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Declaration

I, Marie Harbo Øygaard, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature.....

Date.....

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Abstract

This thesis explores the main challenges associated with the inclusion of indigenous peoples in processes of natural resource extraction. With a predominant focus on the indigenous population on the one hand, and state formation and natural resource governance on the other, I argue that the Bolivian society is structured to include some peoples and exclude others.

My findings suggest that the Morales administration struggles to overcome enduring structures of inequality that were created by colonialism – even under the current indigenous discourse in which ‘ethnic politics’ has become “mainstream”. Therefore, unresolved tensions persist – over what it *means* to be indigenous as well as over how to *effectively* include the indigenous population in processes of natural resource extraction. Whilst the Bolivian state has expanded the country’s extractive industries on the basis of economic necessity, indigenous peoples in the country argue that their expansion conflicts with respect for Mother Earth and the environment. As I discover through my field research, many indigenous representatives and their supporters consider further capitalization of the economy and ‘ethnic politics’ as incompatible. The state lacks institutional control in its hydrocarbon sector. This has stimulated large-scale corruption that strengthens inequality amongst and between indigenous peoples and the state, and fuels unequal power relations. Indeed, as I argue drawing upon Karl (2007), the absence of a ‘fiscal social contract’ further weakens the state’s legitimacy vis-à-vis its indigenous population. Whilst the role of indigenous peoples in natural resource governance is formally strengthened through further constitutional support for rights to prior consultation, the legal regulatory framework in which these rights are exercised, give rise to a set of unintended consequences. Poor procedural activity and lack of due processes hampers indigenous peoples capacity to *effectively* participate in natural resource governance. I therefore conclude that, despite formal advances in cultural recognition and political representation, indigenous peoples’ participatory power and role in natural resource governance is still severely limited.

Key words: indigenous peoples, indigeneity, “Andean-Amazonian” capitalism, ethnic right, prior consultations, natural resource governance, extractivism, political participation, Bolivia.

Abbreviations

BS	Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas, Indígenas y Originarias de Bolivia, “Bartolina Sisa”, National Confederation of Peasants, Indigenous and Native Women in Bolivia
CIDOB	Confederación Indígena del Oriente de Bolivia, Indigenous Federation of Eastern Bolivia
CEADL	Centro de Estudios y Apoyo al Desarrollo Local, Center for Studies and Support to Local Development
CONAMAQ	Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu, National Council for Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, United Federation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia
FPIC	la consulta previa, libre y informada, free, prior and informed consent
IDH	Impuesto Directo a los Hidrocarburos, Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ILO	International Labor Organization
IOS	indígena originario campesino, indigenous original peasant
ISI	import substitution industrialization
LPP	Law of Popular Participation
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo, Movement towards Socialism
MNR	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria, Nationalist Revolutionary Movement
MST	Movimiento sin Tierra, Movement of People Without Land
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OfD	Oil for Development
OTB	organizaciones territoriales de base, territorial grass root organization
TCO	tierras comunitarias de origen, original communal lands
TIPNIS	Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécore, Isiboro Sécore National Park and Indigenous Territory
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNITAS	Unión Nacional de Instituciones para el Trabajo de Acción Social, the National Union of Institutions for Social Action Work
WB	World Bank

YPFB Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, Bolivia's national oil and gas cooperation

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1.0 Introduction

In this thesis, I explore the main challenges associated with the inclusion of indigenous peoples in processes of natural resource extraction in Bolivia. With a predominant focus on the indigenous population on the one hand, and state formation and natural resource governance on the other, I argue that the Bolivian society is structured to include some people and exclude others. This, I hold, is rooted in Bolivia's political history, in which the concept of indigeneity was first constructed.

Thus, I analyze how the 'politics of indigeneity' came about and how the meanings of indigeneity has been negotiated ever since – by indigenous peoples themselves as well as by the various governments' in office. I show how political and economic institutions and cultural logics reproduce racial discrimination and structural inequality, and how the rights to prior consultations have largely failed to sufficiently increase indigenous peoples' participatory power and decision-making role in processes of natural resource extraction. I conclude that the Morales administration struggles to overcome enduring structures of inequality – even under the current indigenous discourse in which 'ethnic politics' has become "mainstream". Therefore, unresolved tensions persist.

In Bolivia, the marginalization of indigenous peoples and the abolishment of their communities underpin the country's political history (Gotkowitz 2007: 3). Thus, it should come as no surprise that social protest and social uprisings by numerous indigenous movements have gone hand-in-hand with Bolivia's state-building project, as highlighted by various authors (Crabtree & Whitehead 2008, Gotkowitz 2007 and Postero 2007).

The "Indian Question" was initially brought into state politics and practices by the Spanish empire, and during the colonial era, a discriminating pattern of forced servitude and various taxes were imposed upon the majority of Bolivia's indigenous population (Gotkowitz 2007: 13, Postero 2007: 9). Later, during the populist cycle following the 1952 Revolution, the racial and cultural domination directed against the indigenous population was further strengthened through the state's 'corporatist party structure', which, in general terms, categorized peoples into various groups based on class and ethnicity (Postero 2007: 38). Additionally, indigenous peoples' formal ties to the state have been further weakened due to privatization of land and labor – the main features characterizing the neoliberal era underway since the mid-1980s onwards (Yashar 1999: 85).

Particularly since the 1990s onwards, social movements have become unified in their opposition against the neoliberal economic model – as exemplified by the “Water War” in 2000 and the subsequent “Gas War” in 2003 (Flesken 2013: 340-341). A political shift has thus occurred, in which ‘ethnic politics’ by means of pro-indigenous discourses have been brought onto the political stage and into national politics. Throughout Latin America as a whole, various left-of-centre governments have been brought into power, and in Bolivia, the presidential election of Evo Morales in 2005 reflects this political shift (Bull 2013: 75, Hindery 2013: 148).

Once formally elected president of what is now the *Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia* (the Plurinational State of Bolivia), Morales pronounced that he would govern in favor of Bolivia’s indigenous population and ensure that indigenous issues were made centre stage in national politics (Hindery 2013: 148). Thus, he has embarked on a “depoliticizing democratic revolution” (Hindery 2013: 149) in which the indigenous population’s political participation and decision-making role is sought strengthened through various constitutional mechanisms and policies. By and large, protection and respect of Mother Earth and the environment, and moreover, of greater recognition of indigenous peoples rights to self-determination, territorial control, autonomy and prior consultations are central elements within the indigenous discourse advocated by Morales and his administration.

However, by continuing on a path of extractivism under a so-called “Andean-Amazonian” capitalist system – a form of state capitalism in which economic growth and development is dependent upon the revenues from natural resources – the Morales administration has yet to fulfill its promises towards indigenous peoples: the majority of Bolivia’s population (Hindery 2013: 148). Thus, a rather strange paradox is occurring in contemporary Bolivia: socio-environmental and political conflicts still persist, and Morales and his administration are thus under great pressure by those that first brought them into power – namely the indigenous population itself.

My thesis starts from this vantage point. I seek to answer the following problem statement: *What are the main challenges associated with the inclusion of indigenous peoples in processes of natural resource extraction in Bolivia, and what are the effects of these challenges?*

1.1 Structure

This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I explain and present the qualitative research approached used in this thesis. I discuss how I positioned myself as a researcher ‘out in the field’ and moreover, how my informant’s list evolved. I also highlight strengths and weaknesses with my empirical findings and discuss how these were addressed in practice.

In Section I, I explore Bolivia’s political history. This section provides a contextual backdrop that will ease the reader’s understanding of the challenges associated with the inclusion of indigenous peoples into processes of natural resource extraction in Bolivia. Thus, in Chapter 1, emphasis is given to state formation and natural resource governance, and to the ways in which indigenous peoples’ identities are constructed and negotiated within these state structures.

In Chapter 2, I delve into the complex and multifaceted concept of indigeneity, and explore how and why the ‘Indian question’ continues to be a source of conflict in contemporary Bolivia. Chapter 3 deals with the linkages between economic performance and natural resource wealth. I discuss the well known ‘resource curse’ literature and the paradox of plenty hypothesis – both of which have been applied almost exclusively to countries of the Global South. However, I question these theories’ ability to sufficiently explain the complexities associated with natural resource abundance in Bolivia. Rather than natural resource-abundance being the root cause of violent conflicts, I argue that indigenous peoples ongoing struggles for self-determination, territorial control and greater political participation in natural resource governance are better explained in terms of Bolivia’s political and socio-economic context and the structural inequalities that the political system generates.

Section II explores the challenges that my informants view as most central concerning natural resource extraction in Bolivia. In Chapter 1, I discuss the ‘middle-ground’ position pursued by the Morales administration, in which the state – under a so-called “Andean-Amazonian” capitalist model – keeps expanding its extractive industries whilst simultaneously advocating a pro-indigenous discourse characterized by greater recognition of indigenous peoples individual and collective rights. I discuss the challenges and implications that this ‘middle-ground’ position reveals and argue that contemporary contestations over ‘ethnic politics’ are rooted in indigenous peoples different understandings of the meaning of indigeneity itself as well as in opposing views regarding natural resource extraction at large.

Chapter 2 investigates the challenges associated with the lack of institutional control in the hydrocarbon sector. I explore how a missing ‘fiscal social contract’ between the Bolivian state and its citizenry increases large-scale corruption, and how this weakens the Morales

administration's legitimacy vis-à-vis the indigenous population in processes of natural resource governance.

In Chapter 3, I go a step further and look into the rights to prior consultations and free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Whilst the 'ethnic rights agenda' has been advocated by the indigenous peoples themselves as a mean to strengthen political participation in processes of natural resource extraction on indigenous territories, the legal framework onto which this approach is built also comes with a set of unintended consequences. Thus, in Chapter 3, the effects of prior consultations are explored in greater detail. The chapter concludes that prior consultations strengthen indigenous peoples' political participation only when the *outcomes* of natural resource extraction on indigenous territories are properly addressed.

Lastly, the final chapter sums up my main findings and provides some conclusions in response to my initial problem statement.

2.0 Methodological framework and choices

2.1 A qualitative approach to my investigation

I conducted a fieldwork in Bolivia from the beginning of October through the end of November 2013. Apart from short excursions to both Cochabamba and Santa Cruz where I participated in workshops related to the challenges and consequences of natural resource extraction on indigenous peoples territories, I spent most of my time in La Paz. Here, I worked closely with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that work with indigenous peoples on issues concerning their political, economic and social rights.

Keeping in mind that indigenous peoples have been marginalized and excluded from the political arena for centuries, there are now a growing number of NGOs working to equip leaders and activists within indigenous peoples organizations and social movements with the tools to strengthen their impact vis-à-vis the government and public institutions. Given the focus of my thesis, I found it to be of utmost importance to cooperate with some of these NGOs. Indeed, I discovered that they possess invaluable knowledge of the historical development processes concerning the rights of indigenous peoples, first-hand information about the country's political-economic context, of the new constitution of 2009 and of the political discourse more generally. They also have contact with and work directly with leaders of several indigenous peoples organizations. Without limiting the importance of secondary sources of information and literature, I nevertheless want to ensure the reader that the main findings in this thesis are based primarily upon own experiences and insights drawn from observations, interviews and conversations with people that I met during my stay in Bolivia.

To increase my understanding of the challenges associated with the inclusion of indigenous peoples in processes of natural resource extraction, I conducted interviews with leaders from different indigenous organizations as well as with people who work in or are closely connected to NGOs that seek to promote and protect the rights of indigenous peoples. In addition, the numerous conversations and discussions that I had with people – outside of offices, meeting rooms and scheduled interviews – should not be overlooked, as these constantly gave me a deeper understanding of the complexities and contradictions embedded within the Bolivian society and culture.

2.1.1 Semi-structured interviews

Interviews can be conducted in several ways, and as a researcher there are a number of considerations to be made before choosing one form over another. Following Willis (2006:

144-145), it is important to reflect upon not only the topic that is to be researched, but also your informant and the context in which the interview is taking place.

All of the interviews that I carried out during my stay in Bolivia were conducted in a semi-structured way – sometimes also referred to as semi-standardized interviews (Berg & Lune 2012: 112). As the label implies, this type of interview is neither fully structured nor completely unstructured. Rather, as Berg & Lune (2012: 108, 112) argue, it is a mix of both worlds, in which the main difference lies with the degree of rigidity that the researcher imposes to the presentational structure.

Generally speaking, the researcher commonly has a set of predetermined questions and topics that are sought answered during the interview, but – importantly – the informant is implicitly expected to elaborate on particular issues of interest, and is also given the freedom to do so as the interview evolves (Berg & Lune 2012: 112, Willis 2006: 144). As such, certain assumptions do in fact underlie a semi-standardized interview, and the researcher must be aware of this for as to enable himself to make certain considerations both ahead of the interview, but also as the interview evolves. For instance, although I had formulated and structured my topics and questions ahead of my very first interview, I nevertheless had to rearrange some of them and word myself in a different manner because, at first, my informant did not grasp what kind of information I was actually looking for. In this particular case, my questions were too swift, which resulted in me having to explain a whole lot more than I originally anticipated and expected.

This experience confirms the importance of flexibility when conducting research by the use of a semi-standardized structure. To avoid that valuable information gets lost along the way, the researcher must be prepared and willing to make changes as the interview develops: the level of language might be adjusted; predetermined topics and questions might have to be clarified; and themes might need to be both deleted and added according to the informants' response (Berg & Lune 2012: 108-112). Such flexibility enables the interview to flow and develop in certain ways - according to both the researchers' and the informants' own thoughts and opinions concerning the themes in question.

With reference to the interviews I conducted during my stay in Bolivia, I am convinced that my choice of interview-form served my informants, my research and myself well. As I have positive experiences with the use of a semi-standardized structure from a previous fieldwork, I committed myself to this also while in Bolivia. I developed an interview guide that contained a wide range of questions on particular themes and topics needed to increase my knowledge of indigenous peoples rights-situation and their relationship to the

Bolivian state apparatus. As already mentioned, some of my questions were further developed as I continued on with my research, but, in overall terms, I believe this strengthened rather than weakened my findings and my research. The semi-standardized structure enabled my informants to elaborate on topics of particular importance to them, and additionally served the purpose of highlighting themes that I might otherwise have overlooked or forgotten to incorporate.

2.1.2 Informants

During my stay in Bolivia, I conducted a total of 23 interviews with 27 informants. All but three cases – which were group interviews – were conducted face-to-face with only the informant present. Most of my informants either work with or are otherwise closely related to an NGO and/or a social movement. Many of them are also members of an indigenous community, and thus presented themselves as belonging to one of Bolivia's many ethnic groups. Depending upon the informant in question, I conducted the interview at his/her work place or office; in his/her home; or simply by sitting down with him/her in break-rooms or cafeterias once participating in workshops.

Following Willis (2006: 148), who highlights the importance of making the interview situation as comfortable as possible for the informant, I began every interview by presenting myself and my research before I embarked on the interview guide. I ensured my informant(s) that any information gathered during the interview was confidential, and that sensitive information that could possibly harm themselves and/or their work would be left out of the final thesis. As such, I aimed to win my informants' trust. Also, to uphold the aim of informed consent – which, for ethical concerns, ought to be obtained by the researcher ahead of the research in question (Brydon 2006: 26) – I made sure to clarify whether my informants wanted their names presented in this thesis, or if they preferred to be kept anonymous.

As I have previously conducted fieldwork in Cuba and chose then – for security reasons and due to the sensitivity concerning the topics of my research – to leave all names out of the final paper I initially assumed that most of my informants wanted to keep their anonymity. However, to my surprise, all but one assured me they had no problems with having their names on print. Given Bolivia's history of repression against marginalized groups, it is reasonable to assume that peoples see it as their duty – as citizens of the Bolivian state – to speak their minds once given the opportunity to do so. Whether or not this was the case for my informants, I do not know. Nonetheless, when referring to the thoughts, views

and quotes of my informants, I do so by presenting their respective names, title(s) and relation to NGO(s) and/or social movement(s). To the extent that it sheds light on the discussion in question and is a feature that my informant explicitly highlighted, I also specify which indigenous community he/she belongs to.

2.2 Strengths and weaknesses with my empirical findings

Within qualitative research, all empirical findings are to a greater or lesser extent biased by both the researcher himself and the context in which he operates. Consequently, the empirical findings that any analysis is built upon will inevitably suffer from certain weaknesses, most notably with regards to the data's reliability and validity. Although I have analyzed my findings both during the fieldwork and after my return to Norway, there is nonetheless some weaknesses – or rather, challenges – within my empirical findings I wish to highlight before I move on.

First off, ahead of my departure, I established contact with one NGO in particular, *Unión Nacional de Instituciones para el Trabajo de Acción Social* (UNITAS, the National Union of Institutions for Social Action Work). In overall terms, UNITAS seeks to ensure greater appreciation and representation of alternative views to socio-economic development than those currently presented under the Morales administration. Once in La Paz, Bolivia, I began to cooperate with UNITAS' staff and project leaders, and my list of informants evolved by the use of the well-known “snowball technique” (Willis 2006: 148).

To ensure a diverse universe of informants, Willis (2006: 148) argues for the importance of starting off with as many contacts as possible, rather than following solely one person's or NGO's network. In my case, most of my interviewees were co-organized through UNITAS's network and I had rather limited control in the selection-process of informants. Although my contact persons within UNITAS did their best to maximize the diversity of my informants list, there is always a need to be cautious once deriving informants from only one network: chances are that those recommended by the particular network might share more or less the same views, opinions and perspectives as those of the network itself, thus limiting the validity of the collected data (Willis 2006: 147). In my case however, and although my informants list grew out of UNITAS's network in particular, I was nonetheless put in contact with actors from a variety of civil-society organizations, as well as members from different indigenous communities, thus limiting the degree of informants biased in favor of the views and opinions of UNITAS. Additionally, I conducted a total of 23 interviews. This enables me

to draw certain conclusions and generalizations even though my list of informants initially developed in close cooperation with project leaders and staff of UNITAS.

However, I was unable to get in contact with state personnel and/or others with ties to the Morales administration, and thus, do not have first-hand information about their ‘side of the story’ with regards to natural resource extraction and challenges between indigenous peoples and the Bolivian state. Due to limited time in the field, I chose to focus my attention towards NGOs that work directly with indigenous peoples and thus have first-hand knowledge of contemporary struggles and political debates rather than pursuing interviews with state personnel. However, this might have weakened my empirical findings, at least to a certain extent. Rather than representing certain views and opinions reflecting those of the Bolivian state, my empirical findings might admittedly be biased in favor of civil society-perspectives in general, and indigenous peoples and their respective communities in particular. Whilst it is certainly an aim of this thesis to discuss some of the challenges that indigenous peoples themselves find to be of importance, this weakness nonetheless highlights the need to also rely on secondary sources of information for as to increase the quality of my conclusions.

Even though the aim of my thesis was never to research NGOs in particular, following Mercer (2006: 98) – and mentioned in the introduction to this chapter – there are a number of good reasons as to why cooperation with NGOs benefit researchers within the field of International Development Studies. They possess local knowledge and are experts on their fields of interest; might function as entry points to get a hold of informants; and possess valuable information, documents, and annual reports that the researcher might draw upon in his research – but to mention a few benefits (Mercer 2006: 99). In my case, I was able to participate in workshops and conferences hosted by both UNITAS and the Norwegian Peoples Aid, and thus put in contact with people that I would otherwise never have met. Additionally, staff and project leaders within UNITAS constantly informed me of blockades, public debates and conferences related to natural resource extraction, and granted me valuable documents – most notable a hand-book of the new constitution; articles about ongoing public issues; and reports of their work – all of which have been of upmost importance to me, both during my fieldwork and in the continuation of my research.

However, there are also several challenges or problems of cooperating with NGOs. These are important to highlight as some may have influenced my empirical findings. It is commonly argued that NGOs might steer a research project in a particular direction, and thus function more as gatekeepers than as trustworthy collaborators (Mercer 2006: 99). As already

mentioned, I do not think UNITAS intentionally sought to guide my research in any particular direction *per se*, but once ‘out in the field’ it was nonetheless important to reflect upon my role as a researcher to avoid any biases with regards to my data collection. For instance, during my fieldwork, I participated in a workshop hosted by Programa NINA– one of several developmental departments within UNITAS – and was given the opportunity to interview some of the participants gathered at the workshop. As a participant at the workshop, I tried to specify my role as an independent researcher. Whether I successfully managed to properly explain this to my informants, I cannot guarantee, and thus, I found it rather challenging – at least in this particular case – to position myself such as to ensure unbiased findings. In overall terms, however, I believe I managed to maintain an independent identity as a researcher (Mercer 2006: 101). Also, and as already touched upon in this chapter, within qualitative research – and particularly once ‘out in the field’ – it is simply impossible to keep a fully impartial position: one enters the field with previous experiences and knowledge of certain kinds, which inevitably ‘colors’ any interpretations of that which is being researched.

In relations to this, as a researcher, it is important to be aware of the issue of power relations and control of knowledge vis-à-vis local people in general, and your informants in particular (Binns 2006: 19, Brydon 2006: 27). In the Global South, Western knowledge has the potential of being viewed by locals as imperialistic in character, and as a researcher, it is important to reflect upon his/her role as the ‘outsider’ (Binns 2006: 19). Bolivia’s history of colonialism, indigenous peoples continuous struggles for rights and recognition, and the presence of multinational oil and gas companies raise ethical questions and concerns, rooted in power relations, highly relevant. As I was only in the field for two months, I was unable to fully get to grips with local nuances of power, but I nonetheless tried to reflect upon my role as a researcher coming ‘from the West’. Particularly, I sensed that some of my informants simply responded according to what they assumed I wanted to hear. Whether this was due to my status as a researcher or the fact that I might have been associated with the views of UNITAS, I cannot tell.

