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In Oil We Trust

A discourse analysis of Norwegian petroleum and environmental policies in the High North

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Declaration

I, Ann-Karin Bjørge Slee, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Ann-Karin Bjørge Slee, August 2015

Signature……..

Date……

Dedications

I dedicate this thesis to my amazing husband who always believes in me and supports me in whatever I do. Also, to my late grandmother, who passed away not knowing how I was going to get on with this thesis; you have been the voice in my head pulling me out of bed every morning, motivating me from a better place. And lastly, I dedicate this to Zoey, my unborn daughter who is going to be my life and world in three short months. You motivated me just by growing, as I knew that this would not be completed easily after you come.

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Abstract

The Arctic is rapidly changing due to global warming, causing both challenges and opportunities for the Arctic countries. Norway has ever since 2005 named the High North its' most strategic and important foreign policy area, and has published several policy statements in the past decade. These policy papers lay the foundation for the Government's actions in the High North, and becomes a crucial field of study in order to gain knowledge and insight into the processes leading up to final decision making.

Discourse analysis has been the preferred approach by many scholars when analysing policy papers. Through conducting a discourse analysis, representations, story-lines and interdiscursivity can be detected; unravelling the meanings of the policy papers. In this thesis, I want to discover the main story-lines and representations that supports the Governments further plans for petroleum exploration in the High North vis a vis environmental governance in the region. This is done to highlight the oft-opposing discourses and policies that enables several paradoxes to develop. First, the Arctic is experiencing unprecedented warming due to global fossil fuel consumption, which again will enable further fossil fuel exploitation that leads to increased global warming. Second, Norway claims to be a 'steward' of the Arctic environment, while at the same time wanting to expand the industry with the worst impact on the environment.

In wake of this, I highlight three central discourses that represent the Government's main petroleum policy, namely; 'drilling for aid', natural gas as a 'bridging fuel' and 'drilling for the environment'. I also investigate whether there is a development of the High North petroleum discourse in the policy statements from the previous to the current Government. I find that there is a visible 'intensification' of the petroleum discourse, as the current Government wants to go 'from word to action' in the High North policy. However, a discrepancy in the translation between the English and Norwegian version of the latest Report highlights a possible conflicting discourse with unknown meanings.

Finally, I look at the widening of the High North security agenda in a post-structuralist securitization framework, where I conclude that the Arctic security agenda has been widened to include energy, economic, social and environmental security. However, there is a tendency of looking at the environmental consequences of global warming in an opportunistic and positive light, as it enables further resource exploration. Bringing in a 'human security' approach, would help to nuance this development, by highlighting the individual security concerns of the millions of people being affected by climate change in the Arctic.

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List of Abbreviations

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
IEA	International Energy Agency
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NRK	Norwegian Broadcasting Company
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USGS	United States Geological Survey

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1.0 Introduction

1.1 Background

"The melting ice of the Arctic is a barometer for the global warming that may cause unimaginable damage to our planet. We, citizens of the Arctic, can see climate change taking place with our naked eyes. It is obvious that we have to commit to the international cooperation to combat climate change (...) As the ice retreats, the Arctic countries will no longer be divided by the ice, but connected by the ocean. The sea will become a highway, not a barrier. It will open up new possibilities for trade and transport; mining and minerals; oil and gas; research and education".

(Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende, Article in Harvard International Review, 16.04.2015)

The Arctic is a symptomatic example of the core ecological and economical crossroads at which the world has now arrived. It symbolizes on the one hand the strong and unparalleled forces of global human induced climate change, as we see the Arctic changing right before our eyes. The consequences of a warmer Arctic range from local stresses to biodiversity, threats to indigenous livelihoods and health, extinction of species and introduction of foreign specimens, to global rises in sea-level, salinization of the oceans, changes in currents and the speeding up of global warming due to feedback mechanisms of the opening Arctic waters. These environmental changes are hard to predict and concretize; we know there is a great likelihood that it will occur, but we do not know how fast these changes will come about. The Norwegian Government acknowledges that climate change is taking place, that it is human-made and that the world has to come together to deal with these changes in order to limit the fatal consequences of global warming. On the flipside, as the ice melts, the Arctic oceans will 'open' up for new opportunities. These opportunities include a possibility for further fossil fuel exploration, more fishing grounds and a new northern sea route linking Asia to Europe. For some of the Arctic states, these opportunities can ensure economic growth, local development and value-creation and enable increased welfare for the entire nation. A melting Arctic threatens the security for many people, while at the same time safeguards security for others. How we act in the Arctic can both set the tone and precedence for how one should act with the challenges and opportunities of climate change in the rest of the world.

Norway has, over the past 40 years, developed into a petroleum nation. Our economy is dependent on a high level of resource exploration to cater for a large state apparatus and comprehensive welfare system. In the early days of our oil age, the Government implemented a policy of 'moderation' in order to avoid overheating our economy and growing too

economically dependent on the oil revenues. Furthermore, the Government decided to keep the oil exploration limited to the North Sea, in spite of expected large oil reserves outside the Lofoten area. Nevertheless, in the 1990s and 2000s, the previous policies of moderation were abandoned and the level of petroleum extraction reached a record high and set a standard for further high levels of petroleum development. In addition, a national oil fund (Pension Fund) was established to keep Norway away from the 'resource curse' or the 'Dutch disease', while enabling a high production level. However, it is believed that Norway has reached 'peak oil', as production level of oil and the overall production levels of fossil fuels have declined steadily from the beginning of the 2000s (Ryggvik, 2010; Kristoffersen & Young, 2010). Since 2005, Norway has named the Arctic as its most important foreign policy priority; a time coinciding with an increasing focus on the melting ice and uncovering of the potential vast petroleum resources available when the ice melts[1].

Here lies the core paradox of the Arctic and of the world. A globalized world with massive fossil fuel consumption has led to global warming and climate change, which in turn enables further fossil fuel exploration that will lead to more global warming[2].

For many, the Arctic stands as the last pristine frontier in the world. An ice-covered region with rare species and invaluable ecosystems, eternal night and eternal days, and with the magnificent Aurelia borealis dancing over the night sky in the landscape of eternal winter. More so, it is the home of over 4 million people living in eight Arctic countries, with almost half a million indigenous people, who have lived in the Arctic for thousands of years. While studying International Environmental Studies at the Norwegian University of Life Science (NMBU), I have become increasingly occupied with the future of the region and what I experience as an intensification of the political discourse around future Arctic petroleum exploration in the media in recent times. I was furthermore surprised by the lack of attention from the faculty towards what is going on in the North, and what some of the major obstacles to Norwegian contributions to solve global environmental problems are. Driven by these concerns, I became interested in analysing the Norwegian High North policy papers with the aim to unravel some of the main representations and story-lines that forms the core Norwegian Arctic discourse. Why does Norway want to intensify petroleum exploration in the

[1] A much-sited US Geology Survey from 2008 concludes that almost a quarter of the world's undiscovered petroleum resources are located under the Arctic ice. This will be further discussed in the analysis.
[2] Leichenko and O'Brien (2008) develop this idea of 'double exposure' in their book *Environmental Change and Globalization*, and will be further discussed in the analysis of this thesis.

High North, in the midst of the last 'pristine frontier' in the world? What are the narratives that support such an exploration in the Arctic, and has there been a development from the previous Government to the one that sits now and has been in power for two years? These are some of the questions I will consider in this thesis.

1.2 Literature review

One of the first researchers to turn towards the High North was Geir Hønneland (2005), with his work on Norwegian High North politics after the Cold War, where the relation between Norway and Russia is a central theme. Moreover, he identifies some key discourses in the High North politics, including Norwegian identity discourse and the environmental discourse around Russia as an environmental foe. Hønneland and Jensen (2008) develop this initial research on the High North politics in their book *The new High North politics*[3], where they look at the Norwegian High North policies after the turn of the century and include research on the petroleum and environmental policy-making. This is where the discourse 'drilling for the environment' began to take shape, which was based on the idea that since Russia was drilling in the Arctic, Norway had to follow suit to ensure high environmental standards. Leif Christian Jensen (2010) took the 'drilling for the environment' discourse further by introducing the concept of 'discourse co-optation'. This is when one side of the debate [pro drilling in the Arctic] takes the core argument of the opposing discourse [no drilling, for environmental concerns], turns it on its head and makes it their key argument for drilling. It was this early research of Leif Christian Jensen which made me want to look closer at the High North discourse, as I became aware of the power of meaning and story-lines in policy-forming.

Jensen has pursued his interest in High North discourse analysis further, and in 2012, he published a PhD titled *Norway on a High in the North* that compiled of five articles published in the period 2007-2012. In addition to developing the themes 'discourse co-optation', drilling for the environment, and analysing Russia-Norway relations in the North, he also adapts a post-structuralist approach to securitization of the High North. He takes these themes further in his forthcoming book *International Relations in the Arctic: Norway and the struggle for power in the New North*[4](Jensen, 2015). Jensen's significant research in this field has clearly served as a stepping-stone for my research, where I attempt to develop his ideas with the more recent policy statements on the High North as his research includes the

[3] «Den nye nordområdepolitikken»
[4] Title suggested by the publishers, not finalized as far as I know.

Government's High North policy-papers only up until 2009. Grindheim (2009) conducts a discourse analysis on Norway's and the EU's strategies towards the Arctic and whether there is a 'scramble' for the natural resources between the Arctic states. Stokke (2007; 2011) explores the 'Arctic scramble' further and looks in general at Arctic security and environmental security in the Arctic. His main message is that the Arctic governance structure is strong and dynamic enough to withstand the 'ongoing race for natural resources'. Hoogensen et al. (2009) and Hoogensen Gjørv, Bazely, Goloviznina and Tanentzap (2014) develops the concept of 'human security' in the Arctic, and how it matters in the 'widening/deepening' discourse of the Arctic security agenda.

Kristoffersen and Young (2010), Kristoffersen (2014) and Kristoffersen (2015) also provide a broad research on the Norwegian High North politics, discourse and security issues. Berit Kristoffersen (2014) recently published a PhD titled *Drilling oil into Arctic minds*, which is a compilation of four journal papers and book chapters from the period 2010-2015, with the subject-matter ranging from the state space and security in the High North to the development of the concept 'opportunistic adaptation', which I have adopted into my analysis. She conceptualizes the emerging policy of how the Government approaches environmental change in the Arctic from an opportunistic and positive side, rather than admitting that further petroleum exploration in the region is only going to contribute to increasing global warming and melting in the Arctic.

Ihlen (2007) and Ryggvik (2010; 2013) look closer at the petroleum industry in Norway and the links between the industry and the state. Ihlen (2007) writes about the Norwegian oil industry's strategic communication and reputation building and in the section on climate change and the oil industry, he highlights that the climate debate can pose some difficult questions for the industry, and that their 'sustainable' petroleum exploration discourse can consequently lead to the downfall of the industry's reputation.

This thesis contributes to existing research by tracing recent continuances or shifts in the established discourse around petroleum and environment in recent policy documents focused on the High North. Political discourse is an ever-changing field of arguments, narratives, representations and assumptions. To highlight and detect these continuing *meanings* in the discourse adds to the established knowledge-bank and enables fluidity in the field of study.

1.3 Research questions and contributions

According to a recent study conducted by McGlade and Ekins (2015), a third of the global oil reserves, a half of the world gas reserves and over 80 percent of existing coal reserves need to remain unused from 2010-2050 in order to meet the globally established target of no more than 2 degrees of warming. Furthermore, they show that resource development in the Arctic and increasing development of unconventional oil production are "incommensurate with efforts to limit global warming to 2^{o}C" (McGlade & Ekins, 2015, p. 187). These findings stand in stark contrast with the current Norwegian High North policy discourse, which underlines the need for an 'intensification' of the petroleum development in the Norwegian Arctic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a). The continuing juxtaposition between Norwegian petroleum and environmental policies - especially seen in light of the Norwegian characteristic of being an 'environmental state'- led to my interest in dismantling and analysing the current policy-making in the High North. As the title *In oil we trust,* highlights, it becomes clear that Norway is following a policy of maintaining high petroleum production, almost at any cost. What led to my research questions is that this is done under the same banner as being a 'steward' of the Arctic environment. Therefore, I posed the following research questions:

1. Why does Norway want to carry on oil exploration in the last 'pristine frontier' in the world?
2. What are the story-lines and representations being created to support oil exploration in the Arctic?
3. In what ways is the newly instated Government from 2013 developing the discourse around petroleum and environmental policies in the Arctic?
4. Why should we talk about a 'widening' of the Arctic security agenda, and why is the concept of 'human security' important in the case of the Arctic?

I look at the policy-papers published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the last five years, from 2009-2014, in addition to the most recent speeches and statements made by the Foreign Minister on the Government's Arctic policies. In a further study or an extended thesis, I would have included policy papers from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the Ministry of Climate and Environment in order to trace the main contradictions and points of cooperation between the two institutions. I would furthermore have attempted to conduct interviews with relevant representatives from the ministries and the petroleum industry.

Moreover, a further field of study of the human security agenda in the Arctic should be based on comprehensive interviews and questionnaires of both locals and indigenous people living in midst of environmental change and petroleum opportunities as this seems lacking from the Norwegian field of study of human security in the Arctic.

1.4 The background for the High North policy

First, I should establish what the Government puts in the wording 'the High North' and my understanding of this term. In its most direct sense, it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official definition from 2003 of a title that contained the Norwegian word; *Nordområdene* (literally translates to 'the northern areas' in English) (Skagestad, 2010). However, the ambiguities of the definition is describes by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in their second High North strategy paper:

> No precise definition of the "High North" has been provided in the Norwegian political debate. The horizon is broader than Northern Norway and Svalbard since Norway has major interests to safeguard in a greater region. When the Government's High North Strategy was developed in 2006, the High North referred to the areas surrounding the Barents Sea. This is really a Norwegian perspective. With regard to closer international cooperation, we must bear in mind that the High North is gradually becoming more synonymous with the Arctic. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 50)

The definition of the 'Arctic', whether it is the area North of 66°33' N, or land and island north of the tree line, or where the median July temperature is +10°C, are all bound to the area defining the Arctic (Skagestad, 2010). This is not synonymous with the High North. However, as none of the other Arctic states have developed their own concept of the High North in the same way as Norway, I use the Norwegian Arctic or the High North interchangeably in this thesis. This is in accordance with both the policy papers and in the secondary literature.

Although not a strictly new concept or policy area, the declaration by previous Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre in 2005 that the High North was now the first priority of Norwegian Foreign policy, acted – at least on a rhetorical level- as something new in Norwegian foreign policy (Hønneland & Jensen, 2008). Until the beginning of the new millennia, there had not been an overarching High North policy under the Norwegian

Government. Thus, the Norwegian Government Official Report[5] *Towards the North* (Mot Nord!) from 2003, the White paper from the Bondevik Government *Opportunities and Challenges in the North* (Muligheter og Utfordringer I Nord) from 2005, and the *High North Strategy* (Nordområdestrategi) from 2006 – comprises what Hønneland and Jensen (2008) call the 'new High North politics'. This is the starting point from where the subsequent High North policy papers follow, and what I used as the basis for my analysis. In the strategy from 2006, with its second addition published in 2009, the Government highlights seven priority areas for policy making in the High North (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009):

1. We will exercise our authority in the High North in a credible, consistent and predictable way.
2. We will be at the forefront of international efforts to develop knowledge in and about the High North.
3. **We intend to be the best steward of the environment and natural resources in the High North.**
4. **We will provide a suitable framework for further development of petroleum activities in the Barents Sea, and will seek to ensure that these activities boost competence in Norway in general and in North Norway in particular, and foster local and regional business development.**
5. We intend the High North policy to play a role in safeguarding the livelihoods, traditions and cultures of indigenous peoples in the High North.
6. We will further develop people-to-people cooperation in the High North.
7. We will strengthen our cooperation with Russia. (p. 6)

The third and fourth policy areas are the focus for my analysis, while the other policy areas all form a part of the overall High North discourse and security concerns.

1.5 The structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 describes the underlying methodology and why I chose discourse analysis as the method for my thesis. Moreover, discourse analysis is presented both as a method and as a theory in its own right, which carries with it epistemological assumptions about how meanings and knowledge are created and reproduced.

[5] «offentlig utredning – NOU»

Chapter 3 outlines further theoretical assumptions that make up a framework composed of several theories. First, the state as an actor in environmental governance is described, followed by an outline of the Copenhagen School of securitization theory and the revised post-structuralist approach to securitization. Finally, I include the concept of 'human security' in the Arctic as a vital component of 'widening' and 'deepening' the Arctic security agenda. Chapter 4 and 5 are the analytical chapters, where statements from the policy-papers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs form the empirical backbone of the discourse analysis, supported by secondary sources. Chapter 4 outlines the current petroleum and environmental policy discourse, sets in in a historic perspective, and identifies three main story-lines and representations defending the development of resource exploration in the High North. The first is 'drilling as foreign aid', the second is 'natural gas as a bridging fuel', and the third is 'drilling for the environment'. Chapter 5 analyses the discourse around the 'widening' of the Arctic security agenda as it appears in the policy-statements, and frame it within a post-structuralist approach to securitization theory. 'Energy security' has become a central concept in the Arctic security vocabulary, while 'human security' and 'environmental security' are somewhat more diffuse. Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and makes concluding remarks, while at the same time suggests some future points of interest in the Norwegian High North policy, as a lot is currently taking place in the wake of the global drop in the oil prices, affecting the future of Arctic petroleum politics.

