The PKK, the 'Global Threat of Terrorism' and the Negotiating of Turkish 'Difference'

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I, Anders Sundstøl Bjørkheim, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended.

This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature

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Acknowledgements

Abstract

Along with the proliferation of terrorism studies that followed the September 11 attacks, many critical theoretical perspectives have followed. But few studies have combined insight into the delegitimizing aspects of the 'terrorist' label with its constitutive role for Self-identity, and even fewer have looked at the possibility of states negotiating their identity vis-à-vis larger collectives by representing 'terrorism' as a shared threat. Through employing discourse analysis, this thesis analyzes representations of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' by Turkish politicians and diplomats in the United Nations between 2001 and 2012, and by Turkish military officers in the NATO *Centre of Excellence: Defence Against Terrorism* between 2006 and 2011. It asks how the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is represented as part of an international fight against terrorism, how these representations position the PKK, and how they contribute to the negotiation of Turkish 'difference' vis-à-vis 'Europe' and 'the West'. It finds that both the politicians, diplomats and military officers represent 'terrorism' as a homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon which there is an international obligation to fight together, rejecting distinctions between 'terrorists' and tying in the PKK trough references to Turkey's own 'sufferings'. The 'terrorist' identity is constructed through various representations that put it in a position of fundamental illegitimacy – as *homo sacer*. Together, these serve as a constitutive Other for the negotiation of 'difference'. In the first years of analysis, 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' are represented as threatening 'civilization', a rhetorical commonplace with links to European discourses of Otherness, with which both the Ottoman Empire and Turkey have struggled. After the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 'civilization' becomes pluralized, cultural diversity is emphasized as a positive, and 'humanity' takes over as what 'terrorism' is mainly represented as threatening. Though representations of Self-identity are less consistent amongst the military officers, there are several examples of negotiating 'difference' similar to the politicians and diplomats, including the invocation of 'common values' articulated to (e.g.) 'human rights' and 'freedom of speech'; rhetorical commonplaces used in designations of Turkish Otherness even today.

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1.

Introduction

What makes a hero? Courage, strength, morality, withstanding adversity? Are these the traits that truly show and create a hero? Is the light truly the source of darkness or vice versa? Is the soul a source of hope or despair? Who are these so called heroes and where do they come from? Are their origins in obscurity or in plain sight?

- Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *Notes from the Underground*, 1992 [1864]

In the opening of the TV series *Homeland*, an American Marine Sergeant held hostage for years in Iraq returns to the United States. A national hero, he is welcomed by the Vice President at his arrival. But as the country is rejoicing, one CIA agent feels something is not right. By herself, she sets up a clandestine surveillance mission, trying to find out whether the years in captivity has made the officer into a threat to his country. As audience we do not know; we follow the agent along her explorations. But at the very end of the second episode we are shown something that the agent does not see: By himself, in a garage, the American officer pulls out a rug and starts an Islamic ritual of prayer. We realize his conversion of identity. And without being confronted with violence, intimidation or faces of fear, our suspicions rise that the officer has indeed become a 'terrorist'. [1]

The above illustrates tellingly the role of *discourse*. The consistent reproduction of a connection between certain signifiers (e.g. 'Islam', 'fundamentalism', 'terrorism') in politics, popular culture and the media temporarily fixes reality, so that the soldier's 'terrorist' identity can appear passively, as a connotation, without its actual enunciation. At the same time, we are reminded of what it means to be American. This scene is interesting not because of its creators' possible intentions, but because of the underlying field of meaning that allows the scene to make sense. It is the naturalization of such a field into seeming objectivity that the discourse analyst wishes to illuminate. Though this thesis does not look specifically at religion, it is exactly such a field of meaning of 'terrorism' it sheds light on.

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1 Created by Gideon Raff, with Fox 21 leading producer; first episode broadcasted October 2, 2011 in the United States, on the TV-channel *Showtime*. The series won six Emmy awards in 2012, including Outstanding Drama Series.

By analyzing speeches and newsletter articles by Turkish politicians, diplomats and military officers, I seek to identify the main representations in their constructions of 'terrorism' as phenomenon and 'terrorist' as identity towards an international audience, seeing how these involve and affect the specific conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). If we understand politics as creating a collective Self capable of action not only by telling people who they themselves are (Neumann 2001: 123), but also by explaining who the 'others' are, my analysis will also allow for insight into the construction of Self-identity through the 'terrorist' Other. Most specifically, it can reveal how Turkish 'difference' (Bilgin 2009) vis-à-vis both 'Europe' and 'the West' can be negotiated by the 'terrorism'/'terrorist' performing the role of "the included outside upon which a community or a society constitutes itself and its moral order" (Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2006: 296). The following research questions manifest these goals; the first general and theoretical, the other more specific and empirical:

[1]:   *How can a discourse on 'terrorism' render sensible violent practices committed in the name of a state, and how do its representations involve the identity of the Self?*

[2]:   *How do the representations of 'terrorism'/'terrorist' made internationally by Turkish politicians, diplomats and military officers involve the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and how does this enable the negotiation of Turkish 'difference' vis-à-vis 'Europe' and 'the West'?*

These are important questions for several reasons: Firstly, they deal with a topic ('terrorism') widely discussed within international relations, even more so after the September 11 attacks in the United States; a topic that has framed several states' enactment of restrictive domestic laws since the turn of the millennium.[2] Secondly, the 'terrorist' concept is employed in descriptions of highly diverse actors, such as al-Qaeda, the PKK, and the anti-Muslim far-rightist Anders Behring Breivik, whose double bomb and shooting attacks in Norway on July 22, 2011 killed 77 people. Any attempt to subsume such diverse actors under the same concepts deserves critical scrutiny. Thirdly, the questions offer a way of relating a specific and geographically restricted conflict to a state's 'outside' concerns with its identity. And finally, being grounded in discourse theory, my question contributes to a post-positivist perspective

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2 Legislation such as the Patriot Act in the United States of 2001, giving the Department of Justice freedom to access third-party information of private citizens and to detain/deport immigrants on grounds of 'terrorist activity', including monetary donations (McGoldrick 2008); the Terrorism Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act in the United Kingdom of 2000 and 2005 respectively, allowing for detainment without trial and the criminalization of non-violent activity such as dissemination of 'terrorist' material (Kassimeris & Jackson 2012: 182); or the revised Law on Fight Against Terrorism of 2006 in Turkey, which has increased the legitimate use of surveillance and covert investigation (Jacoby 2010: 109).

on the topic of 'terrorism'; respecting the contingency of social reality and emphasizing the power that is manifest in discourse.

In this last aspect my thesis diverges from approaches that "talk about and study terrorism as if it had a fixed and stable content, independent of the observing and defining researcher, a meaning independent of time, place and the use to which the concept of terrorism is put" (Staun 2010: 405), allowing them to be treated as independent variables. Here it does not stand alone. With the proliferation of 'terrorism studies' that followed the September 11 attacks on the United States (Weinberg & Eubank 2008), many critical theoretical perspectives have surfaced; perspectives that shed light on the way discourses mobilize the concepts 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' (e.g. Staun 2010; Barrinha 2010; Stohl 2008; Jackson 2005). But there has been less emphasis on the way the identity of the *Self* is constructed through these concepts, and even less on how 'difference' vis-à-vis international collective identities can be negotiated through a state's representation of 'terrorism' as a 'common threat' and 'terrorist' as the radical Other. By focusing on this, my thesis seeks to contribute a growing literature on the relations between identity, threat and policy. Here it is especially indebted to Campbell (1998a), Jackson (2006) and Hansen (2006). Precisely because my focus is on the discursive role of 'terrorism', and not on it as a problem *per se*, I give no literature review of terrorism studies in general (though see section 2.5 for more on this). Put crudely but illustratively, I am less interested in saying something about 'terrorism' in general, than I am in saying something about *attempts* to say something about 'terrorism' in general.

As has most likely been noticed, I consistently put 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' in inverted commas. It should be made very clear that this does not mean that I see the concepts as chimeras, devoid of any descriptive value; the concepts most definitely play important roles in actors making sense of distinct and often shocking events that beg for explanation, and for affecting political practice. The use of inverted commas rather means that I acknowledge the concepts' political nature and that they do not correspond "to something or praxis 'out there' in real life that is independent of time, place and borders" (Staun 2010: 403). I also do this with a series of other signifiers or sets of signifiers when I seek to specifically indicate their conceptual role, as with 'the international community', 'universal values' or 'humanity'. When I use quotation marks ("), on the other hand, this indicates that I am making a direct citation of a portion of text that exceeds a single concept.

Before discussing the specific choice of Turkey as case, I should also note that by critically treating representations of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' I do not reject or underplay the repugnant aspects of many acts that have been labeled 'terrorist', including several of those perpetrated by the PKK in Turkey, which have led to high amounts of casualties, including many civilians. I seek rather to view critically how discourses distribute identities of Self and Other in a way that legitimizes *any* form of violence while unequivocally condemning others, and to draw attention to the naturalization of a certain way of organizing power (the nation-state), where securitization – the successful framing of something as a threat to 'security' – legitimizes exceptional measures taken in response (Wæver 1998). The 'terrorist' identity is especially problematic as it has grave consequences for those represented as such, who are often in positions where they can offer little resistance to such labeling.

Though my skepticism towards 'terrorism'/'terrorist' is theoretically grounded, this nonetheless constitutes a premise that should be underlined rather than muted. I agree with Becker (1967: 247) in biases being inevitable in research, but that they are not problematic as long as efforts are made to "avoid the distortions that this might introduce into our work" – perhaps what Nietzsche meant when stating that objectivity is *not* to be understood as "'contemplation without interest' (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability *to control* one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a *variety* of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge" (quoted in Campbell 1998b: 280 [emphasis in original]). My approach does not see a clear-cut distinction between social science on the one hand, and (e.g.) political practice on the other, in the sense that one is objective while the other is idiosyncratic and strongly value-laden. Ultimately, also the field of the social scientist is tied to specific patterns of organizing and describing reality, through a set of concepts and premises deciding what is important and what is not; effectively, what we can learn by the concept of *discourse* (see section 2.3). As argued by Becker (1998: 19-20),

> in thinking about [a] phenomenon, we include in the picture we build up some notions about the kind of conclusion we will draw about it; the kind of paradigmatic thinking we will assimilate it to. These paradigms come to us out of our participation in a world of professional social scientists.

This is the case also with the study of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist'. Abstract categories are indispensable to research, but at the same time, such categories do injustice to whoever they are applied to. However, discourse theory lessens the damage done here: firstly, by entering research with fewer pre-defined concepts, allowing both facts and concepts to emanate

directly from the data material; and secondly, by accepting the constructed and contingent nature of the social world rather than attempting to grasp the social object 'in itself'.

1.1 The choice of Turkey as case

A first reason for focusing on Turkey is that it has for long been dealing with its own 'terrorists'. The violent conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has been going on since 1984, and before the latest cease-fire was declared on March 21, 2013, it had reached its highest levels of violence since PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured and jailed in 1999 (ICG 2012). The party has for decades been declared as a 'terrorist' organization in Turkey and is also recognized as such by (e.g.) the United States (U.S. Department of State 2012), the United Kingdom (U.K. Home Office 2012) and the European Union (EurLex 2011). The conflict with the PKK offers a way of seeing how a discourse on globally fighting 'terrorism' can be linked to specific and more geographically bound conflicts, conferring legitimacy on practices represented as fighting it and subjecting groups to established representations of the 'terrorist' identity. This is made even more important as 'terrorism' has often been invoked in Turkey without physical violence being involved at all (see section 3.2 for more on this).

Secondly, though the currently ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has made certain important political approaches towards the Kurdish minority during its time in power (Celep 2010; Onar 2007: 284), Turkey has from the mid-2000s seen the juridical enactment of stricter measures against 'terrorism' and a widening of resources with which to fight it, similar to the tendency in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. When the 1991 Law On Fight Against Terrorism (Act no. 3713) was renewed in 2006, it increased security services' authorities and was described by Human Rights Watch as "an ominous sign of the retrograde trend currently prevailing in Turkey" (cited in Jacoby 2010: 109). Legislative changes in this period were to a large extent modeled after 'Western' countries' responses to the attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid and London (ibid.). According to Eccarius-Kelly (2011: 10), the "broadly-applied label of terrorism is often used to justify extraordinary rendition procedures permitting abusive interrogation techniques and torture". There are thus good reasons to engage critically with the social reality such practices build on.

Thirdly, Turkey is an interesting source for insight into the negotiation of Self-identity, as it has historically been in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis both 'Europe' and the 'West' due to

the outside representation of its identity. According to Tank (2006: 463), "Turkey's sense of self relies on the mirror held to it by the outside world". While discourse theory sees this as theoretically true of every identity (see section 2.1), the mirror held by 'Europe' and 'the West' has been conspicuous and multi-faceted, and it has taken part in exclusionary practices. Turkey has been subjected to essentialism such as 'belonging' to the 'Islamic civilization' while having leaders aspiring to the 'Western civilization' (Rumelili 2007: 65), and it is still viewed with ambivalence due to its perceived 'difference' (Bilgin 2009), related strongly to its almost exclusively Muslim population and its roots in the Ottoman Empire.[3] On the other hand, Turkey was member of the United Nations Security Council in 2008-2009, has a long-standing bilateral security relationship with the United States, as well as membership in NATO since 1952. It was also recognized as a candidate for accession to the European Union (EU) in 1999, with negotiations beginning in 2005.[4] The AKP has clearly expressed membership as a goal and accelerated EU-inspired reforms during its first years in office (Müftüler-Baç & Gürsoy 2010: 409). According to Rumelili (2007: 68-69), Turkey occupies a *liminal* position in relation to the 'European' collective identity; partly inside, partly outside – at times represented as a radical and threatening Other.[5] This makes questions of how Turkish actors negotiate Self-identity vis-à-vis 'Europe' important.