Lastly, with reference to the concept of indigeneity, a researcher must be aware that peoples stress different ‘identities’ depending upon circumstance: in certain situations, my informants identified as belonging to an indigenous group or community, whilst at other times, they simply identify themselves as Bolivians. In addition: some of my informants talked of themselves in the third person, or as plural even though I interviewed only *one* person. By the use of “we” or “us”, he/she elaborated on issues as though he/she talked on behalf of his/hers entire community. In my experience however, the fact that people

strategically use different identities forces the researcher to constantly reflect upon when one identity is chosen over the other, what causes such a choice to occur, and what the effects of a choice of identity might imply for the research. Thus, in my opinion, this issue is neither a particular weakness nor a strength but simply a fact that needs to be considered when doing fieldwork in an ethnically diverse country.

My Spanish is fairly good, and this was a huge advantage to me during my entire stay in Bolivia. It enabled me to get in contact with a variety of peoples when travelling by public transport or participating in social happenings, and it enabled me to participate in conversations that I would otherwise have had to observe ‘from the outside’. Inevitably, this increased my knowledge and understanding of the Bolivian society at large. It also permitted me to conduct interviews without having to use a translator. Whilst I believe this made my informants relax during the interview, I nonetheless expect some information to have gone missing, due to my lack of understanding of certain words and phrases. However, I taped all of my interviews and had them translated into Spanish by a Bolivian girl who works for *La Misión Alianza* (the Mission Alliance) – a Norwegian NGO stationed in La Paz, Bolivia. This enabled me to more deeply analyze my interviews, draw conclusions and connections, and translate quotes and phrases used in this thesis into English.

2.3 Accommodation

During my fieldtrip, I stayed at the Mission Alliance’s (*La Misión Alianza*) guesthouse, which is located in Obrajes in the Southern District of La Paz. In general, La Misión Alianza works to strengthen local communities and organizations throughout all of Bolivia, particularly in La Paz and El Alto – the capital’s satellite city – and further, the NGO’s development projects are focused around issues such as water, sanitation, health and education¹. During my stay, I was invited to visit projects and main offices in La Paz and El Alto, and although I did not primarily cooperate with La Misión Alianza for my research project, their local and regional knowledge of Bolivia was nonetheless of great advantage to me.

Also, locals primarily staff the guesthouse, and they constantly informed me about public transport, customs, cultural practices and local events, and upon occasion, helped me to order flight tickets. As mentioned above, they also helped me find a suitable translator. Taken together, this eased my understanding of Bolivia, and of the city of La Paz in particular, and enabled me to get around way faster than was I to figure out everything on my own.

¹ Misjonsalliansen: <http://www.misjonsalliansen.no/her-jobber-vi/bolivia> - 19.05.14.

Moreover, because those working at the guesthouse were genuinely interested in my project, I constantly found myself in deep conversations about Bolivia's political and socio-economic development processes. Also, I was invited to their homes – most of who define themselves as indigenous and live in El Alto. In total, these informal visits and conversations inevitably gave me a deeper understanding of the Bolivian society.

2.4 Travels

During my fieldtrip, I attended two different workshops and thus got to travel to cities other than La Paz. Both were organized by NGOs that seek to equip leaders, members and activists of indigenous organizations and social movements with necessary tools to strengthen their impact vis-à-vis the Bolivian government and public institutions. Whereas the former was hosted by UNITAS and took place in Cochabamba, the capital of Cochabamba Department, the latter was organized by Norwegian People's Aid and took place in Santa Cruz. In both cases, the hosting committee of the respective organizations accommodated me, and I was given a private room on campus. Additionally, the project leaders within each organization introduced me to various people of possible interest to my research project. This ensured a rapidly growing informant's list, which was important to me due to limited time in the field altogether. Albeit the challenges of limited control in the selection process of informants – referred to in a previous section of this chapter – attendance at these workshops were nonetheless of utmost importance to my research project.

However, although I was invited to not only attend but also participate in workshop sessions and activities, in practice, time did not allow for me to fully take part. During daytime, my informants attended activities at different hours, and thus, my project leaders 'handed me' informants whenever the latter had time off in their schedules. Thus, I had to work ad hoc constantly, which had the boomerang effect of me having to observe rather than to fully participate in workshop sessions and discussions once a spot opened up in my own schedule. Consequently, I might have lost out on some interesting views and opinions derived at in plenum, which might have weakened my empirical findings. Thus, if I am to conduct similar fieldworks in the future, in which attendance at workshops suits the research project, I will seek to schedule interviews ahead of arrival rather than once at the workshop.

2.5 Secondary sources

In January 2013 – months before conducting my fieldwork in Bolivia – I attended a press release hosted by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) in Oslo. The agency had just finalized an evaluation of one of its main programs – Oil for Development (OfD) – and as Bolivia is amongst the countries supported by Norad, I attended the press release to gain insights into the work of OfD in general, and of Bolivia more specifically. The evaluation report is titled *Facing the Resource Curse: Norway's Oil for Development Program* (6/2012) and entails a country case study of Bolivia, amongst others, in which its hydrocarbon sector is particularly under the loop. Whilst I do not refer to the evaluation report in this thesis, I nonetheless used it to gain background knowledge of Bolivia's extractive industries at large. However, I do refer to another report, which was commissioned by OfD's Secretariat in 2012. The final report is written by Henstridge et al. and is titled *Enhancing the integrity of the Oil for Development Programme: Assessing vulnerabilities to corruption and identifying prevention measures – case studies of Bolivia, Mozambique and Uganda* (7/2012).

Moreover, while conducting my fieldwork in Bolivia, project leaders and staff personnel in several of the NGO's that I met with gave me reports, manuscripts, news articles and area-specific details and statistics of possible interest to my research topic. For the purpose of this thesis, I use a Spanish compendium whereby a selection of Articles from the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples are gathered, along with Bolivia's new constitution. The compendium is titled *Compendio: Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia* (Compendium: the Political Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia) and was commissioned by the Programa NINA (UNITAS) in 2012.

Occasionally, I also refer to statistics derived at from the World Bank's official website. Whilst it is always important to keep in mind that statistics are powerful and sometimes unreliable or even biased (Mikkelsen 2005: 88), I nonetheless prefer to use the World Bank's webpage simply because its statistics are frequently updated. In my opinion, this ensures – at least to a great extent – its validity and reliability. Moreover, numerous books and scholarly articles of the issues in question back the World Bank's statistics and my empirical findings. Thus, I hold that this thesis is indeed a true reflection of the Bolivian society and its embedded challenges.

Section I: Background

1.0 Bolivia's political history and its embedded contradictions

To fully comprehend a society's distinctiveness is not an easy task to accomplish. Yet, the present situation of any country cannot be understood without knowledge of the past. The aim of this background section is thus to create a sound understanding of Bolivia's political history, and I do this by linking the concept of indigeneity to that of natural resource governance. I hold that attention should be given to certain historical and political events and development processes, as these are fundamentally important to understand the current complexities and contradictions of present-day Bolivia.

Throughout the Bolivian history, the degree to which the indigenous peoples have been granted space to participate in political life and enjoy various rights as citizens of the state has primarily been determined by dominant understandings of the concept of indigeneity. As such, the process of state formation and indigenous peoples' struggle for inclusion in this process must be viewed in light of each other, and not as distinct processes.

What is more, indigeneity entails a dynamic dualism with respect to indigenous peoples identities and their ways of defining themselves as part of a larger community on the one hand, and as individual citizens on the other. This dualism however – as both *individual and collective actors* – does not translate itself into notions of citizenship and political participation as easily as originally anticipated by politicians and academics. Thus, I hold that citizenship for indigenous peoples in Bolivia is impossible to comprehend without knowledge of this dualism.

In the first part, I outline the Bolivian history and explore how the indigenous population has been strategically discriminated against through various state policies and practices until present. In the second part, I delve into the concept of indigeneity and explore how its various meanings have been negotiated until present. The final part investigates the linkages between economic performance and natural resource wealth.

1.1 State formation, governance and political participation in Bolivia

In modern Bolivia, few political events have been given as much international media attention as the Isoboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isoboro Sécure, TIPNIS) crisis of 2011-2012 (Hindery 2013: 1-3). For more than forty days, 2000 indigenous peoples marched from the city of Trinidad to the capital of La

Paz – a distance of 600 kilometers – protesting against the governments’ road project that were going to be built through the above legally protected national park and indigenous territory (McNeish 2013: 224-225). While unique in character, the TIPNIS case nevertheless demonstrates one of Bolivia’s most prominent peculiarities, namely the continuous force and endurance of the indigenous social movements. Following Gotkowitz (2007: 3), this perseverance is rooted in the country’s history, which draws the grim picture of centuries upon centuries of political and socioeconomic marginalization directed against the indigenous population and the abolishment of their communities.

In April 1825, Simón Bolívar proudly announced Bolivia an independent state, entered presidency shortly after, and embarked on the project of re-establishing a nation rooted in liberal ideas of economic equality and political freedom for every Bolivian. Contrary to the discriminatory patterns of the colonial past, in which cultural and racial domination against “Indians” had been a defining feature, Bolívar abolished all tax systems that had previously been imposed upon the indigenous population, and proclaimed them the rightful owners of the land in their possession (Gotkowitz 2007: 13, 17). If the newly elected president and his associates envisioned a society based upon just and dignity for every citizen, the proceeding history nevertheless tells a different story. By re-introducing the tribute tax and depriving Indians of the right of citizenship, President José Antonio de Sucre – Bolívar’s successor – reinstated the discriminatory patterns against the indigenous population as soon as he came into power. This backlash – coupled with a state that gradually became more and more liberalized due to free-trade reforms and increased privatization of land and labor – generated tensions that grew throughout the nineteenth century, and ultimately resulted in the Bolivian civil war of 1899 (Gotkowitz 2007: 17-19).

For the indigenous population, rural mobilization for land, property rights and justice were underlying factors of the civil war and not surprisingly, these factors also determined the course of political action of the next historical event in Bolivia, namely the Chaco War of 1932-35.

Rooted in a dispute over oil lands between Bolivia and Paraguay this war is by far the longest international war, but also one of the bloodiest ones ever fought in 20th century Latin America. Approximately 25 percent of Bolivia’s population was killed or severely wounded – and the greatest number amongst Aymara and Quechua Indians and peasants as they were forced by military officials to fill the army’s front line during armed engagements. In addition, the war was primarily fought on indigenous peoples land, turning Indians into victims of repeated violence in their own communities. For instance, in order for soldiers to

survive in the field, rural producers were continuously forced to supply the army with agricultural products – a scheme that further impoverished Indian communities. Consequently, whilst the war deepened the oppression and discrimination against the indigenous population, the aftermath nonetheless paved the way for rural leaders that vigorously began to lobby for labor rights and land. Community-based leaders from all throughout Bolivia now started to organize as a mean to reclaim their rights to collective representation, self-government and communal landholding (Gotkowitz 2007: 101-107).

The emerging populist project also reached the national level, in which “the poverty and misery of the indigenous race” (Gotkowitz 2007: 101) was recognized as an urgent matter in the process of state formation. For the first time since 1880, delegates from within the government rewrote the constitution to make social protection one of its primary concerns. And although the constitution did not re-conceptualize the place for Indians as citizens of the nation, it nevertheless legally granted the indigenous population more political space than had previously been the case (Gotkowitz 2007: 101-103).

Above all, the 1940s is characterized by the demands for equal protection and guarantees as citizens of the state, but also – and importantly – by claims for individual and collective rights as *indígenas* (Indians). In 1947, a tremendous pressure by rural leaders against the local authorities’ failure to respect – and comply with – the laws of the state reached its heights, ultimately resulting in Bolivia’s largest uprising – the 1947 rebellion (Gotkowitz 2007: 2-5).

This rebellion, coupled with the indigenous peoples’ rural mobilizing and social movements launched in the aftermath of the Chaco War helped to set the stage for Bolivia’s 1952 Revolution. Gotkowitz (2007: 3) captures the essence of Bolivian political history when she labels this period “the hidden revolution before the revolution”.

According to Medeiros (2001: 403), the 1952 Revolution marked a turning point in Bolivia’s political history, as it became “the end of the liberal cycle and the beginning of the populist cycle”. Since the 1940s, new parties and organizations had started to emerge. They sought to increase their political and economic position by challenging the liberal oligarchic system for the first time since its establishment. Above all, they demanded a modern and democratic nation free of the racial, discriminatory and exclusive patterns of the colonial past. This was primarily driven forth by Victor Paz Estenssoro and his *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria* (MNR, Nationalist Revolutionary Movement) (Medeiros 2001: 403; Postero 2007: 37; Hindery 2013: 23).

With a desire to reorganize the old political system, the MNR gathered people from different segments of the population – laborers, miners, the urban middle class and Indian peasants – and, following Postero (2007: 37-38), promised to promote three things in particular: 1) to nationalize the mines, and thus the process of capitalist accumulation, 2) to abolish the servile relationships in agriculture by implementing agrarian reforms and by creating a domestic market, and 3) to wipe out racial discrimination through the realization of universal suffrage. As Medeiros (2001: 404) holds, “...this state model represented the only legitimate form of exercise of power because it was seen as the necessary condition for the nation’s development”.

Consequently, as the MNR gained ground – and especially after the revolution – no one questioned its ‘corporatist party structure’ (Postero 2007: 38), primarily characterized by “...a strongly centralized state administration, state ownership of natural resources, and a state led program of economic development” (Medeiros 2001: 404). For the indigenous population in particular, the revolution meant integration into the state as *producers*, by which the official codification became that of *campesinos* (peasants). Additionally, as part of MNR’s unifying nationalist program, indigenous organizations were renamed *sindicatos* (peasant unions) and the peasant ministry was founded (Postero 2007: 38). Arguably, by the power of a strong and centralized state, the path towards a modern, culturally and integrated i.e. homogeneous nation started to take foot in Bolivia, thus marking the end of the liberal cycle.

Rather than leveling out ethnical divisions amongst the population, peasant unions were increasingly brought under the control of the state in the years following the 1952 Revolution. This state-led agenda certainly did not empower indigenous peoples. Following General René Barrientos coup d’état in 1964, and later, General Hugo Banzer Suárez military dictatorship, labor federations and unions were made illegal, and the repressive violence against indigenous peoples were once again reinstated at the national level. However, while the ‘new state’ and the military regimes that followed preserved the old colonial structure, the population had increasingly started to view themselves not just as Bolivians in the formal sense of the word, but as citizens of the nation-state (Albó 2008: 21). Accordingly, during the years of military dictatorship, the indigenous population in general and the peasant unions in particular, continued to push for their constituencies’ rights by actively proclaiming that Indians be taken seriously as political actors (Postero 2007: 41).

Whereas the 1960s and 70s are characterized by a transition towards dictatorship and military regimes, the pendulum nevertheless swung back again in the 1980s, thus marking a return to democratic rule and an end to Bolivia’s populist cycle. The economic crisis of the

70s had resulted in increased poverty rates throughout most of Latin America, and people had been laid off and forced to sell their land – at that time, their primary source of income (Postero 2007: 48). Hence, in 1985, the newly elected government was forced to introduce what Andersson & Haarstad (2009) label ‘the first generation of neoliberal reforms’: a set of structural adjustment programs which sought to achieve macroeconomic stability through measures of privatization of state enterprises, and by opening the domestic market for import and international capital (Medeiros 2001: 408). While the “New Economic Policy” curbed Bolivia’s inflation rate – viewed as a huge success by its initiators, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular – it nevertheless destroyed the country’s economy: unable to compete with the lower prices of import, national industries were forced to close, leaving tens of thousands of workers unemployed (Medeiros 2001: 408). Consequently, in 1986, the ‘March for Life and Peace’ was organized by the unemployed – mostly miners – whom marched for several days towards the capital city of La Paz protesting against the usurpation of their livelihood (Medeiros 2001: 408). Undeniable, Bolivia’s neoliberal era (1985-2005) had officially begun.

According to Andersson & Haarstad (2009: 12), ‘the second generation of neoliberal reforms’ was implemented in the early 1990s onwards. While the first generation of reforms had achieved a growth rate of approximately four percent – barely an accomplishment in the eyes of the World Bank and the IMF – the reforms of the 90s thus sought to increase economic growth and development by measures of ‘inclusion’ and a strengthening of the country’s social infrastructure. According to policy documents from this period, “sustained” economic growth would be successfully accomplished by including the rural population – e.g. the indigenous population – into the national economy. Thus, the alleviation of rural poverty and the strengthening of human capital from below became the locus of the day (Andersson & Haarstad 2009: 12).

Accordingly, under the leadership of Sánchez de Lozada, *Plan de Todos* (the Plan for Everyone) was designed and legalized. Seeking to reduce the gap between the state and its population, a number of reforms were implemented and legislations were made concerning education, privatization, decentralization, local democracy and pensions. Arguably, one of the most important changes came in 1994, with the Law of Popular Participation (LPP) – Bolivia’s version of decentralization. Pressured by international financial institutions – which sought a restructuring of the state through processes of decentralization in several Latin American countries at that time – the law aimed to wipe out the continuous imbalances between rural and urban areas, primarily by a transferring of responsibilities for health and

educational services to the municipal level (Andersson & Haarstad 2009: 13-14). Ever since the colonial era, political power had been centered in the towns, consequently making political participation inaccessible to indigenous peoples. The LPP sought to correct this imbalance through a restructuring of the state, primarily by dividing the country into 311 municipalities (Postero 2007: 128). The government officially recognized indigenous organizations as *organizaciones territoriales de base* (OTBs, territorial grassroots organizations) and representatives within the OTBs were authorized to participate in local planning of their respective communities (Postero 2007: 129, Andersson & Haarstad 2009: 14). Arguably, the LPP was part of a larger project that sought to bridge the state, the economy and society together through processes of decentralization and local democracy. From the outset, it benefitted the state in two ways: first, class articulations of politics were weakened, as the indigenous peoples were included into the process of state formation. Secondly, as the demands from the indigenous population were taken seriously by the state, political stability augmented (Andersson & Haarstad 2009: 13).

However, while democratic in the formal sense of the word, the neoliberal reforms – and the LPP in particular – produced a range of unintended consequences, and thus came with enormous social costs. Wrapped within a discourse of “good governance”, in which municipalities were sought as means to guarantee the well being of its citizens, e.g. the indigenous population, the structure was primarily characterized by personal clientelist relations between the mayor and communities, and thus only benefitting a handful of citizens (Postero 2007: 162). Rather than leveling out class distinctions and increase political participation amongst the indigenous population, the reform turned out to be deeply exclusionary, thus “[...] paralyzing the viable functioning of democratic institutions” (Postero 2007: 162).

When viewed in light of the negative outcomes of the neoliberal era (1985-2005), it is hardly strange that expectations were sky high once Juan Evo Morales – widely known as “Evo” – was elected president of the Plurinational state of Bolivia in December, 2005. As the first “indigenous” elected President, his elections attracted enormous interest. His leftist party – *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS, Movement Towards Socialism) – was also amongst many in Latin America whom had started to challenge the assumptions of neoliberal economic and political reforms (Crabtree 2008: 1, Hindery 2013: 148). Morales represented a break with the past, in a country where “[...] a ‘white minority’ had previously monopolized political leadership” (Crabtree 2008: 2). Not surprisingly, Morales made it clear that he would govern in favor of Bolivia’s indigenous population, which had previously been denied both

citizenship and access to political and economic power. Consequently, since the very day Morales was elected president, indigenous issues were made center stage in national politics – arguably, a scheme that characterizes his leadership until present.

However, whilst defining his political project “a decolonizing democratic revolution” (Hindery 2013: 149), Morales has not managed to bring an end to political conflicts. By continuing on a path of extractivism under a so-called “Andean-Amazonian capitalist” system – a form of state capitalism in which economic growth and development is dependent upon the revenues from natural resources – Morales has yet to fulfill the promises of respect for Mother Earth and *Vivir Bien* (“living well”) enshrined within the new Constitution (Hindery 2013: 3-4). Thus, the indigenous populations’ struggles for political participation concerning extraction of natural resources on their land, and issues related to territorial rights, autonomy and self-governance are still viable in post-neoliberal Bolivia. Thus, unresolved tensions is a persistent feature in Bolivia, between the state and those affected by the state’s extractive policies. This thesis sheds light on the contradictions that arise within a country blessed with ethnic diversity and abundant quantities of natural resources on the one hand, while simultaneously struggling to overcome the devastating outcomes of a liberal capital-driven extractivist model on the other.

2.0 Indigeneity and indigenous peoples in the Bolivian context

Today, Latin America is comprised of approximately 500 million people in total. Whereas Afro descendants account for more than 120 million, indigenous peoples number 40 million alone (Telles & Bailey 2013: 1559). As these numbers exemplify, the region is highly diverse in terms of ethnicity – a case in point recognized once speaking of ‘indigenous peoples’ in plural, rather than simply of ‘indigenous people’ (Flesken 2013: 338; McNeish & Eversole 2005: 6).