2.0 Methodology

This section goes through the choice of method that forms the backbone of this thesis. I first present discourse analysis as both a research method and as a theoretical approach. In the latter part of the section, I go through some of the assumptions of environmental discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis. In accordance with previous studies of Norwegian oil and environmental policy making in the High North, such as Jensen and Skedsmo (2010), Jensen (2012; 2015), Kristoffersen (2014) and Grindheim (2009), discourse analysis has been a preferred choice of method due to its analytical and explanatory powers. My thesis, in its most basic form, is a presentation of the Norwegian government's exercise of power. Framing discourse is consequently about who has the power to set something on the agenda, and to exercise this power over others, as well as making that a part of everyone's reality and truth (Jensen, 2015). Hence, using discourse analysis as a way of understanding and drawing out the underlying assumptions in Norway's High North policy seems to be an advantageous and fruitful course of action.

2.1 Why use discourse analysis as an analytical tool?

Reading my first policy paper on the Norwegian Government's High North policy, I became aware that there was a certain tone in the text; a style of writing and a seemingly contradictory voice throughout the paper. What fascinated me more than anything was how style and tone were applied in a way to smooth over any possible conflicting areas in the politics. When I proceeded to read the secondary literature on these official papers, I received a confirmation that other well-distinguished researchers (Jensen, 2012, 2015; Kristoffersen, 2014, Grindheim, 2009) also saw this contradictory voice and lack of a unified direction in the High North policy. This set me on the course of using discourse analysis to investigate these observations further in a methodological approach in order to systematize my thoughts. Moreover, the policy papers are not mere words on a piece of paper, it is ultimately a way for the Norwegian Government to justify and set the scene for present and future action in the area. Jensen (2015) defends his reasoning for using discourse as an analytical tool and as a prerequisite for political action in the following way:

> The discourse are interesting from the moment they become or come across as politically relevant regardless of ulterior motives or hidden agendas that might or might not lay behind them. The purpose of discourse analysis is not to find a different perspective or look for alternative agenda, discourse produce reality; therefore it is

meaningful and relevant to study them as preconditions for actions (Jensen, 2015, n.p.).

2.2 Discourse in social science

There is, according to Klotz (2008), an on-going struggle between positivist views and post-modernist views of the role of epistemological approaches towards research in political science and in the study of international policy formation. Epistemology is about how one creates and reproduces meaning and knowledge, as opposed to ontological premises that concerns itself with the basics of nature and existence (Jensen, 2015). The positivist approach gives little room for the interpretation of meaning, which makes it hard to find a meeting point to discuss the rhetoric in policy-making (Klotz, 2008). Jensen (2015) justifies using discourse analysis to unravel meanings in the following statement:

> The world, from a discourse-analytical perspective, cannot have a definitive structural meaning, as, for instance, Marxism assumes. On the other hand, the generation of meaning cannot be traced back to the human subject's personal interpretation of the world. There is, quite simply, no ontologically privileged position from which to understand the creation of meaning and signification. Meaning is installed and constituted in specific historical contexts with mutually constituting elements of signification called discourses. It is a tenet of discourse analysis that social structures and identities are formed by discourses, which thereby become the axes around which the determination of meaning revolves.(n.p.)

The debate tends to be driven by the theoretical underpinnings of epistemology and ontology, rather than having a focus on the practicality of methodology. Shifting the focus to the practicality of methodology henceforth justifies and supports the decision for using discourse analysis as a methodological approach to interpret the underlying assumptions and meaning of policy-making. Discourse analysis as a methodology includes both theory and method, and one has to base it on the epistemological principles put forward (Jensen, 2015). According to Flyvbjerg (2006), "[g]ood social science is problem driven and not methodology driven in the sense that it employs those methods that for a given problematic, best help answer the research questions at hand" (p. 242).

In accordance with Neumann (2008), language represents a social system that sets everything in relation to each other and creates logic; it serves as 'the outlet' for our senses. Discourse is as a way to disseminate and analyse the representation of language production,

and when these representations are conveyed repeatedly, they develop into institutionalized statements and practices that becomes the 'norm' or 'truth' in time (Neumann, 2008). Alas, this becomes evident when conducting a discourse analysis, where one of the methods of showing a text's representations is by proving the reoccurrence of certain metaphors in the same text. An example of a representation that creates a 'norm' or 'truth' in the Norwegian Strategy paper on the High North from 2009 is seen in the way Norway is described as 'unique', a 'world leader' or a 'pioneer' in most aspects of both Arctic resource development and environmental protection. While reading the paper, under numerous occasions, it is brought to our attention that Norway is 'special' and 'important' internationally, underlying the sense of ownership and stewardship that Norway has in the Arctic. This kind of representation links to the overall tone of voice and approach that the Government shows in the policy papers, and becomes an essential part of the High North discourse, which will be further elaborated on in the analysis.

Discourse analysis as a research method has many branches across many research disciplines. For a linguist, discourse analysis concerns itself primarily with the written word, the grammar and sentence structure. While for a social scientist, the motive for conducting a discourse analysis stretches beyond analysing the written word to analyse underlying meanings. There appears to be a lack of a single approach to discourse analysis, leaving the researcher to their own devices, following certain approaches and excluding others (Gee, 2011). The natural approach for me is to develop upon what other researchers have done when analysing the topic of Norwegian High North policy. The following interpretations or definitions of discourse analysis serve as the core foundation of how I follow this method and theory in my thesis. As I am more concerned with 'meanings' and going 'beyond the word' when conducting the discourse analysis, Foucault's much sited definition acts as a starting point: "[w]e will call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation (…) it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined" (Foucault, 1972, p. 117, sited in Jensen, 2015, n.p.).

This way of defining discourse also entails exclusion, as only a few people might legitimize the text's content and participate in its formation. Individual texts are not meaningful in themselves, but it is when seen in the light of their "interconnectedness with other texts, the different discourses on which they draw, and the nature of their production, dissemination, and consumption that they are made meaningful" (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, 3-4, sited in Jensen, 2015, n.p.). When looking further at other definitions of discourse analysis,

the core concept of analysing language is the key theme, while the ways in which one approaches it might vary. Hajer's (1995) defines discourse as: "(…) a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities." (p. 44)

In the view of Hajer (1995), discourse analysis arose from a wider tradition of post-positivist interpretations. Interpretive social science can be seen as a move away from a natural science focus on causality and uncovering general laws (generalization). Instead, there is a focus on uncovering the deeper "meaning of certain social processes in society and to trace the various conceptual connections" (Hajer, 1995, p. 43). As discourse analysis is interpretive in nature, it also becomes interpretive in the way it is being set up and defined by various researchers. As previously mentioned, it is the researcher's job when conducting a discourse analysis, to unravel the discursive paths when analysing the material at hand. There is a wide array of tools and methods one can use, and I have, in the course of my analysis, landed on a handful of authors' approaches which I believe works well in my research. Hajer (1995), Jensen (2015), Neumann (2008) and Gee (2011) set out to create an analytical tool to be further applied in research. Hence, by relying on their extensive research and various approaches, I have attempted to draw out the most applicable tools for my own study in order to guide me through what sometimes can come across as a diffuse and unconventional research method.

2.3 Discourse as an analytical tool

There are several ways to begin the process of discourse analysis, thus, knowing what an analytical 'tool' is serves as a good beginning. A 'tool', in the sense of Gee (2011), is the questions you ask of the data at hand. Moreover, every question makes the researcher look at the details in the sentence more closely, as well as linking it to meanings and intent that the writer(s) have had when putting the policy down on paper (Gee, 2011). Furthermore, according to Neumann (2008), it helps to draw on 'extant knowledge' when conducting a discourse analysis, both in terms of choosing the topic and saving time when trying to understand the subject at hand. With a background in Political Science, Russian Studies, and International Environmental Studies, choosing the High North as the focal point of my studies was not a coincident. To draw on my 'cultural competence,' my hopes are to combine my academic knowledge and personal interest to draw out the underlying meanings and

representation in the Norwegian High North policy making by using discourse analysis (Neumann, 2008).

Hajer (1995) proposes the following analytical course when applying discourse analysis to a policy process. First, an important step in the analytical process is to understand the 'regularities and variation' in what is being said and/or written. Second, there needs to be an underlying understanding of the social backgrounds and effects that constitutes the different discourses. Third, it is important to be aware of the contextual situation in which a statement is made and to whom the statement is directed, when conducting the analysis. Fourth, pointing out the content of what is being said is an expressive way of showing the reader the foundation for the arguments. Jensen (2015) outlines this method – called the 'sandwich method'- where one should first tell the reader about the content, then show the reader by inserting the appropriate quotes and further elaborate on the content of the quotes. Moreover, an interesting question arises when considering how all the different actors who are involved in the discursive process of formulating a policy, reaches a consensus. Politics concerns itself with the contestation of many different opinions, and it becomes the analysts' job to point out the different opinions and carriers of these opinions (Neumann, 2008). One position tends to be the dominant (normally, how it had always been), while one or two other positions might try to challenge this position (Neumann, 2008). This is highly relevant in terms of the often contradictory discursion around the future development path of the Arctic where you have a clear policy line towards continuing present resource exploration, while the environmental - as well as indigenous concerns - might try and contest the hegemonic view.

2.3.1 A 'toolkit' for discourse analysis.

In order to point out the representations that are interesting and important to a discourse analysis, some tools for analysis are vital. The following analytical tools were contrived from the literature and will assist me in the process of analysing the Norwegian policy papers for the High North. First, Neumann (2008) outlines metaphors as a tool for showing the readers the repeated representations in a text. "The ideal is to include as many representations and their variations as possible, and to specify where they are to be found in as high degree as possible" (Neumann, 2008, p. 62). Representations, in its simplicity, are how we interpret phenomena or stories of how something has always been, in the way it is presented (Grindheim, 2009). In the High North policies I will look for the representations of petroleum and environmental policies, to see how the petroleum discourse is made up of

certain ‘truths’ that is reproduced from one policy statement to the next. Neumann (2008) points out that there is generally one dominating representation, and few alternative or possibly contesting representations. In the Norwegian High North policy, the main representation is one of Norway as a petroleum nation. The contesting and sometimes opposing representations are that Norway is an environmental state, and a ‘steward’ of the Arctic. Neumann (2008) He furthermore concludes that “[d]iscourse analysis therefore is particularly well suited for studying situations where power is maintained by aid of culture and challenged only to a limited degree, that is, what Gramscians call ‘hegemony’”. (p. 70)

Additionally, Hajer (1995) develops the role of metaphors in the text when introducing the concepts of ‘story-lines’. This is a good tool when looking for ‘simplified presentations’ of problems and issues that are, in reality, much more complex (Grindheim, 2009). Story-lines, according to Hajer (1995) are:

> (…) condensed narratives or discourses containing simplified messages supported by metaphors with as much emotional as intellectual appeal. (…) a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meanings to specific physical or social phenomena. Key function of a story line is that they suggest unity in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of a problem like acid rain” (p. 56).

Another tool in the discourse toolkit is the concept of ‘buzzwords and fuzzwords’, which Cornwall (2010) explains in the following way:

> Policies depend on a measure of ambiguity to secure the endorsement of diverse potential actors and audiences. Buzzwords aid this process, by providing concepts that can float free of concrete referents, to be filled with meaning by their users. In the struggles for interpretive power that characterise the negotiation of the language of policy, buzzwords shelter multiple agendas, providing room for manoeuvre and space for contestation. (p. 5)

Although not extensively used in the following analysis of the High North policies, I identify the ‘environment’ as a ‘buzzword’ in the analysis, as the word is frequently used both in the pro-petroleum discourse, in addition to the anti-petroleum discourse. It is a word that can be attributed to almost any situation in the High North, and creates enough ambiguity and room for manoeuvring that it works in whatever way the policy-maker intends it to.

Finally, a study of interdiscursivity can allow us to unveil how certain discourses are reproduced by using old representations and connections in a 'new' way. It serves as a tool to seek out change and connections, where we can see a discourse taking parts from previously established discourses and linking them to new themes. In the High North policy, we see that the pro-drilling discourse has borrowed representations from the anti-drilling discourse of an un-environmental Russia, and used this representation as an explanation for why Norway should carry out resource exploration is vulnerable Arctic areas. Consequently, interdiscursivity is a way for actors to put forward their arguments and representations as the hegemonic discourse (Grindheim, 2009).

2.3.2 What will I analyse?

The vital step in conducting a discourse analysis is to delimit the right texts to analyse. In my case, the texts chosen are national policy papers, also named 'monuments' (Neumann, 2008). Discourse analysis gives epistemological and methodological priority to the study of primary texts, like presidential statements and official policy documents (Hansen, 2006). In order to be identified as a primary text, there are three preconditions that have to be fulfilled. First, the texts should clearly articulate identities and policies. Second, they should be widely read and in wide publication. Third, they should have formal authority to define a political position (Hansen, 2006). According to Hajer (1995), "analysing policy papers becomes important even if they do not include "hard" new proposals or legislation. It becomes imperative to examine the specific idea of reality or of the status quo as something that is upheld by key actors through discourse". (p. 55)

The texts analysed in this thesis are primarily governmental policy papers on the High North published in the five-year period from 2009-2014, which fulfils the three mentioned criteria and would therefore fall in the category of primary texts. The reason for choosing this period stems from trying to differentiate my research from the growing body of research done on this topic. Although I use similar analytical and theoretical tools that have been previously applied, the more recent policy papers and official documents on the High North have yet to be analysed in other studies. I will build on the previous studies done to show similarities or differences, and introduce new observations for the more recent policy papers. In addition, the analysis will also include selected ministerial speeches from the same period.

The main texts that form the basis of my analysis were all published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The first policy paper is the second part of the Government's High North

strategy, called *New Building Blocks in the North. The Next Step in the Government's High North Strategy,* published in 2009. This paper is 92 pages long, and contains sections on the environment, the development of the petroleum industry and security issues, among others. Strategies does not lead to legal jurisdiction, however, they set the agenda and outline priorities for further state-action in a given area (Grindheim, 2009). The strategy paper is translated into English, and it is this version that I have analysed in order to not loose metaphors and representations in translation. The next policy paper is a White paper, called *High North. Visions and Strategies,* published in 2012, also in English. This White paper is 141 pages and divided in three sections. Part I, *Strategic objectives and policy instruments*. Part II – *A responsible actor in the High North*, and Part III – *Growing activity in the High North. Opportunities and challenges*. White papers serve as a way for the Government to present their discussions around future policies to the Parliament (Storting). These publications are made by the Ministries, and they act as guides to what the Parliament should consider in any final resolutions (Regjeringen, 2008).

The third paper is a report, published by the new Government in 2014, called *Norway's arctic policy*. *Creating value, managing resources, confronting climate change and fostering knowledge. Developments in the Arctic concern us all*[6]. The report is 71 pages, but stands out from the two prior policy-papers. It is published more as a brochure with large pictures, condensed texts in often interview form, with facts, figures and tables highlighted throughout the paper. It appears to be designed for a broad audience, and serves the information in an easily accessible and innovative way. All three papers were read from cover to cover, in a chronological way, starting with the oldest. Additionally, I have also used earlier White papers and policy statements to underline and highlight historical arguments and discourses where appropriate.

> Primary texts set the agenda and shape the issues at hand, and they frame and produce representations of foreign policy. The actors, empowered by their roles as institutions or presidents, have certain authority and power to define how reality should be perceived. (Jensen, 2012, pp. 44-45)

[6] I have used both the Norwegian and English version of this Report (I have explained the reasoning in section 2.3.2.) The Norwegian version will be referred to as (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a) and the English version (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b)

2.3.3 Critiques/problems of using discourse analysis as a methodology

One of the prevalent critiques of using discourse analysis as a research method is that it is a 'subjective and interpretive' method (Grindheim, 2009), that is in danger of becoming the author's own personal opinions or verifying the researcher's preconceived notions that leads to a study of "doubtful scientific value" (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 234). In my analysis, I use the 'sandwich method' to build my arguments, where I make a statement and show it by selecting the appropriate quotes from the policy-papers. Although this method contributes to highlight the arguments, I still run the risk of making erroneous links and connections when I remove the quotes from the overall contexts. Furthermore, selecting the more extreme quotes might also give a wrong representation of the discourse, and it is therefore vital that the author's steps and thought process are explained clearly, and the quotes referred to properly, so that others can go back and check the sources in order to verify the analysis (Grindheim, 2009).

A further critique against using discourse analysis in addition to other social science methods is the problem of generalization that is so predominant in natural science studies. According to Flyvbjerg (2006), this constant 'battle' between the quantitative and qualitative choice of research method is misleading in the overall debate about what is good research. He concludes that: "[g]ood social science is problem driven and not methodology driven in the sense that it employs those methods that for a given problematic, best help answer the research questions at hand" (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 242). I am not claiming that my research can make any generalizations about Norwegian policy making that constitutes a 'reality' or enables a predictive theorization about how the general policy-making processes functions. Nevertheless, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that generalization is often overrated "as the main source of scientific progress", and that the "force of example" is often underrated (p, 226, 228). As Jensen (2015) notes in his deduction of using discourse analysis as a beneficial methodology that contributes to scientific knowledge accumulation: "[t]he researcher must work with what has been written down or verbalized in some form or another in order to establish patterns in the statements, as well as the likely social impact of different discursive representations of reality" (n.p.). This has been my attempt in this empirical study of Norwegian petroleum and environmental discourse in the High North. The Norwegian Government's policy-making processes and outcomes have grown as an interest of study for many scholars, with discourse analysis as the main choice of methodological approach. With my contribution, I am not hoping to make a grand discovery or see something that no one else has ever seen. Rather, I am attempting to contribute to the general knowledge accumulation of

the High North policy-making, and as Flyvbjerg (2006) notes, "[t]hat knowledge cannot be formally generalized does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society" (p. 227).