Fourthly, choosing Turkey as a case offers the potential for seeing *divergences* in the construction of Self-identity in relation to 'terrorism'/'terrorist', due to historical antagonisms between civilian rule and the military in Turkey. The military has generally seen itself as a "guardian of the secular republic's future, and justified temporary intervention in governmental affairs when the state was determined to be under threat", which has included both 'Islamization' and ethnic 'separatism' (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 22-23). Concerns for such 'Islamization' have increased since the mid-2000s, related to the AKPs approach to the so-called 'headscarf controversy' of 2005, following the European Court of Human Rights' upholding of the ban on the headscarf in public institutions (Onar 2007: 279). The growingly conflicting relationship is suggested also by the *Ergenekon* judicial process, where many current and former military officers have been arrested on accusations of seeking to overthrow

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3 It has also become more common to characterize Turkey as a 'Muslim country' or 'Muslim ally' in the United States since 2002 (Østereng 2011), thus following the September 11 attacks

4 Negotiations are still undergoing, with no new formal advances having taken place since 2005.

5 Onar (2007: 283) argues that from the mid-2000s, grounded in an increasing focus on Islam as a cultural factor, it became "almost politically correct for EU and member state officials […] to express ambivalence if not outright hostility towards the eventuality of Turkish membership".

the regime (Balcı & Jacoby 2012). The popular protests taking place at the time of writing in many Turkish cities (June 2013) have also in part expressed fears of increasing 'Islamization' (The Telegraph 2013a). By comparing politicians and diplomats' statements on 'terrorism' with those of military officers, we might encounter differences in projections of Self-identity – of what 'terrorism' is represented as actually threatening.

Though I am focusing exclusively on Turkish actors, the insight gained could potentially be put in perspective with other states, conflicts and collective identities, such as for example the relation between Russia and Chechen rebels on the one hand, and Russia and 'the West' on the other. My theoretical research question reflects this potential.

1.2 Methodology and data material

My method in this thesis is discourse analysis, theoretically grounded in discourse theory. I view these as intertwined; choosing discourse analysis as method commits to some epistemological principles and is best suited for some types of scientific questions. Many methodological aspects are therefore tied into chapter 2, which discusses my theoretical approach. Generally, my goal is to ask which meanings are discursively fixed to 'terrorism' and 'terrorist', rather than to define these concepts or use them as variables for the empirical testing of hypotheses. I agree with Staun (2010: 403) in that "research should instead focus on describing which political actors are involved in defining terrorism, how they frame the threat and when and why they do so". I seek to outline discourse "through its realization in practices" (Laffey & Weldes 2004: 28), by departing from actual texts.

1.2.1 The choice of data material

Discourse analysis uses texts as its data material – understood in a wide sense, so that it exceeds the written word and can include (e.g.) speeches, TV commercials or newscasts. I adopt what Hansen (2006: 60) refers to as a *research design model 1*, which looks at "political leaders with official authority to sanction the foreign policies pursued as well as those with central roles in executing these policies, for instance high-ranked military staff [and] senior civil servants (including diplomats and mediators)". The texts I use are speeches by Turkish politicians and diplomats in the United Nations,[6] as well as speeches and newsletter articles by Turkish military officers in the NATO *Centre of Excellence: Defence Against Terrorism*,

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6 This includes both the General Assembly and the Security Council.

which is situated in Ankara, Turkey. I discuss the history and function of this Centre further at the beginning of chapter 5. For the first set of texts I have used the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET) for accessing records of speeches (http://unbisnet.un.org/), while for the second set all the material is accessible on the webpage of the NATO Centre (http://www.coedat.nato.int/). As I do not contrast the representations of politicians, diplomats and military officers with the discourse of any 'terrorists', my approach can be considered a 'single-Self' study.[7] According to Hansen (2006: 77), such an approach is suited to situations where "the Other's ability to respond is neutralized", which is very much the case for the 'terrorists' in the forums I study.

From a perspective emphasizing the importance of discourse the position from which someone is speaking is fundamental (Neumann 2001: 117). As Gramsci (1971: 9) has argued, "[a]ll men are intellectuals […] but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals". Politicians, diplomats and military officers can here be viewed as such 'intellectuals'; politicians especially are in positions to shape public conceptions of reality to a much greater extent than, for example, middle-school teachers, speaking consistently in formal forums that widely attended to. Diplomats are central here due to the formal authority of the forums they speak through and their important role of representing state identity. Though military officers' representations of 'terrorism' do not necessarily involve specific policy suggestions, they are highly relevant by taking part in a larger textual interchange where such ideas are disseminated and find their way into other spheres, such as policy circles, especially when articulated through a NATO Centre dedicated to the topic of 'terrorism'.

There are three reasons why I look at international forums and not for instance Turkish parliamentary debates. Firstly, I do not know Turkish, and there are significant theoretical problems in doing discourse analysis based on translations of texts, especially second-hand translations made *ad hoc*.[8] Because discourse analysis looks at the specific enunciation of signifiers or sets of signifiers (what I refer to as rhetorical commonplaces in this thesis), and at their internal relations, much will be lost, or even distorted, by not treating the texts in their

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7 In another sense, it is also a 'multiple Selves' study, as I am treating the relation between a Turkish Self and a 'European' or 'Western' Self.

8 Jackson (2006: 21) exemplifies how translations can distort in a good way when arguing that translations of Max Weber into English "sometimes make him seem like an American liberal individualist".

original form.[9] Secondly, as my goal is to see the representation of Turkish identity vis-à-vis *international* identities, it is of course preferable that the audience be an international one. Thirdly, studying how concepts move through time and become adopted and reproduced by new actors is an important element of discourse analysis (see section 2.2.1 on intertextuality), and for the question of 'terrorism' this would be both more difficult and less rewarding with non-English texts.

I view the U.N. speeches by the Turkish politicians and diplomats as reflecting the main discourse in my thesis, as they are taken from the most known and attended forum, and from where I expect representations of Self-identity to be most prominent and interesting. These texts span from 2001 through 2012. As argued by Neumann (2001: 57), watershed events can be used pragmatically to define boundaries of analysis. I have chosen the starting point due to the September 11 attacks in 2001 in the United States, and the renaissance of the conception of a 'war on terror' by the George W. Bush Administration, which should be expected to lead to an increase in representations of 'terrorism' also by Turkish actors.[10]

The speeches and articles of military officers are important for two main reasons: By diversifying the data material, they can both strengthen or challenge the insights from the U.N. texts. As the military in Turkey is strongly involved in the domestic dealings with 'terrorism', scrutiny of the professional discourse they take part in through such a Centre is warranted. Including these texts also offers grounds for seeing alternative representations of Self-identity, as discussed above. Here, my studied time span is 2006 – 2011. The reason this does not coincide temporally with the U.N. material is that the NATO Centre was not inaugurated until 2005.[11] While this removes the grounds for comparing the military and the politicians/diplomats between 2001 and 2004, I nonetheless have wide access to representations of 'terrorism'/'terrorist' by Turkish military officers, which is not the easiest to come by in English. The time span also covers the beginning of a period where identity conflicts over 'Islamism' and secularism became more marked in Turkey (Onar 2007), as well

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[9]In the case of current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan I have deviated slightly from this principle, as his speeches at the United Nations are translated from Turkish. But as these are simultaneous and official translations by the Delegation, I see this as much less of a problem than if I personally translated Turkish texts.

[10] I refer to this as a renaissance because the Administration of President Ronald Reagan had already used the commonplace of 'war on terror' consistently, especially in relation to perceived 'terrorism' in Central America, West Asia and North Africa (Chomsky 2003).

[11] The reason 2012 is not included is that the NATO Centre newsletter does not include articles by Turkish military officers for this year.

as the beginning of the *Ergenekon* judicial process**.** Finally, the NATO Centre from where I take my material has been the subject of very little – if any – research; as of now I have not encountered a single study looking at it in any detail.

Though I am studying Turkish actors exclusively I cannot justifiably argue to have identified a *Turkish* discourse on 'terrorism' (or *discourses*, if we regard the military officers as constituting a separate one). I understand the Turkish actors as having to adapt to the international forums they are speaking within, being dependent on shared resources for making meaning (such as of 'terrorism'). It would therefore be *more* correct to regard these as a 'United Nations discourse on terrorism' and a 'NATO discourse on terrorism'. This is *not* to say that the texts are not affected by the actors being who they are, which would take away agency. Actors can combine rhetorical commonplaces (see below) in new ways, or even successfully introduce new ones. This is also what facilitates the reconstruction of Self-identity. Rumelili (2007: 15) argues that "representational practices of states […] potentially have the effect of changing the constructions of their identities by others" – in this case by the Turkish actors representing 'terrorism' as the common, radical Other.

1.2.2 Conceptual clarifications

'Discourse' is at the absolute center of my conceptual apparatus, but due to its complexity and its somewhat uncritical usage in a myriad of contexts, I discuss it separately in section 2.3. Other specific concepts that guide my analysis (nodal points, articulation, differentiation, interpellation and breaking) are also discussed in the same section. Here I will describe the two concepts representation and rhetorical commonplace, as I use them quite extensively in this introduction, and as they are central to understanding the other five concepts.

Neumann (2001: 33) defines *representations* as "the most important packages of reality claims that a discourse consists of", as well as "things and phenomena as they present themselves to us, not the things in themselves, but things filtered through that which is in between us and the world: language, categories etc.".[12] In other words, representations are the 'knowledge' that constitutes the social world. An example of a representation could be 'terrorism' as a 'global' threat which it is necessary to fight resolutely and in concert – which

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12 I am indebted to Østereng (2011) for the latter translation. The former translation is from "de viktigste pakkene av virkelighetskrav som en diskurs består av".

we will see is prominent in both the sets of texts I analyze. What distinguishes my treatment of these representations from *arguments* is that I do not seek to counter them by proving them false; their identification is the goal, and from there the discussion of which broader discursive structures they "reflect, constitute, reproduce, and/or challenge" (Rumelili 2007: 14), as well as what forms of practice they render sensible.[13]

By *rhetorical commonplaces* (Jackson 2006) I refer to the signifiers or sets of signifiers that come together to form representations within discourses, such as 'terrorist', 'peace-loving nation' or 'democracy'. Such commonplaces are resources, and they need to be practically invoked in the legitimization of policy in order to have a function. Importantly, they also need to be present in the target audience. As illustratively put by Jackson (2006: 28),

> public officials cannot simply say anything that they like in defense of a policy, any more than I can prevail in a discussion about here we should go to lunch by discoursing at length on the creative genius of George Lucas, or any more than Slobodan Milošević could whip up a crowd using nationalist language in Times Square or in downtown St. Louis.

This understanding of rhetorical commonplaces shows that what is important here is not the 'beliefs' inside people's heads, but that on which "speakers can draw with any hope of having the audience follow their arguments, let alone be moved to action by them" (ibid.). I see rhetorical commonplaces as practically equivalent to predicates (Laffey & Weldes 2004), elements (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999) or objects (Foucault 1972).

I should also define *ontological security*, a concept I use at several points in my analyses and discussions. I understand this as security of *identity*, not as physical security. As an example, this would refer to the existence of Turkey as a definite collective with its own identity, rather than the physical well-being of the individuals within its borders (see Rumelili 2011).

1.2.3 Challenges

This is the first time I write an academic paper of this magnitude, and it is the first time I do proper empirical analysis of an individually chosen data material. While this has been greatly rewarding it has also posed some challenges. Firstly, it was difficult to know where to stop, both in terms of the temporal boundaries of analysis, and in terms of excluding

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13 I refer to the 'structure' of discourse in synchronic terms here only for analytical purposes; a discourse is always in a degree of flux– though some relations are much more stable than others (see chapter 2).

representations that were outside my main focus. In my preliminary analysis there was always something interesting 'a little further back' or somewhat 'on the side', but in the end I decided – for the already stated reasons – to set the starting point at 2001.

Another challenge was how to deal with the name changes of the PKK. In 2002 the PKK was re-established as the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (KADEK), and the year after as the Kurdistan People's Congress (KONGRA-GEL), with stated intentions of political reorientation (see Kongra Gel 2003). Any such difference is generally rejected by national governments, referring to all three as different names for the same group (e.g. MFA Turkey 2011). This *a priori* assumed similarity is, however, an element of discourse by itself, making it difficult for the PKK to escape a formerly defined identity. By not making distinctions myself, I in part contribute to reproducing such a representation. It should therefore be noted that it is not my intention to reject (nor to accept) these entities' stated divergence from the PKK; I consistently refer to 'PKK' in this thesis as this is what is most commonly referred to in relation with 'terrorism' in Turkey.