Whilst a formal definition of indigenous peoples is both problematic and highly contested amongst academics, they nonetheless agree that indigenous peoples share a set of common characteristics (McNeish & Eversole 2005: 6) and thus, comprise one of several ethnic categories. According to Flesken (2013: 335), an ethnic category might be defined as: “ [...] a collective whose members share the perception of a common origin, based on common attributes such as language, culture, history, territory, and/or physical appearance, and who may feel a sense of community and solidarity, sometimes expressed through collective action”. This is the definition adopted in this thesis.

To many, an ethnic category is a constructed entity and a direct result of colonialism – to which Latin America is a poignant example (Flesken 2013: 335, 338). Although the Spanish empire is history, the discriminatory patterns against indigenous peoples have nonetheless been reconstructed and reproduced through various policies and practices throughout the entire region – arguably, until present. As such, it might be argued, as Walter D. Mignolo (2009: 86) does, that ‘the logic of coloniality’ remains in place. Further, as a region, Latin America suffers from income inequality beyond imagination, and according to Telles & Bailey (2013: 1560) indigenous peoples are still concentrated at the bottom of a significantly uneven class structure. Consequently, political debates have emerged over issues such as territorial autonomy, legal pluralism, citizenship and multiculturalism – by ethnic movements and peasants in particular (Yashar 1999: 77). Generally speaking, these movements question the liberal and democratic institutions upon which nearly all Latin American countries are founded. With respect to this region at least, it is evident that the concept of indigeneity and state-society relations in general, are far from resolved and remains questioned.

Indigeneity is also a highly relevant issue once examining Bolivia, as it is regarded as one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Latin America (Flesken 2013: 336). According to the national consensus of 2001 – the latest data available on ethnical classification – 62 percent of the then 8,2 million Bolivians self-identified as belonging to one of over 30 indigenous groups (Albó 2008: 13; Flesken 2013: 336). Once a similar survey was held a hundred years earlier, specific ethnic groups were not poll options and thus, 51 percent self-identified as indigenous and 27 percent argued they were *mestizos* (of mixed heritage) – a racial categorization that has never been reintroduced in Bolivian census’ since then (Albó 2008: 13). As these numbers exemplifies, indigeneity is not a ‘one-way-street’ concept. Rather, it has been *the* heart of political debates ever since colonialism – and arguably, continues to be the locus of political disputes until present-day. Thus, it makes sense to argue, as Postero (2007: 11) does, that it is “ [...] a contingent category negotiated by individual and collective subjects...” What this essentially means is discussed in what follows.

2.1 Indigeneity under the colonial era

As an ethnic category, indigeneity – or, as Postero (2007: 12) terms it, “indigenesness” – can only be understood in light of the social, political and economic relations and contexts that produce it. The categorization of indigenous peoples began in the early 1500s, once the Inca

empire was overthrown and the Spanish elite organized colonial administrations in what was then called Upper Peru – now, Bolivia (Flesken 2013: 338, Postero 2007: 25). Despite the great ethnic diversity indigenous peoples comprise, a sharp distinction was drawn between Spaniards on the one hand, and native Andean peoples on the other, whom were ‘lumped together’ and defined simply as “Indians” (Flesken 2013: 338; Postero 2007: 3).

Under the Spanish Crown, a dual society was established, and two separate legal and institutional systems were implemented: the *república de los españoles* (the Spanish Republic) for colonists, and the *república de indios* (the Indian Republic) for Indians (Postero 2007: 27). The latter one was further organized under the so-called *cacicazgo* system, in which Indians were allowed to hold and use communal property and maintain the right to local self-governance in return for labor force and the *mita* – the required tribute tax (Albó 2008: 17; Postero 2007: 27).

Following Postero (2007: 28), this dual society structure was combined with yet another system – the *sistema de castes* (the caste system) – in which racial categorization was justified by a biological discourse about race in which people were ranked according to purity of blood (Postero 2007: 28). Not surprisingly, Spaniards were at the top (considered pure-blooded people); *castas* (mixed-blood people) were in the middle; and Indians and Africans were at the bottom. In fact, as Albó (2008: 15, 17) notes, a central debate ranged in the early years of colonialism as to whether indigenous peoples were at all human beings – a case in point which clearly marked their degrading status, and also legitimated the usage of yet other labels, such as *indios*, *indígenas* and *originarios* (descended from the original inhabitants).

Indigenous peoples were considered uncivilized and backward, and thus, were not entitled to rights – arguably, apart from the partial royal protection offered in exchange for labor force and tribute tax (Postero 2007: 28). Initially, the term Indian referred to those whom were members of an Indian community and thus, was biologically anchored. Through the process of *mestizaje* (the mix of white, indigenous and even black) however, new racial categorizations emerged, and social and cultural markers such as language, dress and economic status increasingly came to define indigeneity (Albó 2008: 17; Gotkowitz 2007: 13). Castes such as *mulattos* (mix of black and white people), *mestizos* (the mix of white and indigenous peoples) and *zambos* (the mix of mulattos and *mestizos*) (Mignolo 2009: 73) but to mention a few exist until present – a proof of the complexities embedded within the concept of indigeneity.

Through what Tristan Platt (1982) termed ‘the colonial pact’ or ‘the tributary pact’ – which basically refers to Indian labor and tribute – Indians were fundamentally a fiscal

category in which their obligations also defined their identity vis-à-vis the colonial powers (Postero 2007: 27). Combined with the racial categorization, this system thus served a dual purpose: created by the Spanish elite as a mean to discriminate and control the indigenous masses, it was simultaneously a legal mechanism onto which the Crown maintained its economic base (Postero 2007: 27).

2.2 Indigeneity under the liberal era

The concept of indigeneity is not a straightforward and linear one – as the discussion thus far pinpoints. It is also an illusion, according to Albó (2008), to conclude that a white minority constructed racial categories and class-based political cleavages while indigenous peoples “...simply adopted a passive, pre-political posture” (16). The uprisings that eventually led to Bolivia’s independence in 1825 – and the struggles that followed – were indeed political in character. Simultaneously, an interesting and almost paradoxical combination of roles and indigenous identities also found place, in which the concept of indigeneity was reconstructed once again.

By and large, it was the weakening of the “colonial pact” that eventually pushed Bolivian into its republican liberal era, stimulated by the uprisings of the Kataris movement – a group of Andean natives whom attempted to break with the colonial order and establish Indian sovereignty in the late 1700s (Albó 2008:15; Postero 2007: 30). Whilst the Spanish Crown put down the uprisings, the “colonial pact” system was nonetheless severely weakened, albeit not abolished. Thus, in order to formally break with colonialism, the *caciques* – indigenous authorities whom operated as mediators between Indian communities and the Crown – increasingly started to cooperate with the *Creole* elites (a subaltern, marginalized group of Spanish descent) (Albó 2008: 62; Postero 2007: 30). As Mignolo (2009: 62) argues, the Creoles had – since the seventeenth century – taken on what he terms “the colonial wound” and alongside indigenous peoples, they increasingly “[...] took over the conflict of the difference, the colonial difference, racial, political, social and economic”. Seeking to overthrow the Spanish rule, the Creole elite justified their political actions by flagging the degrading treatment of Indians (Postero 2007: 32). Paradoxically however, and very well formulated by Mignolo (2009: 64): “[...] after independence, the Creole found themselves in power and no longer subalterns of the Spanish colonial elites. They became, indeed, the postcolonial elite”. Albeit in a new political context – influenced by European ideology and philosophy – the Creoles continued to exclude and discriminate Indians. As

Mignolo (2009: 74) argues, the traces of colonialism were not left behind: rather, Latin America adopted what he terms “internal colonialism”. As such, the region has yet to free itself from the colonial wound.

The Indian tribute and servitude were not formally abolished until the late nineteenth century, when community landholding was made illegal and transformed into state property as part of the 1874 land reform (Postero 2007: 32-33). Indigeneity was again questioned by the republican liberal elite, and took center stage in political debates, policies and practices. The main paradox of the liberal era lies precisely in the duality of universal definitions of “free” labor and citizenship rights, and the embedded limits to those exact standards – a solution to the “Indian Question” that made it possible for elites to further exclude and discriminate indigenous peoples from the political arena (Postero 2007: 32). For instance, Indians were offered citizenship by becoming either *colonos* (laborers) or small landholders, but the right to vote was tied to literacy and ownership of land – privileges that indigenous peoples had been deprived of during the colonial era. Whilst free from servitude as such, most Indians could not afford to buy land and thus, were forced to work the lands of others – a situation that simultaneously deprived them of universal suffrage. Consequently, many Indians fled to urban zones, and made up yet another racial category – the *cholos* (mixed race class) (Postero 2007: 33). Due to the structure of the state, indigeneity became restructured and further blurred once again.

The overall outcome of the liberal republican era was numerous political reforms, which produced, each in their own right, severely exclusionary effects (Postero 2007: 35). It might be argued that this is best understood by looking at the philosophy of Locke, Mill and Darwin – amongst others – as their doctrines of equal rights based on rational capabilities and the superiority of the white race increasingly gained ground in Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century (Albó 2008: 18; Postero: 2007: 35). Indians and *mestizos* (those of mixed heritage) alike were seen as uncivilized savages, and a causal link was drawn between their backwardness and the unfulfilled processes of modernization and progress. Following Postero (2007: 35), political inclusion was based on a set of rational capacities that all individuals initially share. Indians however – uncivilized and uneducated as they were – could not actualize that rationality, and the elite thus excluded Indians from full citizenship rights on the basis of pre-determined cultural characteristics (Postero 2007: 35).

Marisol de la Cadena (2010) puts forth a similar, albeit slightly different argument. She notes that liberalism and modern scientific paradigms created a distinction between

“Humanity” and “Nature” – a separation that is non-existing within indigenous peoples understanding of reality until present – and emphasized instead knowledge and reason as the basis for political inclusion and participation. Politics, it was assumed, had to distinguish itself from earth-practices and “other-than-human-things”, such as animals, plants and the landscape. Essentially, the relational conditions that make *life* in the Andes and which for more than 500 years have been the corner stone of indigenous peoples worldview were thus banned from the political sphere. Indians relations to *Pachamama* (Mother Earth) were considered nonscientific and reduced to mere beliefs rather than truth, and accordingly, Indians were deemed unworthy to engage in politics (de la Cadena 2010: 341-346).

As such, the republican liberal elites did not only practice exclusion of Indians through various political reforms and policies, but also reconstructed a philosophy of thought and profoundly fueled a mindset of “otherness”. Thus, under the liberal era, the defining feature of indigeneity was still that of difference.

Fueled by the tragedies of the Chaco War, Indians and *mestizos* were brought closer together in a common struggle against the continual racial inequalities of the oligarchy (Postero 2007: 37). During the war, Indians and miners had organized into trade and peasant unions, and once the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionaria* (MNR) emerged and eventually overthrew the oligarchy, the Indian peasantry was increasingly brought onto the stage as allies for political change (Postero 2007: 38). Once the old political system fell due to the 1952 Revolution, a corporatist party structure emerged and the concept of indigeneity took on a different, albeit still, discriminatory path.

As part of the 1953 agrarian reform, a new social and political class structure emerged, in which indigenous peoples were re-codified as *campesinos* (peasants) instead of Indians. Whilst the state sought to cast aside the ethnic categories and assimilate its indigenous population into a wide-scale nation-building project, in reality this categorization only reproduced an already existing discriminatory pattern: Indians were offered citizenship, universal suffrage, national education and full membership into the national economy, but they were still denied the rights of autonomy and self-governance (Postero 2007: 39, Yashar 1999: 81). As such, the MNR ensured its control and continued domination over Indians and thus did not overcome racism. Rather, the term *campesino* (peasant) was simply a restructuring of otherness, wrapped in new layers.

Scholars have assumed that the increased registration of peasant federations and the turning of Indians into peasants stripped indigenous ethnicity of its salience. Yashar (1999) argues however, that the state’s ability to remake and control these social sectors were never

as strong as originally anticipated. She holds that large areas of the country operated ‘beyond the reach of the state’: through patron-clientelist relations that these reforms offered, Indians increasingly gained access to a variety of social services (Yashar 1999: 82). Additionally, redistribution of land to registered peasant communities strengthen rather than weakened Indians community practices at the local level and thus, provided a neat space for indigenous peoples culture, customs and political practices to prosper (Yashar 1999: 83). Further, a dynamic dualism emerged, in which location became the determining factor for the making of identities. As Yashar (1999: 83) argues: “ [...] for the state, Indians assumed identities as peasants; within the communities, peasants assumed their identities as Indians”.

Overall, as the MNR redefined Indians into *campesinos* (peasants) and further reproduced the discriminatory patterns of the past, what Flesken (2013: 339) terms “reindianization”, emerged throughout the 1960s and 70s. In addition to previous claims of political and economic inclusion, Aymara and Quechua activists within a number of peasant and trade unions increasingly begun to demand the inclusion of ideology and indigenous identity in politics, thus spurring a wide range of public debates and uprisings in the years to follow (Flesken 2013: 339). Throughout the 1980s and 90s, this was also sparked by an international discourse of indigenous rights, and the category of ‘indigenous’ became the dominant one (Postero 2013: 109). Coupled also with the introduction of neoliberal reforms – which advocated individual rights at the expense of corporate organizations (Yashar 1999: 85) – indigeneity as collective identity and action, gained ground (Flesken 2013: 339). As Flesken (2013: 340) notes, “ [...] the rhetoric for multiculturalism gave incentives for mobilization in cultural terms”, thus marking the beginning of Bolivia’s plurinational era.

2.3 Indigeneity in the plurinational era

Particularly since the 1990s, indigenous peoples mobilizing power has had a significant impact on national-level politics (Flesken 2013: 340). During Sánchez de Lozada’s first term (1993-1997), Bolivia was reborn into a “multiethnic” and “pluricultural” state, and a number of reforms were implemented that increasingly sought to incorporate the indigenous population into the political sphere. Amongst the most important changes were the concept of TCO (*tierra comunitaria de origen*, or indigenous territory), which recognizes the main attributes of indigenous peoples and their territory; the reformation of the educational system, in which the principles of interculturality and bilingual teaching were approved; and the restructuring of local politics, which increasingly strengthened municipalities (Albó 2008: 25-

26; Flesken 2013: 340). Also important of course, was the entering of Evo Morales and his *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) into national politics – a political party that, according to Flesken (2013: 340), was neither narrowly class nor ethnicity oriented.

Arguably, the concept of indigeneity embarked on a road to success once Evo Morales was elected president in 2005. Becoming Bolivia's first self-declared indigenous president, he has come to represent the inclusion of indigenous peoples – both discursively and politically – and to many, the election of Morales' has also marked the beginning of the return to the indigenous era: *pachakuti* (Flesken 2013: 343).

Above all, this is reflected in the rewriting of Bolivia's constitution. Known today as *the new constitution*, the document was approved in January 2009 in a referendum with 61,4 percent of the vote (Flesken 2013: 343). According to Article 30, a nation or people is defined as being *indígena originario campesino* (IOC, indigenous original peasant) and further as: “ [...] any human collective that shares a cultural identity, language, historical tradition, institutions, territories, and cosmovision, whose existence is prior to the Spanish colonial invasion” (Flesken 2013: 343). It assumes that certain characteristics and attributes are unchangeable to indigenous peoples, and additionally, that these features are held and shared by individuals, but simultaneously actualized collectively. Thus, the new constitution increasingly contests the traditional, universal notion of citizenship, and seeks to bridge a gap between individual rights on the one hand, and collective once on the other.

As the new constitution exemplifies, policies under the Morales' government have brought ethnicity back onto the political stage. Thus, in the 21st century, a reconfiguration of politics is taking place – not only in Bolivia, but also in Latin America as a whole (de la Cadena 2010: 334). It might indeed be argued, as de la Cadena (2010: 335) does, that indigenous politics exceed “politics as we know it”.

However, just as the “corporatist” and “neoliberal citizenship regimes” (Yashar 1999) spurred debates, the shift towards ethnic politics also causes public disputes – most notably by non-indigenous Bolivians whom increasingly feel excluded and discriminated at the expense of indigenous peoples (Flesken 2013: 344). On the one hand, it is argued that the new constitution has reified a distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians – a distinction that hardly exists any more (Flesken 2013: 344). On the other hand however, the dissatisfaction amongst non-indigenous Bolivians might simply be a result of their weakened social and economic influence. Whilst a middle-class indeed exists in today's Bolivia, class-distinctions have nonetheless been reduced due to Morales' cultural and democratic revolutionary policies, thus causing those previously in power to oppose Morales' “cultural

and democratic revolution”. As Flesken argues (2013: 344), “ [...] the institutionalization of ethnic boundaries through the new constitution has led to more, rather than less, contestation of indigeneity in the social and political sphere”.

Additionally, a shift has occurred since the 1980s, in which indigeneity is no longer a language of resistance but instead of governance and rights (Postero 2013: 114). Whilst indigenous peoples previously fought for increased political inclusion and sought to break the chains of colonialism, the current period is characterized by demands for access to state resources and territorial rights – claims rooted in the state’s failure to roll back neoliberalism, as was promised already in the early 2000s. Thus, contestations over indigeneity and ‘ethnic politics’ are yet to be silenced in Bolivia. A rather surprising paradox has become evident: while the concept of indigeneity was brought onto the national stage by indigenous peoples themselves, those are also the ones whom once again question its multiple meanings and implications. In light of the current state structure, this paradox will be further explored throughout the rest of my thesis.

3.0 Natural resource extraction in Bolivia

Apart from the complexities regarding the concept of indigeneity, my problem statement explicitly highlights natural resource extraction as a source of dispute between indigenous peoples and the Bolivian state. In what follows, I discuss natural resource extraction within its proper historical and theoretical framework, and place Bolivia in light of that outline.

3.1 The politics of natural resources

Because Bolivia is home to abundant quantities of natural resources – primarily located in the tropical forests of the Amazonian-Andean interface – extractivism and numerous power struggles for control over these marks the country’s history (Hindery 2013: ix).

The foundation of a new economic world order was founded already in the colonial era, in which the revenues from silver contributed to the maintenance of the Spanish empire, and eventually also spurred international trade and global mercantilism. Rubber became the country’s most valuable commodity in the late nineteenth century, only to be replaced by tin from Andean mines in the early twentieth century. Although spurring the processes of industrialization and economic growth, these resources also enriched political elites and made corruption a widespread phenomenon. In the early 1900s the production of oil started and consequently, extractivism became a defining feature of Bolivia’s state institutions and

economic policies – a pattern that characterizes the country until this day (Hecht 2013: Foreword; Hindery 2013: 22-26).

Rather than being an easy route towards economic growth and development, Bolivia's natural resources have generated severe power struggles exemplified by control shifting back and forth between the state and foreign oil companies – and with the United States a continuous mediator time and again (Hindery 2013: 22). Following Hindery (2013: 22), US-led neocolonialism began already in 1921, when concessions were transferred from the state to John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company. Arguably, this marked the starting point for privatization and extraction of Bolivia's hydrocarbon resources, and the privatization-nationalization pendulum has been swinging back and forth ever since.

In 1936 – primarily through the creation of the state oil company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) – the government renationalized the oil industry and accordingly, regained control over the country's resources. However, this proved to be short lived, and president Estenssoro and his leftist Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) were forced to reopen Bolivia to foreign investment in hydrocarbons by 1956. Following Hindery (2013: 23-24), several factors explain this reopening: first, as president Estenssoro and the MNR had nationalized the mining sector after the 1952 Revolution, the US responded by sanctioning mineral imports – at that point, one of Bolivia's most important sources of income. Second, the tendencies towards complete nationalization of natural resources made government officials in both the United States and Europe portray Bolivia as moving towards protectionism. Consequently, international pressure and threats of economic sanctions eventually forced the Bolivian government to reopen its oil industry to foreign investments, leaving YPFB in direct competition with international oil companies such as Gulf Oil, Tesoro Petroleum and Occidental Petroleum. And although the public pushed for negotiations between the government and foreign investors – the US in particular – these all failed. By 1972, as General Hugo Banzer Suárez permitted joint operation contracts and concessions to eighteenth different companies for thirty years, Bolivia's oil industry had once again become privatized (Hindery 2013: 22-24).

Throughout the 1980s, a variety of factors – most notably a severe decline in oil exports from 1979 onwards and thus a tremendous increase in the country's debt – pushed Bolivia first into a period of Structural Adjustment and then into implementation of neoliberal reforms. Eventually, it became inevitable for General Banzer Suárez and his administration to adapt to the neoliberal reforms imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). With a potential economic crisis at its doorstep, Bolivia sought all sorts of

structural adjustment and stabilizing policies to control inflation and attract foreign investment – most notably through measures of “shock therapy” prescribed by the well-known economist Jeffrey Sachs (Hindery 2013: 25-26). Paradoxically, while only partially resulting in the privatization of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector, the neoliberal reforms adopted in the early 1980s nevertheless continued to create intense debate also in the years that followed (Hindery 2013: 27-28; Postero 2005: 73).

Above all, the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s led to a capitalization – or a partial privatization – of the Bolivian economy in general, and the hydrocarbon sector in particular. To promote private investment in the sector, laws and regulations were rewritten in favor of transnational corporations throughout the 1980s, and the government – pressured by the US, the World Bank and the IMF in particular – committed itself to the process of privatization by reducing royalties and taxes in all “new” fields. This certainly increased the incentives for transnational corporations’ continued presence in the country (Hindery 2013: 27).