Lastly, a problem of translation appeared when analysing the policy paper from 2014 on the High North from the new Government. I have primarily used the English version when conducting the discourse analysis, just to avoid a possible translation error. What I did not first consider is that some meanings might already have been altered in the official translation. However, this issue arose when I looked at the difference between the Norwegian and English version of the Report *Norway's Arctic policy (Nordkloden)* (2014). Consequently, I started out analysing the Norwegian version of this text, as I could not find an English translation. It was in this version that I discovered what I have later described as an 'intensification' of the High North petroleum discourse. Here, the Norwegian Government was making it clear that they intent to "go from word to action" in addition to conduct an "offensive [here meaning aggressive] petroleum policy" in the High North (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a, p. 3 and p. 28). However, when I finally discovered the English version of the Report and decided to go back and use the official English translation of the quotes in order to complete a unified approach to my analysis, I realised that the officially translated quotes did not portray the same 'intensification' of the petroleum discourse as my own interpretation of the Norwegian version. The quote "[w]e will go from word to action…"(p. 3) was officially translated "[w]e intend to work hard…"(p.3). The official translation of the Government carrying out an "offensive petroleum policy…"(p.28), became to carry out "an ambitious oil and gas policy…"(p.20). This revelation left me a little perplexed, and I decided to go back and check all the translations of all the quotes I have used. Although I have not discovered the same discrepancy between the Norwegian and English versions of the two other policy papers, it has highlighted an interesting and somewhat puzzling situation, which I am unsure of what really means. I have discussed this further in the Analysis in Chapter 4. As a possible reason to the alteration, the English version of the 2014 Report states the following: "[p]lease note: This English version of the report is an extract and updated version of the Norwegian report «Nordkloden», that was launched in November 2014." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p.3) Due to this declaration, I have continued to look at both versions of this report and explained the possible conflicting statements if they occur. When I have not made a note, the translations are in unison from the English versions of all three policy papers and, in my interpretations, do not convey a different meaning than from the original Norwegian version.

2.4 Different theories of discourse

2.4.1 Environmental Discourse

This thesis will look at the Norwegian energy agenda in the High North from an environmental viewpoint. There is a clear paradox in Norwegian foreign policy between the heightened focus on fossil fuel exploration in the Arctic on the one hand, and the focus of protecting the fragile Arctic environment on the other hand. It therefore becomes relevant to look not merely at discourse analysis, but go further and include theory behind environmental discourse as presented in Hajer (1995). According to Hajer (1995), environmental discourse is time and space specific, being determined by a particular perception of nature, which is a symptom of our "past experiences and present preoccupations" (p. 17). Using discourse analysis to analyse environmental problems is consequently about understanding why certain environmental problems come further up on the political agenda than others (Hajer, 1995). Environmental discourse is a social constructivist approach to the discursive orientation to how environmental politics is made. Five points are made by Hajer (1995, pp. 17-18) to underline this approach.

First, we are not in an environmental crisis, rather an 'environmental dilemma'; a result of industrialisation, as humans have always manipulated and used the environment for their benefit. Hence, we analyse socio-ecological problems rather than simply ecological problems. Second, "[e]nvironmental change is of all times and all societies but the meaning we give to physical phenomena is dependent on our specific cultural preoccupations" (Hajer, 1995, p. 18). Looking at the environmental focus in the policy papers on a five-year time scale might underline this point further. Third, people have through history had a very contradicting view on nature, where we on the one hand want to control, cultivate and use nature, while one the other hand we long for the wild and undisturbed nature that we want to conserve and protect (Thomas, 1893, as in Hajer 1995).

> (…) how to reconcile the physical requirements of civilization with the new feeling and values which the same civilization had generated. (…) the growth of towns had led to a new longing for the countryside. The progress of cultivation had fostered a taste for weeds, mountains and unsubdued nature. The new-found security from wild animals had generated an increasing concern to protect birds and preserve wild creatures in their natural state. (Thomas, 1893, p. 301, as sited in Hajer, 1995, p. 19)

Keith Tomas wrote on attitudes of the British people on nature between 1500-1800, but the same argument can be applied today. It is evident from the Norwegian policy papers on the High North that the core of the debate is just this contradicting notion of the social development that we envision for the Arctic. The undisturbed nature and the wild animals that we want to preserve and protect, stand in stark contradiction to the industrial development and resource exploitation that we want to base our future economy on. The inability to deal with this contradiction within ourselves and in our developing societies has led us to a critical point, and perhaps the most serious environmental dilemma ever to face humankind.

Fourth, environmental problems are usually not discussed in its full complexity, leaving room for the formation of environmental metaphors/metonyms, which are issues that people understand as the 'larger hole' as the environmental problem (Hajer, 1995). Where political analysis comes in here is to identify these metonyms, how they arose and evaluate the effect of this kind of 'coalition formation' in the environmental discourse. The natural example for the Arctic in this regard is how the 'melting of the Arctic' has become a metonym for the environmental problem that is most detrimental in the North. Moreover, we see the process of how the melting of the Arctic opens up the area for further resource exploration, as well as a shift in the ice edge, including larger areas for exploration.

Fifth, environmental issues only become political when they are discursively created. "Calamities only become a political issue if they are constituted as such in environmental discourse, if story-lines are created around them that indicate the significance of the physical events" (Hajer, 1995, pp. 20-21). The solitary polar bear is an image of the melting ice and the consequences of such an event, but what about the numerous other consequences of an ice-melt? Alternatively, oil spills gain focus when there has been a huge one, affecting local communities or animals. However, there are many real and consequential oils spills every day, but this is not sensationalized in the media and also stays away from the political agenda. In the forthcoming analysis, I will further discuss the main environmental discourse and the prevailing representations and story-lines that makes these issues politicized. Consequently, as Jensen (2010) has pointed out, the environmental discourse has even been adapted by the petroleum discourse, to form 'co-optation' of certain representations, bringing in the environmental discourse to defend the continuance of Norwegian resource exploration in the High North.

Although my analysis gives precedence to the petroleum discourse in the Norwegian High North policy formation, it is unveiled that the petroleum discourse and the environmental discourse are both intertwined (co-optation) and detached, in the sense that they exist side by

side in the general High North discourse, increasingly in tension, although presented as two separate strands of policy. This underlies the paradox of the Norwegian High North politics, and I develop this further in the forthcoming chapters.

2.4.2. Critical Discourse Analysis

As I work on detangling the petroleum and environmental discourse in the Norwegian High North policy papers, a notion of power and a hegemonic voice becomes apparent. In order to conceptualize these thoughts, I turn towards Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), with its focus on power and the reproduction of unequal power relations. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) outlines the main theoretical foundation of CDA in the following structured way:

> CDA sees discourse – language used in speech and writing – as a form of 'social practice'. Describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The discourse event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constructive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to the important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and - position people. (p. 257)

In its most basic form, this thesis is about how one discourse gains power over another to form policy in an area that is highly contested and sought after at the same time. I am a voter, and I elect my leaders based on the available knowledge out there. Therefore, it is vital that the underlying discourse, opinions, political ideologies, personal interests and so on, are sufficiently and critically studied in order to have the best available knowledge to base our decisions on. Wodak and Mayer (2009, p. 7) explains CDA in the following way:

> Critical theories, thus also CDA, want to produce and convey critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-reflection. Thus, they are aimed at producing 'enlightenment and emancipation'. Such

> theories seek out not only to describe and explain, but also to root out a particular kind of delusion. Even with differing concepts of ideology, critical theory seeks to create awareness in agents of their own needs and interests. (p. 7)

Norway has for a long time been driven by a deterministic and hegemonic petroleum policy; our economy is based on the continuing development of resource exploration, and we all live well on the fruits of its profits. Siv Jensen, the Norwegian Minister of Finance, said recently at a party meeting that the world's energy need will be bigger in 25 years than it is today, and that fossil fuels will be the main source of energy (Mogen, 2015). She furthermore claims, "the world needs every single drop of oil that Norway can explore[7]." Although she was speaking as a party leader, she also has the legitimization of being the nations Finance Minister, a place of significant power in Norway. She speaks about the petroleum industry in an undisputed way, that it is a fact that the 'world needs every drop of Norwegian fossil fuel.' Critical voices will argue that indeed the world does not need every drop of Norwegian petroleum, as 2/3 of all fossil fuel reserves will need to remain underground if we are to meet the 2-degree goal (McGlade & Ekins, 2015). It is these repeated hegemonic representations of undisputed facts in Norwegian petroleum discourse that first enticed me to conduct a discourse analysis of the High North policies. According to Wodak and Meyer (2009), " [t]ypically, CDA researchers are interested in the way discourse (re)produce social domination, that is, the power abuse of one group over the others, and how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse"(p. 9). "Consequently, it is not the individual resources and not the specifics of single-exchange situations that are crucial for CDA analyses, but the overall structural features in social fields or in overall society" (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 10).

With this discourse analysis of the High North policies, I wish to highlight and argue that there are certain representations that take the seat at the head of the table, while others get pushed towards the end and remain in the periphery of the policy-making. The Minister of Finance is not the only one who proclaims that the 'world needs' Norwegian energy, as will be further discussed in the analysis. It is not the representation of one person in power that forms the main discourse. It is rather the reproduced representations and story-lines over a longer time-period that serves as the basis for discourse analysis. Furthermore, CDA

[7] «Verden trenger hver eneste dråpe olje Norge råder over» in http://www.dagbladet.no/2015/08/10/nyheter/innenriks/frp/siv_jensen/olje/40555341/

highlights that the texts, which forms the basis for power, are not the work of a single person or even a single government institution.

> An important perspective in CDA related to the notion of 'power' is that it is very rare that a text is the work of only one person. In texts, discursive differences are negotiated; they are governed by differences in power that is in part encoded in and determined by discourse and by genre. Therefore, texts are often sites of struggle in that they bear traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance. (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 10)

In the High North policy papers, the struggle between petroleum exploration on the one hand, and environmental concerns on the other, is visible. Although, at the same time there is also a notion that these two strands of policies can carry on side by side without really affecting each other.

CDA plays on the notion of power and how power is formed as a result of negotiations and relations between several actors. As this thesis focuses on the Norwegian state as the overall actor of management of the Arctic environment, albeit divided between several ministries, agendas and institutions, one should look at a further theoretical view of the state in environmental governance. The next chapter will continue to develop the theoretical assumptions that the analysis is built on. I do not follow one theoretical approach throughout the analysis; rather I have selected different theories that make up a wider theoretical approach to the content at hand. This includes a theoretical view of the role of the state in resource management as progressive and innovative in changing the ecological space (Barry & Eckersley, 2005); how institutions are formed and developed through institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2012); that Arctic security concerns can be viewed thought the lens of a post-structuralist approach to securitization theory (Hansen, 2011; Jensen, 2015), which not only widens the security agenda, but also deepens it; and finally, the inclusion of the 'human security' concept to add an individualistic view of the security actor and to step away from the state-centric approach to security (Hoogensen et al. 2009; Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014).

3.0 Theoretical assumptions

In this chapter, I will outline my underlying theoretical perspectives for the thesis. In the previous chapter I explained that discourse analysis is not simply a set of methods, but also carries with it epistemological premises that derives and recreates meanings and interpretations; for instance, policies. That is meaningful in relation to uncovering the assumptions, narratives and representations that form the foundation of the High North discourse analysed in this thesis. Furthermore, it is valuable to outline the thesis' theoretical assumptions regarding the role of the State as an important actor in the management of the environment in a highly globalized and resource dependent world. The second part of this chapter draws critically on the Copenhagen School of securitization as a theoretical framework, with a focus on the discursively constructed speech act. It thus adopts a post-structuralist approach in order to not just 'widen' the security concept' but also to 'deepen' it in response to some of its main criticism. Finally, the chapter ends by drawing on the concept of 'human security' in order to include further aspects of Arctic security into the analysis and highlight the diverse role and meaning of those responsible for uttering the speech act, including a wider view of who should be considered the 'actor' in security theory.

3.1 The role of the state in environmental governance in the Arctic

The first part of the analysis in this thesis considers the discourse of petroleum and environmental policies in the Norwegian High North policy papers. This is done to uncover the overarching representations and story-lines that the Government uses to conduct its High North policies. From an environmental view, the role of the state in environmental governance is at best ambivalent, as the government both facilitates policies that enables environmental destruction and environmental protection. Whitehead, Jones and Jones (2006) point to an evolving and somewhat anarchistic literature that highlights the increasing "spatial divide between the political and domestic spaces of the state and ecological places of nature". (p. 51) In recent times, the compounding force of globalization, both in terms of supressing state sovereignty in economic matters, but also contributing to the increase of trans-national pollution and global climate change, has added weight to the anarchistic view of a state-nature relations that is at its "best anachronistic and at worst irrelevant" (Whitehead, Jones & Jones, 2006, p. 51). Nevertheless, as opposed to radical political ecology, there are voices arguing that the state has been transformed; it did not become insignificant, but grew into an important and progressive part in changing social and ecological space (Barry & Eckersley, 2005).

Barry and Eckersley accept some of the reasons for eco-anarchistic pessimism of the state's ability to protect the ecological space. Their approach, however, is one of careful optimism regarding the role of the state as an ever changing and progressive player that at times shows potential of 'engagement and renewal'. In this view, the state is not a static body; rather it is composed of a variety of changing practices, discourses, social relations and policies, which are interconnected on many different levels (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010). However, this fluidity can produce a fragmented way of forming institutions, priorities and practices, which can create tension rather than balance. A question to consider further in the analysis of this thesis is how the discourse around energy and the environment has been incorporated irregularly in the state policies of the Norwegian government, which produces tension rather than balance and as well as often holding contrasting political views.

Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes the policy papers on the High North, they are a product of a wider collaboration between several Ministries, among them the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and Ministry of Climate and Environment. These institutions have separate agendas that often stand in contrast to each other. To be aware of the many voices and agendas is important when analysing the High North policy papers, since access to natural resources opens up different questions and interests fields for the different institutions. Frances Cleaver (2012) looks at this discrepancy of formation and development of institutions in resource management, stating that:

> Access to resources may be mediated by a range of institutions. These include designed arrangements of varying degree of openness and formality (committees, associations, user groups, burial societies), institutionalised interactions as embodied in kinship and social networks, relations of reciprocity and patronage and in sets of norms and practices deeply embedded in the habits and routines of everyday life. (p. 14)

In addition to laying out the theoretical assumptions of the state in environmental governance and the formation of institutions in resource management, the next section will outline the theoretical framework for analysing the widening security approach in the High North and the role of human security in the Arctic.

3.2 Security theory

3.2.1 Going beyond the traditionalist approach to security

During the Cold War there was a wide usage of the 'traditional' or 'narrow' definition of security in international relations[8] as something that was bound to a military concern with the state as the main player. "Security is a concept about power, as well as a powerful concept" (Hoogensen & Goloviznina, 2014, p. 1). Maintaining this close relationship between the state, power and security reinforces a world-view built on an imagery that the state is the only important actor and enforcer capable of providing security through its military. Ullmann (1983) points out that while politicians have found it difficult to rally electorates around non-military security issues, analysts have also found it difficult to create a comprehensive analytical framework where threats are measures against the relative contribution towards national security in order to create an appropriate response. After the end of the Cold War, there was nevertheless an increasing interest in moving away from a narrow definition to create a more comprehensive security framework. An emerging group of scholars began to voice their discontent around the neo-realist basis for forming security theory. Their argument revolved around the different challenges and realities in the post-Cold War era, which made it necessary to introduce a new security approach to address contemporary issues (Krause & Williams, 1996). The debate was centred on moving away from the neorealist conceptualization of security as 'state security', where a threat was responded to by 'military force', in an anarchistic world controlled by the 'security dilemma' (Krause and Williams, 1996). One of the earliest attempts to redefine the narrow neo-realist approach to security came from Richard H. Ullmann (1983) as he proposes a rather unconventional definition of security:

> (…) a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state. (p. 133)

[8] In accordance with Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), it is important to include security in 'international relations', as oppose to merely security used in everyday language, as the context of the two types of security differs immensely.

Ullmann's new definition of security includes natural disasters and environmental problems as a part of the security agenda, in addition to more traditional security concerns of wars and rebellions. In his view, limiting the definition of national security to simply military terms creates a false and potentially dangerous reality, which takes away focus on other (and perhaps more serious) dangers, as well as contributes to extensive militarization of the world, leading to global insecurity in the long run (Ullmann, 1983). Furthermore, Thomas Homer-Dixon (1991; 1994) proposed a research agenda that analyses how environmental degradation and scarcities can contribute to create 'acute national and international conflict.' He finds that there are clear indications between environmental degradation and the possibility of conflict. In accordance with anti-Malthusians, he highlights that there are no clear causal or direct links but rather numerous intervening factors - including technological, physical, social and economic, which results in humans experiencing these changes with great variance, levels of resilience and adaptability (Homer-Dixon, 1991).

3.2.2 The beginning of securitization

As previously discussed, the post-Cold War era required scholars to 'deepen' or 'widen' the neorealist security approach in order to fit a different security reality. As the Cold War had contributed to a security reality driven by a 'nuclear and military obsession,' the emergence of new economic, social and political issues drove the need to widen this narrow approach (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998). The Copenhagen School of Securitization emerged in the wake of this. Although new concepts were in demand around why and what needs securing, what are the threats and by what means can these threats be secured, it did not entail a direct move away from the neorealist approach. Rather, the emerging Copenhagen School had a 'critical and constructivist' approach to security,' where national security was looked upon as "a particular set of discourses and practices that rest upon institutionally shared understandings" (Krause & Williams, 1996, p. 243). According to Waever (1995), securitization theory is built on a study of the processes that allows threats to be represented politically, or in other words**:** "who can 'do' or 'speak' security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects…[w]hat is essential is the designation of an existential threat…and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience." (p. 4)

The Copenhagen School 'widens' the security framework by including non-military security issues such as economic security, societal security, political security and environmental security. In order to create a framework, they first construct a

'conceptualization of security', which aims to specify the concept insomuch as it means something more than 'just a threat or a problem', as they hereby explain:

> Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, but to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind. (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 5)

"Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization" (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 23). According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), the way to study the process of 'securitization' is through the study of discourse and political constellations. The challenge is to find out when an argument with a certain kind of rhetoric and 'semiotic structure' becomes so entrenched in the general discourse that the public will accept that rules which otherwise have been obeyed, will be overruled by the actor in power. In this thesis, I will not necessarily look for things outside the 'narrow' security concept to identify processes of securitization. Rather, I will point out discourse around subjects that Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) refer to as a 'securitizing move', meaning that the public might not have accepted the concept as something that is an 'existential threat' to something else, which requires violations of established rules. As it would be an extensive task and going beyond the means of this thesis to also look at the public acceptance of the High North policy, I believe that there is still value in identifying certain areas and concepts which might be called 'securitizing moves'. This will highlight possible trends towards what can become fully securitized further down the line.