A last central challenge has been how to conceptualize the relation between 'Europe' and 'the West' – to what extent they should be grouped together or isolated. I of course realize that there are clear overlaps in common representations of the 'European' and the 'Western', for example in the hegemony of liberal democratic discourse, or in similar roots in e.g. the European Enlightenment imaginary I discuss in chapter 3. But because of the separate accession negotiations of Turkey with the European Union, and because the Turkish Republic at its inception was oriented towards the 'Western' but expressed skepticism towards European powers that had divided the Ottoman Empire through the 1920 Treaty of Sévres, I use both 'Europe' *and* 'the West' to designate identities that the Turkish actors are negotiating their country's 'difference' in relation to. However, I see these as related to an extent that both can be appealed to at the same time, so that it is perfectly possible to become both more 'European' and more 'Western' at the same time (simultaneously becoming more 'Islamic' and more 'European' could for example be expected to be more discursively hindered).

1.3 Structure of thesis

Chapter 2 discusses in detail the theoretical underpinnings of my thesis, referred to as discourse theory, first on a general level, and then specifically in relation to the concepts of

'terrorism' and 'terrorist'. Chapter 3 gives a conceptual background for the Turkish actors' representations of the threat of 'terrorism', emphasizing the role of 'civilization'. It also discusses interaction between Kurdish and Turkish nationalism from the inception of the Turkish Republic, relating this to the concept of 'terrorism' today. Chapter 4 analyzes speeches by Turkish politicians and diplomats at the United Nations between 2001 and 2012, focusing on discussions of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist', but including as well statements concerned specifically with collective identity. Chapter 5 analyzes Turkish military officers' speeches and newsletter articles at the NATO *Centre of Excellence: Defence Against Terrorism*, from 2006 – 2011, following the same general structure as chapter 4. The thesis ends with chapter 6, which summarizes findings from the analyses, discusses the consequences of the representations for political practice and offers concluding thoughts.

2.

Theoretical Approach: Discourse Theory and the Study of 'Terrorism'

> One of my oldest crusades is against the distinction between thought and feeling […] which is really the basis
> of all anti-intellectual views: the heart and the head, thinking and feeling, fantasy and judgment […] I believe
> that we think much more with the instruments provided by our culture than we do with our bodies, and hence
> the much greater diversity of though in the world. Thinking is a form of feeling; feeling is a form of thinking
>
> - Susan Sontag, Interview with Jonathan Cott, *Rolling Stone,* October 4 1979

Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical grounding for my analyses in chapters 4 and 5, which I refer to as *discourse theory*. The chapter builds on the premise that theory and method are not separate choices, but intertwined; though discourse analysis can be performed on the basis of several theoretical perspectives, employing it also entails some epistemological and ontological choices (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). As argued by Hopf (2004: 31), discourse analysis is "a political theory as much as a method of inquiry". My discussions of theoretical and methodological principles will therefore be somewhat intermeshed throughout the chapter. Several of the insights are inspired by Jackson (2006), Connolly (1991) and Nietzsche (1873; 1997 [1886]), who do not refer to 'discourse' (or only to a very low extent), but I see these scholars as lying theoretically close to my approach in this chapter and therefore use their insights in relation to discourse theory. However, I do not contend to present the 'one and only' discourse theory; like for any approach there is a degree of theoretical eclecticism here, and I may well have marginalized some aspects that others would regard as central.

Before discussing discourse as concept, the chapter presents two fundamental elements of discourse theory. Section 2.1 presents elements of a social constructionist epistemology, emphasizing the contingency of social 'reality' and the mutually constitutive relation between the human being and the social world. Section 2.2 discusses the ontological importance of language to discourse theory. Taking a post-structuralist perspective, it presents language as an ultimately unstable system that can never reach complete closure, where meaning arises differentially from the way words stand in relation to each other. Section 2.3 then moves to discourse as concept, building on other scholars' insights and presenting the way I understand the concept in this thesis. The section also discusses other concepts central to performing

discourse analysis. Section 2.4 compares discourse theory to other theoretical schools, emphasizing specifically important divergences from positivist theory. It also includes a discussion of the concept of 'security' from the perspective of discourse theory, drawing especially on the insight of Wæver (1998). The chapter ends with section 2.5, which discusses the concepts of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' in light of the insights from the earlier sections.

2.1   A world constructed

Discourse theory has a *constructionist* view of social reality – it sees it as always in flux, continuously shaped through human interaction. The social world is not given *a priori*; it has no ontological existence independent of the activities of the individuals that constitute it (Jackson 2006: 14; Hardy et al. 2004: 20). The 'state', for example, would disappear if no one legitimized actions on behalf of it or reproduced it in some other way (Campbell 1998a) – though it is of course a discursive change that is very unlikely today. When departing from such a perspective of fundamental contingency, what is interesting is not to look for change occurring to stable actors and social structures, but essentially its opposite: the stabilization of a social reality that is always in some degree of transformation (Jackson 2006: 15).

As human beings we are part and parcel of this social reality, and our identities are continuously formed through interaction with the social world rather than given essentially by nature. The identity of a subject does not exist solely inside the separate mind, but rather on multiple levels that are not all covered by conceptions of individual consciousness and rationality. Building on the psychoanalytical insight of Sigmund Freud and especially Jacques Lacan, discourse theory sees the subject as constructed through continuous interaction with images of what it 'is' in the social world, given by and processed through language as a shared social structure (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 54). Beyond such continuous identifications, there is no 'real' centre of subjectivity, and discourse theory thus challenges any conception of a unified subject with an essential identity (Mouffe 1993: 75-76). When such conceptions are challenged, the idea of individuals representing themselves exactly 'as they are' isolated of social structures makes little sense. Every forum, private or public, always entails some sets of norms or expectations that the individual needs to constitute him- or herself in relation to; even the private sphere of e.g. the family is never unaffected by power in some form (Jackson 2006: 22).

This does not mean that discourse theory has no room for *human agency*. Removing this would revert to a mere structuralism and make accounting for change very difficult. To the contrary, agency is fundamental to a dialectical view of the social world, where subjects are continuously both producing and being produced by their social surroundings. This allows ample room for both idiosyncrasies and social change – what Jackson (2006: 32) refers to as "unpredictable social actions [having] a meaningful effect on outcomes". As was argued by Durkheim, viewing the social as more than a collection of individual consciousnesses does not entail anything 'metaphysical' (Giddens 1971: 67); the importance of the individual is indeed acknowledged here, but the emphasis is on construction through *social interaction*. Here there are clear contrasts to utilitarianism, which tends to treat the social ahistorically, as an aggregation of actions by isolated individuals (Giddens 1971: 69), and to methodological individualism, which sees the individual as acting rationally according to fixed interests and dispositions, irrespective of social conditioning (Vatn 2005: ch. 3). Though methodological individualism emphasizes the individual as an object of study more strongly than discourse theory, it actually *takes away* agency by making these individuals little more than carriers of set inputs. Agency is sacrificed for the sake of *agents* (Jackson 2006: 35-36). As put by Baudrillard (2002: 67), "the man who has this 'rational' choice allotted to him is no longer, ultimately, free to decide".

2.1.1 Contingent and relational identity

Because of its rejection of essentialism, discourse theory sees the representation of any permanent and total identity as a manifestation of power and deserving of illumination (Connolly 1991: 66). This is not only the case with identities; any attempt to lock down a part of social reality as 'objectively' given is problematic and an object of study for the discourse analyst. These are important perspectives for how 'terrorism' as phenomenon and the 'terrorist' identity are represented in my analyses in chapters 4 and 5, and this is reflected in my research questions. However, a distinction between the natural and the social sciences should be made here: While one can certainly point to theoretical issues with uncovering 'objective' truths on a general level – Nietzsche (1997 [1886]) has indeed done so – such aspirations are much more problematic in the *social* sciences because of the contingency of social constructions (and thus human identity). As put by Fierke (2004: 38), "[t]he natural scientist has a freedom to impose meaning on the natural world. The social scientist does not because the subjects of analysis are meaning creating creatures".

The definition of identities is essential to the legitimization of political action. Policy needs to be seen as *ontologically* interlinked with representations of identity; political identities do not exist outside of their employment in practice as justifications for policies, while policies make no sense unless they are related to an overarching image of which identities are at play. Policy and identity are "simultaneously (discursive) foundation and product" (Hansen 2006: 21). This entails that what is said to describe actions and their underlying motivations is not isolated from the actions themselves, but part of what constitutes them as what they are (Jackson 2006: 25). As an example, policy represented as part of a 'counter-terrorist' effort is not just undertaken in response to an objective and pre-given 'terrorist' threat; a given reality of 'terrorism' is reproduced by the legitimization of such policy (Barrinha 2010: 166). This derives from a *relational* view of identity: Rather than viewing identity atomistically, as something that can be understood outside of relations to others, it sees the delineation of a 'we' as contingent on the delineation of a 'them' as the constitutive outside (Mouffe 1993: 84-85). It is this principle especially that makes discourse theory suitable for seeing how the representations of a 'terrorist' Other take part in the negotiation of Self-identity.

2.2   The role of language in discourse theory

Language holds a very important ontological position in discourse theory, and the view of language I present here is grounded in *post-structuralism.* It is through language individuals make sense of the world, and it is therefore the medium of the social construction that I outlined in the above section. From the perspective of post-structuralism, meaning emerges not through the essence of words themselves, but through the constellations in which they stand in relation to other words (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 36). This entails a *differential* rather than a *referential* view of language; the latter which is common to mainstream international relations theory (Wæver 2002: 24). Following Hansen (2006: 19), meaning derives from both positive and negative associations between words (signifiers) – what I refer to as *articulations* and *differentiations* and describe further in section 2.3. Such a totality is of course extremely complex and must be regarded analytically rather than something that can be grasped *in toto.*

Because language is social, and not something each and every individual owns privately, there is no way to grasp an unfiltered and completely idiosyncratic reality beyond language. This

does *not* mean that there is no real material world out there, as is often alleged of post-structuralism and other critical theories (Marsh 2009; Keohane cited in Connolly 1991: 52-54), but that this reality is ambiguous and multi-faceted and has to be conceived of textually in order to be given *meaning* (Neumann 2001: 37). Such meaning is dependent on already existing internal relations given in language. These relations are not permanent, however; a post-structuralist perspective sees language as an open system that can never reach complete closure; signifiers can never be locked in permanent relations to what they point to (signifieds).[14] This shows an important point of departure from *structuralism,* which generally sees the underlying structure of language (*langue*) as set in stone (Wæver 2002: 23). Signifiers are thus ultimately metaphors through which we make sense of the 'outside world', rather than direct and stable referents to it.

This perspective owes a great deal to Nietzsche (1873), who argued that it is self-deception to believe that we are unveiling truths objective and independent of human beings through the structures in languages, and that we can never use language to grasp the thing-in-itself, only in a way where it becomes intelligible and useful for us; "the metamorphosis of the world into man" (ibid.). [15] If this were not the case, there would not be as many languages. Building on this, he argued that our *concepts* make us believe that people have inert and individual 'faculties', but that these are really metaphors for a series of separate incidents we construct as similar by grouping them together (ibid.):

> We call a person "honest". Why did he act so honestly today? we ask. Our answer usually sounds like this: because of his honesty. Honesty! That is to say again: the leaf is the cause of the leaves. After all, we know nothing of an essence-like quality named "honesty"; we know only numerous individualized, and thus unequal actions, which we equate by omitting the unequal and by then calling them honest actions.

This is an important perspective to keep in mind when studying representations of the 'terrorist' identity, if understood as an 'internal' essence derived from a set of acts of 'terrorism' (which is of course by itself such a metaphor).

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14 To foreshadow the understanding of discourse somewhat here, it is exactly such closure that discourses strive to establish (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 38). If successful, this makes it seem as if the relation between signifier and signified *were* in fact permanent. Due to the unstable nature of language, it is a site of political practice; it is where identities are both created and marginalized.

15 See http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/Philosophers/Nietzsche/Truth_and_Lie_in_an_Extra-Moral_Sense.htm

2.2.1 Intertextuality

When the meanings of words are seen as dependent on (unstable) internal relations, it follows naturally that meanings of texts are contingent on their relations to earlier texts, rather than just inherent characteristics of the texts themselves (Wigen 2013: 13). Texts are indeed individually unique, but their meaning must also be understood as "a product of other readings and interpretations" (Hansen 2006: 55). This is what we understand by *intertextuality*. Meaning does thus never have one unequivocal 'starting point'. As language is social, words will always have been used before, and their meanings are dependent on the myriad of associations that have earlier been made (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 84). As pertinently put by Mouffe (1993: 17), "[i]t is through language that the horizon of our present in constituted; this language bears the mark of the past; it is the life of the past in the present and thus constitutes the movement of tradition". When texts are intertextually linked, a dual process of legitimization takes place: The referencing text constructs legitimacy for its own reading, but the older text simultaneously becomes reproduced (Hansen 2006: 57). Relating this to the specific purposes of this thesis; when an actor reproduces a common representation of 'terrorism' given in, for example, a series of United Nations resolutions, the actor's statement is not only made more 'legitimate' through referencing something 'everyone can agree upon'; it importantly contributes to the reproduction of the representation itself – a form of agency which is exactly the condition of existence for discourses.