However, Bolivia’s transition towards global capitalism had just begun. When Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada – known as “Goni” (Postero 2005: 73) – assumed presidency in 1993, he further reduced the role of the state by legalizing private investments in state-owned enterprises – YPFB included. This was primarily carried out through the so-called Energy Triangle, a World Bank-financed capitalization law which favored transnational companies’ future investments over those of the Bolivian state. The Hydrocarbon Law – authorized in 1996 – is also striking in this regard. Contrary to previous decades, in which the state and foreign companies had benefitted equally from the exploration and production of oil and gas, the law established an “attractive and competitive tax system” (Hindery 2013: 39), which cut state royalties and taxes from 50% to 18% in all “new” fields. While these “new” fields already existed they had yet to be certified for exploration. In reality, the authorization of the Hydrocarbon Law exemplifies the ways in which the World Bank maintained its influence upon the government mainly to further its own interests (Hindery 2013: 27-41; Postero 2005: 77-78).

By the late the 1990s, Bolivia had become caught in a spiral of capitalization – a multilateral development strategy imposed by international financial institutions and banks in countries all across Latin America. This arguably, benefitted all investors but the country itself. And although a decentralization of the state promoted through institutional reforms and social policies helped to increase popular participation and expand the populations’ access to certain public services – primarily health and education – such policies were never implemented strategically nor efficiently coordinated by the government. Thus, increased

levels of poverty and inequality followed suit (Wanderley et al. 2012: 176-178). In the end, the reforms adopted in the neoliberal era (1985-2005) were nothing but an illusory discourse wrapped in vested interests (Hindery 2013: 20, 27-33). As this became more and more clear to the public, an up swell of protest emerged in Bolivia throughout the 1990s and early 2000, turning the country into “ [...] one of the most important battlegrounds over neoliberal strategies” (Postero 2005: 73).

This resistance is most notable with regards to the now famous *Guerra del Agua* (Water War) and *Guerra del Gas* (Gas War), which took place in 2000 and 2003, respectively. Rather than leveling out the colonial power relations between the elites and the indigenous peoples, the neoliberal reforms implemented by Goni mostly benefited Bolivia’s entrepreneurial class. Because of a dramatic reduction of public sector employment, poverty increased throughout the 1990s, and caused a wave of dissatisfaction amongst the population (Medeiros 2001: 408, Postero 2013: 73-74). According to Hindery (2013: 31), extreme poverty increased from 36,5 percent in 1997 to a staggering 41,3 percent in 2002, primarily as a result of the state’s unequal distribution of its revenues from oil and gas.

In 2000, growing resentment towards the negative impacts of global capitalism had reached its heights, ultimately resulting in the Water War. Protesting against the governments’ scheduled privatization of water companies in La Paz and Cochabamba, popular actors and peasants organized and forced the transnational corporation to withdraw from the projects by claiming water being a social good and a human right (Hindery 2013: 58-62; Postero 2005: 73). Similar uprisings, ranging from demonstrations against the eradication of coca to protests against laws prohibiting blockades occurred throughout the country in the years that followed, eventually culminating into the 2003 Gas War – a violent rebellion, which left approximately eighty people dead and several hundred wounded (Hindery 2013: 60-61; Postero 2005: 74-75; Wanderley et al. 2012: 191).

Goni’s controversial plan of building a pipeline through Chile, in which Bolivia’s natural gas would be easily exported to the US and Mexico had sparked the conflict. Yet again – as with the neoliberal reforms previously implemented – it soon became evident that Bolivia herself would benefit the least from this proposal compared to other consortiums’. Consequently, protests arose all throughout the country, with popular movements from a variety of sectors demanding a rewriting of the constitution and the 1996 Hydrocarbon Law, as well as the nationalization and industrialization of the hydrocarbon sector (Hindery 2013: 60-61; Postero 2005: 74).

As with previous conflicts throughout Bolivia's history, protests erupted because of inconsistencies between the government and its population for control over natural resources. With the Gas War, Goni never managed to respond to the public's claim of abandoning the neoliberal model and renationalize the country's hydrocarbon sector. On October 17, 2003, Goni filed his resignation as president – in retrospect deemed a victory for the indigenous peoples and their struggle for human rights, self-determination and political participation (Hindery 2013: 60; Postero 2005: 73-74).

The popular movements' uprisings in the late 1990s and early 2000 marked 'the beginning of the end' of the neoliberal discourse that had prevailed in Bolivia over the past twenty years. The move towards nationalism – or post-neoliberalism – had officially begun, particularly marked by the election of Evo Morales in December 2005. By proclaiming the final end to unequal race relations, promising a wide-ranging inclusion of the indigenous population into state politics, along with publicly announcing all of Bolivia's natural oil and gas reserves as state property by the 1 of May 2006, Morales truly was the opposite of his predecessors. Also, by 2009 he had adopted both the United Nations (UN) Declarations of Indigenous Peoples Rights and the country's new constitution, which proudly establishes Bolivia as a "multicultural" and "plurinational" independent state (Hindery 2013: 148-151). On the face of it, neoliberalism was over.

Evo Morales has defined his political project "a decolonizing democratic revolution" (Hindery 2013: 149). However, the accumulation of capital is made possible primarily through the forces of a capitalist market – in much the same ways as previously. This is exemplified through the approval of the new Hydrocarbon Law no. 3058 of 2005 – adopted by Carlos Mesa as he assumed the presidency in 2003 – followed by the nationalization decree ('Heroes of the Chaco', no. 28701), passed by the Morales administration in May 2006 (Wanderley et al. 2012: 194). Both emphasize a restructuring of the hydrocarbon sector by presenting a framework in which the state controls the entire production chain – primarily through the state oil company YPFB – and attracts foreign direct investment to finance new economic and social policies (Wanderley et al. 2012: 195). Additionally, a more equitable tax regime has been introduced through the so-called Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH), which benefits the Bolivian state to a greater extent than has been the case with the former 1996 Hydrocarbon Law.

However, whilst clearly beneficial to state control, an over-reliance on non-renewable resource rents has forced the Morales administration to preserve the core elements of a neoliberal-capitalist model by continuing on the path of extractivism – thus repeating the

extractive traps of the past. Accordingly, market-oriented policies seem to trump considerations of environmental protection and indigenous peoples rights to self-determination and participation in decision-making processes related to the extraction of natural resources on their territories. Clearly, this is contradictory to the promises enshrined in the new Constitution, in which respect for Mother Earth and *Vivir Bien* (“living well”) are explicitly stated. It also complicates the governments’ promise to inform and consult *indigenas* (Indians), *originarios* (those belonging to an indigenous group) and *campesinos* (peasants) in processes of exploitation that threatens their livelihood and autonomy. This is why a prevalent feature of the Bolivian society is still that of unresolved tensions.

3.2 Linkages between economic performance and natural resource wealth

For the past fifty years, scholars within the social sciences have debated how natural-resource wealth influences economic development (Ross 1999: 297). Conventional wisdom has largely regarded the former as advantageous for the latter, as the works of development theorist Walter Rostow (1960) clearly exemplifies (Logan & McNeish 2012: 9, Rosser 2006: 7). As part of the wider modernization literature, which was particularly influential during the 1960s, Rostow famously argued that the path towards modernization went through certain universal ‘stages’ of growth (Peet & Hartwick 2009: 129). It was commonly assumed that natural resource wealth would push societies into a ‘take-off’ stage and that underdeveloped countries would eventually become technological developed and industrialized by copying what Britain, Australia and the United States had previously done once they achieve their high levels of modernization (Logan & McNeish 2012: 9, Peet & Hartwick 2009: 127-129, Ross 1999: 301).

More recently however, a large body of literature has been put forth that increasingly question the assumptions underlying such a transition. The failure of the third wave of democracy (Huntington 1991) – to which Bolivia was also a part – seem to suggest, “...that states with abundant resource wealth performs less well than their resource-poor counterparts” (Ross 1999: 297). Rather than becoming substantive democracies with stable and well-functioning institutions, this literature points to the negative political and socio-economic outcomes of natural-resource abundance, such as the increased likelihood of civil war, low levels of democratic deepening and more generally, poor economic performance (Logan & McNeish 2012: 9, Rosser 2006: 7). Given these empirical evidences, it is widely assumed today – within academia and the international community alike – that natural-

resource wealth complicates rather than ease the route towards development, and that countries characterized by natural resource endowments are locked within what is commonly known as ‘the resource curse’.

Since the late 1980s onwards, the resource curse has been applied almost exclusively to countries of the Global South (Logan & McNeish 2012: 9). As the name implies, the entire concept points to the different ‘curses’ that seem inevitable to avoid for resource-rich countries, such as the inability to use natural resources to boost economic growth, and the failure of state institutions to distribute the revenues from natural resources effectively and by means of political equality (Logan & McNeish: 10). There is however, not a single explanation as to what initially causes a condition of the so-called resource curse to occur. Rather, several theories and subsequent recommendations have been put forth that highlights different aspects of the linkages between economic performance and natural resource abundance.

The earliest works by development economics argued that developing states were characterized by an unfortunate imbalance in production – surplus labor on the one hand, but shortage of investible capital on the other. By promoting development strategies based on resource exports however, it was assumed that these imbalances could easily be controlled for. Additionally, such strategies would attract foreign investments and enable resource-rich governments to collect revenues and hence, make it easier to provide public goods (Ross 1999: 301). From the mid-1950s onwards however, skeptics – most notably structuralists such as Prebisch and Singer – increasingly began to question these assumptions, and argued that resource-exporting states would become even poorer once competing with rich industrialized states, due primarily to a decline in the terms of trade (Ross 1999: 301).

According to this school of thought, Third World economies were too different compared to the already well-functioning and developed Western economies and thus, a universal neoclassical approach, which works according to certain market principles, was deemed inapplicable in the Latin American context (Peet & Hartwick 2009: 64-65). Prebisch in particular, argued that underdevelopment in Latin America was precisely the result of its emphasis on primary exports, and that its peripheral position in the global economy further weakened its chances of achieving industrialization and progress. Thus, his solution to improve Latin America’s terms of trade was by means of structural change, in which import substitution industrialization (ISI) became amongst the main strategies. In the years following World War II, nearly all Latin American countries – Bolivia included – adopted this strategy, and initially, industry grew rapidly as a result of these economic interventions. Over time

however, critical voices – particularly within more conventional development circles – began to argue that ISI produced high cost and low-quality industrial goods, and that agriculture was largely neglected in the process. In overall terms, although the ISI strategy served Third World countries well and enabled industrialization that, arguably, would never have happened in the classical liberal tradition of free trade, open borders and no-state intervention, it nonetheless gained a rather bad reputation and was abandoned as a development strategy already in the 1970s (Peet & Hartwick 2009: 64-68).

Rather than highlighting the importance of structural change per se, other development promoters argued that international commodity markets suffered from unusually sharp price fluctuations and thus, were unstable (Logan & McNeish 2012: 10, Ross 1999: 301). According to this logic, the instability of the international market could easily be transferred to those developing states reliant upon commodity exports, thus weakening their domestic economies and further affecting their means to attract private investment from abroad – usually their primary source of income (Logan & McNeish 2012: 10, Ross 1999: 10).

Yet, whilst the terms of trade for most primary commodities have fallen since the 1980s onwards – due primarily to a rising volume of commodity exports, but caused also by the debt crisis in the 1970s; the collapse of international commodity agreements, and more recently; by the fall of the former Soviet Union – the problem of linkages between economic performance and natural resource endowments has persisted (Ross 1999: 302, 305). Thus, a more recent explanation of the resource curse has been the so-called “Dutch Disease” – a condition in which a boom in resources leads to an appreciation of a country’s real exchange rate. Following this logic, a resource-boom alters economic growth and further weakens manufacturing and subsequent sectors of the economy, most notably agriculture (Logan & McNeish 2012: 10, Ross 1999: 305-306).

Regardless of the various theories and terminologies associated with the resource curse, a general consensus has nonetheless come to define them all, namely that an abundance of natural resources is the root-cause of violent conflict (Logan & McNeish 2012: 10, McNeish 2010: 1). Whilst this acknowledgement reached its heights in the post-cold war period in particular, more recently however, it has also resulted in the acceptance of *the paradox of plenty*. In overall terms, the paradox of plenty points out the puzzling truth that although countries of the Global South are extractive economies endowed with strategic natural wealth, they nonetheless cannot seem to avoid neither violence or war: the majority of conflict-prone and war-ravaged states – including those recently emerging from violent conflict – are both extractive economies *and* located in the southern hemisphere (McNeish

2010: 1). In addition, and contrary to the overall assumptions of economic growth and industrialization depicted by the modernization literature, states in the Global South remain both underdeveloped and politically unstable (McNeish 2010: 1).

3.3 Bolivia and its extractive economic industries

As Bebbington (2009: 14) argues, throughout Latin America, “governments of all political hues seem primarily concerned to make the very most out of extraction”. Also in Bolivia, the MAS government continues to rely on an extractive development model and seem to believe it can escape both ‘the resource curse’ and ‘the paradox of plenty’ by applying a set of policies that, arguably, reflect indigenous peoples claims for cultural and political recognition – what de la Cardena (2010) labels “ethnic politics”. Yet, recent uprisings – most notably the violations related to the TIPNIS case in 2011-2012 – and the fact that Bolivia is still considered a ‘lower middle income level’ country², suggests that Bolivia has yet to escape both of the abovementioned hypothesis. The abundance of natural resources is still a root-cause of violent conflicts, and the government continues to pursue what I have elsewhere referred to as an “Andean-Amazonian capitalism” (Hindery 2013), thus being precisely the extractive economy to which the paradox of plenty describes.

In Bolivia, its extractive frontiers have kept on expanding since the early 2000s onwards, and plans to speed up gas production in particular have intensified since the Morales administration took power in 2005 (Bebbington 2009: 15). Thus, and following Bebbington (2009: 14), 55 percent of today’s national territory “ [...] is considered to be of potential hydrocarbon interest”. On the one hand; the Morales administration’s rationale for such interest rests upon its need to finance national social policies and cash-transfer programs for its citizenry, on the other; increased extraction is indeed due to a world economy that largely demands and depends upon natural resources to uphold consumerism.

With regards to the former, following the 2005 hydrocarbon laws and the nationalization process which begun in 2006, between 2006 and 2010, the revenues from gas increased from an averaged \$1.4 billion, versus only \$283 million between 2001 and 2005 (Hindery 2013: 153). Through the establishment of the new Direct Hydrocarbon Tax (*impuesto directo a los hidrocarburos*, IDH), regional government’s share of hydrocarbon rents have significantly increased, thus benefitting the Bolivian citizenry to a greater extent than during the neoliberal period (Hindery 2013: 153, McNeish 2010: 12). On the other hand,

² The World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/bolivia?display=graph> - 24.04.14.

5 percent of gas revenues (or 1.6 percent of net hydrocarbon revenues) were initially supposed to be distributed towards the Development Fund for Indigenous Peoples and Peasant Communities to fund projects by Indigenous communities and parent organizations. Whilst the Fund is still operative, it is nonetheless perceived of as being corruptly managed and biased in favor of central governments rather than directly benefitting regional and local municipalities (Hindery 2013: 153-154). With regards to the latter, the global economy is still driven forth by capitalist claims for economic growth, modernization and industrialization – features that the Morales administration has further developed, albeit in its own semi-nationalized and ethno-indigenous way (Hindery 2013: 3-4).

While under the Morales administration, social policies are better than during earlier regimes, the central problems related to macro-politics nonetheless persist (Hecht 2013: xi). The government continues to rely upon an extractivist development model that – supposedly – benefit both the nation state and its indigenous population (Bebbington 2009: 15), whilst also promising to roll back neoliberalism and comply with the new constitution, which in 2009 recognized indigenous peoples rights to the greatest extent worldwide (Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: 2012).

Given these contradictions, it is hardly surprising that Morales's political agenda has come under great pressure recently, and that the concept of indigeneity thus continues to be redefined and negotiated (Postero 2013: 107-119). This is particularly evident with regards to the new constitution, in which the indigenous population is recognized as nations and peoples (Flesken 2013: 343) and are given rights to self-determination and self-governance, autonomy and free, prior and informed consent in extraction-processes on indigenous territory – rights that, in overall terms and for various reasons, in practice remains non-complied to by the government. As Schilling-Vacaflor (2013: 202-219) argues, in any consultation process, indigenous norms and practices have the potential of bringing incomprehensible local knowledge to the forefront – insights that inevitably can strengthen Bolivia's democracy in the long run – but the centralized power of the state prevents such decision-making from being properly anchored in practice. Consequently, contestations over what the extractivist development model can in fact accomplish is thus further strengthened and intensified by the state structure itself. To this I will return once discussing my findings, as several of my informants view non-compliance with national and international agreements a major weakness of the administration currently in office.

What these insights suggest, is that the linkages between economic performance and natural resource abundance in Bolivia are still problematic – both for the state and its

indigenous population. Thus, with reference to the abovementioned challenges, a valid question arises: is the resource curse sufficient in explaining the current complexities of these problems? Whilst economists and political scientists have gradually incorporated ideas from each other and attempted to both revise and add more variables into the analysis, more recently however, others have begun to question the factual applicability of the resource curse and the quality of the data onto which the hypothesis rests (Logan and McNeish 2012: 13-16). Although it is still widely accepted that resource-rich countries in the Global South suffer from various negative development effects, the linkages between economic performance and natural resource abundance are nonetheless not as straight forward as originally anticipated. Quoted in Logan & McNeish (2012: 15), "...the relationship is anything but as conclusive, or direct, as the 'resource curse' terminology would suggest".

According to Rosser (2006: 7), present-day 'resource curse' literature has thus far failed to address a number of issues: the role of social forces that shape development outcomes in resource rich-countries have been largely neglected; the literature does not take into account that – although the majority of resource abundant countries have performed bad – some have also done quite well in developmental terms, and lastly; the recommendations derived from the various theories fails to acknowledge what he terms "the issue of political feasibility (Rosser 2006: 7). He also argues that the current resource curse literature holds a reductionist position, by which he means that the various explanations of development performance tend to focus solely on countries' natural resource base (their size and nature) rather than acknowledging that historical and structural factors have also shaped countries developmental outcomes (Rosser 2006: 7).

Following Rosser then (2006: 8), there is a crucial need for scholars to refocus their attention *away* from questions of why natural resource wealth has fostered "various political pathologies and in turn promoted poor developmental performance", and *towards* questions of what political and social factors enable some (rather than all) resource-rich countries to utilize their resources to achieve sound development. More specifically, Rosser (2006) calls for 1) increased attention towards the specific political and social factors that shape developmental outcomes, e.g. societies social contexts, and 2) the ways in which relationships rooted in class, ethnic and/or religious cleavages hampers equal distribution of countries revenues from natural resource extraction, e.g. societies structural characteristics.

In order to fully comprehend the complex political, socio-economic relationship of resource governance in Bolivia, I find Rosser's critique of the current resource curse literature particularly interesting. In my discussion of the challenges that arise between the Bolivian

state and its indigenous population in relation to natural resource extraction, I draw upon Rosser's views, in addition to the theories already presented here.

Section II: Empirical exploration and discussion

1.0 Exploring the challenges associated with the inclusion of indigenous peoples in natural resource governance

Whilst it was previously assumed that natural-resource wealth functioned as a mean to boost economic growth and development, more recently however, a sizeable literature has emerged that points in the complete opposite direction: natural-resource wealth increases rather than decreases the likelihood for countries to experience negative economic, political and social outcomes, including civil and ethnic war, low levels of democracy and poor economic performance (McNeish 2010: 2). Since the late 1980s onwards – and backed by numerous empirical findings on the issue in question – theories such as *the resource curse* and *the paradox of plenty* have thus been applied almost exclusively to countries of the Global South, including Bolivia (McNeish 2010: 2).

Meanwhile, efforts are also being made to broaden our understanding of the relationship between economic performance and natural resource abundance. Scholars have increasingly begun to refocus their attention towards the structural characteristics and socio-historical contexts of resource-rich countries in the Global South, thus recognizing the fact that neither imperialist power relations nor ideology discourses are perspectives of the past (Logan & McNeish 2012: 22, Rosser 2006).

In Bolivia, opposition against the government's reliance upon extractive industries and non-renewable resources seem to suggest that natural resource wealth do not come about without popular uprising. Social conflicts abound, ranging from indigenous peoples struggles over territorial rights, self-governance and autonomy, to more general claims of greater economic and political power. Whilst “ethnic politics” (de la Cadena 2010) has made it onto the national political stage, neither indigenous peoples themselves nor the Morales administration seem to be at ease with what such an indigenous discourse ought to imply and moreover, of how to sufficiently combine ethnic politics with that of neoliberalism. Thus, opposing views and interests both amongst and between indigenous peoples and the Bolivian state have led to more rather than less contestations in recent times.

With reference to empirical findings derived at from my fieldwork, the following chapters explore some of the challenges that my informants view as most central concerning natural resource extraction.

1.1 Neoliberalism with a hint of indigeneity?

What is happening with Evo [Morales] is that he has an Indian face but a neoliberal mindset. We have been dreaming of, not yet a colonial state but of a plurinational one, in which our communities' visions are respected. But today, our visions are not respected, and this is why we continue to fight (Rafael Arcángel Quispe Flores, La Paz, 05.11.13)

According to several of my informants and exemplified by the quote above, Morales and his administration struggle to combine an indigenous discourse with that of a neoliberal one. However, to properly define what an *indigenous discourse* implies, is not a straightforward mission – neither for my informants nor for scholars.