3.2.3. Limitations to securitization theory: a post-structuralist approach

Although the central thoughts from the Copenhagen School of securitization is applied in the scope of this essay to address and outline the widening of Arctic security issues, there are limitations to using this theoretical framework in analysis, as pointed out by several critical voices. In the recent literature, critiques of the Securitization theory have included, but not been limited to Hansen (2001, 2011), Balsacq (2005), McDonald (2008), Huysmans (2011) and Stritzel (2007, 2011). Hansen (2001) argues that there are limitations in the use of 'speech act' as a defining characteristic of how a security issue can be set on the agenda. She

takes gender as an example, and points out two 'blank spots' in defining the 'speech act,' including 'security as silence,' where speaking up can evoke further security concerns or it is merely impossible, and 'subsuming security,' where, for instance, the gender identity is undermined by other identities such as national or religious identity (Hansen, 2001). McDonald (2008) furthermore comments on the narrow definition of the 'speech act,' as it limits other forms of communication (for instance, images or material practices). He moreover highlights the potential restrictive nature of the 'speech act' as carried out by those named 'institutionally legitimate,' excluding other potentially important voices from speaking on behalf of the state. Also, the theory does not adequately address the possibility that a security act can develop over time, by several overlapping processes and representations, in addition to questions regarding why certain representations develop into security issues while others do not. Finally, he points out the narrowness of the securitization framework as defining the act merely as a threat to security, which renders the conceptualization of security politics 'as inherently negative or reactionary' (McDonald, 2008).

Yet another critique of the Copenhagen School has come from Morten Kelstrup (2004), where he furthers the need for inclusion of the role of globalization in creating underlying conditions that changes the traditional approach to security, which the Copenhagen school has not adequately addressed in their securitization theory:

> The general picture is that the different forms of globalisation create a move from a world in which military concerns dominate questions of security to a world in which societal insecurity plays a much greater role, not in the sense that military means are unimportant, but rather in the sense that new complexities of societal insecurity becomes the primary security concern. (Kelstrup, 2004, p. 110)

This is in line with Mark Duffield's (2001) view that in a world of new forms of war, a security and development merge: "[i]n response to the new wars and the merging of development and security, innovative strategic complexes – linking state and non-state actors. Public and private organisations, military and civilian organisations and so on – have emerged" (Duffield, 2001, p. 45). These 'innovative strategic complexes' entail a new governance system, created partly as a response to the way globalization leads to societal insecurities.

Developed on the critiques and limitations of the Copenhagen School, a new approach evolves, based on post-structuralism. Post-structuralism is understood as "a critical attitude,

approach or ethos, which calls attention to the importance of representations, the relationship of power and knowledge, and the politics of identity in the production and understanding of global affairs" (Campbell, 2007, p. 206). Hansen (2011) proposes, based on the securitization theory, a post-structuralist framework constructed on three questions:

> Through which discursive structures are cases and phenomena represented and incorporated into a larger discursive field? What is the epistemic terrain through which phenomena is known? And, what are the substantial modalities that define what kind of an issue a security problem is? (p. 357)

This attempt to expand the securitization theory therefor acts as the foundation of the theoretical framework that supports the analysis of the widening and deepening of the Arctic security concept. Nevertheless, there is an alternative theory worth introducing to this theoretical discussion of widening of the Arctic security concept, namely the concept of 'human security.' Although human security does not necessarily following the same theoretical foundations as the Copenhagen School, securitization theory does open up for the inclusion of non-state actors in setting the security agenda, making human security a possible platform for introducing a more diverse range of 'speech actors' (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014[9]). The next section will briefly outline the human security approach, and discuss how it can work in tandem, rather than be an opposing theory to the Copenhagen School of securitization. The important overall questions to ask, regardless of the specific theoretical framework chosen for the analysis, is by 'whom, in what context and for what political purpose' a security threat is being invoked (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010; Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998; Hoogensen et al., 2009).

3.2.4. Human Security

Human security in its most basic form means 'freedom from fear, freedom from want', as defined in the United Nations Human Development Report (1994). I was first introduced to the concept of 'human security' in a lecture by Professor Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv at the Arctic Frontiers conference this past January when forming ideas around my thesis. She introduced the assumption that security does not merely mean military security orchestrated by the state, but it includes individual security of what we hold dear and what is going to

[9] Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv has changed her last name between 2009 and 2014. In 2009, her last name was only Hoogensen, now Hoogensen Gjørv. Not to confuse, I have referenced her throughout the thesis as Hoogensen Gjørv (2014) or Hoogensen (2009).

make us feel secure in the future. For the future of the Arctic and the people living there, individual security might entail development of fossil fuel production in order to experience economic stability and security. While for other people, protecting the environment and focusing on renewable energy development in the region is a part of ensuring their individual security for the future. In accordance with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), security also includes dimensions such as economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. These concerns were included to try to rectify the glaring gap between the traditional narrow approaches to security in the Cold War era formed by superpowers, to the emerging reality of individual security concerns in fragile, newly formed nations (UNDP, 1994). Updating the UNDP approach to human security, Hoogensen et al. (2009) add a definition of human security that applies to the Arctic and other communities today:

> Security is achieved when individuals and/or multiple actors have the freedom to identify risks and threats to their wellbeing and values (negative security), the opportunity to articulate these threats to other actors, and the capacity to determine ways to end, mitigate or adapt to those risks and threats either individually or in concert with other actors (positive security). (p. 3)

By 'actors' in this definition of security, Hoogensen et al. (2009) includes 'individuals and communities, researchers and research communities, governmental organisations and non-governmental organisations, media, business/industry, military and policy makers', which all play a role in identifying threats and ensuring security. Although the main theoretical framework in this thesis is based on the post-structuralist approach to securitization theory, I find it valuable to include the human security concept. In the following discourse analysis of the Foreign Ministry's High North policy papers, it is the state that is the main actor setting the security agenda in the High North. Nevertheless, as Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv pointed out at the Arctic Frontiers conference, analysing the Arctic security discourse is about finding who is in and who is out of the security discourse, and as will be shown in the discourse analysis, the state does not act as a static and isolated actor. Rather, there are concerns being raised from organizations, businesses, communities and research clusters among others, which play a role in forming the policy. At any given time, there are those who are present at the table, affecting the direction of the discourse and agenda setting, while many more are excluded. Thus, it is important to be aware of who is in and who is out of the High North

discourse to uncover trends and formation of certain representations and discourse, as it will also play a key role in the future formation of the High North security agenda.

3.2.5 How discourse analysis and theory is combined in the analysis.

In the previous chapter, I stated that discourse in this thesis is interpreted as going beyond the written word to look at meanings and representations in a limited, but grouped arrangement of texts to critically engage with the official High North discourse in Norwegian politics. The individual texts do not provide a deeper meaning in themselves, however, they become meaningful when they are connected with other texts, as one can then draw on repeated representations to uncover how texts are produced, distributed and accepted (Jensen, 2012). My approach to using discourse analysis follows on the interpretations made by Neumann (2008):

> Because a discourse maintains a degree of regularity in social relations, it produces preconditions for action. It constrains how the stuff that the world consists of is ordered, and so how people categorize and think about the world. It constrains what is thought of at all, what is thought of as possible, and what is thought of as the 'natural thing' to do in a given situation. But discourse cannot determine action completely. There will always be more than one possible outcome. Discourse analysis aims at specifying the bandwidth of possible outcomes. (p. 62)

According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), using text-analysis to reveal the meaning of a concept such as 'security,' is useful in the sense that through text-analysis one uncovers what has been viewed as more important and should be prioritized over other issues. Furthermore, they claim that the way to study 'securitization' and 'securitizing moves' is through the study of 'discourse and political constellations'. It is thought that when an argument built on certain 'rhetoric and semiotic structure' becomes sufficiently accepted by the audience that they will allow violations of rules that would otherwise not be tolerated, which would entail a 'securitization' of that issue (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p. 25). Post-structuralist theory also engages in conceptualizations that "facilitate critical engagement with the ways in which political discourse and text works" (Hansen, 2011, p. 361). As Jensen (2015) concludes in his study of *Security and Insecurity in the New North*, "discourse analysis has much to offer by revealing the processes leading to the securitization of a given issue-area" (n.p.). Although my research does not attempt to identify actual instances of 'securitization' in the High North discourse, using discourse analysis to detect the underlying

meanings and representations of the 'widening' and 'deepening' of emerging security issues, is a useful approach to critically engage in the current Norwegian security agenda.

3.3. Summary

In the following two chapters, I analyse the discourse of the most recent policy papers on the High North in order to first critically engage with the Norwegian petroleum discourse, then second, to assess the 'widening' of Arctic security issues. In chapter 4, on Norwegian petroleum and environmental policies, I have not used a set theoretical framework to explain the findings; rather I am relying on the epistemological underpinnings of discourse analysis as not just a method, but also as a theoretical approach in its own right (Jensen, 2015). Nevertheless, I have outlined some theoretical assumptions about the role of the state in resource management and how institutions are not static and isolated; instead, they are influenced and formed by a multitude of people and interest groups. This is done to explain what can be underlying causes for often opposing policies and interests in the High North. Finally, chapter 5 analyses the widening of the Arctic security agenda, using post-structuralist securitization theory, in addition to drawing on the concept of 'human security.' The connecting link between the theoretical approach and the method is to investigate the discourse, which takes the form of the written word in the policy papers, or using security theory as a "discursively constructed speech act" (Grindheim, 2009, p 9).

4.0 The Analysis, part I

The next two chapters deal with how the Norwegian Government forms petroleum and energy policies in an overarching environmental framework in the High North. The analysis is based on the presumption of the State as the central actor in policy making. However, the State does not act as a static player; rather it is influenced by multiple actors and groups with varying degrees of power. I have systematically read through the most recent policy papers on Norwegian High North policy, and building on inserts from the papers in addition to other official documents and speeches made by Ministers, I have identified the most prevalent representations and story-lines concerning the Norwegian petroleum and environmental discourse. This is done by using the 'sandwich method', where a representation is first presented, then supported by appropriate quotes and further discussed, often backed up by secondary sources. To draw on representations in discourse and systematically present them in an analysis identifies and sets out the basic arguments and assumptions the discourse bearer creates when building up arguments. The analysis will outline the foundation of the representations and how they sometimes stand in stark contrast to each other. Here it should be clarified that the representations and story-lines I draw on are in the scope of this thesis, and that this is not an outline of *all* representations of petroleum and environmental discourse in the High North. Rather, it highlights the most prominent and prevailing representations. The following chapters combine both empirical data and analysis instead of keeping these two separate. This shows the representations and underline the foundation of my arguments.

4.1 Norwegian petroleum and environmental policies in the High North

This section outlines the Norwegian petroleum discourse as presented in the most recent policy papers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the High North. First, I describe the petroleum discourse in light of a brief historical background. Second, I show the dominant representations of current petroleum policy making in the High North. Consequently, this analysis identifies three dominating representations in Norwegian petroleum policy: first, is 'drilling for aid'; the second representation is that Norway should expand its natural gas production as 'gas is a bridging fuel' into a renewable future; and third, that Norway is 'drilling for the environment'.

4.1.1 The beginning: an era of moderation and state ownership

At a time where living standards were rising in Western Europe, and countries were searching high and low for new energy resources, large petroleum discoveries were made in the North Sea that would allow Norway to expand on earlier aspirations for development. The discovery of 'Ekofisk', in 1969, starts the oil age in Norway (Regjeringen, 2015). At this point, the Norwegian state had ensured sovereignty of the continental shelf around Norway, and the Government was subsequently the only legal authority that could provide drilling licences to companies wanting to explore the Norwegian coast for fossil fuel (Regjeringen, 2015). In the 1970s, Norway experienced the highest rise in living standard in Western Europe, due to the development of the petroleum industry and rising oil prices (Noreng, 1984). The 25th White paper, *The role of petroleum activities in Norwegian Society* (1974), states "[t]he petroleum discoveries in the North Sea entails that we as a nation will be richer. The Government believes that one should first and foremost explore the new possibilities in order to develop a qualitative better society[10]." (Ministry of Finance, 1974, p.5)

A 'qualitative better society' meant building a welfare state on the basis of equality for all, the economic development of local communities, the targeting of social problems and the development of oil production based on efficiency with regards to the environment (Ryggvik, 2010). In Norwegian petroleum policy, the state plays a central role. Not only did the state decide who gets to drill for oil and gas but Norwegian companies have also been in the forefront of petroleum exploitation from their entrance into the field of exploration in 1972 (Regjeringen, 2015). "The organisational pattern for Norwegian petroleum activity has to ensure that the Norwegian Government is in full control over all the steps in the activity: exploration, production, distribution, export and marketing[11]" (Ministry of Finance, 1974, p. 7).

In addition to the state ensuring sovereignty over the continental shelf and being a part of every aspect of the petroleum development, it was also vital that the development followed a pace of 'moderate tempo'. "Desiring a long-term perspective in the exploitation of resources, and after a comprehensive evaluation of the social needs, the Government has concluded that Norway should take a moderate pace in the extraction of petroleum

[10] Authors own translation of: «Petroleumsfunnene i Nordsjøen gjør at vi som nasjon, blir rikere. Regjeringen mener at en i første rekke må benytte de nye muligheter til å utvikle et kvalitativt bedre samfunn»
[11] Authors own translation of: «Organisasjonsmønsteret for norsk petroleumsvirksomhet må gi norske myndigheter kontroll over alle trinn i virksomheten: leting, produksjon, viderefordeling, eksport og markedføring» (p. 7)

resources[12]" (Ministry of Finance, 1974, p. 6). The Government designed the 'moderate policy' to ensure a sustainable and long-term development path for the petroleum industry and to avoid what others had experienced as the 'Dutch disease' or the 'oil curse'. Together with what has been called the 'ten oil commandments', published in the 1971 White paper *Recommendation from the extended industrial committee about the exploration for and the extraction of underwater natural deposits on the Norwegian Continental Shelf etc.*, it laid the foundation for a Government-controlled resource exploration (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate [NDP], 2010).

Whereas the 1974 White paper underlined the need for 'moderate tempo', the 1971 White papers' so called 'ten commandments' laid down the criteria for state involvement in all levels of the petroleum industry. The first commandment highlights that there will be state supervision of all activity on the Norwegian continental shelf. The third commandment states that all business activity would be developed based on the petroleum industry. Further, the fourth commandment underlines that existing commercial activity must be taken into consideration, as well as the nature and environment when developing the oil industry. The seventh commandment informs that the state will be involved in all levels of the Norwegian petroleum industry with both a national and international perspective. Moreover, a state owned Oil Company would be established to ensure Norwegian commercial interests, as stated in the eighth commandment. Finally, the ninth commandment highlighted that an activity plan for the development of the industry north of the 62nd parallel that would take the unique socio-political factors into account, must be adopted (NDP, 2010). In the early 1970s, Norwegian petroleum-policy emphasised moderation and a reluctance to rely solely on the oil industry for the future development path of Norwegian society. However, as governments changed and new voices became prominent in the policy forming, a new petroleum era was underway not merely a decade after the 'moderate policy' of the 1970s.

4.1.2. From policy of moderation to full throttle

In accordance with the policy of 'moderate tempo', an annual upper limit of 90 million tons of oil equivalent production was adopted in 1973. This came under increasing contestation in the 1980s, and in 1993 this embargo on tempo and investments was completely discarded (Kristoffersen, 2014). The tempo was set so high, that in 2009, Norway was one of the countries in the world with highest production rate compared to its remaining

[12] The translation is taken from: Kristoffersen (2014) Drilling oil into Arctic minds? State security, industry consensus and local contestation. A dissertation for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor – May 2014. P. 20

reserves (Ryggvik, 2010). Today, we live in a reality where the oil industry is the country´s most important single export commodity (48.9% of all export). It accounts for 21.5% of BNP, and ensures almost 30% of the State's yearly income (Fakta, 2014). As overall production rates exploded in the 1990s and into the 2000s, new areas for further development became in high demand. Norway's overall petroleum production is widely believed to have peaked, reaching its highest production rate in 2000-2001. Since then, oil production has decreased severely, and even though gas production has increased, the overall production is still significantly lower today (Ryggvik, 2013). Nevertheless, the government's focus on maintaining a high level of petroleum production has not faltered, as there has been no official acceptance of 'peak oil' by the state. In 2005, the Government published its first White paper on the High North, *Opportunities and Challenges in the North*[13], where oil exploration was one of the focus-points for future development in the region.