Intertextuality does not make the tracing of concepts in history meaningless; it is rather the condition that makes it relevant. Noticing shifts in the articulations between words, and seeing rhetorical commonplaces used in new settings, is important in order to trace the gradual development of representations into 'common sense'. This makes *genealogy* central to a discourse analytical methodology – the attempt to go backwards in time to exhume conceptual origins and study the specific sites of employment of rhetorical commonplaces, tracing in this way their development. In chapter 3 I look at the historical deployment of some of the concepts used by the Turkish actors in their representations of Self-identity, and in chapters 4 and 5 I discuss intertextual elements to how 'terrorism'/'terrorist' *as Other* is

represented.[16] Tracing such origins can also give insight into who has been in a position to shape hegemonic representations.

2.3   The concept of discourse

The concept of discourse is essential to my empirical treatment in this thesis. Though it may seem paradoxical, it would be a demonstration of hubris to insist upon some clear-cut and unequivocal definition of the concept, exactly because discourse theory stresses contingency and does thus not accept locked-down meanings of words. Because it has been used in so many contexts, and often without theoretical commitments, 'discourse' has almost taken the qualities of a free-for-all that can mean anything (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999), and hence there are good reasons to counteract this by interpreting it and giving it a definition when it is employed, and by highlighting how various scholars have employed the concept theoretically. I will start by presenting five central aspects to how I understand the concept in this thesis, inspired mainly by Laffey and Weldes (2004), before presenting a set of definitions, including the one that guides my analyses.

Firstly, discourses define the objects of reality and how they are ordered in relation to each other, directing how statements can be made and enabling certain practices. Power is manifest in discourses through the dissemination of representations as social 'truths'. *Secondly*, discourses take part in producing the subjects that are acting within them. A 'counter-terrorism expert', for example, knows what he or she is and does through the way both 'terrorism' and 'counter-terrorism' are represented in discourse. *Thirdly*, discourses are political as they construct identities and put these in relation to other identities. A mutually constitutive relation between Self and Other entails that representing the Other will simultaneously reinforce the conception of the Self as something definite. *Fourthly*, discourses do not only have linguistic manifestations, but can present themselves materially, through structures such as institutions. The NATO *Centre of Excellence: Defence Against Terrorism*, one of the sources of my texts, is a good example in this regard. The existence of such an institution will reproduce the representation that there is a definite and general phenomenon called terrorism, and that someone is working to protect against it. *Fifthly,* discourses are about exclusion, about barring "other possibilities of world-interpretation"

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16 Here it is mainly *implicit* intertextuality that is emphasized (Hansen 2006: 57-58): how historically important rhetorical commonplaces end up in the representations of Turkish politicians, diplomats and military officers *without* this being drawn attention to.

(Nietzsche 1997 [1886]: 14). As argued by Græger (2007: 23), the *doxa* of a discourse – the 'taken-for-granted' – define the actions – such as policies – that can validly be pursued.

The above is supported by many scholars, though it is often put in different terms. Jørgensen & Phillips (1999: 9) define discourse as "a certain way of speaking about and understanding the world (or a part of the world)" and note that discourses refer to the way language is structured in patterns that our statements have to follow, but that are not the same across different social domains.[17] Hansen (2006: 18-20) argues that policy discourses rely upon both constructions of problems and subjectivities, that discourses are *not* merely the same as ideas but also have a material aspect, and that discourses "strive to fix meaning around a closed structure", though this fixity is never complete. Neumann (2001: 18) expands this by explicitly including the constitutive function of discourse, arguing that it is "a system for bringing forth a set of statements and practices that, through being embedded in institutions and appear more or less as normal, are constitutive of reality for their carriers and have a certain regularity in a set of social relations".[18] In all of these views we see the important commonality that discourse is about representing the social world as if it were unequivocally locked-down in some definite pattern.

Because the representation of a 'terrorist' *identity* is very important to what I study in this thesis, and because none of the above definitions emphasize identities specifically, I here offer the definition that guides my analyses: *A discourse is a system for generating meaning which both produces and builds on representations of what the world looks like and what its important identities are; striving to fix the ordering of these in relation to each other in a way that conditions what can and cannot be meaningfully said.*

Though I describe discourses as systems, they exist because of reproduced patterns of practice, not because of some essential and underlying configuration; the representations they contain cannot be isolated from continuous social construction. If this were not so, discourse would be reducible to the Saussurean concept of *langue* – the underlying, set structure of language (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 19). Discourse must therefore also be understood in a

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17 My translation, from "en bestemt made at tale om og forstå verden (eller et udsnit af verden) på".

18 My translation, from "et system for frembringelse av et sett utsagn og praksiser som, ved å innskrive seg i institusjoner og fremstå som mer eller mindre normale, er virkelighetskonstituerende for sine bærere og har en viss grad av regularitet i et sett sosiale relasjoner"

plural sense, so that one can talk of (e.g.) a 'sports discourse', a 'feminist discourse', a 'terrorism discourse' and so on. This is not to say that the dividing lines between discourses are finite or sharp; separating discourses is a matter of interpretation and the identification of patterns (such as the recurrence of rhetorical commonplaces. As argued by Foucault (1972: 33), they are "initial approximation[s]", and they must remain open to discoveries that lead to the dissolution of their own outlines.

Many of the above points are overlooked by scholars who nonetheless use the concept of discourse. Kettell (2012: 3) argues that a "discursive strategy" must stand in a plausible relation to the "actual conditions to which it refers", and that the credibility of the strategy can be undermined if the "real" situation "on the ground" changes. Here he implies that there is something outside of discourse that can either be represented correctly or misrepresented, and used in this sense the concept of discourse is easily reduced to 'argument'. According to the perspective of this thesis, it is better to view *all* social phenomena as discursive, but to view some as much more locked-down than others – which is where hegemony enters the frame.

2.3.1 Hegemony

Seeing the social world as fluid and language as inherently unstable does not mean that degrees of fixity do not exist. Some discursive constructions are far more stable than others – most often one representation of reality is dominant (Neumann 2001: 60). This is captured by the concept of *hegemony*. The discourse theoretical perspective on hegemony builds on Gramsci (1971: 12), who presented the concept as something that "the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production", leading to the masses spontaneously consenting to "the general direction on social life". However, discourse theory sheds away the essentialism in Gramsci's neo-Marxist approach, where there is an objective material 'basis' underlying the (discursive) 'superstructure'. Discourse theory sees hegemony instead as the successful stabilization of meaning. In this perspective, identification with for example a social class does not mean that it 'objectively' exists, but that there is (temporary) closure, so that people identify with it and take it for granted (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 51).

It is here we find the understanding of *power* in discourse theory: Power is not a thing that people have, but is manifested in knowledge, identities and the relations between them, as well as in the exclusion of other possibilities. It hides itself by dissolving into 'objectivity',

making the social world appear as though *not* constructed (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 49). Foucault (1972**:** 24) argued for being critical towards this:

> We must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we normally accept before any examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset; we must oust those forms and obscure forces by which we usually link the discourse of one man with that of another; they must be driven out from the darkness in which they reign.

An important goal of discourse analysis is to expose such 'ready-made syntheses' – to show practically, through the analysis of texts in their proper form, how the locking-down of meaning is engendered by the discursive act of representation. Here we again see why the scene from *Homeland* described at the beginning of chapter 1 is important. Without an underlying field of meaning supporting some degree of natural relation between Islam and 'terrorism', suddenly including a scene where the soldier bows down in prayer would make as little sense as one where he goes out to bet on horses.

Two related concepts developed by Laclau and Mouffe (referred in Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 51-52) are important to discursive stability: myths and imaginaries. A myth offers a complete reading frame for social situations and is generally tied to a rhetorical commonplace, such as an idea of 'Turkey'. Such myths can become exchanged radically, however, and a pertinent example here is Çelik's (2000) argument that the inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923, and the nation-building project that followed it, entailed the creation of a new national myth that replaced the undermined Ottoman order, is pertinent in this regard. I argue that this understanding of a myth is similar to Wæver's (2002: 31) understanding of different discursive *layers*, where some are more fundamental and stable than others. Wæver's insight is important for seeing how basic elements of political discourse (such as the identity of the 'nation-state' being acted on behalf of) may be shared by politicians with strongly opposing views on a specific policy issue, in a way that will already have narrowed the spectrum of policies that can sensibly be proposed. *Imaginaries* are highly successful myths that shape an overall 'field of intelligibility', such as the 'Enlightenment' (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 15-16) – an imaginary of which I emphasize the development in chapter 3. The nation-state system could by itself be regarded as such an imaginary; today, it is indeed quite dominant in rendering the world intelligible. Its naturalization is apparent in

a wealth of forums: watching a newscast, a viewer is unlikely to regard the distinction between domestic and international news as something else than the natural order of things.[19]

2.3.2   The political relevance of discourse

Discourse is important to international relations inquiry because political actors are situated within a larger discursive field that individual statements cannot be divorced from, and within which their actions need to make sense; reproduced not only by the politicians themselves but by (e.g.) the media or other institutions (Hansen 2006: 7). As Wæver (2002: 26) argues, "it is always necessary for policy makers to be able to present a convincing narrative of how the present trends […] point towards a future which is hospitable to an attractive vision of the self". Though he is referring specifically to *foreign* policy, we can apply the same principle to how Turkish policy-makers frame the measures taken in the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). What the PKK is, and what the conflict with it is, needs to resonate on some level with an idea of a Turkish Self. It is important, however, that discourses are not seen simply as strategic tools employed by political actors to gain support or legitimacy. Though it is of course important that politicians appeal to identities in order to justify policies, focusing on this in a narrow sense, as a form of rational manipulation, takes away the basis of discourse theory. Discourses take part in constituting the *actors themselves, and their world-views*, as well as the *conflicts themselves* (Barrinha 2010: 163).

While public utterances are most definitely empirically central to discourse analysis, the goal is not to use such data to draw conclusions about the thoughts in people's heads – to conclude whether or not they 'really meant' what they said. Firstly, we have no way of really knowing whether we are right (Jackson 2006: 22); secondly, discourse theory sees it as far more interesting to examine the structures that condition and facilitate what actors say when they need to legitimize some form of action. As put by Laffey and Weldes (1997), we wish to identify the 'symbolic technologies' and social relations through which actors perform, rather than personal 'beliefs'. Such beliefs are not even necessary for the performing of functions; one may very well employ and reproduce a discourse on 'terrorism' through one's job as a 'counter-terrorism official', whether or not one really 'believes' in what one is doing. This can contrasted for example with the neo-realist account of the 'war on terror' given by Van Evera (2007). Here the emphasis is unequivocally on actors in the George W. Bush Administration

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19 I owe the credits for this example to Jørgensen & Phillips (1999)

making the wrong policy decisions, rather than on the resources they drew on to make such policies sensible towards various audiences (for example, *how* it was possible to represent Saddam Hussein as a main threat to the United States). People do of course have motivations, but these cannot be isolated from the shared notions that are used to make sense vis-à-vis the collective (Jackson 2006: 24).

This view of discourse does not mean that it is something completely external to human beings, which decides strictly what they can say or not. Arguing this would take away agency. By employing and combining rhetorical commonplaces in new ways, perhaps borrowing from other discourses, actors will modify discourse – potentially also changing the way their identities are constructed by others through 'identity-politics strategies' (Rumelili 2007: 15). The degree of success in disseminating some representations and excluding others is essential to policy formulation. As Græger (2007: 43) puts it, "whoever wins the political battle of framing the discourse can to a large part also control the shaping of policy".[20] But discourses nonetheless significantly affect the formulation of statements. Although it could be *practically* possible to give whichever representation of a situation one would want, many of these are made "*politically* impossible by the creative and contingent ways that commonplaces [have been] deployed during debates" (Jackson 2006: 113 [emphasis in original]). Politicians and other actors in formal positions may psychologically have a series of idiosyncratic reasons for their actions, but as long as there are no discursive resources through which to sensibly represent them, they are actually of less importance when doing discourse analysis.

2.3.3   Studying discourses: key concepts

How does one identify a discourse? How does one know what is a relevant part of it, and what is not? Here we encounter one of the potential weaknesses of discourse theory: By assuming the *a priori* existence of a given discourse, one can end up taking part in its creation or reproduction, seeing everything as 'making sense' as a part of it. This problem is counteracted by letting the identification of a discourse follow from *nodal points*, privileged signifiers that serve as an intersection for chains of other signifiers (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 8), such as 'the market' for economical discourses, 'the body' in medical discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999), or – in this case – 'terrorism' (or 'terrorist'). As an example of

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20 Translated from "Den som vinner den politiske kampen om innrammingen av diskursen kan i stor grad også kontrollere politikkens utforming".

how nodal points are important, 'flexible' gets a quite different meaning in a discourse with 'the market' as a nodal point, than it would in a discourse where 'the body' served this role. From the identification of such nodal points the analyst can begin to outline discourse, reasoning backwards from empirical manifestations in texts (Laffey & Weldes 2004: 28).

Four other concepts are specifically important to my analyses in chapters 4 and 5: articulation, differentiation, breaking and interpellation. By *articulation* I refer to the linking of signifiers in associative chains, so that the first comes to entail the other. For example, 'democracy' can be articulated to 'freedom' or 'terrorist' to 'fundamentalism'. In order to discover articulations, the discourse analyst has to look for specific rhetorical commonplaces, what Laffey and Weldes (2004: 29) refer to as the "main signifying elements of the discourse", and then identify the "[c]hains of connotation" that articulate them together. Here it is also important to look for how rhetorical commonplaces are articulated to *material* aspects of discourse, such as institutions, for example the articulation of 'counter-terrorism' to the NATO. Articulation can also be referred to as joining (Jackson 2006) or linking (Hansen 2006). The flipside of articulations are *differentiations* (Hansen 2006), where signifiers are instead *contrasted* with others. To use an example relevant for this thesis to illustrate these two concepts, a 'terrorist' is understood through its articulation to a large set of signifiers and its differentiation from others – as well as through the internal relations between these other signifiers as well (if 'terrorist' is clearly differentiated from 'security force' and 'security force' is articulated to 'legitimate', then a differential relation is established between 'terrorist' and 'legitimate' as well). Neither articulations nor differentiations are permanently set in stone, but require continuous discursive labor both for their creation and their maintenance.