According to Crabtree (2008), there is simply “no clear agreed statement” (10) as to what an indigenous or ethnic discourse actually consists of and thus, he simply argues that, in overall terms, it refers to “ [...] a desire to right the wrongs of centuries and to break down areas of exclusion”. Moreover, numerous terms exist – such as multiculturalism, cultural pluralism and interculturality – which all seek to encompass, in one way or another, greater recognition and respect of formerly marginalized groups, and a renewed interest in assuring individual and collective rights of such groups (Postero 2007: 13-14).

Thus, the mobilizing of social movements since the 1980s onward, in which ethnic and cultural claims as well as historical claims to territory, self-governance and autonomy gained ground – coupled with a state that gradually became more and more influenced by the international human rights agenda and further, adopted several pro-indigenous declarations – now comprise the basis of Bolivia's so-called indigenous discourse. In addition, ethnic politics has been further embraced since Evo Morales and his *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS, Movement towards Socialism) took power in 2005. This is seen most clearly in the text of the country's new constitution in which respect and protection for Mother Earth and the environment is explicitly highlighted. Taken together, the revaluation of indigenous peoples culture, customs and worldviews within public as well as private spheres seem to suggest that contemporary Bolivia has adopted precisely that of an indigenous discourse.

It is not an overstatement to argue that this pro-indigenous agenda has derived from contestations over that of indigeneity itself. However, and as highlighted in my theory chapter: the concept of indigeneity and the frameworks that give meaning to “Indianness” (Postero 2007: 11) is constantly changing – according to historical, economic, social and political circumstances, and across time and space. As Postero (2007: 11) argues, “ [...]

indigenusness – like any identity – is not an uncontested category of domination, but a contingent category negotiated by individual and collective subjects”, as exemplified by several of my informants.

Rafael Arcángel Quispe Flores is the leader and coordinator of CONAMAQ (National Council for Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu), Bolivia’s main highland indigenous federation, which was founded in 1997 (Fabricant 2013: 164). He is Aymara and thus, belongs to one of Bolivia’s largest ethnic groups, which is mostly to be found in the western Andean region of the country (Albó 2008: 10). When I met him at CONAMAQs headquarters, located in the area of Sopocachi in La Paz, he was dressed in a traditional, colorful woven shawl and an Aymara Fedora Hat, both of which he wore with great pride (Field notes, La Paz, 05.11.13).

When he argues that Evo Morales has ‘an Indian face but a neoliberal mindset’, Rafael points to the fact that the president – arguably, unlike himself – pursues two discourses simultaneously: by face, Morales’ is indigenous and thus pursues the indigenous discourse referred to above, but in his mind, he pursues that of neoliberalism. During my conversation with Rafael, he also argued that ‘the president has another vision’, which ought to imply that Morales’ pursues something ‘other than’ that what might be termed ‘*pachamamismo*’, and that the Morales’ administration simply does not comply with the rights of indigenous peoples as enshrined within the new constitution. Are these discourses simply impossible to combine? It seems perfectly clear from Rafael’s quotes at least, that certain elements of ‘*pachamamismo*’ stand in direct opposition to Bolivia’s current neoliberal discourse. He further elaborated on this by stating that:

Politically speaking, it [the governments’ discourse] is neoliberal. A government that is indigenous in discourse implies that it is anti-capitalistic and anti-neoliberal, but our policies are oriented in the complete opposite direction. The structure of the state, you can see that it remains colonial: the developmental plans remain colonial and the justice system remains mono-cultural. Although one recognizes a plural justice –and economic system, we have been able to implement absolutely nothing. We see that our president [Evo Morales] has established and is consolidating a colonial Republican state, and in name – nothing else – is it plurinational (Rafael Arcángel Quispe Flores, La Paz, 05.11.13).

As stated elsewhere in this thesis and as elaborated on by Rafael, neoliberalism – the form of state government that has gained dominance since the mid-1980s onwards – is the prevailing discourse in present-day Bolivia (Postero 2007: 15). Apart from being a philosophy

in which individuals are privileged and the market is guided by the ‘invisible hand’, it is also a set of political and economic ideologies which aim at minimizing the state apparatus and privileging market forces through the liberalization of trade, creation of private enterprises and provision of social services (Hindery 2013: 4), Postero 2005: 77, 2007: 13-14).

Arguably, Bolivia finds itself somewhere ‘in between’ full-scale neoliberalism and that of socialism: it has reduced certain state-functions and trimmed down social spending, whilst simultaneously maintaining a somewhat repressive and centralized state apparatus (Postero 2005: 77). Thus, Bolivia is associated with what Vice President Álvaro García Linera has termed “Andean-Amazonian” capitalism: the state depends upon revenues from gas, oil, minerals and other natural resources to achieve domestic development and economic growth and thus continues to rely upon the core features of a capitalist market, whilst also having left behind certain tenets of neoliberalism (Hindery 2013: 4) – as exemplified by the process of nationalization of the hydrocarbon production chain since the 2000s onwards.

With reference to my interview with Rafael, it might be argued that it is precisely this ‘middle-ground’ position that continues to create tension between indigenous peoples and the Bolivian state. As Hindery (2013: 4) writes, the Morales administration “ [...] privileges a Western view of modernization and industrialization over Indigenous cosmologies of respect for Mother Earth and living well (*Vivir Bien*)”, thus maintaining a state structure similar to that of Bolivia’s colonial and liberal era. Possibly, this is what upsets Rafael and makes him argue that in name only, is Bolivia plurinational.

Since the early 1980s, CONAMAQ – amongst others – has represented an alternative political discourse to that of neoliberalism and “Andean-Amazonian-capitalism”. Known as the “ayllu”, a Pre-Columbian land-holding system based upon kin relations and collective work patterns, CONAMAQ works to reconstitute an egalitarian, traditional ayllu and *marka* (communal unit of several ayllus) structure in Western Bolivia (Fabricant 2013: 163-166). Thus, their political work revolves around claims of autonomy and self-sufficiency to kin-based and collectively owned territories. Also, since the mid-2000s, CONAMAQ has established itself as an important actor within the climate justice area and today, it is a key member of the Bolivian Platform for Climate Change (Fabricant 2013: 164). As Fabricant (2013: 164) notes, CONAMAQ has mobilized the ayllu and marka structure “...as an alternative to expansive and destructive capitalism”. According to Fabricant (2013: 164), CONAMAQ’s members are critical of Bolivia’s dependency upon extractive industries and non-renewable resources, as it harms both the environment and contributes to climate change. In overall terms, CONAMAQ is thus known to support the indigenous discourse referred to

above. Respect for Mother Earth (*pachamama*) and the concept of “living well” (*Vivir Bien*) have become particularly important. As Fabricant (2013: 164) notes, to live in harmony with others as well as with the larger, natural environment, are prominent features of this “idealized Andean cosmovision”.

According to Rafael, Morales’ pursues anything but an indigenous discourse, which, in his opinion, ought to be both ‘anti-capitalistic and anti-neoliberal’ in character. Thus, to Rafael, to combine an indigenous discourse with that of capitalism is impossible. To some extent at least, his response resembles that of early anthropological representations of native peoples and their communities: perceived of as timeless and grounded in rural realities, this body of literature often reflected natives and their systems of “ayllu” democracy as untouched by both colonialism and capitalism, as explicitly highlighted by Fabricant (2013: 167). However, whilst it is certainly true that Bolivia’s nation-building process has undermined – or rather, worked against – the ayllu and marka structure of democracy, indigenous peoples have nonetheless gradually adopted to changing historical, economic, social and political circumstances. This is evident if one looks back at Bolivia’s political history.

During the colonial era, the role played by the *caciques* (indigenous authorities) provided a neat linkage between on the one hand, ‘the republic of *indios*’ (Indians) and the white minority; during the corporatist era, some indigenous groups made use of the uneven reach of the state and thus, gained access to social services and politico-economic benefits, and lastly; during the neoliberal era, the introduction of neoliberal reforms – and arguably, their preceding failures – provided political leverage for the indigenous discourse to blossom even further and gain foothold in national politics. Obviously, as this short glance back at Bolivia’s political history suggests, the concept of indigeneity is not static, and neither are the peoples that define themselves according to it. Thus, possibly, when Rafael argues that the current discourse is neoliberal with ‘policies oriented in the complete opposite direction’ to that of indigeneity – of ‘*pachamamismo*’ – he simply fails to acknowledge the ways in which indigenous peoples have also contributed to and benefitted from the development of capitalism – albeit, unevenly so.

This resembles a point made by Postero (2007: 15), namely that neoliberalism “acts to define citizen participation” according to certain logics. Derived from classical liberalism and the doctrines of philosophers such as Locke and Mill, Postero (2007: 16) argues that once a state offers fewer public services and funding to its population, neoliberalism thus urges citizens to take greater responsibility for their own welfare. Accordingly, the ultimate result becomes the creation of “neoliberal subjects” – individuals that are gradually integrated into

the market (Postero 2007: 16). Keeping in mind that the concept of indigeneity is hardly static, it should come as no surprise that ethnic identities are “adjusted” according to changing circumstances, and across time and space – both consciously and unconsciously. The framework that gives meaning to Indianness is constantly changing, whereby some gain, while others lose. In a constant search for what indigeneity and *pachamamismo* ought to imply, it thus seems reasonable that Rafael blames capitalism rather than acknowledging that he is amongst those “neoliberal subjects” whose identity is affected by neoliberalism.

A somewhat more nuanced response is found in my conversation with Juan Pablo Flores. He works for *Centro de Estudios y Apoyo al Desarrollo Local* (CEADL, Center for Studies and Support to Local Development), a small NGO based in La Paz, but with offices also in El Alto, Santa Cruz and Sucre (Field notes, October 2013). Discussing *pachamamismo*, social movements and the Morales administrations’ extractivist development model, he stated the following:

In my opinion, Bolivians – and you too for that matter – must be careful of looking at indigenous communities as a unit that exists outside of the capitalist system; as if they somehow exist outside of the development of this country; as if they exist outside of their own conditions and as if they do not have relations with other indigenous communities. I think you need to look into their specific features, because they have serious problems too, you know (Juan Pablo Flores, La Paz, 16.10.13).

To some extent at least, Juan Pablo seems to be more inclined to acknowledge that indigenous peoples are somehow affected by neoliberalism – for better or for worse – and that they thus have become “neoliberal subjects”, as argued by Postero (2007: 16). Possibly, what Juan Pablo suggests, is that Western scientists, and as he argues, also Bolivians, all too often define indigenous peoples and their communities in terms of stereotyped images which describe them as somehow unaffected by the societies to which they are a part. This is an issue I will return to below.

Here it suffices to observe that within and amongst indigenous peoples there exist different, and sometimes also contradictory views of what indigeneity and capitalism implies for those affected by such concepts. To Rafael, capitalism is certainly viewed as the most devastating factor of the Morales’ extractivist development model, and thus, it makes sense for him to argue that his ‘communities’ visions are not respected’ under the current model. To Juan Pablo on the other hand, it is possible to trace a more nuanced view: rather than simply concluding that capitalism alone is the root cause to problems between indigenous peoples

and the Bolivian state, he argues that the specific features and characteristics of indigenous communities need to be further explored before coming to conclusions.

Postero (2007: 15-18) argues that the integration of “neoliberal subjects” into the market is precisely what happened in Bolivia during the 1990s. In this period, the state introduced various political reforms under the *Plan de Todos* (the Plan for Everyone) and thus reorganized the entire principles of responsibility by encouraging peoples to participate in developmental projects at the local and regional level. Moreover, rather than “fighting the national government over large issues of resource allocation” (Postero 2007: 16), Bolivia’s decentralization process resulted in a strengthening of civil society organizations through measures of inclusion, as well as through a reintegration of indigenous peoples cultural claims and rights. However, and as noted elsewhere in this thesis, by operating according to patron-clientelist relations similar to those established during the colonial and liberal era, certain civil society organizations and indigenous groups were favored at the expense of others, thus causing a situation of further discontent amongst the indigenous population at large. Possibly, the continuation of such elitist and patron-clientelist relations’ in present-day Bolivia (Bull 2013: 93) is what further upsets CONAMAQ’s leader, Rafael. As the next part reveals, his organization – amongst others – has, arguably, gained the least, both economically and politically speaking, by the current administration in office. As such, it should come as no surprise that he is rather critical of Morales’ and his extractivist development model, claiming that the structure of the state is still colonial in character.

1.2 Clientelism and the uneven access to economic and political power

To a large extent, elitist and patron-clientelist relations’ prevails in contemporary Bolivia (Bull 2013: 93). According to several of my informants, they have all gained from the ways in which the Morales administration pursues on the one hand, an indigenous agenda, whilst on the other, also sticks to – and depends upon – an extractivist development model for its survival. Amongst others, Luis Felipe Villarroel explained this to me when I attended a workshop hosted by the Norwegian People’s Aid in Santa Cruz. A man in his early 40s, he is currently the leader of *Movimiento sin Tierra* (Movement of People Without Land) in Santa Cruz – the region’s landless Peasant Movement. During the hour I sat down with him to discuss Bolivia’s extractivist development model and its effects upon the indigenous population, he stated the following:

Los campesinos (peasants) function as the articulators of the government's policies – they are the government's arms. The government says something, and they do it. Whenever the government approves something [new], who raise their hands? The peasants do – along with a small part of [other] indigenous groups that support the government because of economic and political benefits. If you're not with the government, what are you then to receive? Nothing. As I see it, peasants eat from two sides: they eat from the government and they eat from the right wing [politically speaking]. From the government, they [peasants] eat from projects funded by the Indigenous Fund; from the right, they [peasants] eat from projects supported by the Governor (Luis Felipe Villarroel, Santa Cruz, 08.11.13).

According to Luis, there are several factors at play here. Obviously, corruption and elitism is maintained vis-à-vis the government and certain indigenous groups, and as Luis highlighted: mainly *los campesinos* (the peasants) gain from the government currently in office.

This, I hold, is rooted in Bolivia's political history, in which the concept of indigeneity was constructed according to particular state-society relations. Historically speaking, the term *campesino* was first adopted after the 1952 Revolution (Molina 2008: 114). As part of the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario's* (MNR, National Revolutionary Movement) project to assimilate indigenous peoples into the national economy, Indians were renamed *campesinos* (peasants or farmers) and peasant unions were organized under the umbrella-term *sindicatos campesinos* (peasant unions) (Postero 2007: 10). Whilst the MNR's initial aim was to achieve cultural homogeneity throughout Bolivia as a whole (Molina 2008: 114), in the process, it was primarily the indigenous groups located in the highlands that adopted the term *campesino* (Postero 2007: 10). Consequently, highland peoples were also those with the closest ties to the state apparatus and thus to its resources – politically as well as economically speaking – a pattern that, arguably, exists until present, and which has been further strengthened under the Morales administration and the MAS party.

This is firmly documented by sociologist Schilling-Vacaflor (2011) in her article about Bolivia's new constitution. As previously highlighted, throughout the 1990s, indigenous-*campesinos* (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 6) became the driving forces in challenging the existing social order and demanding profound state-structural transformation. Several enhancements were made, such as the recognition of Bolivia as a “multicultural and pluri-ethnic” state, along with numerous decentralization policies and political reforms. Amongst the most important once were the Law of Popular Participation (1995) and the Law of Political Parties (1999) (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 7). The latter enabled civil society organizations and

indigenous peoples organizations to nominate candidates from their own parties, thus strengthening the decision-making role of civil society in general and indigenous political parties in particular. Founded already in 1995 by an alliance of several unionized peasant organizations, in which the *cocaleros* (coca-growers) of the Chapare region in Cochabamba played the most active part, the Movement towards Socialism (MAS) quickly became Bolivia's largest indigenous party (Bull 2007: 75-76). Thus, it is not an overstatement to argue that a heterogeneous indigenous-*campesino* discourse was about to emerge in Bolivia (Schilling-Vacaflor (2011: 7).

This is further evident studying the MAS' first period in office (2006-2010), in which it profoundly sealed its hegemonic power within the Constituent Assembly – the very same chamber that in 2009 approved and adopted Bolivia's new constitution. Initially, once Morales entered presidency in 2005, a general agreement was made between the MAS and indigenous organizations that the latter would be granted 16 reserved seats in the Assembly. Morales and the MAS nonetheless broke this promise as they assumed 137 out of 255 assembly seats – making it close to impossible for indigenous groups to elect candidates without simultaneously allying with the MAS. As Schilling-Vacaflor (2011: 8) argues, the MAS broke the pact primarily to concentrate votes in its own favor, thus altering any process of achieving a substantive and transformative democracy.

In retrospect, although the new constitution was adopted by referendum (Flesken 2013: 343), the constitution-writing process became undemocratic and biased in favor of the MAS administration and its founding organizations. Whilst the legal documents that comprise today's constitution was prepared by an assembly of representatives from the major indigenous organizations – known as the 'Unity Pact' – and then used as the basis for the MAS party's proposals, a widespread critique has been that various political parties and indigenous groups tried to achieve their own goals by means of influencing and controlling the Constituent Assembly (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 9).

It is fair to argue that such a strategy largely succeeded, as Congress delegates changed approximately a 100 of the assembly's original articles (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 9). In the end, lowland organizations in particular, but also Ayllu organizations such as CONAMAQ – to which my informant, Rafael, represents – lost the most in this corrupt scheme: they had both fewer representatives within the Constituent Assembly as well as looser ties to the MAS (Bull 2013: 93, Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 9). Ultimately then, the MAS did little to ensure that a participative, representative and communitarian democracy was strengthened during both the constitution-writing process and the preceding implementation

process of the new constitution, thus compromising the underlying aims of Article 11 – which explicitly highlights these as specific goals (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 9).

Under the Morales administration it is clearly evident that corruption and patron-clientelist relations are not features of the past, as highlighted by both of my informants thus far. Rather, these features still flourish – a case in point that obviously hampers any attempts of maintaining and strengthening the MAS’ self-proclaimed indigenous discourse. Also, it hampers attempts of building an extensive and substantive democracy. As Schilling-Vacaflor argues (2011: 4): whilst a democracy is commonly assumed to ensure transparency, accountability and broaden the basis for civil society participation, it might also produce antidemocratic societal tendencies through those very same participatory processes. The MAS is a poignant example of this, and it might be argued that it has succeeded in ‘manipulating’ its citizenry with a one-sided political indigenous-identity discourse and thus, has excluded rather than included both non-indigenous Bolivians and various indigenous organizations in the process – as my informant, Luis Villarroel, argued above (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011: 4).

1.3 Bolivia anno 2014: Who is indigenous?

Although indigenous peoples initially pushed for a political shift towards that of *pachamamismo*, I doubt they envisioned a situation in which the MAS – under the leadership of Evo Morales himself – would centralize its power by following a top-down approach commonly associated with that of his predecessors. Thus, it might be argued that the revaluation of ethnicity into national politics has led to more rather than less contestation over the concept of indigeneity and over what an indigenous discourse in reality ought to imply.

This is particularly evident with reference to the new constitution, in which the articulations of indigenous identities are particularly highlighted (Flesken 2013: 344). Article 30 for instance, which is relatively widespread throughout Bolivia, defines a nation or peoples being *indígena originario campesino* (IOC, indigenous original peasant) as “ [...] any human collective that shares a cultural identity, language, historical tradition, institutions, territoriality and cosmovision, whose existence is prior to the Spanish colonial invasion” (Flesken 2013: 343). Whilst this article properly defines the indigenous population as both nations and peoples, more recently however, it has also sharpened polarization within the Bolivian population: on the one hand, it establishes a division between an indigenous and a non-indigenous Bolivia, on the other, it increases divisions amongst the indigenous

population itself because of the heterogeneous characteristics given to the concept of indigeneity (Flesken 2013: 344).

Polarization as such, is also reflected within the scholarly literature on indigeneity, which, more often than not, has come to define native peoples according to stereotyped images of ‘the noble savage’ or the ‘eco-Indian’. Particularly, works by social scientists in the 1970s and 1980s commonly portrayed indigenous peoples according to ideas of ‘lo Andino’ (Andeanism), in which their closeness to ecologies and natural environments were highlighted as prominent features (Fabricant 2013: 167). In the more recent debate about the issue of indigeneity – what is sometimes termed “the indigenous peoples debate” (Canessa 2007) – scholarly are frequently quoted referring to native peoples as ‘hunter-gatherers’ and ‘nomads’, or even as peoples ‘living in the stone age’, again, as if they are somehow untouched by societal changes (Canessa 2007: 196-197).

In the era of globalization however, tides are definitely changing and thus, indigenous peoples no longer fit into such reductionist and romantic ideals of indigeneity. The concept itself means different things to different peoples – across time as well as across place – and is thus, not a heterogeneous one. As Canessa (2007) states:

Although it may appear ‘relatively easy’ to say who is indigenous in Latin America, as is sometimes suggested, who is and who isn’t indigenous and what it means to be indigenous in Latin America is highly variable, context specific and changes over time...Whatever indigeneity is about in Bolivia, it is not about a hunter-gatherer Urkultur (197).

