox"/> between ½ - 1ha</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> 1ha <input type="checkbox"/> 1ha – 2ha <input type="checkbox"/> >2ha</p>	
<p>2.5. Com o aparecimento das empresas florestais a distância para a sua machambas:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Reduziu <input type="checkbox"/> Aumentou <input type="checkbox"/> Mantem-se</p> <p>2.5.1.se a distância aumentou, quantos km?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> <1km <input type="checkbox"/> Entre1 -3km <input type="checkbox"/> 4-5km <input type="checkbox"/> >5km</p>	<p>2.6. Houve alguma mudança relacionada ao excedente ou insuficiência de comida depois das empresas florestais iniciarem as plantações florestais em Niassa?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Sim <input type="checkbox"/> Não</p> <p>2.6.1. Desde que as empresas florestais chegaram, a situação de comida para si e sua família tornou-se:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Melhor <input type="checkbox"/> Mantem-se <input type="checkbox"/> Piorou</p>

SECÇÃO C: POSSIBILIDADE DE EMPREGO

<p>3.1. Houve alguma mudança relacionada ao acesso ao emprego desde que as empresas florestais começaram os seus trabalhos em Niassa? <input type="checkbox"/> Sim <input type="checkbox"/> Não</p> <p>3.1.1. Com a chegada de empresas florestais a possibilidade de ter emprego remunerado tornou-se:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Melhor</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Igual antes</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Pior</p>	<p>3.2. Pagaste para ter acesso ao emprego numa das empresas florestais? <input type="checkbox"/> Sim <input type="checkbox"/> Não</p> <p>3.2.1. Como poderia descrever as condições de trabalho que as empresas florestais oferecem:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Boas <input type="checkbox"/> Razoáveis <input type="checkbox"/> Péssimas (resposta a acompanhar em entrevistas individuais em relação: contratos de curto prazo;/longo prazo/permanente, hora de trabalho, salários, equipamentos de trabalho etc).</p> <hr/>
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SECÇÃO D: CONSULTAS COMUNITÁRIAS

<p>4.1. Como membro da comunidade, sente que a sua voz foi ouvida na atribuição de terra as empresas florestais? <input type="checkbox"/> Sim <input type="checkbox"/> Não</p> <p>4.1.1. Até que ponto acha que sua opinião sobre como a terra da comunidade pode ser usada foi ouvida pelas empresas florestais:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Boa <input type="checkbox"/> Razoável <input type="checkbox"/> Mã</p>	<p>4.1.2 ... pelas autoridades locais da comunidade/líderes comunitários:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Boa <input type="checkbox"/> Razoável <input type="checkbox"/> Mã</p> <p>4.1.3... pelo Governo distrital:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Boa <input type="checkbox"/> Razoável <input type="checkbox"/> Mã</p> <p>4.1.4... pelo Conselhos Consultivos de Posto Administrativo e de Distrito</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Boa <input type="checkbox"/> Razoável <input type="checkbox"/> Mã</p> <p>4.1.5... pelo Governo provincial:</p>
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Boa Razoável Má

SECÇÃO E: RELACIONAMENTO ENTRE A COMUNIDADE E EMPRESA

5.1.Como descreve o relacionamento entre a sua comunidade/aldeia e empresa florestal:

Boa Razoável Má

5.2.As promessas de melhorias sociais e económicas das comunidades feitas pelas empresas florestais, já foram cumpridas?

Sim Não

(que promessa, por perceber em entrevistas individuais/grupos focais).

5.3.As promessas de melhorias para as comunidades esperadas em troca do arrendamento pela terra foram escritas num contrato? Sim Não

5.4.Será que as relações entre a sua comunidade e a empresas florestal melhoraram desde a sua chegada?

Sim Não

5.5.Será que a relação entre a sua comunidade e empresas florestais piorou desde a sua chegada?

Sim Não

Secção F: Future perspectivas/Conselhos:

6.1.Sera que a chegada de empresas florestais afectou a sua vida diária e tornou-se:

Melhor igual pior

6.2.Se fosse para dar conselho a outras comunidades/aldeias que consideram arrendar terras fora das comunidades a empresas florestais estrangeiras, o conselho seria?

Sim Não

6.3. Se você for a descrever o future para a sua comunidade, você está:

optimista

neutro

pessimista

7.0. Tem algo por acrescentar?

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Annex 3: List of interviews with key-informants

2014:

- Tim Lund, Senior Sustainability Advisor in Norfund
- Lasse D. Nergaard, Investment Director in Norfund
- AnnLouise Oloffsson, First Secretary Swedish Embassy
- Carlos Rafa Mate, Advisor at the Royal Embassy in Mauputo
- Abdul Cesar, Director for Mozambique's Agriculture Promotion Centre (Cepagri)
- Laourenço Sambo, Director for the Investment Promotion Centre (CPI)
- Simão Pedro Santos Joaquim, Director for the National Directorate of Land and Forests, (DNTF), Ministry of Agriculture
- Darlindo Pechisso, head of Forest Department at the National Directorate of Land and Forests (DNTF), Ministry of Agriculture
- Arlito Cuco, Green Resources (GRAS) Managing Director of the Mozambique Operations
- Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Green Resources Niassa, who became second-in command after the merger.
- Simon Norfolk, Director/Partner, Terra Firma Consulting
- Anabela Lemos, Director Justica Ambiental
- Joseph Hanlon, researcher and author who has been writing about Mozambique since 1978
- Luis Muchanga, Executive Coordinator National Farmers Union, Mozambique (UNAC)
- Diamantino Nhampossa, Country Representative/Programme Coordinator 'We Effect' (formerly Swedish Cooperative Centre)
- Célia Enosse, Programme Officer, 'We Effect' (formerly Swedish Cooperative Centre)
- Paulino Imede, Coordinator Farmer's Union Lichinga (UCA)
- Leonardo Abilio António, Programme Officer Rural Association for Mutual Aid (ORAM)
- Felisberto Muterua at the District Government office in the Chimbonila District.

- Maria Betânia Defipo, First Secretary at the District Administrator's Office in Sanga District
- Mateus Simão, District Government in Sanga, section for Floresta, Forest and Fauna
- Pedro Vicente, Province Director Niassa for forest and native plants
- Iassine Alabe, First Secretary District Administrator's office in Lago

2011:

- Arlito Cuco, Green Resources (GRAS) Managing Director of the Mozambique Operations
- Inocencio Sotomane, Managing Director for Niassa Green Resources (NGR)
- Carlos Rafa Mate, Advisor at the Royal Embassy in Mauputo.
- Dipac Jaiantilal, Resarch Coordinator at Cruzeiro do Sul
- Ismael Mussa, Parliamentarian
- Laourenço Sambo, Director for the Investment Promotion Centre (CPI)
- João Carrilho, project Coordinator of Land Component of Mozambique "Millennium Challenge Account" (MCA), National Directorate of Lands and Forestry, Ministry of Agriculture.
- Eusébio Mauricio Tumuitikile, Provincial Director of Agriculture in Niassa Province.
- Paulino Husa, District Administrator in Sanga
- Paulino Imede, Coordinator Farmer's Union Lichinga (UCA)
- Mads Asprem, CEO, Green Resources (GRAS)



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