When understanding identity relationally, articulations and differentiations related to the Other will at the same time have consequences for the discursive representation of the Self, through the representation of what the Self is *not*. For this reason, an identity can be upheld and represented without at all describing it directly; rather "inferred from (and assured by) its opposite" (Balibar quoted in Campbell 1998: 89). This is described well by Hansen (2006: 44) in relation to the representations of President George W. Bush:

> When Bush constructs Saddam Hussein as 'evil', he does not explicitly say that he, himself, is 'not
> evil'; when the 'Iraqi people are defined as 'oppressed', he does not immediately declare that 'the

American people are not oppressed'. Not only would such repetitive juxtapositions make speech unbearably cumbersome, but also the audience to whom he is speaking is supposed not to question the implicit American parts of the juxtapositions.

Differentiations must not be confused with *breaking*, however, which refers to the attempt to counter a dominant articulation between rhetorical commonplaces, so that reproducing a discourse will not imply certain representations (Jackson 2006: 45). In my analyses we will see many examples of such breaking – of the articulation between Islam and 'terrorism'.

The last central concept I will discuss here is *interpellation*, understood as a practice where identities (or subject positions) are created, and specific entities or individuals are represented as part of these (Laffey & Weldes 2004);'terrorist' being the identity *par excellence* in this thesis. The obvious example here is interpellating the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) into this identity, which simultaneously subjects it to the discursive web of meaning within which 'terrorist' and 'terrorism' are placed. Interpellations can also be accepted by those subjected, so that they come to identify with it and reproduce it themselves. As an example of how such a dynamic can potentially unfold; with the increasing representation of Turkey as a Muslim rather than secular partner by the United States from 2002, this was eventually reproduced by the currently ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) as well (Østereng 2011: 34).

It is also important to identify the subject position – the abstract 'we' – that the speaker (or writer) purports to represent, such as 'Norwegians', 'the international society' or 'the working class' (I refer to this as the Self in my analyses). This can be regarded as a form of Self-interpellation. By for example stating 'our common civilization', a Turkish politician would interpellate Turkey into this identity. Not everyone is allowed to invoke every identity, however; it would for example most likely be perceived as somewhat strange if a North Korean politician purported to be representing a 'Western' identity, though there is nothing *essentially* wrong about it (that Australia is generally seen as part of the 'Western' world shows the indeterminacy of geography here). Statements are contextually dependent upon the person – understood as the *identity* of the person, not the physical body – from whom they originate (Foucault 1972: 56). It is nonetheless this dynamic that makes possible the negotiation of 'difference'.

It is important to underline that discourse analysis is not allegorical in the sense of taking a series of statements and 'reading between the lines' to discover their 'actual' meaning. It departs specifically from what is being said, and a given rhetorical commonplace can therefore not be assumed as implied in the text. *By itself*, the one scene from *Homeland* described at the beginning of the thesis cannot be used to infer an articulation to 'terrorism' without this actually being explicit. Its condition of possibility can however be grasped from a discourse theoretical perspective – as the consistent articulation between Islam and 'terrorism' in political discourse, popular culture, etc.

Having presented the epistemological importance of social constructionism and the ontological importance of language, and having discussed the specific concept of discourse, I now move to positioning discourse theory in relation to other theoretical approaches.

2.4   Discourse theory in the international relations discipline

As follows naturally from the discussion in this chapter, choosing discourse analysis as a method for making sense of empirical data entails certain theoretical commitments. Though there is no universal link between discourse analysis and a given epistemology, this means that the method is unsuited to fulfill certain scientific goals. In the following section I will discuss central differences between discourse theory and other theoretical approaches to international relations, beginning with contrasts to positivist theory. Emphasizing such contrasts does not entail the rejection of other theoretical approaches as unfruitful or irrelevant, but the acknowledgement of some questions being better answered from some theoretical viewpoints. Jackson (2012) puts this well when arguing for theoretical pluralism:

> Feminist, post-colonial, and critical constructivist scholarship, to select just three examples, may simply *not be interested* in the question of whether some X is correlated with some Y; this does not detract from the potential validity of a claim about the relationship between X and Y, but it does suggest that perhaps there might be other important questions to ask that do not fit neatly into that neopositivist explanatory framework.[21]

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21 Jackson refers to neo-positivism here. When I instead use positivism (without the neo prefix) this is most likely similar to Jackson's understanding, as I am referring not to an older, Comtean conception of positivism, but to the form which has been dominant in international relations since the mid-20th century, and which emerged out of logical positivism – without adopting its very stark principles of what qualifies as proper knowledge (Smith 1996: 14-15).

In relation to 'terrorism' I will go one step further than Jackson, however. The reason a discourse theoretical approach is suitable is not only that its view of identity allows for important insight into what representations of 'terrorism' enable, but also the conviction that a neo-positivist explanatory framework stands in danger of reproducing a problematic status quo through the use of purportedly objective concepts carrying with themselves a certain worldview (which I of course recognize is a value statement).

2.4.1 Contrasts to positivist international relations theory[22]

Discourse analysis as method is incompatible with a strictly positivist view of science where one attempts to get as close as possible to objective truths about a social reality seen as unchanging, grounded in an empiricist epistemology and relying on methods common to the natural sciences. For international relations specifically the two most central contrasting theories are neo-realism and neo-liberalism, which can both be seen as generally positivist. Smith (1996: 15-16) makes four important arguments regarding positivism in international relations that I will reproduce here, as they all are viewed critically from a discourse theoretical perspective.

Firstly, positivist accounts believe in unity between the natural and social sciences, so that the same methodologies and epistemologies are applicable to both without incurring theoretical problems. This is contrary to the perspective of discourse theory on human beings as not essentially given, but embedded in a mutually conditioning and contingent relation with the social world. Secondly, they divide clearly between 'facts' and 'values', where discourse theory sees also such 'facts' as dependent on their discursive framing, rejecting "the once sacrosanct distinction between objective scientific explanations and subjective hermeneutical descriptions and understandings" (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 6). Thirdly, positivist accounts seek to uncover transcendent social regularities, where discourse theory sees regularities as contextually dependent. Fourthly, they believe in the validation of knowledge (or unsuccessful falsification) through hypothesis-testing, which discourse theory sees as problematic because claims of having uncovered a truth about the social world will itself take part in changing said world.

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22 An apropos should be made regarding the distinctions in this subsection. Discourse theory might also be seen as positivist in the sense that its ontology defines language – actual texts – as valid data, as has been stated by e.g. Foucault, but this does *not* mean that it accepts social reality as objectively 'verifiable' (Neumann 2001: 36).

I will add three more issues with neo-realism and neo-liberalism in international relations to the four derived from Smith's (1996) description of positivism. Firstly, they *reify* the nation-state as actor on the world arena, making this into a universal starting point for theorizing, disregarding the way the state is reproduced through practice and how it – like other concepts – have grown out of specific traditions and due to specific needs. One of the important strengths of discourse theory is that it offers a perspective from which to look critically at concepts that are often taken for granted, such as 'democracy', 'the national interest' or 'terrorism', seeing them as elements of discourses rather than independent variables. Secondly, neo-realism and neo-liberalism seek to establish clear causal relations in a way that disregards the mutually constitutive nature between e.g. identities and policies (Hansen 2006). Thirdly, they build on pre-given and self-interested agents that act (or should act) according to 'real interests', whether this is the individual or the abstract state, disregarding the way interests are conditioned on the way the social world and its identities are represented (Weldes 1996). Though efforts have been made in positivist international relations scholarship to more consistently integrate ideational factors (e.g. Goldstein & Keohane 1993), a problem persists when they stick to a division between 'ideas' and a given, non-discursive realm (for example of 'interests'), as well as by *reifying* 'ideas' and treating them as objects that can be converted to variables and put in traditional causal models (Laffey & Weldes 1997).

Criticisms have also been directed from positivist towards post-positivist schools (of which I consider discourse theory to be a part). A well-known example of this is Robert Keohane's seminal address in 1988 as President of the International Studies Association, where he distinguished between 'rationalistic' (e.g. his own neo-liberal institutionalism) and 'reflective' (post-positivist) schools. While he did affirm the importance of both and cast doubt on the "legitimacy of rationalism's intellectual hegemony", he criticized 'reflective' schools both for lacking a research program, and for lacking "theories of their own with *a prior*[*i*] *content*" (Keohane 1988: 392-393). While he has been rightly answered on the first point by representatives of such schools, advocating for staying away from 'pure theory' and striving to be able to account empirically for important social and political issues (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000; Hansen 2006), his second criticism attacks 'reflective' schools on an unfair front. Keohane subjects these schools to criteria they are intent on criticizing in the first place, asking for *a priori* principles in explaining a social world that is seen as contingent. His willingness to accept 'reflective' theory thus becomes a "back-handed faux tolerance",

communicating that "everyone can play if you play my game", and not an actual recognition of theoretical pluralism (Jackson 2012).[23]

A similar reflection of 'rationalistic' terms understood as *a priori* valid is seen in Kenneth Waltz' concession that theories cannot grasp reality in full, but should rather be judged on the basis of whether they are *useful*, which presents 'usefulness' in a seemingly neutral way that "allows only the criteria of 'explanatory and predictive power' […] to govern theory construction and reconstruction" (Connolly 1991: 51). Though discourse analysis does not look to test pre-made hypotheses in order to attain objective knowledge about the social world, this does not mean one cannot use it for constructing meaningful knowledge; there is much to be derived from how representations show a social world *as if* it were objectively given. Discourse analysis is suitable for answering my research questions because it allows for tracing how policies come to be rendered sensible and how this affects the identities of the actors involved. And because of its ontological emphasis on language, it offers a source (texts) from which to account for both stability and change. It can even account for a form of causality; not in the neo-positivist sense as "the systematic correlation between factors across cases" (Jackson 2006: 40), but in the sense that a set of factors (dominant representations) can together make certain outcomes almost unavoidable. As an example drawn from my data material, if the representation of 'terrorism' as a global phenomenon that affects everyone and needs to be dealt with resolutely is practically unchallenged, it can be regarded as related in such a modified causal sense to the enactment of policies of international cooperation.[24]

2.4.2 Discourse theory in relation to other schools

There are important affinities between discourse theory and early sociological theory, specifically when it comes to emphasizing the social construction of reality. For example, Durkheim's concept of the *conscience collective* – "beliefs and sentiments shared in common by the members of the society" (Giddens 1971: 75) – is similar to the concept of discourse in many respects. Discourse theory also owes a lot to the theories of Marx, especially through the neo-Marxism of Gramsci. However, discourse theory emphasizes the ontological importance of language to a larger extent than sociology in general, and it has a critical

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23 See http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/03/fear-of-relativism/

24 Note that such a form of 'adequate causality' does not say anything about whether or not an outcome would occur *without* such factors (Jackson 2006: 43).

attitude towards the essentialism that often follows with the use of concepts common in sociology (such as 'class'). While sociology generally wishes to say something about groups; the way they construct their subjects, how they interact with other groups, and so on, discourse analysis is more interested in the practices that constitute them *as* groups in the first place; "mov[ing] the centre of social and political research from 'ontically' given objects of investigation to their 'ontological' conditions of possibility" (Laclau 2000: xi).

Discourse theory also manifests important contrasts to some (so-called 'thin') constructivist accounts of international relations, though this is often less obvious than with neo-realism or neo-liberalism. While the constructed nature of the social world is emphasized by such accounts as well, they nonetheless often keep some factors entirely outside of discourse, making a clear ontological divide between ideas (as 'thought') and the material (as 'reality'). We see the manifestations of this in arguments such as that of Hinnebusch (2009: 150), who states that the high levels of conflict in the Middle East is not caused by identity by itself, but by "its *frustration* by imposed material structures"; in Marsh (2009: 694-695) asking for giving "independent causal powers to the material realm"; or in Alexander Wendt's treatment of states as unitary entities existing pre-discursively, erasing much of the distance to neo-realism/neo-liberalism (Weldes 1996: 280). Constructivists also often rely on 'shared values' in a way that, as described above, make them seem as inert faculties (Jackson 2006: 15).

A final distinction, which exemplifies that methods are not merely methods, is that between discourse analysis and *content* analysis, which have often been compared (Herrera & Braumoeller 2004). Though content analysis may also be empirically grounded in texts, it produces quantitative data and is more easily integrated into positivist accounts such as described above. From a discourse theoretical perspective, a problematic issue with content analysis is that it enters its field of study with pre-determined categories rather than letting them arise from the data, and has thus already contributed to reproducing the categories it wishes to study (Fierke 2003: 38). We see here a reason that refraining from the *a priori* content Keohane is asking for can be considered a strength of discourse analysis rather than a weakness, as it avoids gestures of essentialism and avoids having answers already built into the concepts that are being used (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 5).