> The new opportunities in the North are tied to the assumed large oil and gas reserves under the seabed. The exploitation of these resources will affect the development of the High North in many decades to come. There is a possibility that the High North, in a long-term perspective, can become the most important petroleum province in Europe[14]. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005, p. 6)

It is important to note that this trend in the Norwegian petroleum policy has not changed in the more recent plans for exploration in the High North. Nor do we see a move away from a petroleum dependent development path for the area christened 'the new energy province of Europe'. If anything, the tone of the discourse has become more deterministic and certain of the expected petroleum resources waiting to be exploited, as the Arctic is 'opening up' due to global warming:

> We now see that the presence of oil and gas deposits also open up the Barents Sea as a new European energy province. Exploiting the opportunities of the High North is one of the most important components of the Government's High North Strategy. Responsible exploitation of these resources will help to safeguard the welfare of the future generations. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 67)

The heightened focus of petroleum development in the Arctic appears to be a consequence of a widening discrepancy between the current high production rate and the

[13] 'Muligheter og Utfordringer I Nord'
[14] Author's own translation

decrease in the reserves of existing petroleum fields. After reaching a peak in the production over ten years ago, and keeping one of the highest production rates in the world, according to *British Petroleum (BP) Statistical Review of World Energy 2008*, Norway would have only 8.8 years of production left if keeping up the same production level as up until 2008 (Ryggvik, 2010). All the while, the Government is optimistic about the remaining oil and gas resources, as we have produced and sold 'only[15]' 45% of all available oil and gas on the Norwegian continental shelf, with 37% of the remaining petroleum resources remaining undiscovered (Norskpetroleum, 2015). Of the undiscovered resources, as much as 43% are believed to be found in the Barents Sea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b).



Fig.1 Grey area marks the produced and sold quantities of oil and gas, while the lighter areas represents the unexplored and undiscovered resources. The image of large quantities still remaining, stands in slight opposition to the next figure of how much oil has been produced and the downwards level of the past decades production. Source: http://www.norskpetroleum.no/?attachment_id=8347

[15] "The oil directorate's estimate of the total discovered and undiscovered petroleum resources on the Norwegian continental shelf is about 14.1 billion standard cubic metres oil equivalent. Of this, only 45 present is sold and delivered". Here, the oil directorate puts a positive undertone of the amount of oil/gas that has been sold and delivered by using the word 'only'.

Figur 1. Samlet produksjon av olje (inkludert NGL og kondensat) og gass. 3. kvartal

Kilde: Statistisk sentralbyrå.

Fig 2 From this we can see that oil production peaked in 2001, and although gas production has increased, the overall development is down from 2004. Source: http://www.ssb.no/energi-og-industri/statistikker/ogprodre/kvartal/2014-11-21#content

Much of the Government's 'energy optimism' is based on the frequently sited report made by the US Geological Survey (USGS) in 2008, which states that up to 22% of the world's undiscovered petroleum resources are found above the Arctic Circle (USGS, 2008). In the most recent Strategy paper from 2009, *New Building Blocks in the North,* and in the White paper from 2012 *The High North. Visions and Strategies,* in addition to the most recent Report from 2014 *Norway's Arctic policy* by the new government, we see clear representations of the Government's intent to develop the High North as an energy province for the future. In the 2009 Strategy paper, it is stated *"*[t]he Government will seek to ensure that petroleum activities become a driving force of business development and economic activity in Northern Norway*"* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 24). Similar representations for petroleum development are seen in the following statement*,* "[i]t is therefore important that Norwegian policy is designed to make the High North attractive to oil companies so that they give it priority in their portfolios" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 18). In light of these statements, there is no doubt as to what the Government sees as its main priority in its High North policy, and using the word 'designed' about the policy paper indicates clear intent.

Opening up the Barents Sea for oil exploration is first driven by the necessity of finding new areas for petroleum exploration, as the older wells are emptying quicker than new oil reserves are found. Furthermore, and more controversially, this development path is a

result of close collaboration between oil companies and the Government (NRK Brennpunkt, 2008). Konkraft is a forum, set up in the beginning of the 2000s, where representatives from oil companies and government officials met off record to discuss the future of Norwegian petroleum development. As the industry has already been able to tap most of the oil in the lower latitudes, gaining access to prospective areas in the Barents Sea and in the Lofoten/Vesterålenen/Senja areas in order to be globally more competitive, is becoming an important priority (Kristoffersen, 2014). Directed by Konkraft and chaired by the Minister of Petroleum and Energy, a quarterly meeting between representatives from the oil industry and politicians called 'Topplederforum' (top-leader forum) was set up. This was conducted behind closed doors, in order for the participants to speak freely and off record (Kristoffersen, 2014). According to revelations in a Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) documentary (NRK Brennpunkt, 2008), Konkraft facilitated meetings and designed lobbying strategies, among them how to create a better environmental profile around the petroleum industry. Throughout the official High North policy papers, the representation of an 'environmental petroleum production' is repeatedly emphasized. This can henceforth be attributed to an offensive strategy between the industry and politicians in order to gain public acceptance for petroleum exploitation in vulnerable areas. The representation 'drilling for the environment' will be further explored in the forthcoming analysis. The following insert from the 2009 Strategy paper shows the Government's intent on a future petroleum-driven development path:

> It is important for the Government that the development of new oil and gas fields results in increased productivity in Northern Norway and in the rest of the country. Exploitation of the petroleum resources of the High North must support the positive developments in the High North. Petroleum activities will be a major driving force for new technology intensive activities in Northern Norway. In order to bring this about, an industry must be built up in Northern Norway that can position itself both nationally and internationally. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 67)

However, the same Strategy paper also underlines the environmental concerns for expanding petroleum production into certain vulnerable areas. In both the 2009 and 2012 policy-papers there is an underlying tension between the need for expanding petroleum production further north, and the environmental consequences this would entail:

> Challenges are associated with the effects of fisheries, ship traffic and petroleum activities, and with environmental toxins, radioactivity and introduced species. This

> particularly applies to the area from Lofoten to Vesterålen, inshore areas, Tromsøflaket, Eggakanten, the ice edge, the polar front and the sea areas surrounding Svalbard. These are areas that, on the basis of scientific assessments, are of major importance for biodiversity and biological production, and where possible injurious effects may have long-term or irreversible consequences. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 74)

Here there is an ongoing debate between the intensification of petroleum exploration on the one hand, and the identification of vulnerable areas in need of additional protection from further petroleum development on the other hand. We will see in the forthcoming discourse that the 'environmental argument' is both used in the pro-drilling discourse as well as the 'anti-drilling' discourse, and creates an underlying paradox in the whole High North policy making.

4.1.3 From words to action in the High North

There has been a change in government in the past two years, which made me interested in following the developing petroleum discourse in the High North during this time. In general, policy papers are drawn up when the Government wants to present matters to the Storting that does not necessarily require direct action, serving as guiding documents and is often the prerequisite for a bill or a law to be passed at a later stage (Regjeringen, 2008). Moreover, the policy paper can span from one Government to the next, however, the new Government might present a policy report with their own visions for a policy area. This is what was done when the new Government came to power in 2013, and when analysing the policy papers before 2013 and comparing it with the policy statements that emerged with the new Government, a shift in the discourse became noticeable. The previous Government, as has been shown, spoke with clear intent in developing the petroleum industry farther north. The new Government on their side is talking about an 'offensive' petroleum development, as in aggressive. In the report *Norway's Arctic policy* (2014b), the petroleum industry is described as the core contributor to the Norwegian economy, and that further development of the petroleum industry in the Arctic is necessary in order to keep up the income level and production scale:

> The oil and gas industry is the largest contributor to the Norwegian economy, and provides major opportunities for increased employment and growth in Northern Norway. The Government will carry out an ambitious oil and gas policy, which

> facilitates future development projects in the High North, including by offering attractive exploration areas offering attractive exploration areas. Access to land and a high level of activity are important prerequisites for the further development of oil- and gas-related business ashore. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 20)

In the original report, written in Norwegian, the statement "[t]he Government will carry out an ambitious oil and gas policy (…)", translates to "[r]egjeringen vil føre en offensiv petroleumspolitikk"(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a, p. 28). The direct English translation of this according to the oxford dictionary is: "[t]he Government will carry out an offensive petroleum policy". The word "offensiv", in Norwegian, with its closest synonyms "aggressiv" (aggressive) or "angrepslysten" (want to attack)[16] carries with it a different meaning that the word "ambitious". The former word is a stronger adjective than the latter.

Likewise, the representation of a deterministic petroleum politic in the Norwegian version of the policy paper is further underlined by Prime Minister Erna Solberg's introduction of the 2014 Report, stating, "we will go from word to action in Norway's High North politics" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a, p. 3). The representation here is that the previous Government has mostly been talking, while the new Government will take further action in the High North politics. This quote directly translated from the Norwegian version, which says "[v]i skal gå fra ord til handling i nordområdepolitikken" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a, p. 3). In the English version of this report however, this statement is translated: "[w]e intend to work hard to put our Arctic policy into practice" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 3). First, this wording does not send a message that the new Government will differentiate itself from the previous Government. Second, it is not a message with deterministic character, as the word 'intend' is not a strong verb. These two translations render me a little perplexed. Why does the Norwegian version of the report speak with a more deterministic voice than the English translation? It is merely a question of translation complexities? Alternatively, does it signify a conscious choice to apply one voice for the Norwegian audience and one voice for the international?

Nevertheless, the proverb 'action speaks louder than words' can be applied to the actions taken by the new Government after coming to power in 2013. The new coalition Government formed by the two right-wing parties; the Conservative Party and the Progressive Party, in addition to the more centre orientated Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party, started their time in the Government with hard negotiations regarding opening

[16] Synonymer hentet fra www.synonymer.no

Lofoten/Vesterålen/Senja area for oil exploration. This area underwent seismic mapping in the period of 2007-2009, and is assumed to hold the largest amount of easily accessible oil and gas in the High North (Kristoffersen, 2014). This is a highly contested area for petroleum exploration, due to large primary industries of fishing, tourism and agriculture in this pristine and unique wilderness, which is under potential threat by having oilrigs within close proximity. After intense negotiations between the four ruling parties, they had to agree to keep the question of petroleum exploration undecided until the next election round in 2017, as this is one of the key polarizing policy-areas between the four coalition parties. Nevertheless, the current Government has put words into actions by opening up new exploration areas in the Barents Sea in the 23rd licensing round, as stated in the report:

> The Government will offer new acreage in both geologically known and unknown areas, within the parts of the High North that are open to oil and gas activities. Awards in the Predefined Areas in 2014 consentrates on the geologically known areas and will make an important contribution to the further exploration of the Barents Sea. Large parts of the High North have not been explored. In the 23rd licensing round, for the first time since 1994 the Government will give access to new, interesting exploration opportunities in the southeast of the Barents Sea. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p 20)

Included in these 'new and interesting' areas are areas surrounding the much debated ice edge, which is on the list of vulnerable and valuable areas of the 2009 Strategy paper, where possible injurious effects could damage and destroy the regions biodiversity. The Government argues that global warming and melting ice has naturally moved the ice edge, including the vulnerable areas. Prime Minister Erna Solberg is quoted saying, "[w]e have not moved the ice edge, it has moved itself[17]" when defending the decision to include areas that the Norwegian Polar Institute advised against (Olsen, 2015). According to the social geographer, Berit Kristoffersen, the intensified petroleum focus is in line with the last decade's petroleum policy of extracting as much as possible in the shortest time possible (Olsen, 2015). In the following sections, I look at how certain representations of the Norwegian petroleum industry are created and/or reproduced in order to argue for a continuance and speeding up of exploitation in the Arctic. This includes the representation of 'drilling as aid', 'natural gas as a bridging fuel' and that Norway is 'drilling for the environment'.

[17] Authors own translation

4.1.4. Drilling as aid

One of the most prominent and reoccurring representations in the recent Arctic petroleum discourse is that Norway should exploit oil in the Barents Sea to help the developing word. This builds on an image of Norwegian altruism, which is now visible in the current petroleum policy discourse. In January 2015, I participated in the annual conference Arctic Frontier in Tromsø, as a prelude to my research for this thesis. One of the events that set me on the course of studying Norwegian High North policy was the speech made by the cureent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende. He spoke of the many challenges we are facing in the High North due to climate change, but also the opportunities this creates for further resource exploration. Moreover, he underlined the link between the developing world's growing demand for energy in order to eradicate poverty, and Norway's advantageous position to be able to provide this needed energy:

> The global demand for energy will increase by 35–40 % over the next 20 years, according to the International Energy Agency. The demand for energy will grow immensely in developing countries. Without electricity, there can be no development, no economic growth. As the Arctic becomes more accessible, we will be able to produce more energy. (Brende, 2015b)

This statement from the Foreign Minister appears to be built on reproduced discourse from at least a decade ago. The former Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Thorhild Widvey stated in her last interview as a Minister in 2005 that:

> Norway has a global responsibility to extract more energy to the world in order to contribute to increase the welfare for the developing countries. (…) It is the poorest countries that in 25 years should have their energy needs satisfied. What rights do we have to say that when we have satisfied our energy need, we should just turn off the tap and deny other countries the same increase in welfare as we have enjoyed?(…) The developing world should be allowed a larger share of the energy resources. Norway is in possession of some of the remaining, undiscovered natural resources in the world. It cannot be that we should not open up for the poor countries to receive access to energy when their turn is up[18]. (Quoted in Hellestøl, 2005b, p. 2, as sited in Ihlen, 2007, p. 110-111)

[18] Author's own translation

Norway is one of the countries in the world that gives the most foreign aid per capita, around 1% of GDP (SSB, 2014b). The notion of Norway as 'altruistic' and a nation that helps people in need is underlined by the following statement made in a report on Power and Humanitarianism in Norway:

> Since the early 1990s, «Norway» has been built up as an international brand; as a particularly peace loving and aid friendly country with special tasks in world politics. Constructing this brand has occurred through a policy of 'engagement' – the work for conflict resolution, peace, democracy and human rights – around the world. The image of Norway as a moral and humanitarian super power[19]. (NOU, 2003, p. 51)

That the Norwegian Ministers draws the parallel between the developing world's energy poverty and Norway's role as a trusted and natural energy supplier is a natural continuance of the already established altruistic representation. Whereas we have previously been talking about ensuring peace, human rights and democracy, there is now a reason to presume that eradicating the developing world's 'energy poverty' should be included in the list of representations of Norwegian altruism. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende (2015a), develops the ideas of 'energy as aid' further in an article published by the *Harvard International Review*, again with a striking similarity to the statement made by former Minister Widvey:

> (…)as the Arctic becomes more accessible, there may be more efforts to extract the energy reserves hidden beneath the surface and feed the demands of a growing planet. The world needs energy. Lack of access to energy is a barrier to development. According to the International Energy Agency, over 1.3 billion people live without access to electricity, and the global demand for energy will increase by 35 to 40 percent over the next 20 years, mostly in developing countries. (Brende, 2015a)

Here there is a representation of Norwegian energy as a solution to the world's growing energy poverty. The statement 'feed the demands of a growing planet' draws on a storyline of feeding a hungry world, and is here interpreted as a part of Norwegian aid effort to save the world's poor. The national identity of an altruistic Norway is maintained, in addition to ensuring our own economic development. However, our own economic gains are duly left out of the representation of Norway as saving the energy poor with clean Arctic energy. There is

[19] Author's own translation

also an underlying assumption from our politicians that since the world needs energy, it straightforward equals that the world needs Norwegian energy (as oppose to energy they could produce themselves from sun and wind). Not only does the developing world need Norwegian energy, it is Norway's duty to provide it to them as an altruistic and giving nation.

4.1.5. Natural gas as a 'bridging fuel'.

The storyline of using natural gas as a 'transition fuel' or 'bridging fuel' has developed rapidly in the international petroleum discourse in recent years, and the Norwegian Government has followed suit in adopting this rhetoric in its High North policy making.

> The International Energy Agency (IEA) has highlighted the advantages of making more use of natural gas as a replacement for coal. Norway and Europe are long-term gas partners. We will continue exploration for gas – particularly in the High North. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p.15)

As previously highlighted, Norway is, today, primarily a gas producing country, as the oil reserves have steadily been decreasing since the early 2000s. Furthermore, gas constitutes the bulk of the expected petroleum resources in the unexplored areas in the Arctic. Whereas the 2012 White paper explains that natural gas could replace coal in order to decrease greenhouse gas emissions, the representation of gas as a 'bridging fuel' is developed further in recent statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende:

> The Arctic is home to globally significant oil and gas reserves. (…) a large share of the global energy supply will still have to come from fossil fuels for decades. Even while the global economy shifts away from oil, gas will remain an important bridging fuel by reducing emissions without dispensing with them. For that reason, it is safe to assume that Arctic energy will have its day—and in the Arctic summer, a day is a long time. (Brende, 2015a)

Consequently, the representation of gas as a 'bridging fuel' has become one of the more prominent arguments in the High North discourse in favour of expanding the Arctic petroleum industry. This discourse arose in the aftermath of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) 2007 Executive Summary, presenting natural gas as a transition fuel in phasing out coal and oil, in addition to acting as a 'bridge' into a renewable energy future (IPCC, 2007). Moreover, the IEA has signalled that we might be in a 'golden age for gas' (IEA, 2012). This discourse was quickly adopted by the industry, and in addition to being

a key argument for further Norwegian gas development in the Arctic, has also been used to promote the contested extraction of unconventional gas resources in, for instance, Canada:

> Natural gas is the world's cleanest-burning fossil fuel. B.C. [British Colombia] exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) can significantly lower global greenhouse gas emissions by replacing coal-fired power plants and oil-based transportation fuels with a much cleaner alternative. LNG development in B.C. can have lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions than anywhere else in the world by promoting the use of clean electricity to power LNG plants. B.C.'s LNG industry will contribute to our leadership in the transition to a low carbon economy. (BC MEM, 2012, p. 2, as sited in Stephenson, Doukas & Shaw, 2012, p. 454)

Although natural gas might be the cleanest-burning fossil fuel, the emissions from production is still contested and not taken sufficiently into consideration. As there is an increase in the development of unconventional gas reserves from shale and sand, emission rates also vary considerably. Stephenson, Doukas and Shaw (2012) argue that the discourse around gas as a 'bridging fuel' should be abandoned, and that it would be more fruitful to focus more on transparency and openness around the production side of natural gas. More importantly, when considering gas as a transition fuel, one should ask, "[w]hat types of natural gas, under what conditions, can contribute to a more sustainable energy future?" (Stephenson, Doukas & Shaw, 2012, p. 458). Although natural gas production in the Arctic is more conventional, it is nevertheless conducted in very climate-challenging, contested and vulnerable arena. However, if the Arctic Frontier conference, or the latest statements made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Børge Brende is anything to go by, it does not appear that Norway has abandoned the 'bridging' discourse around natural gas production; rather it appears to have intensified and turned into one of the key arguments for fossil fuel exploration in the Arctic:

> Renewable energy use should, and will, increase considerably, but a large share of the global energy supply will still have to come from sources such as gas. Gas will be an important bridge between a fossil fuel based and a low-carbon economy. Due to stringent requirements and strict regulation over the course of many years, the Norwegian oil and gas sector is a world leader in terms of limiting negative environmental impacts. Greenhouse gas emissions from oil and gas production on the Norwegian continental shelf are considerably lower than the international average. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 14)

This last insert links directly to the next representation in the High North discourse, which is one where Norwegian resource exploration is one of the most environmental in the world, henceforth, Norway should drill for oil for the sake of the environment. The statement also links to the storyline of Norway being the 'best in class', casting a positive light on Norwegian petroleum exploration.