According to Albó (2008: 30), the formation of identities – and moreover, of *indigenismo* – comes with “dialectical tensions that tend to repeat themselves through history”. Following Albó (2008), one such tension is found between ethnic identities and a unified national identity, which in his opinion is “...the oldest and most enduring conditioning factor affecting both politics and social formation in Bolivia...” (30). Viewed historically, Albó (2008) argues that during both the colonial period and the preceding neoliberal era ethnic identities emerge through patterns of ‘generic polarization’: in one end of the specter where white Spaniards and *criollos*; in the other were *indios* (Indians) and indigenous groups. However, both eras failed to erase these polarization tendencies, and so they remained in the subsequent period of nation building and cultural *mestizaje* following the 1952 Revolution (Albó 2008: 30). Tensions between ethnic identities and a common national identity have thus become socially embedded in Bolivia, and as witnessed by the reemergence of ethnic politics

from the 1960s onwards: thus far, no political agenda has successfully replaced these tensions.

What is more, it might be argued that this tension is further strengthened under the new constitution, as witnessed with reference to indigenous peoples' search for greater complementarity between individual citizen rights on the one hand, and collective rights on the other. Whilst the former strengthens national unity on the basis of peoples' equal status as citizens of the nation-state, the latter might indeed be argued to do the opposite. Within the new constitution, indigenous peoples have rights as first-class citizens – thus, individual rights – whilst simultaneously having specific rights, rooted in ties to indigenous communities. The latter also grants them collective rights. As such, indigenous peoples have a double demand to which the new constitution fulfills: they have gained equality while also won their right to be differently respected on the basis of cultural identities and diversity (Albó 2008: 31).

Thus, more recently, and particularly with reference to the new constitution in which collective rights for indigenous groups loom large, critical voices amongst 'regular Bolivians' as well as indigenous groups have emerged. Following Flesken (2013: 345), criticism of Andean centrism is increasing against both the new constitution and the Morales' administrations' policies, which are deemed to prioritize rural and collective forms of indigeneity at the expense of urban and individual forms. As such, yet another of Albó's (2008: 32) tensions becomes evident: the rural-versus-urban one.

Historically speaking, poverty and indigeness has commonly been concentrated in the rural areas, both geographically and culturally – a pattern that is evident also in present-day Bolivia. However, during the colonial and neocolonial period, and particularly during the liberal era, this led to the rather unscientific conclusion that the rural sector was the poorest one because of the influence by ancient cultures – in stark contrast to the cities whereby non-indigenous culture and customs had gained hegemony (Albó 2008: 32). Consequently, a process of cultural *mestizaje* (cultural mixing) emerged, in which indigenous peoples were forced to abandon their own culture and replace it by the dominant Hispanic-*criollo* one.

More recently, and due to migration from the countryside to the cities, to the advancing agricultural frontiers and from Bolivia to other countries alike, the majority of those defining themselves as belonging to indigenous groups now live in urban areas, and as Albó (2008: 33) notes – in the poorest peripheries. Thus, it no longer makes sense to define indigeneity in terms of a rural-versus-urban contradiction: if anything, the pendulum has shifted towards a rural/impoverished/ethnically urban periphery versus a wealthier/more central and urban one, as argued by Albó (2008: 33).

I experienced this myself when travelling back and forth between downtown La Paz and its satellite city, El Alto. The latter is located at an altitude of 4000 m above sea level, and thus, might rightfully be termed “an indigenous urban center overlooking a colonial city” (Arbona & Kohl 2004: 255). Whereas La Paz represents a *mestizo* (hybrid) urban metropolis whereby peoples of both indigenous and non-indigenous heritage live side by side, in the 2001 census, 74 percent of El Alto’s population identified themselves as Aymara (Albó 2008: 33). Thus, poor, urban Aymara Indians make up the majority of the population in the satellite city – in sharp contrast to La Paz’s southern zone (*la zona sur*), in which a middle- and upper class have blossomed over the last twenty years (Arbona & Kohl 2004: 260, Postero 2007: 2).

The socio-economic differences between the two cities are evident once getting off at the ‘*Ceja*’, literally ‘the eyebrow’ in El Alto, which is surrounded by brick buildings in varying degrees of completion, and mostly unpaved sidewalks (Field notes, November 2013). Moreover, El Alto is located on an almost treeless plateau commonly termed *el altiplano* (the high plateau) and due to its altitude, it is known for its rough climate. Thus, women are dressed in traditional Indian wool-shawls, and more often than not, I saw peoples wearing several layers of clothes on top of each other (Field notes, November 2013). Also, it is estimated that fifty-four percent of El Alto’s residents relies on outdoor plumbing for access to water, and thirty-seven percent of its households are without access to toilets or latrines, compared to only 16 percent in La Paz (Arbona & Kohl 2004: 261). Thus, El Alto represents a rather opposite social universe to that of urban metropolis’ elsewhere in the world: geographically speaking, the poorest parts of the population is located ‘on the top’ rather than ‘at the bottom’.

During my stay in Bolivia, I was invited home to one of the housekeepers working at *La Misión Alianza*’s (the Mission Alliance) guesthouse. A woman in her mid-30s, Berta lives in a brick house in El Alto together with her husband and their three children. To my surprise, Berta welcomed me fully dressed as a *cholita* (an Aymara woman), which is never the case when she is at work. Wearing a traditional – and I would suppose, heavy – blue-colored skirt, firmly placed around her waist to give a ‘round’ backside, a black wool-shawl and the typical Bolivian bowler-hat on top, she proudly showed me around in her house. We spent most of the afternoon looking through her wardrobe, in which all of her Aymara-dresses were neatly organized in a long row. This further strengthened my perception of her as proud of being Aymara-Indian.

However, only if peoples ask her if she is Aymara, will she tell them so. Otherwise, she simply identifies herself as Bolivian. Also, I never saw her dress up like a *cholita*

(Aymara woman) except from when she was at home or walking around in El Alto. Moreover, although both Berta and her husband know their native language by heart, they never speak Aymara with their children or amongst themselves. The entire family simply communicates with each other in Spanish, rather than giving both languages equal footing within the household (Field notes, November 2013). This reflects the 2001 census, which recorded that – for the first time in Bolivia’s history – the majority of Bolivians had Spanish as their mother tongue (Canessa 2007: 199). However, and as argued by Canessa (2007: 199-200), such records runs somewhat counter to the history of a country whereby *pachamamismo* and ethnic politics are its most important political weapons against patterns of discrimination.

This exemplifies the ways in which indigeneity is a context-specific concept to which different ‘identities’ are stressed depending upon circumstance: in Berta’s case, she aims at being Aymara-Indian only while surrounded by others who define themselves accordingly. At the guesthouse however, she simply prefers to identify as non-indigenous. Possibly, outside of El Alto, Berta feels less discriminated against and looked down upon by stressing her identity as Bolivian rather than that of Aymara. Thus, being indigenous or Indian in 2014 is not a straightforward issue. It is for this reason Albó (2008: 14) argues that, in Bolivia, people can just as easily define themselves as Aymara or Quechua and at the same time as *mestizo* (of mixed heritage). In my opinion, this clearly exemplifies in the ways in which Berta stresses different identities depending upon circumstance.

In this chapter I have argued that contemporary contestations over ethnic politics are rooted in indigenous peoples different understandings of the meaning of indigeneity itself, and moreover, of their opposing views concerning the Morales administrations continuous dependency upon natural resource extraction. On the one hand, indigenous peoples resist the combination of *pachamamismo* and neoliberalism, claiming that the latter capitalizes the political and socioeconomic system and thus, conflicts with the promises of respect and protection for Mother Earth and the environment. On the other hand, indigenous peoples fail to acknowledge that they have both contributed to and benefitted from the capitalization of the economy – a pattern that also persists under the Morales administration. However, Bolivia’s history has left its mark on the society to the extent that patron-clintelist relations still determine which indigenous organizations and ethnic groups gain the most from the government currently in office. Thus, the indigenous discourse currently in place is challenged by the very same mechanisms that provoked tensions between the state and its citizenry in pre-historical epochs, namely that of exclusion rather than inclusion.

2.0 Challenges of natural resource extraction in contemporary Bolivia

In the late 20th century, a political shift has occurred throughout all of Latin America. In nearly every country – and supported by more or less unified social movements – authoritarian regimes have been replaced by that of left-of-centre governments, what Bull terms ‘Pink-Tide’ governments (Bull 2013). In Brazil, this was marked by the presidential elections of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2002; in Bolivia, the entering of Aymara Indian and coca-grower unionist Evo Morales in 2005 similarly reflects the changes about to occur in the region (Bull 2013: 75).

Following this shift, Bolivia has attempted to break free from its neoliberal market-led development trajectory by pursuing instead the “Andean-Amazonian” economic model explained elsewhere in this thesis. Key in this process has been a restructuring of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector, with the ultimate aim being that of full-scale nationalization of the country’s oil and gas reserves (Hindery 2013: 150-151). Thus, shortly after Morales took power, Bolivia’s state oil company – YPFB – regained control of the hydrocarbon production chain, followed by the implementation of both the ‘nationalization decree’ (‘Heroes of the Chaco, no. 28701) and the so-called Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH) – a tax regime that is to redistribute the revenues from natural resources towards different social programs (Hindery 2013: 151, Wanderley et al. 2012: 193-194). Recently, the government has also expanded its extractive frontiers by escalating its production in natural gas, amongst other minerals. Following Schilling-Vacaflor (2013: 207), between 2001 and 2009, estimates suggest that the production of gas alone was doubled. What is more, 43,3 percent of Bolivia’s exports in 2010 stemmed from the exportation of mineral fuel³.

Thus, due to continued expansion and dependency upon natural resource extraction, social conflicts persist in Bolivia. As Bull (2013: 76) argues, these conflicts revolve around both the distribution of greater political and economic power as well as protection from the penetration of capitalism on indigenous territories, which are protected by international and domestic laws alike. In Bolivia, it is reasonable to argue that the ‘resource curse’ continues to be an urgent puzzle. Whilst the former depends upon extractive industries and non-renewable resources to finance social policies (Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: 207), natural-resource wealth does not come about without simultaneously producing tensions. Based upon interviews conducted in Bolivia, this chapter explores current challenges and contradictions

³ Norad Report 7/2012, Enhancing the integrity of the Oil for Development Programme: Assessing vulnerabilities to corruption and identifying prevention measures – case studies of Bolivia, Mozambique and Uganda.

faced by indigenous peoples and leaders of various NGOs concerned by the continued rise in natural resource extraction.

2.1 Nationalization of natural resources: solely an illusion?

When I asked my informants to describe Bolivia's nationalization process, nearly all of them simply stated that it is an ongoing process yet to be completed, since – as they argued – transnational companies are still present (Interviews, La Paz, 05.01.13 and 06.11.13).

This was also the response I got when conducting an interview with María Lohman, the coordinator and spokes person of *Somos Sur* – an NGO founded in Cochabamba in 2005, which aims at expanding alternative views of socio-economic development through publications, courses and radio activities⁴. María is originally from the United States, but has lived most of her adult life in Bolivia, and over the past twenty years – in the Cochabamba Department. As such, she is my only informant whose nationality is not Bolivian. Even though she obviously speaks English fluently, she nonetheless preferred to conduct the interview in Spanish. According to her, it was simply '*mejor como así*' (better that way/better like this), and moreover, she did not want her Bolivian friends – whom were waiting in the back yard of her house – to assume that I was a journalist from abroad (Interview, Cochabamba, 22.10.13). Thus, discussing Bolivia's shift from neoliberalism towards that of "Andean-Amazonian capitalism" and its effects upon the indigenous population, María stated the following:

Today, our natural resources are managed in a neoliberal way – with only a hint of indigeneity. As such, it is not neoliberal as it used to be, which implied that the state did not intervene at all. But, it is nonetheless neoliberal; natural resources are commercialized with the aim of getting it abroad. Indigenous peoples are in power, theoretically speaking, but we follow an extractivist development model...Look at the mining sector: 85 percent of it is in the hands of 2 or 3 transnational companies! And Bolivia is still tremendously poor, except for a small middle class who benefit from the commercialization of drugs. Therefore I ask you: where is the industrialization? Where is the nationalization that Morales talks about? We need to handle our national resources in a sovereign manner. However, the problem is that we don't have the technology to do so (María Lohman, Cochabamba, 22.10.13).

⁴ Somos Sur: <http://somosur.net/nosotros.html> - 25.05.13.

The Andean Amazonian model pursued by the Morales administration is anchored in its need to secure both macroeconomic stability and economic surplus for redistribution, mainly to finance ambitious social policies (Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011: 137-138). Over the past years, several government representatives have stated this as a political objective. Arguing for the continuation of the extractivist model, Vice President Alvaro García Linero recently said that: "...[t]he social-state need[s] to generate economic surplus that are the state's responsibility", and further that: "[...] you need to produce on a large scale, to implement processes of expansive industrialization that provide you with a social surplus that can be redistributed and support other processes of *campesino* (peasant), communitarian and small scale modernization" (quoted in Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011: 137). Thus, albeit social policies are greater under the Morales administration than was the case with previous regimes, it is nonetheless striking how its macro policies have not particularly changed for the better (Hecht 2013: xi).

To a large extent, this is also reflected in my interview with Marcelo Osvaldo Ortega Aramayo. He works for CARITAS Bolivia, which is amongst several of the Catholic Church's official organizations worldwide⁵. A man in his early 50s, Marcelo met with me in his office, located in downtown La Paz. Responsible for the organization's national programs, he holds tremendous knowledge of Bolivia's socio-economic and political development processes and thus, when I asked him to describe Bolivia's nationalization process and the country's future, he simply stated that:

Politicians continue on with "politics as usual". In practice, what [the government] does, is to meet with foreign actors and make commitments with businesses, regardless of taking into account, in reality, the commitments that it has with its indigenous population. The government says that we're in a process of decolonization – of nationalization – that we're in a process whereby we don't recognize the capitalist and neoliberal system. It's the worst lie I've ever heard: you don't have to be that intelligent to see that Bolivia's economic policies – both at micro and macro level – are imperialist, exploitative and neoliberal in character (Marcelo Osvaldo Ortega Aramayo, La Paz, 05.11.13).

Rather than the 'resource curse' being an economic phenomenon – which has commonly been assumed by scholars and the international community alike – Karl (2007) has suggested that, above all, the 'curse' is a political phenomenon. According to her, petroleum dependent states are turned into 'honey pots' – a trap which roots are political in character and

⁵ CARITAS: <http://www.caritas.org/where-we-are/latin-america/bolivia/> - 31.05.2014.

thus, must be contained with “political and international agreements” (257). The solution to the ‘honey-pot’ problem is the establishment of a so-called ‘fiscal social contract’: tax regimes whereby citizens are enabled to hold government personnel accountable for the returns from natural resources. Failing to implement a sufficient tax system will inevitably lead to unchecked corruption and misuse of public resources. Her more general point is that “...state authority is historically structured through a series of exchanges of resources for institutions” (Karl 2007: 259). Whenever such exchanges (or rather, rents) are generated between the state and foreign companies rather than between the state and its citizenry, the state ultimately becomes what Bebbington et al. (2008: 970) term an ‘extrovert state’: its legitimacy is maintained vis-à-vis international interests rather than national ones.

In the Bolivian case, it is not an overstatement to argue that Karl’s ‘fiscal social contract’ is more or less non-existent and thus, that the state’s interests are biased in favor of transnational corporations rather than towards the interests of the population. Considering the fact that approximately 73,5 percent of Bolivia’s 10,5 million peoples make a living from the informal rather than the formal economy (World Bank 2013), and moreover, that a tax regime is lacking between these informal workers and the state, it is hardly strange that the Morales administration focuses its attention towards the interests of transnational corporations: to date, the returns from natural resource extraction – to which transnational corporations contribute to – is, in reality, the state’s only reliable source of income that finance its social programs and services.

Thus, it is reasonable to assume that in the absence of a tax regime financed by taxes imposed upon the citizenry – which, in the Bolivian case seems impossible to implement due to the extremely high proportion of informal workers – the Morales administration will hardly change its policies *away* from natural resource extraction and the interests of transnational corporations. As highlighted by Marcelo Aramayo, politicians continue on with “politics as usual”, which implies anything but a temporarily reliance upon natural resource extraction (Interview, La Paz, 05.11.13). However, whilst the Bolivian economy has grown by an average of 4,4 percent since 2008 and the returns from natural resources grew six folded between 2004 and 2011, Bolivia nonetheless remains amongst the poorest countries in Latin America (Norad Report 7/2012). As noted by María Lohman, ‘Bolivia is still tremendously poor’ (Interview, Cochabamba, 22.10.13). How might this paradox be explained?

2.2 In a state of corruption?

In Bolivia, it is reasonable to assume that the ‘fiscal social contract’ called for by Karl (2007) is weakened due to high levels of corruption, primarily within the public sector. Following the report by Norad (7/2012: 6), as of 2011, Bolivia ranked amongst the bottom half of countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). In 2013, out of a total of 175 countries worldwide, the same index ranked Bolivia as country no. 106⁶. According to these results – which to date are Transparency International’s latest results available – the public sector got a score of 34 out of a 100, in which the latter is perceived of as highly clean, or otherwise stated: without corruption (CPI 2013). Following the Norad report (7/2012: 6), the misuse of public resources is mostly committed by the elite and by personnel working within the state administration itself.

Although the CPI remains the most widely used corruption index and includes measures from various organizations such as the Economist Intelligence Unit and Freedom House, it nonetheless suffers from severe weaknesses – as is the case with most statistics (Seligson 2006: 384). Apart from the obvious fact that such statistics usually put forth stereotyped images that do not necessarily reflect the reality of countries, the data sources mostly stem from the impressions of business peoples whose attention is biased in favor of business transactions rather than towards economic activities pursued also by regular citizens (Seligson 2006: 385). Clearly, citizens operate through other means than those depicted by standard ‘business measures’, and thus, caution must be paid before judging the book by its cover.

That being said, the fact that the Morales administration gains from corruption weakens its legitimacy vis-à-vis its population and thus, makes its dependency upon natural resource extraction an even greater nut to defend publicly. Thus, to justify the government’s commitment to extraction, Morales frequently makes public statements whereby the redistribution scenario is explicitly stated. For instance, he has famously argued that: “[...] what then, is Bolivia going to live off if some NGO’s say ‘Amazonia without oil’?...They are saying, in other words, that the Bolivian people should not have money...”, and moreover that, “[...] necessity obligates us to exploit these natural resources, the gas, the oil, for all Bolivians...If there’s no oil, gas, you know it is for all Bolivians and this money that we collect from oil, from gas, has to go to all Bolivians” (quoted in Bebbington & Humphreys Bebbington 2011: 138).

⁶ Transparency International Corruption Perception Index: <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/> - 04.06.14.

It might be argued that Morales hardly seems to care that Bolivia scores at the low bottom of the world's well-known corruption index and further, that his country is amongst the poorest one in the region. However, under the Morales government, anti-corruption measures have also been implemented – such as the passing of laws to increase transparency in the public sector, and the establishment of a new Ministry post known as the Vice Ministry for Institutional Transparency and the Fight against Corruption (Kohl 2010: 114). Moreover, several peoples within the state administration have been laid off or even prosecuted on claims of corruption, including representatives also from within Morales' political party, the Movement towards Socialism (the MAS) (Kohl 2010: 114-115). Yet, to break with old patterns of the past has proven to be harder than, arguably, anticipated by the Morales administration, causing persistently high levels of corruption. Thus, a more plausible explanation might simply be that in times of writing, in Bolivia, no law exists that regulates access to public information – a case in point that clearly hampers any attempts of building a more transparent petroleum sector (Norad Report 7/2012: 32).

2.3 Weak institutional capacity: the root cause to contemporary conflicts?

Although necessity legitimates neither the government's misuse of public resources nor its lack of respect for Mother Earth and the environment, it might nonetheless be argued that these are effects of weak institutional capacity rather than simply the lack of political will to 'perform better'. This seems to be the main conclusion drawn from Norad's report on Bolivia's hydrocarbon sector (7/2012). Moreover, the report stresses that the interplay of both weak state capacity and that of technological complexity needed to make efficient use of the hydrocarbon sector is what causes Bolivia to perform poorly, in developmental terms (2).

To some extent, this conclusion resembles that of the 'resource curse' literature, particularly articles by those who argue that regime type and low levels of democracy are the main factors explaining why resource-rich countries like Bolivia perform so poorly in terms of developmental outcomes⁷. Kohl (2010) for instance, argues that Bolivia's political history of "inefficiency, disorganization and rent-seeking" (112) is replayed through MAS delegates whose grass roots rather than professional constituency hamper a profound restructuring of the state. In his view, paternalistic relationships and frequent replacements of ministers make the government structure uneven and chaotic and thus, highly sensitive to further misuse of

⁷ See Rosser 2006: *The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey* for a review of this literature

public resources and funds (Kohl 2010: 112-114). Others, such as Mitra (1994) and Krause (1995), argue that natural resource booms increase government spending simply due to the economic opportunities envisioned by politicians in resource-rich countries (McNeish & Logan 2012: 12). However, whilst this literature sheds light on some important vulnerability-risks commonly associated with resource-rich countries in the Global South, in the Bolivian case, it might be argued that low levels of industrialization and technology are better explained in terms of historico-structuralist perspectives.