2.4.3 Discourse theory and the concept of security

Much of international relations scholarship is concerned with questions of security: how threats are dealt with, what leads to given responses to threats, what structures are important for security, and so on. A discourse theoretical approach diverges from conventional approaches in security studies by emphasizing the process through which treats are defined as such in the first place. A central premise is that the portrayal of a threat by a political actor is not a reflection of its unproblematic existence in reality, but contingent on discursive positioning and the representations used (Hansen 2006: 25; Jackson 2006: 132). As Campbell (1998a: 2) importantly points out, the rejection of danger as an objective condition does not entail that no risks exist; they are out there, but not every risk is interpreted as dangerous; "events or factors that we identify as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness" (ibid.). This is a very important distinction due to the common misinterpretation that discourse theory and other 'post-positivist' perspectives contend that threats are only imaginary. For example, Neumann (2013: 487) criticizes constructivist accounts by stating that "from this contorted perspective, Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein are merely products of Western paranoia, while Western approaches […] constitute a new form of global domination". This is a far cry from the actual contentions here: [1] There is no unproblematic and *a priori* given link between a set of material factors and the identification of a threat; and [2] by defining something as a threat, the sensible response to it is to a large extent defined as well, especially when the threat is articulated to a clearly defined identity (Jackson 2006: 132).[25]

The criticism from 'rationalistic' accounts of international relations is relevant here, because it is often pointed out that 'reflective' schools put little emphasis on material factors, especially when it comes to questions of security, where they need to be prioritized over ideational factors (see Hansen 2006: 33). Again we are dealing with a problematic thought/reality distinction. While it is of course true that a bullet to the head inflicts damage whether or not the receiver constructs it as 'dangerous', this is merely an isolated incident and quite uninteresting as a site of scientific inquiry. Something can hurt the physical body without being identified as a *threat* as such. It is for example quite unlikely for actors in the U.N. Security Council to refer to the 'shared threat of cigarette smoking', though smoking is

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25 Weldes (1996) example of the 'Cuban missile crisis' is illustrative of this point: At the time of these events it may have seemed evident that the deployment of missiles by the Soviet Union needed a swift and clear response, but such conclusions followed almost passively through how the situation and its actors were dominantly represented (for example, that the whole event was a 'crisis'; that the Soviet Union was 'aggressive' and 'secretive'). This was possible even though the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, noted in the National Security Council that he thought the missiles had *no* significance for the strategic balance (ibid.: 294).

associated with very high amounts of deaths. Purportedly objective material factors need to be given *meaning* ('is a powerful United States a guarantor of peace or a threat the world?'), and it is this attribution of meaning that cannot be isolated from discursive positioning.

As Wæver (1998: 50) has shown, the way the concept of 'security' is generally invoked in discussions of the political is not even in its 'everyday' meaning, as that of the physical body, but as part of a "specific *field of practice* […] where states threaten each other, challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so on"; it is the *ontological* security of the nation-state that is generally represented as threatened. This is a very important point for this thesis, considering that part of the definition of 'terrorism' in Turkey is "damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation" and "jeopardizing the existence of the Turkish State and the Republic" (Legislationline 2013). When an issue is 'securitized' – moved into the realm of security politics – this is a potent political practice that claims legitimacy for dealing with the issue through exceptional measures (Wæver 1998: 51-54). Securitization also entails that actors cannot tone down the issue without incurring political costs, unless the issue is removed from the realm of security and into 'normal' politics again (desecuritization: Hansen 2011; Wæver 1998). If something is defined as e.g. a 'critical security threat' and articulated to specific groups – such as the PKK – it will have important consequences for both the group's legitimacy and for the approaches towards it. These perspectives give an important background for conceptualizing 'terrorism' and 'terrorist', to which I now turn.

2.5 A critical view on 'terrorism'

After the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the topic of 'terrorism' gained increased attention in scholarly circles, a tendency strengthened by later attacks in (e.g.) Bali, Madrid and London. Many national governments allotted huge resources to research institutes, 'think tanks' and universities focusing on the study of 'terrorism', with an increasing demand for 'terrorism specialists' (Weinberg & Eubank 2008: 185). Though several attempts of understanding 'terrorism' as phenomenon have offered important insights and given due attention to questions pertaining to its definition, such as analyses of underlying ('root') causes (see Bjørgo 2005), few studies on 'terrorism' have been grounded in a discourse theoretical approach. Conventional approaches generally treat 'terrorism' or even 'terrorist' as independent variables that can be put into analyses of correlation or

causality without incurring problems (see Neumann 2013), purporting to know the 'beliefs' or 'mindset' of the 'terrorist' Other (see Hoffmann 2002), or an understanding of the 'terrorist' as a basis for arguing for specific policies (see Van Evera 2007).

I do not focus further here on conventional studies of 'terrorism' as phenomenon, simply because my focus is different altogether: I agree with Barrinha (2010: 168) in that the most relevant is "the *discourse* of terrorism, rather than the contested phenomenon itself". An important reason that critical approaches to 'terrorism' are needed is to shed light on hegemonic renderings of it – and of its corollary 'terrorist' identity. Discourse theory offers a vantage point for such a perspective, seeing a given reality of 'terrorism' not as essential and pre-defined, but discursively dependent and changing across time. After all, at the time of the French Revolution, Maximilien Robespierre (1794) referred to the use of 'terror' (*la terreur*) as "nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible", which is presumably a quite uncommon way of conceptualizing it today. As far back as 1100 BCE, the Assyrians used the word *melammu* to express purposeful terror, viewed as a necessary political tool (Fine 2010: 272). The goal of the discourse analyst is therefore to study how a given image of reality is fixed by the invocation of 'terrorism'/'terrorist', including the measures represented as necessary or even unavoidable in order to deal with it. It achieves this by departing from texts and looking for the way rhetorical commonplaces are articulated to or differentiated from both 'terrorism'/'terrorist' and the Self, as well as for interpellations of groups or individuals into the 'terrorist' identity.

The definition of 'terrorism' has been the subject of some controversy. In a 1984 study that asked a series of 'terrorism experts' about the concept, Schmid and Jungman (2005) discovered 109 different definitions of 'terrorism', with highly varying elements. However, they still argued that the "search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on" (2005: 1), offering a definition of their own – which the United Nations somewhat presumptuously refers to as an "academic consensus definition" (UN 2013).[26] In politics there is a low degree

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26 For reference, since the length of the definition demonstrates the ambiguity of the concept: "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought".

of uniformity in how the concept is defined, which is illustrated by the U.S. State Department, the FBI, the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security all employing different definitions (Staun 2010: 404). From a discourse theoretical perspective this lack of a common, consistent definition is not seen as a token of incompetence or the lack of trying hard enough, but as a quite natural consequence of its nature as a rhetorical commonplace.

This does not mean that the concept is a chimera and that discussing it is pointless and without effects. The lack of a common understanding of what 'terrorism' means does not even have to be a hindrance for extensive discussions, as it is not actually the beliefs of individual people that are relevant here, but the shared resources of language being employed. This can be illustrated by Wittgenstein's 'language-game' (quoted in Jackson 2006: 24):

> Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at *his* beetle. […] But suppose the word 'beetle' has a use in these people's language? – If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a *something*: for the box might even be empty.

Whether or not one agrees with Wittgenstein's contention that whatever is in the box has no place *at all* in the language-game, what we at least need to acknowledge is that every person carrying a 'box' has to refer to a common pool of resources in order to describe whatever their 'beetle' is, and that there is no direct link between these resources (the signifier 'beetle', as well as its related signifiers) and whatever is in the box (the signified), which will vary across actors. Actors can *talk* about terrorism – in ways that have important consequences – without knowing what is in the 'box' of the other actors. While this is of course important for these actors making sense of the world, it can also have severe consequences for the constitution of conflicts. What should be done with 'terrorism', then, is what Jackson (2006: 11) suggest for the concept of 'civilization': "[W]e might simultaneously affirm [it] as a category of political and social *practice* while denying it a role in our *theoretical apparatus*".

The concept of 'terrorist' as *identity* deserves separate attention here, as it turns people into activities, "as though what such people do or are likely to do makes sense, has been 'explained' causally, by the kind of person they are" (Becker 1998: 44). The interpellation of someone into the terrorist subject position has severe consequences and is fundamentally a power-gesture. Barrinha (2010: 167) refers to the label as a "powerful contextualised political

choice", where this power follows from the already discussed consequences of invoking the 'security' thematic. A relational understanding of identity also allows for seeing how representations of the 'terrorist' Other relate to the Self. Representing the Other as the illegitimate 'terrorist' will simultaneously affect Self-identity – not in a strictly manipulative sense, but as the basic mechanism through which self-identities are inscribed in processes of social construction (Mouffe 1993). Two important points follow from this. Firstly, one cannot talk about 'counter-terrorism' without simultaneously talking about 'terrorism'. Secondly, and most importantly because its workings are more insidious, one cannot talk about 'terrorism' without affecting the legitimacy of 'counter-terrorism'. Forgetting this point makes it harder to challenge the self-evidence in statements such as "the [Turkish] government was forced to develop new military and legal methods to fight it, while remaining determined not to negotiate with or make concessions to the terrorists" (Alexander 2008: 75).

To sum up, what this chapter has emphasized is that social truths – including identities – are contingent and constructed, and that discourses distribute such truths (in the form of representations) in ways that constrain what can meaningfully be argued politically and produce the subjects acting within them. The concepts of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' must therefore be understood as standing in a mutually constitutive relation with Self-identity, and the representations they take part in must be seen as manifestations of power. Such representations also build on deployments throughout history – rhetorical commonplaces moving between actors and across countries. Identifying the direction of such movements will allow for seeing who is winning what Gramsci referred to as "the struggle to define the categories of common sense" (quoted in Weldes 1997: 280). This is one of the main concerns of the following chapter. Its first part focuses on the historical deployment of 'civilization' by European actors in interaction with the non-European Other, including the Ottoman Empire – and later Turkey. This is important for contextualizing the rhetorical commonplaces used by the Turkish actors in my analyses, and for seeing how they contribute to the negotiation of Turkish 'difference'.

3.

Situating Turkey: A Conceptual and Historical Background

The goal of chapter 3 is to give a background for the representations in the Turkish actors' discussions of 'terrorism' that are analyzed in chapters 4 and 5. The first part of the chapter provides a *conceptual* background, emphasizing primarily the rhetorical commonplace 'civilization' and its employment in European and later 'Western' discourses of Otherness. In line with Campbell (1998a: 30), I hold as a premise that "previously established discursive strategies of otherness [can] be invoked in novel circumstances to provide powerful modes of understanding". This background is important in order to see how Turkey – and the Ottoman Empire it emerged out of – have historically been represented as 'outside' of collective identities that the Turkish actors are representing Turkey as 'inside' in my analyses. This part is thus most important for the *last* part of my specified research question: the representation of the Turkish Self and its 'difference' vis-à-vis 'Europe' and 'the West'. The second part of the chapter gives a *historical* background on the Turkish Republic and the position of the Kurdish minority within it, stressing the destabilizing effect of Kurdish nationalism on the Turkish nation-building discourse. This is important for situating the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its position as 'terrorist' in Turkish discourse, and thus for the *first* part of the specified research question: How the representations of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' made internationally by Turkish politicians, diplomats and military officers involve the conflict with the PKK.

There are five main insights to be drawn from this chapter:

[1] The concept of 'civilization' has played an important part in European, and later 'Western' designations of the inferior Other. Eventually this was manifested in law through a 'standard of civilization' that was employed against the Ottoman Empire (amongst others).

[2] While 'civilizational' discourse was initially grounded in a Christian common identity, it survived the gradual demise of the church as a source of unity in Europe and the emerging Enlightenment imaginary, being instead tied to a specific (secular) way of organizing society in the form of the developing nation-state.

[3] With the emergence of 'Western civilization' in the nineteenth century, encompassing the United States and Western Europe, the progressivist idea of general 'civilization' was challenged by an essentialist understanding of cultures; an essentialism reproduced by the contemporary 'clash of civilizations' thesis and narrowing the opportunity for the Turkish Other of moving towards both 'Europe' and 'the West'.

[4] Following the decline of the Ottoman Empire, and building on reform processes of its latter periods, the founding leaders of the Turkish Republic established a modern nation state oriented towards 'the West' and clearly distanced from its temporal Ottoman past. The Turkish nationalist myth that replaced the Ottoman order strongly emphasized state unity.

[5] Calls for Kurdish national recognition destabilized this nationalist discourse, and crackdowns on rioting Kurds and purging of traces of Kurdish nationhood should be understood accordingly. These dynamics are manifested in the official definition of 'terrorism' in Turkey today, where undermining state unity qualifies as a 'terrorist' offence.

My perspective in the first part of the chapter is Eurocentric – for a reason: The dominant political language of today builds on concepts that have a European history, either through concepts native to other languages having 'absorbed' meaning through interpretations of European concepts, or through actual loan words from European languages (Wigen 2013: 26). The historical experience of Europe has been *interwoven* with the political language being used, so to speak. The fact that the Ottoman Empire – from which contemporary Turkey emerged – "increasingly had to legitimise [its] claims to rule by use of foreign vocabularies" (ibid.: 4) makes being attentive to the rhetorical commonplaces employed by Turkish actors in a discourse on 'terrorism' even more important. Keeping this in mind can also help avoid naturalizations that "sanitise the post-1649 era of its imperialism and the very Eurocentric metanarratives upon which this has been founded" (de Carvalho et al. 2011: 756).