4.1.6 Drilling for the environment

The development of the representation 'drilling for the environment' rests on multiple strands of discourse. On one hand, it is based on Norway's role as an environmental 'steward' of the Arctic; that we know best how to protect the fragile polar environment. Furthermore, there has been an 'othering of Russia' as an environmental foe to the Arctic environment, where Norway has to show the way towards more environmental resource exploration (Hønneland & Jensen 2008; Jensen 2010; Jensen 2015). This 'othering' has recently developed into a representation of Norway as one of the most environmental petroleum nations in the world, and that it would benefit the global greenhouse gas emission rate if Norway continues exploring petroleum in the High North. Finally, I conclude that in the Norwegian High North policies, the use of the word 'environment' can be interpreted as a 'buzzword', creating enough ambiguity in policy making to satisfy several strands of interests.

First, Norway has positioned itself as a 'steward' of the Arctic environment, and the underlying theme in the High North policy papers is that any form of development in the Arctic will have to take a sustainable and integrated approach. It is in the Arctic we see global climate change occurring first. The circumpolar region is warming twice as fast as the rest of the planet. The melting land ice will increase global sea levels, and the opened waters will speed up further climate change due to the positive feedback mechanism of the dark sea. Policy paper statements maintain an awareness of Arctic environmental responsibility:

> Norway must lead the way in the environmental area, be an active partner for other countries and a long-term and trustworthy guardian of environmental and cultural values in the High North. The Government provides for wealth creation through sustainable use of marine and land resources, while safeguarding the functioning and productivity of the ecosystem. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 73)

> The Government intends Norway to be the best steward of the environment and the natural resources in the High North. We will protect the environment in the High

> North and facilitate value creation and human activity while ensuring that ecosystems, ecological goods and services and biodiversity are maintained. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 97)

The representation of Norway as a 'steward' of the Arctic environment builds neatly on the altruistic discourse of Norway drilling for aid. As previously discussed, being a country with a strong aid culture is important for Norwegians' national identity. Similarly, Norway has also been at the forefront of international environmental diplomacy, with the 1987 Brundtland Report of 'Our Common Future', where the concept of 'sustainable development' was applied to environmental governance in order to protect the environment for future generations. The wording of a sustainable future for the Arctic environment is very much present in the current High North policies:

> Climate change, ocean acidification and increasing levels of activity will give rise to new challenges for the authorities responsible for environmental and natural resource management, and they will have to meet new demands for knowledge and adaptation. Norway must therefore develop its knowledge-based environmental and resource management regime. We need to succeed in this so that the inevitable processes of change do not cause degradation of important habitats and ecosystems or depletion of living resources that we need as a basis for development and welfare in the future. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 16)

The development of Norway's 'environmentalism' in the world, and the image of the rightful 'steward' of the Arctic were furthered deepened in the 1990s after a sharp increase in reports of serious environmental disasters occurring not far from the Norwegian border in the Russian north. Orchestrated by sensationalist mass-media and idealistic environmental organizations, this 'environmental-disaster discourse' was picked up by the Government and adopted in the High North policy-making, where Norwegian aid money was poured into cleaning up the nuclear disaster in northwest Russia (Hønneland, 2005). The renewed focus of the Barents area in the 1990s gave way to the 'High North euphoria[20]' of the 2000s, after reports started coming out of the substantial amounts of natural resources hiding under the melting ice. The political discourse quickly adopted the story-line that Russia was already in progress of extracting valuable resources, and in light of their poor environmental records, Norway have to join in to help ensuring a higher environmental standard in the High North

[20] 'Nordområdeeuforien' (Hønneland and Jensen 2008)

(Hønneland & Jensen, 2008). Jensen (2010) looks closer at this phenomenon where one discourse [drilling for the environment] goes into the opposing discourse [no drilling], taking the core message and making it their own. This is referred to as 'discourse co-optation', which illustrates the way the oil industry took the environmentalists argument of 'Russia as an environmental foe who should not drill for oil' and made this the main argument for why Norway should pursue drilling in the High North (Hønneland & Jensen, 2008; Jensen, 2010). Consequently, the environmental organizations stood behind, bereft, with a weakened argument watching the industry and politicians developing a discourse of 'drilling for the environment'.

In recent High North discourse, there is a representation that takes this rhetoric a step further, and presents the Norwegian petroleum industry as more environmental than Russia, and also the rest of the world; therefore it is more beneficial for the environment that Norway continues resource exploration in the High North:

> Due to stringent requirements and strict regulation over the course of many years, the Norwegian oil and gas sector is a world leader in terms of limiting negative environmental impacts. Greenhouse gas emissions from oil and gas production on the Norwegian continental shelf are considerably lower than the international average. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 14)

In order for this argument to have bearing, it would mean that Norwegian petroleum exploitation would automatically be replaced by a less environmentally friendly petroleum production method elsewhere. Nevertheless, this representation can be viewed as a natural continuation of the discourse of Norway 'drilling for the environment'.

Another aspect of the 'drilling for the environment' discourse is how the word 'environment' is used as a 'buzzword'. In the representation of environmental Norwegian petroleum exploration, there is very little emphasis on what the 'environment' really means. According to Cornwall (2010), when forming policies, it is important to create excess room with enough ambiguity in order to satisfy the multiple actors and audiences affected by the policies. As previously shown, the High North policies have been a result of impulses not only from politicians and their advisors, but also been shaped by informal meetings with the industry through forums such as Konkraft. When exploring the PR-strategies of the Norwegian petroleum industry, Ihlen (2007) outlines an emerging norm embedded within the

oil industry and the Government, underlying that 'what is good for the oil industry, is good for Norway'. This is represented in the High North policies, where it is repeatedly shown that oil revenues are linked closely to the running of a well-functioning welfare system. "The oil and gas industry is the largest contributor to the Norwegian economy, and provides major opportunities for increased employment and growth in Northern Norway" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 20). Additionally, for the oil industry, it is increasingly important to position itself in an environmental light as the world is waking up to mounting climate changes caused by greenhouse gas emissions. This, as has been shown, is also evident by the representations presented in the High North policy papers, portraying the Norwegian oil industry in a more favourable environmental light than their competitors. The reader of the High North policy papers are continuously faced with representations such as, "[w]e must therefore facilitate the coexistence of different industries within an environmentally sustainable framework" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 14), which, when considering it closely, says nothing of what its true implications are. What is an 'environmentally sustainable framework?' What aspects of the 'environment' is taken into consideration when making such a statement? Can we say that industrial development such as oil exploration is at all 'environmentally sustainable?' When the Government states that Norwegian oil production follows the strictest environmental regulations, is it henceforth implied that the oil production *is* environmental and that these regulations are strict enough to actually protect the environment? Cornwall (2010: 3) states, "buzzwords get their 'buzz' from being in-words, words that define what is in vogue." 'Environment' or 'environmental' is here interpreted as such a buzzword from the sheer number of times it is used in the Norwegian High North policy-papers. Moreover, buzzwords exist so that they can be used without further reference or explanation of meaning, other than what the reader attaches to the word. In effect, buzzwords in policy papers aid to disguise multiple agendas, giving the policy makers space to wriggle around and alienate their responsibilities (Cornwall 2010).

4.2 Summary: Polarizing preferences in the Norwegian High North Policy

After the first High North White paper was published in 2005, it has been repeated that the Government regards the High North as its most strategic and important foreign policy area. This thesis outlines the discourse around the development of Norwegian petroleum policy to detect how certain representations are reproduced and developed to justify the need to carry out petroleum exploration in contested areas. In the discourse around petroleum exploration in the High North there is an element of interdiscursivity. General assumptions of good governance and Arctic stewardship concerning the environment are used to argue for why Norway should carry out petroleum exploration in these fragile areas. Interdiscursivity shows us how discourse can be adopted from one area to reproduce arguments and representations to make them stronger in another. Likewise, the story-line of Norway as an altruistic nation that has a strong aid profile and regards itself as a country that provides 'sustainability to the world,' underlines the argument that Norway should provide environmental energy to help poor people in the developing world. According to Leira et al. (2007), identity building can be seen in light of a nation's foreign policies. Through foreign policy statements, images of state-identity are created, and through actions, these images are further reproduced and challenged; strengthened or weakened (Leira et al., 2007). Historically, there reigned a broad agreement that Norway was not to politicise its oil and energy politics and bring it into the realm of foreign policy (Leira & Sverdrup, 2013). However, as Norway has become one of the leading gas exporters in the world, as well as a large oil producer, keeping oil and energy interests out of the foreign policy process has not succeeded in reality, as can be seen by the discourse in the High North policy-papers. In a study on Norwegian national interests and identities conducted by Leira and Sverdrup (2013), they conclude that although international reputation as an environmentally conscious nation is regarded as important theoretically; in practice it is not emphasized in the same manner as economic and energy interests, which are regarded by far as the most important foreign policy interests.

The representations and storylines we see in the High North policy-papers support the conclusions made by Leira and Sverdrup (2013) that the economic interests around an intensified petroleum development in the Arctic are weighted more favourably than protecting the environment by high mitigation standards and trying to limit ice melting. Nevertheless, as the government is masking their 'real' reasons for carrying out resource exploration in the Arctic through a discourse of 'drilling for aid and the environment', in addition to arguing that

natural gas should act as a 'bridging fuel' towards a renewable future, it creates paradoxes and 'double speak' which can ultimately weaken the Governments arguments. From an outside perspective, Norwegian High North policy can be interpreted as two-faced, especially if the High north policy is seen from an environmental perspective. Historically, Norway has prided itself with being a 'steward' and 'protector' of the fragile Arctic environment, in line with the altruistic approach taken towards international policy. Two realities became clear in the wake of the Cold War - first, that global warming was occurring much faster in Artic than in the rest of the world, and second, that almost a quarter of the worlds undiscovered fossil fuel reserves could be under the melting Arctic ice. In this aftermath, Norway has conducted a two-pronged foreign policy in the High North. Moreover, this two-pronged policy seemingly operates side by side, untroubled by its opposing messages. The mid-2000s saw a growing discourse around Norway's role around protecting the Arctic environment (Leira et al., 2007). The Management Plan for the Marine Environment in the Barents Sea and outside the Lofoten Sea areas, published in 2006 by the Ministry of Climate and Environment, laid the foundation for conducting all forms of industrial development under strict environmental regulation in order to protect the ecosystems. The opening statements show this:

> The eco-systems in the Barents Sea and in the seas around Lofoten has important environmental value, and contains living resources that forms the basis of significant value creation. (…) The Government finds it increasingly important to ensure these oceans fundamental ecosystems in a long-term perspective, in so much as it remains clean, rich and productive[21]. (Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2006, p. 7)

Similar wordings are also visible in the High North policy papers, as shown previously, and the fluidity between the environment and economic interests goes for most of the time hand in hand, not really in contradiction, but ambiguous enough to pose questions. Nevertheless, areas of polarizing preferences are emerging, as it becomes challenging to maintain a consistent Arctic politic with the two oft-opposing storylines. For instance, in May 2015, the Government, in unison, decided to withdraw the Pension Fund out of international coal production (NRK, 2015). However, while this is unfolding, the Government is at the same time standing firm behind and supporting a subsidized coal industry in Svalbard, with the equivalent CO2 emissions of 3 million cars (Naturverforbundet, 2009). Moreover,

[21] Authors own translation

coinciding with the decision of withdrawing the Pension Fund from coal came the news that the Government invested 500 million NOK in the coal company Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani, which, without the Government's financial support, was facing bankruptcy (Kramviken, 2015). That governments in general follows a politic of self-interest and opportunistic economic development is not surprising. Moreover, it is in line with a growing view within social studies that the state fails in environmental governance, as it is unable to act in the global governance structure of an increasingly globalized world driven by political-economic deregulation and privatization (Kristoffersen, 2014). Nevertheless, we have seen that the state is not a static actor in environmental governance, and that there is a high degree of fluid and transformative preferences that governs policy-making. However, from a perspective of developing a national identity around Norway as an 'environmentally conscious' nation, these opposing preferences become problematic, and will not be helpful when attempting to set high international standards for future climate negotiation, as well as supporting Norway's role as a 'steward' of the Arctic environment.

5.0 The Analysis, part II

Chapter 4 concludes that there is a high degree of fluidity and contradiction in the Norwegian High North policy papers. On the one hand, there are clear economic drivers that steer policy making, such as the continuance of a petroleum industry. On the other hand, there are important and urgent environmental concerns that, in accordance with Norwegian altruistic national identity, also become a central theme in High North politics. The next step is to investigate whether the discourse around energy and environment in the High North policy making can be seen as a part of the overarching security discourse. I have investigated Norwegian policy documents to uncover representations of energy and environmental policy that can be seen as a 'widening' of the traditionalist security approach in the High North. In the theory chapter, 'security' is identified as a speech act, and 'securitizing moves' are seen as 'self-referential' forms of speech (Grindheim, 2009). In order for something to be seen as a security threat, it just has to be perceived as a threat, not necessarily be an actual threat or invoke extraordinary measures. Investigating the widening of the security concept in relation to the Arctic becomes a link in understanding the many driving-forces behind policy making in the High North. Although the state, in a traditionalist approach, sets the security agenda, there is now an increased focus on including other actors to partake in the security debate (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014). This chapter first outlines the widening of the security concept in the High North. Furthermore, I look at issues identified as security concerns in the policy papers, and attempt to identify the voices behind the agenda setting in order to understand the driving forces behind Norwegian policy making in the Arctic.

5.1. Moving away from a traditionalist security approach in the High North

5.1.1 From militarization to cooperation

According to Heininen (2014), Arctic security concerns match those of classical geopolitics. Military security is formed based on the technology models of geopolitics, while resource politics are formed around resource models of geopolitics, driving relations between the Arctic and the rest of the world. During the Cold War, the High North was an important and strategic region for the Soviet Union, where the first nuclear submarine was launched, and in the 1960s, the Northern Fleet became the biggest marine fleet in the Soviet Union (Hønneland, 2005). During that time, heavy militarization of the region was a central element of Norway's High North security policy, both in response to the power-struggle between two superpowers and to secure national borders (Hoogensen Gjørv & Goloviznina, 2014).

> For more than 40 years, strategic and geopolitical interest in the High North was shaped by the logic of the Cold War and the region's inaccessibility.
> The High North is still an area of strategic military interest, among other things because a large proportion of Russia's nuclear forces are located there and the region is used as a site for military exercises involving important aircraft and naval units. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 18)

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a shift away from the military driven security approach in the Artic, towards an emphasis on regional and international cooperation. The Arctic Council was initiated in 1998, based on a growing concern for the Arctic environment. The circumpolar cooperation was officially formed in 1996 by signing the Ottawa declaration, and composed of the eight Arctic states: USA, Canada, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Denmark (Greenland). The heavy militarization of the region, and the increasing anxiety around the mounting nuclear waste, drove the Arctic states to facilitate circumpolar cooperation, and in recent times has grown to include matters beyond environmental concerns. Due to climate change and melting ice, the region is 'opening' up for further resource exploration, expanding fishing grounds and shipping routes, which increases the need for international cooperation and agreements between the Arctic states. Moreover, security concerns in the Arctic now include fields such as economics, energy, environment and social security.