Following the literature survey presented in Rosser (2006: 16), these perspectives suggest that bad economic performance is due to the relative power of different social classes or groups, and furthermore, that Latin America's failure to reduce poverty over the past decades is due to the region's natural resource endowments on industrial policies. For instance, Auty & Gelb (2000: 3) argue that rent-seeking behavior – albeit mostly found in sub-Saharan Africa – persists in Latin America because landed elites sustained their power even after countries gained their independence from colonialism and became somewhat more democratic. The result has been a continuation of what he terms 'factional states': governments who legitimate their power vis-à-vis their population by favoring certain ethnic groups or classes (Auty & Gelb 2000: 3).

This point resembles that of Collier (2000), whom argues that greed and grievance make warlords and rebel leaders enrich themselves on the economic opportunities commonly associated with natural resource abundance and thus, distort attempts of achieving sound developmental outcomes (McNeish & Logan 2012: 13). The ultimate result of natural resource wealth is thus internal conflict and civil war (McNeish & Mogan 2012: 13-14). What is largely neglected in Collier's technocratic perspective however, is that neither political relationships nor ideology are erased by resource politics. Auty & Gelb (2000) recognize this to a somewhat greater extent since they – at least implicitly – draw a historical link to the import substitution industrialization (ISI) reforms implemented throughout Latin America from the mid-1950s onwards. Thus, they admit that the region still suffers from the outcomes produced under these reforms.

Perhaps, Bolivia's lack of technological know-how and capacity within its hydrocarbon sector, coupled with a continuation of pre-historical patterns of clientelism and corruption implies that what we currently see in Bolivia, is a replay of the ISI's. Bolivia is still amongst the poorest states within the Latin American region, albeit holding the fifth largest oil reserves and the second largest gas reserves in South America (Norad Report

7/2012: 30). Yet, it continues to hold a periphery position in the global economy in much the same ways as argued by Prebisch and Singer back in the early 1950s.

Albeit none of my informant mentioned the ISI's in particular, María Lohman nonetheless wondered why – after decades of extractivism – industrialization, or rather, modernization has thus far *not* come about in Bolivia. As already stated in a previous quote by her, she simply asked me: “where is the industrialization? Where is the nationalization that Morales talks about?” And further, that: “all we see is commercial signs of Coca Cola and a continuation of the extractivist model” (Interview, Cochabamba, 22.10.13). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the resource-driven capitalist model underway in Bolivia since the beginning of time continues to produce asymmetric access to technology and manufactured goods (McNeish & Logan 2012: 19) – a case in point that helps explain why, as María argued, Bolivia is still tremendously poor (Interview, Cochabamba, 22.10.13). Moreover, whilst increased foreign direct investments (FDI) in natural resources spurs hope of greater social and economic development, it might also deepen commodity dependency, increase corruption and ‘tie the hands of governments’ (Haarstad 2012: 2) – as the Morales administration is a poignant example of.

Thus, within a global political economy drive forth by a continuous dependency upon natural resource extraction, resource sovereignty is indeed undermined. This causes social frictions to abound. As ongoing efforts at reforms make abundantly clear: the Bolivian political system struggles to balance on the one hand, popular support for the continuation of its extractivist model, which is needed to finance already existing public services and programs, and to achieve sufficient levels of investment and production for as to expand the technological capacity of its hydrocarbon sector, on the other (Wanderley et al. 2012: 177). Both articulations continue to create tensions and resistance amongst and between indigenous groups as well as within the Morales administration itself. Thus, until present, neither “Andean Amazonian capitalism” nor ethnic politics has managed to put an end to socio-environmental conflicts.

3.0 The proliferation of the ‘ethnic rights agenda’

In the context of global capitalism, socio-environmental conflicts have intensified to the extent that the idea of prior consultation and its different versions of free, prior and informed consent now comprise an approach of its own – at the international as well as on national levels (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010: 6). Whilst relatively new in terms of precipitating both hard and soft laws within well-known human rights instruments, the ‘ethnic rights agenda’ (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010) as such, is hardly a new phenomenon. Rather, it reflects what anti-capitalist writer Harvey (2003) terms “accumulation by dispossession”, namely indigenous peoples’ century-old struggles against states, transnational companies, mafias and other illegal armed groups, whom – under the brands of capitalism and development – have been enriching themselves on the natural-resource wealth contained in the soil of indigenous territories (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010: 5).

Worldwide, such natural-resource abundant territories comprise what Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 5) terms ‘social minefields’: the dynamics of social interactions produced within them are characterized by unequal power relations between states, indigenous communities and transnational companies, and moreover, over struggles of how to equally distribute both the risks and benefits associated with natural resource extraction. Thus, due to these ‘minefields’ and the political and socio-economic conflicts they continue to produce, a juridical and legal framework has emerged, in which the right to prior consultations and free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) have gained centre stage in recent years.

Through processes of consultation, indigenous peoples are suppose to get ‘a say’ prior to extractive projects, laws and/or policies carried out on indigenous territories that directly affect them and/or their livelihood. Thus, if properly performed, such procedures might indeed serve to strengthen indigenous peoples decision-making role in extractive policies and natural resource governance commonly known to have negative developmental effects upon their territories, environmentally speaking or otherwise. Moreover, for governments that still struggle to overcome pre-historical patterns of racism, discrimination and exclusionism of marginalized groups – to which the indigenous population is a poignant example – prior consultations might also have the transformative effect of closing the gap between states and its citizenry through means of greater political inclusion and thus, mitigate social conflicts.

This helps explain why some scholars – particularly those within the corporate social responsibility approach – praise the ‘participatory rights paradigm’ currently underway. According to this school of thought, the ‘participatory rights approach’ would most certainly serve as an effective mechanism for ‘breaking the resource curse’ and thus, mitigate social

conflicts commonly known to follow from natural resource extraction in countries in the Global South⁸. However, Flemming & Schilling-Vacaflor (2013: 1) derive at the exact opposite conclusion in their GIGA-paper: according to their work, social conflicts caused by natural resource extraction might serve as a potential force of ‘emancipatory change’ (Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: 1).

Leaving the above positions aside for a minute, this chapter explores one question in particular, namely: how useful are prior consultations if the players in the field have unequal amounts of power to efficiently exercise the rights? Following Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 12-13), since the end of the twentieth century onwards, neoliberal globalism has been defined in terms of the ‘centrality of the law’ and the proliferation of ‘law and order’ to the extent that constitutionalism, contracts, rights and legal activities characterize public as well as private policy programs and initiatives worldwide. According to Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 12-14), this legal dimension has also spilled over into the ‘ethnic rights agenda’ and thus, has turned indigenous peoples into ‘legal subjects’ whose collective claims for self-determination and territorial control is fought within the space of legal jurisdiction. Through procedures and numerous types of participatory consultation processes, the material conditions necessary for genuine deliberations are thus left aside and untouched. What is created instead, according to Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 16), is a vision of a public sphere “ [...] as a depoliticized space for collaboration among generic ‘stakeholders’”.

In light of quotes and thoughts of my informants, this chapter sheds light on the above debates and discusses the right to prior consultation and free, prior and informed consent. It is reasonable to assume that if the legal framework current in place leaves power relations untouched and fails to get to the core of indigenous peoples claims for cultural specific collective rights, then the right to prior consultation and FPIC are nothing but glaze on top of the “human rights” cake. However, it might also be the case – as Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor argue in their GIGA-paper (2013) – that, regardless of the imperfect conditions under which FPIC are currently exercised, the ‘participatory rights approach’ might nonetheless serve as a transformative force towards that of “emancipatory change” (Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: 1).

⁸ Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: ”Exploring the Consultation-Conflict Link: Lessons from Bolivia’s and Peru’s Gas and Oil Sector” – GIGA draft that has yet to be officially published

3.1 The right to prior consultations and free, prior and informed consent

In contemporary Bolivia, as in other resource-reliant states, it seems appropriate to argue that the right to prior consultations and FPIC are amongst the main measures causing continuous tension between the indigenous population, transnational corporations and the state. As the Morales government's plan to construct a highway through the Isoboro Securé National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) in 2011 reveals: challenges abound on how to develop sound policies of the right to prior consultations and FPIC as established within international human rights instruments and the country's new institution, and moreover, on how to comply to these legal frameworks in practice (Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: 202-203).

Following Hindery (2013: 168), legal measures of the right to prior consultations – and more recently, of the FPIC – grew out of reforms adopted in the early 1990s. Indigenous peoples' mobilizing power led first to the ratification of the International Labor Organization's Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Tribal Populations (ILO, C169) in 1992; and second, in 2007, to the approval of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), in which the FPIC is explicitly highlighted (Article 32) (Hindery 2013: 168, Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: 203).

At the local level, socio-environmental impacts such as the contamination of water, dispossession from land or even the abolishment of pre-historical and cultural ways of life is commonly known to follow from natural resource extraction (Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: 205). Thus, indigenous peoples' right to prior consultations seek to secure on the one hand, basic human rights such as freedom of opinion and expression and adequate standards of living and housing⁹, and more cultural specific rights such as autonomy and territorial control, on the other (Hindery 2013: 169, Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: 205). According to Schilling-Vacaflor (2013), it is thus reasonable to argue that the latter rights are particularly important to indigenous peoples, as they make up "...the largest impoverish and marginalized group in the region" (205). Moreover, as this thesis so vividly explores, indigenous peoples have been systematically excluded from participation in state politics throughout the Bolivian history, and only in recent decades have they achieved rights commonly known to follow from full-scale citizenship. Thus, the right to prior consultations aims at correcting for this injustice. As stated in UNDRIP's Article 32 (2):

⁹ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a1>, Article 18 and 25, respectively - 29.05.2014.

States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources¹⁰

At the international level, the UNDRIP and the ILO C169 reflect the global indigenous rights movement and the rise of multicultural constitutionalism that has come to define it. However, it is only within the UNDRIP that indigenous peoples' right to FPIC is explicitly stated, as exemplified in the above Article.

According to Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 21-22), the ILO has adopted a much weaker version, and the final text reduces the FPIC to a 'priority of economic development' (22). Following Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 20), the previous Convention 107 was revised precisely due to stark tensions between the international indigenous rights movements and the ILO over the objective of replacing indigenous peoples 'integration' with that of their 'participation'. Whilst the former sought to substitute participation with that of territorial control and socioeconomic conditions in general, the latter objectified to every idea based upon granting indigenous peoples self-determination (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010: 21). Thus, the initial compromise proposed by the ILO Office was for governments and states to "*seek* the consent" of indigenous peoples – a compromise that obviously met stark resistance by those affected. Consequently, the weaker formulation of "consultation", "participation" and "respect for identity" ultimately found its way into the texts of the ILO C169 (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010: 22).

Thus, in ILO C169, the FPIC's political function is appropriately defined as 'a procedural compromise between two substantively opposing positions' (Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 22). If the ILO's main agenda was to silent principle-based discussions of possible harm to its own political grounds, it certainly did well. Moreover, it managed to incorporate the FPIC into the neoliberal mainstream by profoundly establishing the right within ILO's economic framework of 'development process', which highlights natural resource extraction as a capital-intensive path to increased economic growth (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010: 22).

Following Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 22-23), to maintain and reinforce their own development-discourses, multilateral organization and private corporations alike have thus adopted the rhetoric of the FPIC – as exemplified by the ways in which the Inter-American

¹⁰ The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf - 29.05.2014.

Development Bank (IADB) has incorporated concepts such as ‘participation, empowerment’ and consultation’ within its “development with identity” approach. As such, the “ethic.gov” approach has been incorporated into the neoliberal globalization paradigm itself and indigenous peoples’ cultural specific right to prior consultations and free, prior and informed consent have thus become a prefix rather than adjectives on their own. Thus, it is hardly an illusion that power relations between ‘stakeholders’ are indeed biased in favor of certain actors (e.g. multilateral organizations and transnational corporations) rather than towards the interests of the indigenous population at large. This chapter shows how – and to what extent – this affect the outcomes of prior consultations.

To some extent, Bolivia’s 2009 constitution reflects similar contradictions. Although Bolivia has ratified both the UNDRIP and the ILO C169, the new constitution nonetheless reduces the FPIC to a mere ‘choice’ rather than a full-scale requirement (Hindery 2013: 169). Following Hindery (2013: 169), in practical terms this means that – having consulted the indigenous population in question – extractivism often continues whether those affected agree to such extraction or not (Hindery 2013: 169). This exemplifies that even those countries that have adopted a legal human rights regime characterized by the recognition of cultural specific rights – what might be termed the ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ approach – struggle to sufficiently deal with the structural patterns that, until present, has excluded indigenous peoples from natural resource governance at large.

This helps explain why social conflicts still abound in resource-rich countries like Bolivia. Moreover, it testifies to the fact that the right to prior consultations – and free, prior and informed consent in particular – are exercised within a highly dynamic and complex sociological field coexisting with other legal approaches that, to a greater or lesser extent, all seek to deal with the “Indian Question” so vividly explained in previous chapters of this thesis (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010). The rest of this chapter explores the main challenges and contradictions associated with prior consultations and FPIC.

Challenges and implications of the right to free, prior and informed consent

Juan Pablo Flores – my informant who works for CEADL (Centre for Studies and Support to Local Development) – identified two main challenges that, in his opinion, hampers any attempts of resolving current tensions between indigenous peoples and the Bolivian state (Interview, La Paz, 16.10.13). According to Juan Pablo, the first revolves the obvious challenge of how to carry out consultation processes in practice and in agreement with international and national standards. To date, several consultation processes have been

completed, albeit with varying degrees of success (see Schilling-Vacaflor 2013). However, weak institutional capacity; insufficient or non-existing implementation-frameworks; corruption and opposing views concerning natural resource extraction altogether, hampers efficient consultation processes in practice. The second challenge relates to opposing interests between and amongst indigenous federations as well as towards the MAS party, and particularly concerning a much recent phenomenon known as *el anteproyecto de la ley de consulta previa* (the ‘anti-project’ of the law/right to prior consultation). By drawing upon thoughts and views of my informants, the rest of this chapter explores these conflicts in greater depth.

In Bolivia, there are mainly three institutions that facilitate, regulate and control the state’s hydrocarbon sector: the YPFB, *Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos* (Bolivia’s national oil and gas corporation), the ANH, *Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos* (the National Agency of Hydrocarbons), and the MHE, *Ministerio de Hidrocarburos y Energía* (the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy) (NORAD Report 7/2012). Under the existing Hydrocarbon Law of 2005 (no. 3028), the latter institution – the MHE – regulates any consultation procedure in accordance to *el Decreto Supremo no. 29033*, or the Supreme Decree no. 29033, which stipulates that:

The competent authority for carrying out prior consultations is the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy (MHE); the customs and traditions as well as the representative decision-making institutions of indigenous peoples and peasant communities should be taken into account; the consultation mechanisms are to be established jointly between the MHE and the indigenous-peasant communities in each case; consultations must comply with the phases of coordination and information, organization and planning, execution of the consultation and agreement-finding. The results of the consultation shall be recorded in a signed agreement and the concerted observations should be considered as fundamental criteria for the concerted of the EIAs (Environmental Impact Assessment (quoted in Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: 208).

According to Juan Pablo Flores, my informant within CEADL, consultation processes are time-consuming and expensive, and thus, it is not in the state’s interest to go through with such procedures in the first place (La Paz, 16.10.13). This is also documented by Schilling-Vacaflor (2013). According to her, it usually takes several months to finalize an agreement between the state, the corporation and the indigenous community in question, and moreover, unless indigenous representatives possess adequate knowledge of the planned project about to occur on their territory, the resulting agreement is – more often than not – biased in favor of

state representatives' interests rather than towards the interests of those representing the indigenous community (Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: 208-209).

According to Juan Pablo Flores, a similar case recently occurred in the northern area of La Paz: consultation processes were conducted, but they were anything but 'free', 'prior' and 'informed', as enshrined within international instruments as well as within the country's new constitution. Rather, he argued:

You know very well that in every indigenous community there are a lot of children, but there is no way that these children can say either 'yes' or 'no' to exploration of hydrocarbons on their soil. But what happens? The kids sign off on sheets that state that the indigenous community participated in a process of consultation! And then arrive state representatives once more and show these sheets to the adults and say: "Look, here are the consultation-sheets with more than 50 signatures". But, children that are 10-12 years old – who do not have the capacity to take on such responsibility yet – have signed these sheets. This creates some serious problems because, altogether, indigenous communities stop believing in the state (Juan Pablo Flores, La Paz, 16.10.13).

Except from the obvious facts of corruption and biased interests of the state, this quote also makes it perfectly clear that the Morales administration's continuous dependency upon natural resource extraction weakens its legitimacy vis-à-vis the indigenous population. As Juan Pablo argues, indigenous communities no longer have faith in the state. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that in much the same ways as the state pursues its own interests, so too do indigenous peoples. During my interview with Juan Pablo, the following statement highlights this point:

[Since] the state does not comply, indigenous peoples go directly to transnational companies instead, and say: "If you want to exploit here, that's fine, but we want this and that", and *voilà* – the transnational companies give them [the indigenous peoples] what they [indigenous community and transnational company] have agreed upon. The state does not intervene because, in the long run, it [the state] knows that it will benefit from the returns from natural resource extraction. Thus, towards the public, the state keeps its mouth shut. For instance, between 2000 and 2010 – so that Evo Morales would win his electoral mandate in 2005 – PETROBRAS did this on a regular basis. There is a Guaraní community that gained approximately 10 or 11 million US dollars, but these money were not transferred directly of course: they [the money] went through some mechanisms within the international market and then the indigenous community withdrew it bit by bit (Juan Pablo Flores, La Paz 16.10.13).

In light of this statement, we can reason that the state's inability – or as Juan Pablo argues, its unwillingness – to sufficiently control the hydrocarbon sector has resulted in a replay of the tendencies that characterized Bolivia during its corporatist era. In much the same ways as indigenous peoples, through patron-clientelist relations, operated 'beyond the reach of the state' (Yashar 1999) to gain access to certain social services in the 1950s, so it is reasonable to assume they are still doing.

Several hypotheses might explain why Bolivia's hydrocarbon sector is characterized by large-scale corruption, and moreover, why the state struggles to comply with the legal human rights agenda advocated since the mid-1980s onwards. First, and following the report commissioned by Norad (7/2012: 31), an institutional tension exists between the three main institutions currently in charge of Bolivia's petroleum sector. In theory, the MHE is supposed to set out extractive policies with YPFB executing them, and moreover, to conduct prior consultations with affected communities, as stated above. However, according to Article 361 of the new constitution, YPFB is the only actor authorized to further develop hydrocarbon activities (Norad Report 7/2012: 31-32). Moreover, there are no legal mechanisms in place to control the activities of the YPFB and thus, a political vacuum makes Bolivia's petroleum sector highly vulnerable to corruption – by state personnel as well as by regular citizens.

Second, it is reasonable to argue that in the absence of Karl's (2007) 'fiscal social contract' – which might indeed be a characterizing feature of the Bolivian society – corruption increases simply because citizens do not have incentives to trust that the state promotes their interests instead of its own or those of transnational corporations'. In the Bolivian case, the Morales administration has largely failed to change its macro policies towards that of protection of Mother Earth and the environment, albeit its repeated promises to conduct such a political shift (Hecht 2013: xi). Moreover, although the MHE is supposed to be an impartial actor in any consultation process and the YPFB an unbiased one in regulating the petroleum sector more generally, both have repeatedly been accused of partiality towards particular transnational companies (Norad Report 7/2012: 32, Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: 215). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that indigenous peoples have lost faith in the state altogether, as stated by Juan Pablo in one of the above quotes.

Indeed, transnational corporations must take their share of the political and socio-economic implications caused by corruption – such as increased cleavages between and amongst indigenous communities due to uneven access to capital, and moreover, of the continuous tensions this creates between indigenous peoples and the state. However, it is also

reasonable to assume that in the absence of compliance to international human rights instruments, and moreover, the ways in which the MAS party has increasingly centralized its power more recently, indigenous peoples feel the need to keep a certain distance from the state and political parties in general, simply to maintain a definite degree of autonomy. Bull (2013) has elaborated on this point at length. She argues that as clientelism has historically been associated with only semi-political inclusion – either through the emerging of classes (e.g. *campesinos*, peasants) or through a subordinate position vis-à-vis existing elites – indigenous peoples in particular and social movements more generally find it better to ‘keep their distance’ than to rely upon a state that – supposedly – is to grant them political, economic and civic rights (Bull 2013: 79).

However, we might reason, as Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 28) does, that the effects of the legal regulatory framework – be that large-scale corruption or the state’s inability to sufficiently control its hydrocarbon sector and moreover, its failure to comply with prior consultation procedures – results from both the limits and opportunities created by, on the one hand, the legal justice system itself (e.g. the laws and rules) and by the subjective understandings and legal strategies of the actors that use them, on the other.

During my fieldwork in Bolivia, one of my informants touched upon this aspect once I met with him while participating in the workshop hosted by UNITAS in Cochabamba. A man in his early 30s, Leandro Candapay Chauarría proudly introduced himself as belonging to the Guaraní peoples of the Chaco region, which makes up no less than three of Bolivia’s departments: Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca and Tarija, respectively. During my interview with Leandro, his skepticism towards the Morales administration’s continuous dependency upon natural resource extraction was made abundantly clear: in his opinion, the state pursues an extractivist development model to finance social programs that his community has yet to see the fruits of, and moreover, he argued that his backyard still serves as ‘the playground’ for transnational corporations in their ever increasing search for natural gas, which is located in the soil of the Guaraní community to which he belongs and lives (Interview, Cochabamba, 21.10.13). Discussing the outcomes of the Morales administration’s extractivist development model, and moreover, of the FPIC, Leandro stated the following:

Often, the only political space we have is within our respective organizations – that’s where we discuss our needs and problems – and over the past decades, also issues that go beyond those of mere justice. As such, the Morales administration’s legal justice system is somewhat subordinated to that of the indigenous justice system. However, whenever we decide to deal with problems [internal or

external outcomes stemming from natural resource extraction] within our community, then – immediately – the state intervenes with its legal justice system. But, it is not us who do not respect human rights – it is they! [The state]. Therefore, we have a huge job ahead of us: we have the capacity [to participate in societal transformation] but we are neither given the opportunity nor the power to do so and thus, the only possibility for us is to continue to fight. If we manage to win political positions – that will be due to our respective organizations and not due to ourselves [not due to peoples’ individual performances] (Leandro Candapay Chauarría, Cochabamba, 21.10.13).