3.1 'Civilization' and the Other

The rhetorical commonplace of 'civilization', in either a singular or plural form, is prominent in the Turkish actors' representations of the Self that is threatened by 'terrorism', especially among the politicians and diplomats analyzed in chapter 4. The main reason this is important here, is the experience of both the Ottoman Empire and Turkey with being represented on the historical side of the 'non-civilized' Other in confrontation with European powers. In order to better grasp the intertextual relevance of 'civilization' and how it is relevant to the negotiation

of 'difference', I will discuss its historical deployment in the following sections, beginning with the first experiences of Christian Europe with a true external Other.

In the late-15th and 16th centuries, when the European discoverers encountered the indigenous population of the Americas, these did not fit into what was then an all-encompassing Christian framework of world-explanation. Islam had long since shown its presence, but it was incorporated into a Christian narrative rather than recognized as an alternative culture with a separate direction (Jackson 2006: 81). The indigenous were accommodated into this framework through two main forms of Otherness. The first distinguished between the 'civilized' and superior Self on the one hand, and the 'uncivilized' Other who could be legitimately enslaved on the other. The second distinguished between 'believer' and 'nonbeliever', but invoking the *overarching* identity of 'humanity' made possible the move from Other to Self, in contrast with the essential, inferior Otherness of the first account, and there were thus no grounds for legitimate slavery. These representations were made by Ginés de J. Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de Las Casas respectively at a famous 1550 debate in Valladolid, Spain. Though there were obvious and important differences in the Othering of their accounts, none of them included the recognition of *equal value*; the alternative to the Christian was either temporal backwardness or an intrinsic and permanent lack of 'civilization' (Jackson 2006: 81-83; Campbell 1998a 100-101; Knutsen 1997: 66-67).[27]

The Europe from which these discoverers departed did not collectively identify with any *idea* of 'Europe'; it was foremost Christianity that provided the grounds for unity. But with the gradual decline of the church in providing a node for collective identity, the idea of 'civilization' did not disappear. It was adapted to the emerging Enlightenment imaginary that was grounded in rational man and the secular legitimization of political power – "the Enlightenment project of self-foundation" (Mouffe 1993: 12) – and eventually in the nation-state. According to Blumenberg (quoted in Campbell 1998a: 46), when the "metaphysical guarantees for the world" offered by the church were weakened, in its place was developed a "counterworld of elementary rationality and manipulability", and the state became "an emerging substitute for divine providence" (Campbell 1998a: 47). This was no sudden about-

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27 The Spanish were by no means alone in these forms of Othering. For example, the Scottish philosopher David Hume employed the idea of the civilized – in the form of Sepúlveda – in describing the 'negroes' in African colonies: "I am apt to suspect that Negroes and in general all the other species of men […] to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation" (quoted in Campbell 1998: 117).

face, however; these were gradual responses to social conditions of their time, of which the devastating Religious Wars in the 16th and 17th centuries must be considered highly central (Toulmin 1990).[28] These developments were important to the continued employment of 'civilization' in the interaction with the non-European Other, and it built on a similar dynamic as for Christian Europe: While the discoverers' use of 'civilization' in describing formerly unknown populations reflected the opposition between a *temporal* Other ('savage' and non-Christian) and a 'progressed' Christian Self, Enlightenment Europe with its "secularized evangelism depending rather more on reason than on God" (Jackson 2006: 84) was again further progressed than its Christian past. It was primarily this latter development that undergirded the 'standard of civilization' that eventually became formalized in international law, and with which the Ottoman Empire interacted as 'less-than-civilized' Other.

3.1.1 The 'standard of civilization'

From the late-19th century into the 20th, related to the emergence of the United States and Japan as non-European great powers that gained 'international status', an explicit 'standard of civilization' was developed and manifested in international law (Gong 1984). The legal standard laid the fundamentals to which the Other would need to aspire in order to be accepted as a fully-fledged member of 'the international society'. Until the standard was fulfilled, countries were outside "the law's pale and protection" (Gong 1984: 6), considered *terra nullius* as lands with no state, and were thus "a free-for-all for colonial expansion" (Wigen 2013: 20). Gradually, countries stripped away their own standards in order to accept the one proclaimed by Europe – and later, by the 'West' – as of universal validity. Bilgin (2009: 115) describes the dynamic well:

> [I]n an unequal setting where the hierarchical binaries of western/eastern or civilized/less-than-civilized were defined by the powerful, feigning similarity, seemingly becoming and being modern, civilized, western often emerged as a primal form of response. The non-western often resorted to feigning similarity, because it was on the basis of hierarchical classification of nations (civilized vs. less-than-civilized) that colonialism had been justified for years.

In this way it helped to legitimize the continuation of colonial rule in other than merely military terms (Gong 1984: 42), which was portrayed "as an essentially benevolent effort to spread the blessings of civilization to all" (Jackson 2006: 84).

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28 The oft-repeated narrative within international relations that the nation-state appeared more or less with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia must thus be countered (Carvalho et al. 2011).

The standard was related to the developments in Europe described above. According to Gong (1984: 36), "many of the intellectual and institutional elements of what later became the standard of 'civilization' were natural outgrowths of the European states-system". When 'civilization' as a specific mode of differentiation became less important in the 20th century, the state kept this position; the 'ontology of difference' eventually became grounded in the "superior capacity of Western states to govern and the proper form of the Western liberal state" (Jones 2013: 61; 65).

3.1.2 'Civilization' and 'difference': The Ottoman Empire and Turkey

Although the Ottoman Empire was never subjected to colonial rule proper, it was nonetheless portrayed as outside of the identity from which the explicit 'standard of civilization' emanated. The Empire was gradually introduced to the European international system between the 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz and the 1856 Treaty of Paris, but this was only as a provisional member of 'international society', and not as a fully 'civilized' legal personality. Even at the Second Hague Conference in 1907 full 'civilization' was not attained, and the Empire was identified as a 'second-class power' (Gong 1984: 107-115). As late as the end of the 19th century, Turks were at times portrayed as the lowest possible category of the races of mankind, with "no lower category […] possible in the science of jurisprudence" (ibid.: 49).

A way of noting the impetus of 'civilization', and the standard to which it was tied, to the Ottoman Empire is that only one or two decades after the rhetorical commonplace was deployed in English and French writings on the Empire, the concept *'sivilisazyon'* appeared in Arabic and was given its first explanation. Establishing this concept "as an integral part of Ottoman political vocabulary was also an aspect of 'entering' international society […] increasingly [using] the established standards of legitimizing policies on the international arena" (Wigen 2013: 21-25). The continued relevance of the standard (and the persistence of 'difference') is also suggested by the so-called *capitulations*, various benefits that were originally offered by the Empire to European foreign nationals as far back as 1536, but which became detrimental to the Empire and important to its gradual decline relative to European powers (Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 50; 116).[29] The capitulations persisted partly because they became tied to the 'standard of civilization'; the standard defining conditions under which

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29 Gong (1984: 107) even traces the capitulations all the way back to 1193

nationals from 'civilized' countries should be treated when in 'non-civilized' countries (Gong 1984: 115). A last way to observe the importance of 'civilization' and the explicit standard is by the reforms undertaken during the 'Tanzimat era' of the Ottoman Empire between 1839 and 1878, led by "Europeanized Ottoman bureaucrats" with a "commitment to remake the governing institutions of the Ottoman Empire in the image of Europe" (Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 82). Though it was importantly not a linear process as is often portrayed, the Ottoman Empire adopted West European goods, institutions and ideas partially or wholly – according to Kancı (2009: 361) in the attempt of preserving the state of the Empire. When the Empire was undergoing reforms in direction of 'European standards', this was accompanied by European insistence that "they were helping the Empire to 'civilize' itself" (Gong 1984: 112).

Similar reforms – though more extensive – followed the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. With the expressed motivation of distancing Turkey from its temporal Ottoman past and of orienting it towards 'the West', the one-party government of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk; 'father of the Turks') brought forward swift societal reforms: transferring the capital from Istanbul to Ankara; abolishing the Caliphate that had lasted for centuries, closing religious schools and lessening the societal role of religion by subjecting it to governmental authority; [30] adopting civil and penal codes inspired by European countries; adopting the Latin alphabet and translating the *Quran* into the written Turkish language – amongst several others (Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 179ff). The Turkish Republic had inherited some of the concerns for its 'difference' from the Ottoman Empire due to its position as successor. Although Turkish 'sovereignty' had been recognized in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, there were concerns about how stable this recognition was (Bilgin 2009: 113-117).

Though the 'capitulations' were finally abolished in 1923, which was as a significant step towards 'civilized' status, the continued representation of Turkey as 'different' even today suggests an unfinished move into 'international society', if understood as a collective cultural identity, such as the idea of 'Europe'. According to Rumelili (2007: 18), there is a "continued prevalence of discourses which construct Turkey as inherently different from Europe", a type of construction that has "formed [the] very basis" of interaction between the European Union and Turkey (ibid.: 83). According to Bilgin (2009: 122), the tendencies of negotiating

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30 Here the principle of *laicism* is more precise than conventionally understood secularism. Laicism built on a French model of secularism (Bilgin 2008; Onar 2007) and put religion more under state control than separating it from the state – the Directorate of Religious Affairs serving this purpose (Onar 2007: 275).

'difference' like described above "remain essential to understanding Turkey's present-day international relations". 'Civilization' has been used in the discursive representation of Turkish Otherness as late as 2000, when former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt used "unsuitable civilization" as an argument for excluding Turkey from the European Union (Hurd 2010: 189; Rumelili 2007: 98). Its 'difference' has even been articulated specifically to 'terrorism', as when Independence and Democracy (IND-DEM) parliamentarian in the European Parliament, Boguslaw Rogalski, made the argument that Turkey "could become a gateway for terrorism", because it "is part of a world that is alien to us in terms of its culture and traditions" (quoted in Rumelili 2007: 98).

For this thesis, the most important point to draw from this is that the Turkish actors' representations of the threat of 'terrorism' must be understood in the perspective of negotiating Self-identity, especially when the rhetorical commonplace of 'civilization' is being used. Representing Turkey as part of a 'civilizational' identity with (West) European origins can thus be a way of diminishing the 'difference' discussed above. This becomes more difficult, however, with an increasingly prominent understanding of essential 'civilizations' (instead of just one 'civilized'/'non-civilized' dichotomy). Struggles with such essentialism are apparent in the speeches of the Turkish politicians and diplomats, especially after the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In the following subsection I cover the development of the idea of 'Western civilization', which fundamentally challenged the progressivist idea of general 'civilization' (Jackson 2006: 72ff).

3.1.3 'Western civilization'

The rhetorical commonplace 'Western civilization' became increasingly prominent in Europe and subsequently the United States from the late-19th century onwards. The commonplace had roots in a Hegelian notion of multiple worlds moving towards their separate destinies, as well as in German scholars' renewed use of *Abenland* to denote a Christian community with essential characteristics. But 'Western civilization' became truly manifested in practice through the interaction between Europe and Russia, where the conception of the latter as essentially different included in parallel the construction of a 'Western' identity. Its dissemination was dependent especially on the interaction between Germany and the United States. German scholars interpellated Western Europe and the United States into a 'Western' identity with which these scholars themselves did not identify. This was picked up on and

brought forward in the United States, where it radically altered the American educational system in order to make young Americans realize their part in a 'civilizational' community of 'the West' – what we can refer to as the *Grand Narrative*. These dynamics were important for the framing and the development of the First World War, with Germany as the 'barbaric' Other against which the United States safeguarded 'Western civilization' and human liberty (Jackson 2006: 87-104).

'Western civilization' is first and foremost important here because of its essentialism: the identification of some 'civilizations' as fundamentally different from others. This essentialism made it so that "industrial capitalism, democracy, and freedom were seen as fundamentally *Western* notions, instead of being seen as universal values that happened to have manifested themselves in Europe" (Jackson 2006: 95), and it thus ended the dominance of an idea that *all* societies would in the end converge on the 'universal' values that originated in Western Europe. The weakening of a notion of universal accessibility could be expected to pose increased differences for countries formerly standing outside of 'civilization' in moving from Other to Self; especially relevant for Turkey due to its almost exclusively Muslim population. This is not to suggest the impossibility of representing Turkey as part of a specifically 'Western civilization'; the plasticity of the identity is illustrated by the fact that Germany – the Other *par excellence* in the period of World War I – became integrated into this identity after World War II (Jackson 2006), and is of course today highly central to common conceptions of the 'Western'. However, it is most likely easier to negotiate 'difference' on the basis of a singular conception of 'civilization', as it is discursively more open to conversion of identity. My analysis in the next chapter especially will demonstrate this difficulty and how it is dealt with through the invocation of 'humanity' as node for common identity. Before getting that far, however, I will give a historical background on the position of the Kurdish minority within Turkey and the interaction between Kurdish and Turkish nationalism.