In light of the climatic changes affecting the Arctic and the increased international attention around the region, the Norwegian Government has identified the High North as "Norway's most important strategic foreign policy priority" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 9). The heightened focus around the Arctic, due to the opportunistic consequences of global warming, allows the Arctic States to gain access to areas previously covered with impenetrable ice. From a realist perspective, security is about every state securing their own sovereignty and power in an anarchistic world (Rottem, 2010). From this perspective, Arctic security should be concerned with securing territory and claiming access over resources, causing increased tension between the Arctic states. This has been widely debated, and one of the most cited sceptics to a peaceful Arctic 'scramble' was the former US coast guard Scott Borgerson. He is quoted in an article from *Foreign Affairs* from 2008, saying "[w]ithout U.S. leadership to help develop diplomatic solutions to competing claims and potential conflicts, the region could erupt in an armed mad dash for its resources" (Borgerson, 2008, n.p.). Stokke (2011) however, argues that the conditions for a peaceful resource management of the Arctic

is favourable due to the 'dynamic governance structure' already in place. The Law of the Sea forms the governing body responsible for settling territorial disputes and is mostly respected by the Arctic nations. Delimitations of the Arctic maritime zones were already well underway when the 'scramble' for resources became a topic, and there are clear indications of a cooperative tone between the Arctic nations in recent policy statements: "[t]he melting ice and expected increase in activity in the Arctic Ocean will make cooperation on the implementation of existing instruments and the development of supplementary rules in various areas essential." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 61)

Although ensuring sovereignty and protecting borders is still an important security concern in the Arctic region, the Government now places more emphasis on ensuring peaceful cooperation and collaboration between Arctic states. This is seen as an important step towards the successful governance of Arctic resources and area. In relation to Norway's relation to its biggest neighbour, Russia, cooperation is regarded as one of the 'main pillars' of the High North Policy:

> Russia is a constructive player in the High North and appears to take the view that its interests are best served by keeping tensions low and promoting cooperation. Strengthening Norway's relations with Russia is one of the main pillars of the Government's High North policy. Developing contacts and cooperation across the border has a clear security dimension. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 74)

5.1.2. Moving away from a traditionalist approach to security

In this thesis, the theoretical framework of post-structuralist securitization is applied to explain the widening and deepening of the security concept beyond military security. Securitizing theory was originally designed with the intent to conceptualize security concerns outside military security, and at the same time creating guidelines and criteria for setting security apart from other forms of politics (Wæver, 2010, cited in Gad & Peteresen, 2011). "Security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics" (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde. al., 1998, p. 23). An issue can become politicized, meaning that it is up for political debate, is a part of a policy-making process, or under resource allocation and under political decision-making processes. Alternatively, an issue becomes 'securitized', when the issue is seen as a threat to the State, requiring emergency action that reaches beyond the bounds of normal political processes (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 24). As outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Hansen (2011) identifies three important aspects, which further 'deepen' the

securitization framework in a post-structuralist approach, making the framework more applicable to the current security debate. First, one should identify the discursive structures that represent cases and phenomena and brings them into the larger discursive field. Second, we have to look at the underlying knowledge a phenomenon is based on. Finally, it is important to outline the foundation and reasons why a security problem is identified as such, and what kind of issue constitutes a security problem (Hansen, 2011). Chapter 4 looked at the most prominent representations for petroleum development in the High North and how they are brought into the overarching High North discourse. I have attempted to link the representations with historical patterns in the discourse or global trends and identity building that affects the direction of the representations. Lastly, this chapter develops the foundations and reasons, or in the words of Hansen (2011), the "substantial modality", for why certain issues reach the security agenda, and what those issues are (p. 357). In the scope of this essay, we keep to the governmental policy papers, making the state the central security actor. However, as has been discussed, the Government is not a static or isolated institution; rather it is affected by a range of interests and information from a varying body of institutions and groups. Due to the set limitations of this research, I look at 'securitizing moves', which does not entail that an issue has been fully 'securitized' according to the Copenhagen School. It merely entails that the issue has been brought to the agenda as a 'speech act', which can be identified in the High North political discourse. However, for an issue to be fully 'securitized' it requires the general audience to accept or obey emergency replies or actions that otherwise would not be accepted (Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde, 1998).

In the most recent policy papers on the High North, there is now an inclusion of non-militaristic security issues, which the Government recognizes should be included in a 'wider' security approach for the Arctic:

> Today the security policy situation in the north is complex and marked by a broad range of different risk factors. There is a growing international focus on the High North due to issues related to fisheries, energy, the environment and the melting of the polar ice. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 37)
>
> Climate change, easier access to natural resources and growing human activity mean that more attention is being focused on the High North, and that there is greater potential for both cooperation and conflict of interest. Security policy therefore needs

> to be based on an extended security concept.[22]Growing human activity in the region as the sea ice melts and retreats is accompanied by a high risk of accidents at sea, pollution, and environmental degradation as a result of a growing volume of shipping and more use of resources. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 68)

The inclusion of issues stretching beyond the 'traditionalist' approach to security is evident in the previous two quotes from the policy papers. The following sections will identify and outline these 'securitization moves' in the High North policy. This can be further linked to the general discourse on energy and environment in the Arctic.

5.2 Energy security in the Arctic

The concept of energy security in the Arctic has gained considerable focus, both internationally and in the recent policy papers on the Norwegian High North because of the vast unexplored hydrocarbon reserves believed to be increasingly accessible due to global warming. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is an 'intensification' of the petroleum discourse from the current Government, as seen from the opening up of new and highly contested areas for resource exploration in the 23rd licencing round. Energy security is a concept with altering meanings, depending on how it is used. IEA defines energy security as "the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price," with a division between long-term and short-term energy security (IEA, 2015, n.p.). If an energy producing country, such as Norway, refers to energy security, it is about ensuring a high level of energy production in order to secure steady export levels and economic gain. Whereas, energy security for a country relying on imported energy is about securing a stable level of accessible energy at a low price, with a high degree of safety and reliance. For Norway, accessibility to new petroleum areas in the Arctic is therefore a step in ensuring security of high production levels of energy and a high level of income. The role of the Barents Sea as a new energy province underlines the Government's expectations of the future of the region:

> If we move the map a little, we can place the High North in the centre. The High North is a kind of new centre, not just on the map, but as a resource area. (…) We now see that the presence of oil and gas deposits also opens up the Barents Sea as a new European energy province. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, p. 67)

[22] «Territorial security, ecological security, economic security, social security and political security» (White paper 2011-2012: 68 – footnote)

5.2.1. Norwegian energy security after peak oil

In Norway, energy security in the Arctic is linked closely to economic security and social security of both the people living in the North and to maintain a high level of national welfare. Although the Government does not seem to acknowledge publicly that Norway has reached 'peak oil,' the production level on the Norwegian continental shelf has steadily decreased since the early 2000s, and it is tempting to conclude that the most accessible fossil fuel reserves have been developed. Furthermore, in order to maintain the current high production levels, new petroleum fields need to be developed. In the policy papers, the petroleum development in the Arctic represents a vital corner stone, enabling energy security, economic security and social security for people living in the North. Moreover, it ensures a high level of welfare and standard of living across the rest of the country: "The oil and gas sector is a mainstay of economic activity in the north, and offers unique opportunities for value creation, employment and growth, and for generating other positive spin-off effects in North Norway…" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b, p. 14).

In the policy papers, there is a representation of a growing petroleum industry as the solution to the dwindling of towns and lack of work opportunities for Northerners. Hammerfest is used as an example of a success story after the development of the Snøhvit and Goliat fields, where ripple effects were created, boosting other industry and economic development in the region and ensuring population growth rather than decline (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Local environmental concerns are downplayed in favour of growing petroleum development; the focus is on securing value-creation, positive ripple effects and creating new job opportunities for the local population. Nevertheless, while a developing petroleum industry might ensure economic and social security for the local population for a time-period, it becomes increasingly apparent that there are strong global forces at play that can undermine Norwegian security, creating insecurity when one has become too dependent on one single industry. This human security dilemma will be discussed further in section 5.4.

5.2.2. Ensuring energy security for a growing global demand

Whilst a political rhetoric of ensuring local value creation and social security of people living in the North is frequently used when arguing for resource exploration, it is the concept of ensuring global energy security that resonates in the Norwegian discourse on energy security in the Arctic. The representation of a stable and reliable Norwegian energy supply to ensure European and global energy security connects to the established representation of

'drilling for aid.' In recent years, reports show a steep increase in global demand for energy when the developing world is lifted out of poverty. The IEA predicts that the global demand for fossil fuels will increase by 50% by 2030 compared to 2006 levels (IEA, 2006). Moreover, as we are predicted to reach (or have reached, depending on who interprets the figures) global peak oil, there is, according to the IEA, an urgent demand for discovering new hydrocarbon resources, as we are facing a deficit of about 12.5 million barrels a day (IEA, 2007). In light of this, Norway emerges as a predictable and reliable energy supplier. Norway plays on its history of being a small and respected country, while at the same time being a major petroleum actor, with a stable and transparent economy safely entrenched in the global market (Grindheim, 2009). Not only does petroleum exploration in the High North ensure social security for the local population in the North, Norwegian energy can also contribute to safeguard global energy security in an increasingly insecure world with big and powerful energy nations. This is clearly represented in the following inserts from several policy papers:

> We [Norway] have trust because we are a small, stable and political predictable country, and a significant exporter of oil and gas. Norway is close to both Europe and the US. We have a common border and interests with Russia. Furthermore, Norway is a western OECD country with considerable respect in the Middle East, the Gulf region and developing countries with oil economies. We are also fully integrated in the world economy, but with an administration model with solid national control over Norwegian base. We have a partly state owned oil company (2/3 of the shares), but with a broad participation of all the big international companies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009b, p. 65).

More recent statements highlight Norway as a reliable energy supplier for Europe, and that energy security is furthermore an important global concern: "[o]il and gas deliveries from this region can improve European energy security and make an important contribution to global energy supplies, and at the same time provide a basis for developing industry and services in North Norway" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 15). In addition, this White paper outlines: "[i]n our contacts with other states and foreign commercial interests, issues related to access to energy and energy security will become increasingly important both in themselves and as a part of foreign and security policy" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 15).

However, this representation of a stable Norwegian energy supplier presumes a high production level of petroleum. As previously discussed, Norway is experiencing dwindling production levels of petroleum and maintaining the same level as in the 2000s, therefore

increased production seems an unlikely scenario, especially in a world with decreasing energy prices. Fossil fuel exploration in the Arctic is both technologically challenging and costly. Nevertheless, as seen in the current Government's rhetoric, plans to ensure meeting a growing demand of global energy security persist as a central element in the High North policy making.

Energy security thus works in coherence with a more state-centric, traditional approach to security. Although introducing energy security as a security concept is a widening of the traditionalist security agenda, it still revolves around the state's interest and protection of its resources, welfare and income, thereby still fitting the traditionalist state-centric security approach. Environmental security on the other hand, also includes a level of 'human security,' where individual security is drawn into the discourse. Traditionalist views regard the state as the 'security provider,' while human security makes the individual the security referent (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014). Even though the Copenhagen securitizing school does not endorse directly the 'human security' concept, it opens up for non-state actors to partake in the securitizing process: "[t]he essence of the theory is that security can be understood as a 'speech act' through which a particular issue is framed by one or more 'securitizing actors' as constituting an existential threat to a designated referent object" (Åtland & Pedersen, 2014, p. 19). The next two sections will first sketch out the environmental security discourse in the most recent policy papers, followed by an outline of the concept of 'opportunistic adaptation' introduced by Kristoffersen (2015). 'Opportunistic adaptation' shows how the environmental consequences of global warming are highlighted as positive for further development of the region, and that the focus should be on adapting to the changing environment rather than mitigating the underlying causes of global warming. The final section goes further into the 'human security' debate and highlights the need to include a more individualistic view on security as opposed to current state-centric views.

5.3 Environmental security ('opportunistic adaptation')

This section shows how environmental security in the Arctic has emerged in the policy paper on the High North. Environmental security in the Arctic is presented in the policy papers as both vital to the preservation and survival of fragile ecosystems, species, and indigenous peoples, in addition to being central to ensuring global environmental security.

> Long-term, integrated management of the environment and natural resources is crucial for securing the livelihoods of present and future generations. The diversity of species and habitats is essential for maintaining ecological processes and systems, which in turn form the basis for human settlement, value-creation and welfare. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 98)

According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), environmental security discourse, as opposed to other forms of security discourses (political, societal and economical), is shaped by a diverse range of actors, and not merely the state, thus it also includes social movements, organizations, governmental departments and epistemic communities. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment first manifested the environmental security discourse in 1972. In the following decade, Kristoffersen (2014) argues that Norway went through a period of 'environmentalization of the State', where the voices of environmentalists mixed with government officials in important government committees, pushed through new environmental regulations, such as clear targets for reduction of CO_2 emissions and later a tax on CO_2 emissions. Due to the early introduction of stringent emission targets and environmental taxes, Norway appeared as an international leader on the issue (Kristoffersen, 2014). This, according to Kristoffersen and Young (2010), reflected an inclusive and open Norwegian government, who welcomed environmental organizations in the political debates and institutions. However, in the recent decade, as this analysis has shown, the petroleum industry has been allowed to partake more in the policy making processes in the High North, and turned the environmentalists' arguments on its head and used it in order to promote further exploration in the Arctic. This turn of events has been proceeded by what Kristoffersen (2015) has deemed an Arctic policy of 'opportunistic adaptation.'

Kristoffersen's (2015) article on *Opportunistic Adaptation: New discourses on oil, equity and environmental security* presents 'opportunistic adaptation' as an emerging concept in the Government's High North environmental policy. 'Opportunistic adaptation' is seen as the tendency of Norwegian policy formed by a discourse where the positive consequences of climate change in the Arctic are highlighted to a higher extent than the negative consequences. Adaptation to the evolving environmental effects of climate change gains importance rather than mitigating the underlying causes of climate change, which would ultimately reduce the negative consequences in the Arctic and in the rest of the world. An example from the 2012 White paper shows this form of 'opportunistic adaptation:'

> Climate change, greater access to natural resources and growing human activity suggest that the High North will be a region of considerable geopolitical interest. The Government's overall objective is to make use of the opportunities this offers, and at the same time manage the environment and the natural resources sustainably, and maintain the High North as a peaceful and stable region. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 18-19)

Here, the Government clearly states that climate change leads to greater access to resources and opportunities, which the Government will make use of, while the environment and natural resources can be 'managed.' This in turn will lead to a peaceful and stable region. There is no attempt to address the underlying causes of climate change, nor how we can mitigate future climate change to limit the extent of the negative consequences of a melting Arctic. Furthermore, to claim that the Arctic environment can be 'managed' is to undermine the enormous powers and resources at stake, located in one of the most inhospitable areas on the planet. Nevertheless, the same White paper continues to develop a policy of opportunistic adaptation' for the region:

> (…) the impacts of the changes we are observing in the north may be at least as severe and have very serious consequences for people's living conditions in other parts of the world. For example, rising sea levels caused by the melting of inland ice sheets will have a major global impact. At the same time, the melting ice is providing greater access to resources in the High North and opening up new opportunities for shipping. This in turn is leading to growing interest in exploring resources in the Arctic and an increase in maritime activity. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012, p. 12)

The Government acknowledges that climate change is causing melting ice and rising sea levels, which will severely affect other places in the world, leading to reduced environmental security. Notwithstanding these 'severe consequences' for people's lives in other places in the world, the main message is that the resources will be available for Norway to exploit, and as long as it is managed sustainably, it is the Government's first priority for the region. In both of these White paper statements, the acknowledgement of petroleum exploration as the main cause for global climate change in the first place is completely absent from the reasoning, keeping these two realities separate in the policy making process. The Government is recognizing the paradox we are facing, however, it does not believe that it is Norway's duty to resolve that paradox. Rather, it stands to reason that it is Norway's duty to make the most out of the paradoxical situation, as this will both ensure environmental and energy security:

> (…) introducing restrictions unilaterally in Norway or in a particular region of the world, would probably have limited, or possibly even the opposite effect; in a world with increasing demand for energy, I believe imposing such restrictions could result in energy substitution of the wrong kind, with coal and heavy oil replacing natural gas. My point is – yes, we are facing a paradox. It is not a national or regional paradox, but a global one. We must increase out capacity to deal with challenges to economic activity. (Støre, 2012)

This quote is from a speech made by former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, at the Offshore Northern Seas Expo in Stavanger, where he connects energy security and environmental security to the established story-lines of petroleum exploration in the High North. First, Norway should cater to the growing global demand for energy. Furthermore, a restriction on 'environmental' petroleum exploration in the High North may result in bad energy substitution. This relates to the resonance that natural gas is a 'bridging fuel,' which Norway should exploit for environmental reasons. And finally, there is recognition that we are facing a paradoxical situation. Nevertheless, as this paradox is global, the solutions should therefore be global. There is a complete de-coupling of two interconnected strands of policy that, in the Norwegian perspective, do not seem to connect. The last point clearly links to Leichenko and O'Brien's (2008) argument of 'double exposure.' Global environmental change and globalisation are often kept apart in two separate discourses, where they are compartmentalized and presented as two different areas of policy. The quote from Jonas Gahr Støre is an example of this, where the need for us to increase energy supply overshadows the reasons for why these energy resources are available in the first place, and the adverse consequences that arise for people other places on the planet. Consequently, the multiple drivers of climate change and globalization induce positive feedbacks that enables further resource exploration, increased trade and transport and a higher net greenhouse gas emissions, ultimately causing further climate change (Leichenko & O'Brien, 2008).

5.4. Human security: the ultimate 'wide' security approach?

Although the 'human security' approach follows a different framework than post-structuralist securitization theory, Hoogensen Gjørv (2014) argues that the broad framework of 'human security' does not exclude securitization theory; rather, these two strands of theory can work in tandem, not in opposition. So far, I have looked at the security discourse in the

Norwegian High North policies and identified a widening of the security concept to include 'energy security' and 'environmental security.' This has been done by looking at the 'speech act' in the form of the written word, which, according to securitization theory, is the way to identify emerging security concepts. One of the critiques of the securitization theory is that it maintains a state-centric approach to securitization; or to who can be the 'speech actor' (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014; Heininen, 2014). Since it is the state which has the ultimate position to enforce the 'emergency measures' and "actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure", the state is the ultimate 'speech actor' (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 24). The traditionalists' approach to security carries with it a heavily militarized, nationalistic and ideological foundation, and critiques of widening the security concept would claim that including non-militaristic issues as security issues would endanger national security (Heininen, 2014). However, advocates for a 'human security' approach point out that the army is not always the best protector against new threats, as it can potentially make a threat worse by getting involved militarily. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) saw the need for a new concept to include wider security issues, often with an individualistic nature. In 1994, the concept of 'human security' was introduced in the Human Development Report, where 'human security' is defined as 'freedom from fear, freedom from want'. However, the practicality of who acts as the security provider and how security issues are set on the agenda and responded to still retains problematic aspects of the widening of the security agenda (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014). Furthermore, policy making is a fluid process, and new security issues come on the agenda, while others falters. This, as previously outlined, became evident from the period of 'environmentalization of the state' in the 1980s, where multiple actors and organizations partook in policy debates around the environmental consequences of petroleum exploitation, until recently, when tides turned and other actors, such as oil companies, stepped in and took the environmentalists' seats (Kristofferesen, 2014).