In Leandro’s opinion, the only political space currently available to indigenous peoples is within their respective organizations, but their autonomous character is currently being threatened by the ways in which the Morales administration’s promotes a legal human rights system whose framework is characterized by laws and procedures that – to a greater or lesser extent – undermine the political structure commonly associated with indigenous communities.

Following Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 29), the legal human rights paradigm underway since the 1980s onwards, and particularly the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) – which has been both advocated and praised by the international indigenous rights movement itself – rests upon a procedural rationality and moreover, upon unequal power relations that yields various sets of consequences in practice. With reference to the quotes presented thus far, the following paragraphs explore some of these effects in greater detail.

What Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 30) terms the “displacement effect” is perhaps most visible with reference to my interview with Juan Pablo, referred to above. Due to the procedural character and numerous steps commonly associated with prior consultations – such as deadlines, timelines, expenses and locations – the more substantive conflicts (e.g. the actual conflict over territorial control, environmental damages and preservation of indigenous cultures) are simply displaced, replaced or postponed, particularly if the parties involved in the consultation procedure hold profoundly opposing views. Under such circumstances, the laws procedural character creates a politicized vacuum of ‘neutrality’ between the opposing parties that only serves to postpone the issues that initially sparked the conflict in the first place (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010: 32). In practice, the displacement effect is evident with reference to monetary compensations so commonly associated with natural resource extraction on indigenous territories (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010: 31). As highlighted in my interview with Juan Pablo: in the absence of the Bolivian state’s presence in consultation procedures, indigenous peoples negotiate directly with transnational companies – a case in

point that replaces the actual conflict over natural resource extraction with that of monetary compensation and moreover, leaves the state with even fewer incentives to efficiently incorporate its indigenous population into national policies of natural resource governance.

Moreover, what Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 36-40) terms the “domination effect” is also a common characteristic featuring the regulatory framework onto which prior consultations is build. Rather than the neoliberal premise of equality between the numerous stakeholders involved, we might reason that the legal battlefield in which prior consultations are fought is anything but symmetric in practice. This helps explain why nearly all of my informants simply argue that the state fails to comply to human right laws in general – and particularly those of the FPIC. As highlighted by both Juan Pablo and Leandro, more often than not, do indigenous peoples lack the capabilities – be that power, knowledge or money – to benefit from prior consultations and thus, the procedures themselves do not allow for free and informed participation, let alone genuine consent. As Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 36) argues: “...the reality of consultation usually resembles a private act of negotiation more than a public act of deliberation...” Thus, it might be argued that – given the inequality between the parties involved – structural power relations are left intact. As such, we might reason that the FPIC has failed to close the gap between the indigenous peoples and other stakeholders involved in natural resource extraction – the very goal that the right initially sought to secure.

3.2 El anteproyecto de la ley de consulta previa

It is commonly argued that, in a favorable political climate, prior consultations and FPIC function as a political instrument to strengthen indigenous peoples’ political participation vis-à-vis the state, and moreover, that such rights ensure greater incorporation of indigenous peoples’ local conceptions of development and environmental concerns. To date however, we can reason that extractivism triumph indigenous peoples’ local knowledge to the extent that socio-environmental conflicts persist nationally as well as regionally. Thus, the various stakeholders’ unequal access to the capabilities needed to exercise the FPIC in practice, leaves structural power relations largely untouched.

Due to these unintended outcomes, more recently, a political struggle has reemerged over the right to prior consultations, in which two opposing groups have been established on Bolivia’s national political arena (Field notes 31.10.13). Known as *el anteproyecto de la ley de consulta previa* (the ‘anti-project’ of the law/right to prior consultation), representatives within BARTOLINA SISA (the National Confederation of Peasants, Indigenous and Native

Women in Bolivia) and CSUTCB (the Unified Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia) – amongst others – is found to support the MAS party’s position, whereas CONAMAQ and CIDOB (the Indigenous Federation of Eastern Bolivia, the Santa Cruz-based national federation of indigenous peoples) are found on the other (Field notes, 31.10.13). Note that, as highlighted elsewhere in this thesis, because of looser ties to the Morales administration, CONAMAQ and CIDOB have formed their own alliance *against* the MAS party and other highland indigenous federations. In this particular case at least, this strengthens the assumption previously highlighted, namely that the Morales administration tends to favor those indigenous federations that – at least publicly – do not oppose the state administration’s continuous reliance upon extractivism to the same extent as lowland indigenous federations and CONAMAQ (albeit commonly defined as a highland organization) are known to do.

This recent fraction is rooted in what CONAMAQ and CIDOB perceive of as inconsistencies within the current law of the FPIC (Group interview, La Paz, 31.10.13). While in La Paz, Walter Limache – the coordinator of Programa NINA (UNITAS) – and one of his staff members, Edwin – whom is originally from the Department of Cochabamba – gave me a brief insight into this much recent phenomenon. According to them, since the TIPNIS case in 2011, indigenous peoples from numerous indigenous organizations and communities have been mobilizing to get the right to prior consultation revised within the Constitutional Assembly. Unhappy with the outcome of the TIPNIS case in which the Morales administration made no efforts of carrying out prior consultation exercise (McNeish 2013: 226), indigenous federations – with significant support from CONAMAQ and CIDOB in particular – managed to have the right revised several times, and in April 2013, a new proposal of the FPIC was put forth in the Constituent Assembly. Following Walter and Edwin, this is what has become known as *el anteproyecto de la ley de consulta previa* (the anti-project of the law/right to prior consultation) (Group interview, La Paz 31.10.13).

However, the bill has been severely criticized from several quarters: first off, the government’s new proposal has made a separation between rights to prior consultations towards *indigenas y originarios* (indigenous and native groups) on the one hand, and rights to prior consultations towards *campesinos* (peasants) on the other. Whilst BARTOLINA SISA and CSUTCB are clearly in favor of this diversification as it grants indigenous-*campesinos* (peasants) certain collective rights due to their belonging to the *campesino*-classification, CONAMAQ and CIDOB on the other hand, claim it exceeds the new constitution, which states that indigenous peoples ought be defined as *indigena originario campesino* (indígena

originario peasant). According to the latter fraction, the new constitution operates without a separation between ethnic groups and thus, if the new proposal articulated by the Morales administration (and those who support it) is passed in the Constituent Assembly – then, old political cleavages are kept alive rather than significantly reduced. Moreover, due to the government’s proposal of placing prior consultations into the public sphere and also, to limit consultation procedures to a two-months period rather than ‘as long as necessary’ to establish sound agreements between the parties involved, CONAMAQ and CIDOB argue that indigenous peoples’ decision-making role in extractive processes are in danger of being further weakened. Consequently, their role to significantly affect the outcomes of the procedures will be close to zero (Group interview, La Paz, 31.10.13).

To date, no decisions have been reached concerning the ‘anti-project’ described above – neither between and amongst the opposing indigenous federations, nor with reference to the MAS party’s hostile position towards certain indigenous federations – lowland organizations in particular (Interview 31.10.13). Thus, it is reasonable to assume, as Schilling-Vacaflor (2013: 217) does, that attempts of building a plurinational state is limited by Bolivia’s current politico-economic context, in which the FPIC are currently exercised. Moreover, the “displacement effect” touched upon in the previous section of this chapter is evident also here – a case in point that largely confirms that the FPIC has become an institution of its own within what Rodríguez-Garavito (2010: 26) terms the “transnational regulation of indigenous rights”.

A similar conclusion is drawn by Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor (2013) in their GIGA draft paper¹¹. Albeit acknowledging the obvious limitations of the FPIC – which might indeed be termed a project still ‘in its making’ – they nonetheless suggest that, in the long run, the tensions caused by prior consultations might nonetheless contribute to what they term “conflict transformation”. In their opinion, *effective* participation will follow suit if stakeholders are given equal rights to define and shape the participatory space in which prior consultations are exercised (Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor (2013: 20).

This certainly yields hope for the future. However, it is still too soon to tell whether these rights serve as mechanisms that in reality strengthen indigenous peoples’ decision-making role and position in natural resource governance and policies, or if they simply leave unequal power relations intact, as has been the case with reforms and policies implemented by

¹¹ Flemmer & Schilling-Vacaflor 2013: “Exploring the Consultation-Conflict Link: Lessons from Bolivia’s and Peru’s Gas and Oil Sector” – GIGA draft that has yet to be officially published

previous regimes. Therefore, further research is needed before any absolute conclusions can be drawn – particularly regarding the effects of the legal regulatory framework currently in place. To date, its wrapped within an international discourse of “multicultural constitutionalism” (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010), which, in my opinion, resembles anything but the demands of territorial control, self-determination and autonomy that indigenous peoples have been fighting for since the Spanish conquistadores first put their feet on Bolivian soil in the early 1500s (Postero 2007: 3). This certainly helps explain why Bolivia is still in a stage of unresolved tensions – as exemplified throughout this entire thesis. Thus, I conclude here that prior consultations strengthen indigenous peoples’ political participation only if – and when – the *outcomes* of natural resource extraction on indigenous peoples territories are properly addressed. Since the various stakeholders involved in natural resource extraction oftentimes are in disagreement over what the outcomes ought to be, I reason that socio-environmental conflicts will be a persistent feature in Bolivia also in the years to come.

3.0 Concluding remarks

The aim of this thesis has been to explore the main challenges associated with the inclusion of indigenous peoples in processes of natural resource extraction in Bolivia. I argue that, despite formal advances in cultural recognition and political representation, indigenous peoples' political space to *effectively* participate in natural resource governance is at best, still severely limited. This is related to a variety of factors that are addressed in what follows.

Firstly, a main challenge of natural resource extraction results from the 'middle-ground' position currently advocated by the Morales administration. Whilst the state depends upon the revenues from natural resource extraction to finance ambitious public services and programs, the continued reliance upon and expansion of extractive industries is nonetheless a main source of tension between the state and the indigenous population in its own right. This tension is rooted in different understandings of the *meaning* of indigeneity on the one hand, and in contestations over what the extractive development model can in fact accomplish, on the other.

To some analysts, the "Andean-Amazonian" capitalist model is simply incompatible with the visions and aspirations for development held by themselves and/or their community and thus, ought to be left behind altogether. Within this 'idealized Amazonian cosmovision' (Fabricant 2013: 164), capitalism destroys gender complementarity and undermines egalitarianism.

However, what is largely neglected in this view is that indigeneity is not a static and heterogeneous concept, and neither are the peoples that define themselves according to it. Rather, neoliberalism 'act to define citizen participation' according to certain logics (Postero 2007: 15) and it is thus an illusion to assume that indigenous peoples and their communities are somehow untouched by societal changes. This is backed up by the, often, conflicting statements made to me by indigenous informants during my field research.

I therefore reject the polarized approaches commonly found within the "indigenous peoples debate" (Canessa 2007), which define indigenous peoples according to stereotyped images such as 'the noble savage' or the 'eco-Indian'. As this thesis reveals, indigenous peoples have been negotiating the meanings of indigeneity throughout Bolivia's political history. To date, there continues to be disagreement between and amongst indigenous peoples and the state as to what the concept ought to imply, and more importantly: what it does *not* imply. Thus, tensions are apparent.

The second factor that hampers effective inclusion of indigenous peoples in processes of natural resource governance is related to the consequences produced by the “Andean-Amazonian” model currently in place. Hindery (2013: 150) argues that: “[...] under Andean-Amazonian capitalism the state prescribed a universal template for modernization, with little chance to opt out”. This is compatible with my field research findings. Whilst the state has regained control over its hydrocarbon sector – particularly through the nationalization of the production chain – the sector is found to be institutionally weak, with internal conflicts between and amongst the departments that currently manage the sector. This yields large-scale corruption – amongst state officials in particular – but also amongst and between indigenous peoples that are involved in processes of natural resource extraction on indigenous territories. Corruption is further strengthened due to limited public information and regulation of the hydrocarbon sector at large. Moreover, to date, no law exists that regulates access to public information (Norad Report 7/2012: 32). Taken together, large-scale corruption, weak institutional capacity and lack of transparency hampers any effects of building a hydrocarbon sector in which indigenous peoples can effectively participate in processes of natural resource extraction. To date then, there seems to be slim chances for ‘opting out’.

Also, in the absence of a ‘fiscal social contract’ (Karl 2007) – which, at the time of writing is more or less non-existing in Bolivia – the state has no cause to direct its policies away from natural resource extraction and the interests of transnational corporations. In my opinion, this yields consequences beyond that of increased corruption: in line with the state’s declining legitimacy vis-à-vis its citizenry, the greater becomes the citizenry’s need to keep a certain distance – as witnessed by indigenous federations’ claim for autonomy. This complicates attempts to include indigenous peoples into state policies in general, and to strengthen their decision-making role in processes of natural resource extraction in particular. Thus, whilst Karl’s ‘fiscal social contract’ is useful in terms of explaining Bolivia’s ‘rent-seeking’ behavior – which indeed explains a great deal of the complex corruption-legitimacy issue in Bolivia – her theory nonetheless fails to acknowledge that the country’s history has also left its mark on issues that are *societal* in character, rather than solely economic. As this thesis reveals, the absence of a profound social contract that intrinsically links indigenous peoples to the state as a whole (rather than solely towards those with economic power, e.g. the elite) has been lacking throughout Bolivia’s entire political history – arguably, until present. This helps explain why indigenous peoples generally find it better to keep a safe distance from the state, than to follow ‘the lead’ of whoever holds office.

However, the negative outcomes of the “Andean-Amazonian” capitalist model are also strengthened through the global political economy to which the Bolivian society is immersed. The global political economy is ordered such as to depend upon natural resource extraction to encourage economic consumerism commonly associated with ‘modernity’ and thus, development. However, booms in natural resource extraction are frequently followed by socio-environmental conflicts or even civil war because extractivism tends to undermine the resource sovereignty of those affected by its outcomes. In this regard, the ‘recourse-curse’ literature thus seems to be applicable.

Nevertheless, I question the ‘resource-curse’ literature’s relevance to Bolivia on one point in particular: whilst socio-environmental conflicts persist due to the extraction of non-renewable resources, the unresolved tensions between and amongst indigenous peoples and the state are rooted in perspectives that are ideological in character rather than solely economic in nature, as some advocates of the ‘resource-curse’ literature suggest. Whilst it is found that the Morales administration expands its extractive industries primarily due to economic necessity, my findings suggest that indigenous peoples mostly resist the “Andean-Amazonian” capitalist model because it leaves power relations and ideological discourses untouched. Moreover, they resist it because – as history reveals – economic growth based on natural resource extraction alone has neither increased their political and economic power nor granted them a greater decision-making role in natural resource extraction.

A failure to recognize both the political economic structural characteristics and socio-historical contexts of resource-rich countries plays a significant role in conflicts following from natural resource extraction. Indeed, countries in the global south might find themselves in the very same peripheral position a couple of decades down the road as they, arguably, find themselves in today. In Bolivia, the unresolved tensions and the negative outcomes that follow from them are derived from models and reforms implemented by previous regimes and thus, cannot be explained by exploring the linkages between economic performance and natural resource wealth alone. Rather, as my fieldwork findings and interviews reveal: racism, political and economic institutions and cultural logics have reinforced the enduring structures of inequality that were created by colonialism. These patterns of exclusionism explain why indigenous peoples are still excluded from effectively participating in processes of natural resource extraction even under the mainstream discourses of *‘pachamamismo’* and ‘ethnic rights’.

The third and final challenge addressed in this thesis is the question of prior consultations or free, prior and informed consent. Although the international indigenous rights

movement has advocated the ‘ethnic rights agenda’ these mechanism have largely not been implemented correctly to ensure indigenous peoples’ participatory power in processes associated with natural resource extraction in Bolivia. This is due to the poor regulatory framework in which prior consultations are immersed, which is characterized by the centrality of the law and which give priority to procedural activities rather than to the actual outcomes following from natural resource extraction.

As the last chapter in my thesis reveals, prior consultations thus come with a set of negative consequences. Here, I placed an emphasis on the “displacement effect” and the “domination effect” in particular, as both became evident in conversations with my informants. Due to the procedural character of prior consultations, in practice, the more substantive conflicts (e.g. the actual conflict over territorial control and environmental damages) are frequently displaced, replaced or postponed. Moreover, and contrary to the neoliberal assumption of equality between parties – in practice, processes of prior consultations are commonly exercised within a political climate in which the stakeholders involved hold anything *but* equal political and economic power (Rodríguez-Garavito 2010: 36). Indigenous peoples commonly do not hold either the economic or the political capabilities needed to sufficiently affect the outcomes of prior consultations. Consequently, they are bound to an inferior and subordinated position within the legal regulatory framework that was initially advocated to enforce their decision-making role in processes of natural resource extraction in the first place.

Thus, whilst the rights to prior consultations were initially promoted to strengthen indigenous peoples participation power and decision-making role in processes of natural resource extraction, the rights leave structural power relations untouched. Albeit that prior consultations yields hope for the future as far as political participation goes, they have, thus far, failed to close the gap between the indigenous peoples and other stakeholders involved in processes of natural resource extraction. If prior consultations are to serve as human rights instruments that efficiently include indigenous peoples into state policies of natural resource extraction, the structural power relations currently intact must be properly addressed and dealt with. To date, prior consultations yield abysmal disparities in power and resources between the parties involved, thus causing unresolved tensions within the borders of Bolivia. Thus, further research ought to refocus their attention towards these enduring structures of inequality in which indigenous peoples are immersed rather than to rely upon that prior consultations *alone* will serve to strengthen indigenous peoples’ participatory role in processes of natural resource extraction.

This thesis has explored the main challenges associated with the inclusion of indigenous peoples in processes of natural resource extraction. My field research and interviews suggest that the Morales administration struggles to overcome enduring structures of inequality – even under the current indigenous discourse in which ‘ethnic rights’ has become “mainstream”. Unresolved tensions thus persist in Bolivia anno 2014. Above all, this reminds us that indigeneity continues to be a productive category through which history is made and remade (Postero 2013: 118). Whilst created by colonialism and reproduced by political and economic institutions and cultural logics, indigeneity is certainly not an issue of the past. As this thesis reveals, contestations over what it *means* to be indigenous and over how to *effectively* include the indigenous population in processes of natural resource extraction is likely to create tensions amongst and between indigenous peoples and the Bolivian state also in the years to come.

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5.0 Appendices

Appendix I: Interview guide

Questions asked to peoples working within NGO(s)/social movement(s)

I: *Personal information:*

- 1) Name
- 2) Age
- 3) Title(s)
- 4) Belonging to indigenous community

II: *Regarding the Morales administration's reliance upon natural resource extraction:*

- 5) What are your thoughts regarding the Morales administration's dependency upon natural resource extraction? Elaborate.
- 6) What are your main concerns regarding a continued reliance upon natural resource extraction?
- 7) In your opinion, are indigenous peoples included in processes of natural resource governance under the "Andean-Amazonian" model pursued by the Morales administration? (E.g. are indigenous peoples' rights respected under this model) If yes, how and why? If no, how and why?
- 8) In your opinion, to what extent do indigenous peoples benefit under the current capitalist model?
- 9) Do you agree with the Morales administration that a continued reliance upon natural resource extraction benefits the country as whole?

III: *Regarding the nationalization processes of the hydrocarbon sector:*

- 10) Can you please describe the nationalization processes of the hydrocarbon sector?
- 11) In your opinion, what are the main challenges associated with the nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector?

IV: *Regarding indigenous peoples rights and the right to prior consultations:*

- 12) Can you please describe the evolvement of indigenous peoples rights into national politics?
- 13) Can you explain the main difference between *indigeno originario campesino* as enshrined within the new constitution?
- 14) Do you agree to this separation of ethnic groups? If yes, why? If no, why?

- 15) Compared to Bolivia's previous regimes, are indigenous peoples rights respected under the Morales administration? If yes, how? If no, how are they not?
- 16) Did you participate in the TIPNIS march?
- 17) In your opinion, are you content with the outcomes of the TIPNIS march?
- 18) Can you please explain the right to prior consultation and free, prior and informed consent?
- 19) Have you ever participated in a process of prior consultation?
- 20) If yes, can you explain how it was done in practice and what the outcomes were?
- 21) In your opinion, does the right to prior consultation strengthen indigenous peoples participatory power in processes of natural resource extraction?
- 22) Are you content with indigenous peoples' present human right situation? If yes, why? If not, what is missing?

V: Regarding the upcoming elections in December 2014:

- 23) Would you like for Evo Morales to hold the presidency for another five years? If yes, why? If not, why?
- 24) In the upcoming elections, is it likely that other candidates pick up a fight against Evo Morales?



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