Heininen (2014) identifies five issues which should be included in a human security approach to Arctic security: pollution and environmental degradation; general environmental degradation; utilization and transportation of energy sources; impacts of climate change; trans-nationalism and globalization; innovations in governance. These issues, to a lesser or larger extent, are covered in the High North policy papers. However, the links that interconnect and bring these issues together are not developed in the policy reports, as well as including a more individualistic security view. Applying a 'human security' approach to these issues would contribute to identify and recognize areas, which requires a more individualistic approach to security. Previously in this chapter, I touched upon how the Government has

portrayed ‘energy security’ as a way of ensuring local value creation, increased welfare and jobs for Northern regions. Hence, ‘energy security’ links closely to ‘social security’ and ‘economic security’. A ‘human security’ approach will include both ecological and environmental security, in addition to individual security in the equation for a more holistic approach. The Arctic situation illustrates how difficult and integrated these systems are. The environmental and ecological consequences of melting Arctic ice can be severe and catastrophic for some animals and humans, leading to extinction and mass migration. On the other hand, it opens up areas for further resource development and shipping routes. This again entails economic opportunities for many people. At the same time, increased traffic and pollution might worsen conditions for fishing, reindeer herding and agriculture in local areas. On a global scale, a warmer Arctic leads to a global sea level rise, a possible change in the oceans currents and a speeding up of global warming, which again is life threatening for millions of people living at sea level or in climate-harsh areas. Thus, at the same time, access to more petroleum recourses could help bring the developing world out of poverty. The widening and deepening of the Arctic security agenda is a crucial step in understanding local and global consequences of climate change, the driving forces behind globalisation and global environmental change, and to put in perspective the state’s interest versus local and individual concerns. However, as pointed out by Hoogensen et al. (2009), “(…) little knowledge exists of the creation of security and insecurity, and the identification of threats, at non-state levels as dominant state-based security discourses attempt to maintain their stranglehold on what can and cannot be called ‘security.’” (p. 4) As long as there is a de-coupling of the causes, drivers and consequences of both globalization and global climate change, these human security issues will be inadequately addressed. Subsequently, the policy papers on Norwegian High North, published by the Foreign Ministry, are collaborative pieces between the concerned Ministries, with their own working groups and lobbyists. Identifying the central actors and understanding multi-layered policy making processes becomes an important part of the agenda setting. Additionally, it is important that local interests groups, individuals, industries, organization and others, receive a clearer voice in setting the Arctic security agenda.

5.5. Summary

The development of Arctic security is one that illustrates well how global security has gone through a shift in the period after the Cold War. With the end of the militaristic and nuclear security concerns of the Cold War came a reality that revolves around a wider range

of security issues. Nuclear waste, pollution and animal welfare became a growing concern for the Arctic states, and the High North woke up to a world where there was a need for regionalization and international collaboration, as opposed to the strict polarization that had defined security politics for so long. The Arctic Council was set up as a response to growing concern for the Arctic environment. In the years following the Cold War, there was also a need to develop the traditionalist security theory to include a wider conceptualization of the new security reality. The Copenhagen School of securitization theory became a popular framework to define the widening of the new security agendas. However, many scholars have criticised the framework for carrying on a state centric approach to the security actor, and that the framework does not draw on the underlying conditions and backgrounds for why something becomes a security concern in the first place. A post-structuralist securitization theory has been proposed by some of the critiques to build on the securitization theory in order to 'deepen' the securitization theory (Hansen, 2011). According to Jensen (2015), this approach is fruitful in coming to grips with what really goes on with the 'audience' in debates, deliberations and discourses in the time building up to the policy making. A discourse analysis of the policy papers is a further step in understanding the processes leading up to securitization, namely describing the 'securitizing moves'. In the scope of this thesis, the 'audience' has remained a quiet actor, while I have focused on the finished product of the policy papers. However, for a further holistic approach to security theory, analysing the role of the audience, the actors and the underlying processes are important steps in fully coming to grips with the complex security reality today.

Furthermore, drawing on 'human security' theory, with its focus on individual security as well as state security, creates an additional step in 'widening' the securitization theory and understanding the role of the 'security actor.' Arctic security is not only about states defending their national interests, territories and resources in order to ensure national welfare, economic security, energy security or even environmental security. Grasping Arctic security is about understanding the interlinked processes that lead to climate change and set in motion a wide array of security process that affects both the state and individuals. On a national level, Arctic security is about ensuring energy security, first for local development and value creation, then to contribute to global energy security and help the developing world. Arctic security is also about environmental security, with a focus on maintaining ecosystems, species and a clean and pristine wilderness for the further management and exploitation that enables value creation and livelihoods for Norwegians. We see a growing tendency of 'opportunistic

adaptation' in the High North (Kristoffersen, 2015). The Government focuses more on the positive consequences of climate change and the 'opening' up for resource exploration, rather than the local and global consequences of rising sea levels, extinction of Arctic species, pollution and increased human activity. Consequently, when environmental security is based on a state-centric approach, many defining aspects are in danger of being overlooked. A human security approach will include a broader range of interests and levels of analysis. Hence, a holistic approach to Arctic security should take individual security and underlying causes into consideration when forming policies.

The development of Arctic security is not a static affair, and while we can learn from historical events, build on theories and form new ones, the Arctic is a place where it is happening right now. While the Norwegian government has followed a petroleum-focused policy for over 30 years, making the petroleum industry the core contributor to local and national economic and social security, stronger global forces can as quickly lead to a rising insecurity in the petroleum market. In the past months, there has been a significant drop in petroleum prices, and this has an immediate effect on economic and social security of people living in towns and cities formed around the petroleum industry. The Norwegian media is, as we speak, saturated with headlines such as "The unemployment will continue to rise – the oil crisis is to blame" (NRK, 29.07.2015), "The oil crisis is worse than the economic crisis" (NRK Sørlandet, 18.06.2015), "Analytic about the oil crisis: - We are nowhere close to the bottom" (E24, 23.06.2015). If we follow the definition of discourse as the meaning lying behind the written word, "[d]iscourse is an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception, which brings an object into being" (Parker, 1992, p. 3, as sited in Jensen, 2015, n.p.), then bringing the media into the formulation of the petroleum discourse becomes meaningful. If we accept that creating discourse is a process with many actors, steps and interconnected processes, it translates that security discourse should also be a field of many actors, steps and interconnected processes. However, where we stand today, the security agenda is primarily set by the state and state actors. Change is thus occurring, our understanding of complex processes is widening, and scholars grasp on reality is deepening. Hence, viewing the state's role in environmental governance in a careful, optimistic light, shows potential for 'engagement and renewal'- in the words of Barry and Eckersley (2005), then all is not lost for the Norwegian State to take a more integrated view on Arctic security and what it means both nationally and internationally.

6. Conclusion

In this thesis, I have been concerned with analysing Norwegian petroleum and environmental policies in the High North in the wake of the overarching global paradox that we are facing. The global community has declared that global warming should not exceed more than 2 degrees, and the most effective way to stop this warming is to limit global CO_2 emissions. The Arctic is warming faster than anywhere in the world, and the future of the Arctic environment will affect the whole planet, in addition to the irrevocable changes occurring in the Arctic itself. Norway has named itself a 'steward' of the Arctic environment, and looks at the environmental developments in the Arctic with growing concern. Nevertheless, the Norwegian Government also focuses on the emerging opportunities, which the 'opening' Arctic presents. Norway is a petroleum nation. Our economy and welfare depends on a high level of petroleum extraction. It is this unavoidable decoupling of policy thinking, which made me pose the question of why Norway wants to carry out resource exploration in the Arctic. Moreover, I wanted to uncover the main discourses, which justifies such an exploration and see if I could detect a development from the previous Government to the current one. Lastly, in light of the policy developments in the Arctic, we now talk of a widening of the Arctic security agenda, and I wanted to analyse why this is important for the future security agenda for the region.

The question *why Norway wants to carry on resource exploitation in the Arctic* might seem like an obvious one, with the quick answer – for economic reasons, of course. However, when the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs was answering this question at the Arctic Frontier conference that was not what he replied. It was then I became fully aware of the power of language when powerful people, who none the less are reliant on their electors, use language to dilute simple answers to simple questions. Analysing political discourse is a way to look under the layers of complexities and ambiguities, to start to understand the rules of the game and be aware of who is in and who is out. As the short historical summary of the Norwegian petroleum fairy-tale given in chapter 4 illustrated, we started the oil era with a policy of moderation and heavy state involvement to avoid an overheated economy dependent on the black gold. Norway furthermore went thought a period of 'environmentalization of the state' (Kristoffersen & Young, 2010), where environmental organizations had a seat at the front of the table and participated

actively in the policy making. However, as our oil production peaked at a record high in the beginning of the 2000s, the need to find new areas for exploration became increasingly important for the industry. Konkraft became a covert arena where the oil industry and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy could meet and privately discuss lobby strategies to increase the public acceptance for oil exploration in more contested areas. As Ihlen (2007) points out, the most important aspect of a company's or an industry's reputation, is that it is legitimized in the eyes of the public. The petroleum industry has broad public acceptance in Norway, and as Ihlen (2007) concludes, there is now an underlying notion that 'what is good for the industry is good for the state.' This then becomes one of the answers to *why the Norwegian Government wants to drill for oil in the Arctic*. The web of players becomes interdependent, and as highlighted in the theory of CDA:

> Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and - position people. (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 257)

Subsequently, it becomes central to pose critical questions relating to power and how power translates thought the discourse. Although the petroleum industry has for many years enjoyed broad public support and state backing, it is nevertheless detrimental to carry on developing a good reputation in the realm of social welfare and environmental stressors. In order to analyse this I posed the following question: *what are the emerging story-lines and representations supporting a development of petroleum exploration in the High North?*

I find in my study of the policy-papers on the High North that there are story-lines and representations that are being reproduced and developed from Government to Government, including the discourse of 'drilling for foreign aid', 'drilling for the environment' and 'natural gas as a bridging fuel'. These representations of Norwegian petroleum policy appears to intensify and reproduce from the former Government to the current, and has gone through stages of interdiscursivity, where old representations are being reproduced in a 'new' way and presented as current priorities. The 'drilling for the environment' discourse is an example of this. The discourse started, according to Hønneland and Jensen (2008) and Jensen (2010) as an 'othering' of Russia as an environmental foe in the Arctic waters, which Norway had to help by setting the precedence of drilling more environmentally. It furthermore developed into

what Jensen (2010) has called ‘discourse co-optation’, where one side of the parties [pro-drilling] takes the main message of the opposing party [no drilling] and makes it the core of their own arguments. This was done by the oil companies in the mid- to late. 2000s, where oil companies and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy met to lay out the pathways for getting the Norwegian public behind an intensified petroleum exploration farther North. Today, Norway does not just talk about drilling in the Arctic to set high environmental standards for Russia. Rather, Norway presents drilling in the Arctic as the best scenario for the global environment, as Norwegian petroleum production standards are one of the best in the world (sometimes even portrayed as the best). Therefore, Norway should continue fossil fuel exploration to avoid substitute fuel with a worse environmental standard.

The ‘drilling for aid’ discourse, which the Government has intensified in the last few years, can trace its origins in the Norwegian national identity as an altruistic nation that is at the forefront of international aid. As I showed in the analysis, the former Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Thorhild Widvey brought forward the discourse of ‘drilling for aid’ ten years ago. This story-line has been reproduced and further developed by the latter Governments, and most recently, it has been one of the current Minister of Foreign Affairs main argument for why Norway should continue exploring in the Arctic waters. However, as pointed out by Ryggvik (2010), the developing world does not necessarily need polluting and expensive fossil fuel from the Arctic waters to move out of poverty. However, their energy insufficiencies could be solved by using the income from a tax regime for the use and production of fossil fuel, to subsidize a massive development of the renewable industry from local wind and solar power.

The last discourse highlighted in this thesis, is the discourse of natural gas as a ‘bridging fuel’. This discourse can be traced back to reports coming from IPCC in 2007, and from IEA in 2012, stating that gas as a substitute for coal can substantially decrease CO_2 emissions as a step towards a low-carbon society. This was an argument that was quickly snapped up by the industry and subsequently by the Norwegian Government, especially since Norway has developed into a gas-exploiting nation with most of the uncovered resources in the Arctic being natural gas. Nevertheless, as was revealed in the analysis, the representation of gas as a ‘bridging fuel’ says little of the polluting production processes of the gas, neither does it guarantee that the production of gas would be a substitute for coal, rather than simply adding on to existing production.

I was furthermore interested in seeing if there was a change in the discourse between the former Government and the current, and posed the question *in what ways is the newly instated Government from 2013 developing the discourse around petroleum and environmental policies in the Arctic?* Although it is still too early to draw any conclusions as to whether or not the new Government will indeed go from 'word to action' in the High North petroleum policy, it does appear that the current Government means to carry out a more deterministic and intensive petroleum politic in the High North. At least there is no indication that the sitting Government intends to change the developing course of action, and the representations of 'drilling for the environment', 'drilling for aid' and the representation of gas as a 'bridging fuel' are reproduced and even represented more forcefully. A perplexing discovery was made when I looked at the difference between the Norwegian and English translation of the most recent policy paper from 2014, where the Norwegian version showed more force and resolve as opposed to the English version in carrying out petroleum exploration in the Arctic. I can only speculate as to the reasoning behind this. Is it merely a case of meanings lost in translation, or is it a deliberate action in order to portray a different image outwards to the international community? This could potentially be the theme of a whole new thesis: to see whether or not there is a difference in the discourse of the national and international policy papers in Norwegian foreign policy making.

I have not conducted a discourse analysis to discredit all the arguments that the Government makes about continuing fossil fuel exploration in the High North. There might indeed be some validity in the claims that natural gas is less carbon intensive than coal, or that the developing world needs energy to fight poverty. Furthermore, that the Norwegian petroleum industry can boast about following high environmental standards is of course better than the alternative. However, the Norwegian Government, although heavily involved, is not just a mouthpiece for the oil industry. It represents a wide public interest, different kinds of industries and is moreover, the 'stewards' of the environment. It is, in my opinion, important to analyse policy papers and statements with a broader perspective than just from the main industry of our country. Especially in times when this industry is being heavily blamed for the human-made climate changes that, if not haltered in time, will entail unimaginable consequences for everyone living on this planet.

My last research question therefore asked: *Why should we talk about a 'widening' of the Arctic security agenda, and why is the concept of 'human security' important in the case of the Arctic.* The Government clearly states that the changes happening in wake of global

warming, requires an 'extended' security agenda, to include issues such as energy, economic, environmental and social security. Nevertheless, as the analysis clarifies, energy security has become the most prominent concern. First by ensuring local economic and social security, then to contribute to global energy security where a reliable supply of Norwegian energy resources plays a key role. Environmental security comes in the shadow of this security strategy, and as Kristoffersen (2015) shows, there is a tendency of talking about a warmer Arctic in terms of the positive opportunities for further resource exploration, shipping routes and new fishing grounds. This policy of 'opportunistic adaptation' is clearly visible in the recent policy statements, and underlines the need to not just 'widen' the security agenda, as proposed by the securitization theory, but also ' deepen' the security agenda by adapting a 'human security' approach. A melting Arctic will affect millions of people in many different ways, and only by adapting a more comprehensive security concept in the case of the High North, will the Government be able to conduct policy making that reflects the true security concerns of both the country and its people.

In addition to outline prominent discourses from the Norwegian Government concerning the High North petroleum and energy policies, the overall impression of Norway's High North agenda is one where there is a need to find a more holistic and interdisciplinary approach to the policy making process. There is a decoupling of the two strands of policies, and when highlighted, it weakens the Government's arguments, both in terms of being a 'steward' of the Arctic environment, and also of the real intent for why the Government want to pursue resource exploration in one of the most vulnerable areas in the world. However, in order for the Government to adapt a more 'honest'[23] discourse, and a fully comprehensive security agenda, it has to come to terms with some emerging realities, which would all be interesting for further study: 1. Norway has become more dependent on the petroleum industry than we want to admit. 2. There are very close ties between the Government and the petroleum industry that creates ambiguities and paradoxes in the policy-making concerning the High North. 3. Norway has reached peak oil, and there is a growing need to invest and develop other types of industries. 4. Norway is not as 'environmental' as we want to be, and in order to claim proper 'environmentalism to the world' we have to start making some real changes, first with our dependency of the petroleum industry. 5. A comprehensive approach to Arctic security has to take into account the individual security concerns from the millions

[23] These observations are of course the author's own opinions as an afterthought of the work she has done for the past few months, and might be considered 'wrong' by others.

of people who will be affected by the melting ice, including indigenous and local people above the Arctic Circle, and all those affected by rising sea level in the world. 6. The Norwegian Government should include more mitigation policies rather than keeping a focus on (opportunistic) adaptation to climate change. It is not too late to put the brakes on global warming; however, it would entail a shift away from looking at the positive consequences of the melting ice, to concentrate on how to stop the worrying development of an ice-free Arctic.

Analysing the continuing development of Norwegian policy-making in the High North is a vital step in unravelling and decoding the complex and multi-layered discourse. For anyone who is interested in Norway's High North policy, it surely is a time of change and surprises, which can take the policy-making to unknown territories. In current time, the drastic decrease in global oil prices over the past few months affects the speed and incentives for oil companies to carry out expensive and uncertain exploration in the High North. No one knows how long the oil prices will be as low as they are now, and this might provide a window for the environmental discourse to once more gain some footing in the debate. It furthermore illustrates that our economy is heavily dependent on the petroleum industry and that there are strong global forces at play, which Norway has no power over. Realizing this, might entice the public to request a more diversified economy and a shift towards renewables energies.

Consequently, conducting this research on Norwegian policy making in the High North has only made me more determined that it is indeed Norway's most important foreign policy area. However, it is where Norway has a chance of proving itself a true 'steward' of the environment, and show that we are determined to not breech 2-degree warming by changing focus from a petroleum driven policy path to a more holistic and integrated approach of renewables and low-carbon development strategies.

7.0 References

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