3.2 Kemalism, Kurdish nationalism and 'terrorism': a historical background

After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which ended the Turkish War of Independence, the founding leaders of Turkey would succeed in a rapid but comprehensive project of constructing a modern nation-state on the Anatolian remnants of the earlier Ottoman Empire, including a construction of national identity that had taken European countries several hundred years (Wigen 2011: 46). The reforms undertaken under the lead of

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk were embedded in the construction of a new national identity; what Çelik (2000: 194-195) refers to as a new 'myth' taking over after the collapse of the Ottoman hegemonic political order, reconstituting the grounds for social coherence. National unity and territorial integrity was represented as of the absolute essence, safeguarded by the protectors of the Kemalist revolution. By relating this to the developments described in section 3.1, we see how the European discourse on governing standards was embedded in the nationalist discourse of the Turkish Republic and its emphasis on the unitary nation-state structure. This transformation did not happen out of the blue, of course; it would make little sense for the political actors to suddenly make an about-face and reformulate the whole basis for collective identity. As touched briefly upon, the developments built on currents in the late Ottoman Empire, especially the ideology of Ziya Gökalp, who emphasized national belonging through practice and not merely essentially inherited characteristics (Wigen 2011: 40-42).

Though the population of the Turkish state was religiously homogeneous, it was *ethnically* heterogeneous – a characteristic revealed by the Turkish maxim "In Turkey there are 72 and a half nations" (Gunter 1994: 1). This diversity was dealt with through a strict discipline emphasizing culturally homogeneous *practice*, tied specifically to the use of the Turkish language. As long as people accepted such loyalty through practice they were effectively Turks. Here we see reflected Gökalps principles of nationalism described above. 'Turkishness' was also conditioned on Muslim heritage, however; religion was a central social marker in Turkey, with official documents having no such category as 'non-believer' or 'atheist' As Kurds were Muslims they were therefore not recognized as a minority by the Turkish state, but rather included into the state-building project through the above-mentioned disciplinary pressure (Wigen 2011: 37-43).

From the perspective this Kemalist nationalist discourse, expressed Kurdish nationhood and demands for recognition of rights and a separate language understandably had a destabilizing effect, and it was countered accordingly. A series of Kurdish (and Islamic) uprisings in 1925 – the biggest of them the *Sheikh Said* rebellion – led a series of leaders being hanged, and "[h]undreds of villages were destroyed and hundreds of thousands of Kurds deported" (Pope & Pope 2011: 246). Those Kurds failing to adopt to the nation-building principles laid down

by Kemalism were excluded from the state's national life (Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 530).[31] The disciplining of the Kurdish minority led to a purging of traces of Kurdish nationhood in Turkey. In 1924, tied in with the reform process outlined above, Atatürk banned "all Kurdish schools, publications and associations" (Pope & Pope 2011: 245), with the Kurdish language being forbidden in public life and 'Kurdistan' eventually being removed from textbooks. Later, boarding schools were established where Kurdish children were put in order to support their 'Turkish identity' (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 2-3; Marcus 2007: 26-27). These were effective ventures as Kurdish nationalism for a long time became marginalized in Turkey. According to Pope and Pope (2011: 247), the five decades following 1930 "are covered in a blanket of silence"; foreigners not even allowed to the Kurdish-dominated South-East until 1964. When Kurdish nationalism was revived in the 1960s the developments of what later became the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) began – the quintessential 'terrorist group' in Turkey today.

The renaissance of Kurdish nationalism was tied in with the growing dominance of socialism in Turkey; for example, the socialist Turkish Workers' Party (TIP), established in 1971, had a growing Kurdish contingent; channeling "their energies into the exciting ferment of the Turkish left" (Pope & Pope 2011: 248). The followers of Abdullah Öcalan that formally established the Kurdistan Workers' Party in 1978 were rooted in a similar discourse. However, the military intervention in 1980, the second in less than ten years, ushered in a new wave of mass arrests that included many Kurds, and to the drawing of a new constitution in 1982 where "[t]he perceived need to control, to avoid the disorder of the 1970s, shone through almost every article"; severely restricting freedoms (Pope & Pope 2011: 145). Again nationalist agitation was effectively stifled. But after the return to civilian rule in 1984 disorder re-blossomed, and the PKK initiated its insurgency, which has since seen the deaths of between 30,000 and 40,000 people (Eccarius-Kelly 2011), as well as involving "the destruction of more than 2,000 Kurdish villages" and "the uprooting of at least 300,000 people" (Pope & Pope 2011: 255). Before a new cease-fire was declared by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in March 2013, it had reached its highest levels of violence since the capture of Öcalan in 1999 (ICG 2012), who is still imprisoned on İmralı island in the Marmara Sea.

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31 Such reactions have to be understood also in light of Ottoman experiences with nationalist agitation, which eventually resulted in significant territorial separations from the Empire and, according to Gunter (1994: 1), to its "gradual disintegration". Such nationalist agitation was often supported by European powers (Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 75).

The 'terrorist' label as it is used in Turkey to describe the PKK has therefore been associated with many acts of violence deserving of strict criticism, including attacks in densely populated areas that have taken many civilian lives. But this is not the only way the concept has been invoked. Through the formalization of 'terrorism' as a crime in the 1991 Law to Fight Terrorism (Act no. 3713) – interestingly in the same year that President Turgut Özal had explicitly recognized the existence of the Kurdish minority (Gunter 1994: 12-13) – the fight for Kurdish cultural rights were effectively defined as 'terrorist' acts. Article 1 in the latest version of this law (2010) is still quite clear, defining 'terrorism' as (e.g.) "changing the attributes of the Republic as specified in the Constitution" or "damaging the indivisible unity of the state" (Legislationline 2013). We thus see that 'terrorism' has consistently been used also to designate acts that have entailed discursive rather than physical violence.

This has affected political activity without apparent links to physical violence as well. In 1991, when attention was drawn to two members of parliament having underlined their Kurdish allegiance as they were sworn in, they were called 'terrorist' in newspapers (Gunter 1994: 8). Several Kurdish nationalist parties have also been closed down due to perceived links to the PKK, the first being the People's Labour Party (HEP) in 1990:

> The first attempt to set up a legal representation for Kurdish nationalist sentiment in Turkey was to meet with serial party closures and bewildering changes of acronym […] More than 100 party activists were to be murdered, their most famous leaders were gaoled and most of the rest were to choose voluntary exile (Pope & Pope 2011: 260).

In December 2009, the Democratic Society Party (DTP) was banned for such an alleged link to the PKK, and since then, there have been thousands of arrests of activists from the currently legal Kurdish party BDP (ICG 2012: 2). Though the AKP has made several steps towards political reconciliation with the Kurdish minority, there have also been moves in the other direction. The year 2005 saw the new Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code introduced, making insulting 'Turkishness' into a crime (Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 533). In 2006 a new 'anti-terror' law was enacted which widened the definition of 'terrorism' in a way that NGOs described as severely endangering freedom of expression (Onar 2007: 285).[32]

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32 A last side to this is that the PKK insurgency, devastating though it has been, has not been a one-way violent affair. Both the security forces, paramilitaries and the so-called 'village guard' system, consisting of Kurds loyal to the Turkish government fighting the PKK, have committed high degrees of violence,which has also included assassinations, torture and village demolition (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 10; Human Rights Watch 2003)

From all of these aspects to the concept of 'terrorism' in Turkey and the way it has been associated with Kurdish nationalism, it should be clear why an inquiry is warranted into how a regionally restricted violent conflict such as that with the PKK is articulated to a discourse on 'terrorism' as an international problem. By emphasizing the role of 'civilization', the first sections of this chapter have equally shown that there are reasons to look for the negotiation of Self-identity through the way the threat of 'terrorism' is represented. This is what the next two chapters seek to provide.

4.

Talking 'Terrorism' at the United Nations, 2001-2012

Having described my theoretical approach, and having given a conceptual and historical background for the Turkish actors' representations of 'terrorism' and the common Self, the two following chapters will analyze specific texts. Here I am interested in identifying how rhetorical commonplaces come together to represent the phenomenon of 'terrorism' and the identity of the 'terrorist', and through this the Self that is being threatened. Both chapters begin by discussing representations of the Other, followed by the Self. This division is reflected in my specified research question: *How do the representations of 'terrorism'/'terrorist' made internationally by Turkish politicians, diplomats and military officers involve the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and how does this enable the negotiation of Turkish 'difference' vis-à-vis 'Europe' and 'the West'?*

Chapter 4 analyzes speeches by Turkish politicians and diplomats at the United Nations from 2001 to 2012, which I refer to as part of a U.N. discourse on 'terrorism'. Though such a discourse can of course not be mapped out on the basis of one country alone, it is more theoretically consistent to regard it as such than as a Turkish discourse on 'terrorism'. I expect the Turkish actors' representations to be constrained by international traditions and tendencies of a forum where 'terrorism' is discussed extensively and has a long history. This does not remove the role of *agency*: By combining rhetorical commonplaces in new ways, or by challenging dominant articulations (breaking), actors take part in changing discourses. Through identity-politics strategies (Rumelili 1997: 15) they can potentially change the way their identities are constructed by others. It is thus in the interaction between agent and structure we learn the most about the representation of Turkish identity in through 'terrorism', as well as of how the conflict with the PKK is being related to representations of 'terrorism' as international problem.[33]

The speeches are taken both from the General Assembly and the Security Council. I have not made any *a priori* distinctions between these, nor have I encountered any conspicuous

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33 Note that this agent-structure divide is analytical: Discourse theory does not see these as ontologically separate; both are implicated in every form of social situation and do therefore not occur at different points in time (Jackson 2006: 34)

patterns of difference across the two in my analysis. As mentioned in chapter 1, 2001 is chosen as a starting point because of the September 11 attacks in the United States. My main emphasis is on speeches that specifically enunciate the nodal points of 'terrorism' or 'terrorist', but I have also included and analyzed speeches where the actors extensively discuss Turkey's position as part of a common Self, as this gives important insight into the negotiation of Turkish 'difference', tying the speeches in with the developments described in the previous chapter. As far as actors are concerned, I focus on Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Presidents and Prime Ministers on the political side, and Ambassadors and Deputy Ambassadors to the United Nations on the diplomatic side. As different actors hold these positions throughout, a significant selection of different persons' speeches are analyzed. The three politicians from the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, are especially important as they are the strongest carriers of changes to the representations of Self-identity.

Section 4.1 covers the representation of 'terrorism' as a homogeneous and 'global' phenomenon, discussing how this representation enables the argument that states need to fighting unequivocally in concert. Section 4.2 relates this representation to the actors' references to Turkey's own 'sufferings' from 'terrorism' and criticism towards the collective Self for using 'double standards'. Section 4.3 describes the constitution of the 'terrorist' *identity* both directly and through representations of 'terrorism', showing how it is constructed as fundamentally illegitimate. Section 4.4 discusses the intertextuality of the representations of 'terrorism'/'terrorist' as Other in the Turkish speeches. The final section, 4.5, then moves to the representations of the common Self by the Turkish actors, emphasizing the roles of the rhetorical commonplaces 'civilization' and 'humanity'/'humankind', as well as discussions of the role of religion. It ends by discussing the increasing prominence of representations of liberalist discourse along with the other developments to Self-identity.

Because the representations of 'terrorism'/'terrorist' as Other are generally similar between the politicians/diplomats and the military officers, I mostly discuss the consequences of these representations together, in chapter 6. As for Self-identity, where there are clearer differences between the two sets of texts, I make more running discussions throughout the analyses.

4.1 Terrorism as a homogeneous and 'global' threat

From start to end of the period of analysis, one representation is practically unequivocal in the speeches in the United Nations. 'Terrorism' is represented, both by Turkish politicians and diplomats, as one homogeneous phenomenon that can be abstracted and subsumed by one concept. Although the actors sometimes refer to practical differences across time and space, events of 'terrorism' are still represented as manifestations of the same phenomenon. No attempts are made at differentiating between degrees or forms of 'terrorism' (this is explicitly rejected at several points), nor are specific groups mentioned by the actors. This representation of homogeneity is present at both ends of the period of analysis (e.g. Pamir 2001: 9; Apakan 2012b: 23). To give a few telling example, Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem (2001: 8) describes 'terrorism' as "humankind's number one enemy", arguing that "[t]he same terrorism manifests itself in different countries all over the world, both in the West and in the East", while Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu (2010: 3) refers to "the constantly evolving threat of terrorism", internationally, regionally and nationally. Deputy U.N. Ambassador Altay Cengizer (2003: 24) shows the perspective that differences in manifestation are merely cosmetic, by stating that "regardless of the many shapes that it cleverly assumes, terrorism in our time has indeed become a burning global issue". The year before (2002b: 5) he states that "[d]efinitional problems might conceal important philosophical differences, but the result of terrorism will be the same for everyone".

Not only is this the most consistent representation; the abstract and undifferentiated phenomenon of 'terrorism' serves as a nodal point for a series of articulations and is central to many other representations. A conspicuous example of this is 'terrorism' as being ubiquitous, often articulated through the use of 'global'. In his first speech after the September 11 attacks, Foreign Minister Cem (2001: 8) states that "we have to be conscious of the fact that terrorism is a global phenomenon". It is referred to as a 'global menace' (Esenli 2002: 12), as operating on a 'global scale' (Cengizer 2003: 24; Gül 2010: 24), as a 'global scourge' (İlkin 2005a: 6), as a 'global problem' (Erdoğan 2007: 3), as having assumed a 'global dimension' (Erdoğan 2008: 11), as a 'global threat' (Apakan 2010c: 10) undermining 'global stability and prosperity' (Apakan 2012a: 25). U.N. Ambassador Baki İlkin (2005b: 8) refers to it as "one of the most serious threats to the peace, security and welfare of the global community", and uses even more explicit terms in 2008:

> [T]errorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. Indeed, it concerns all nations, large and small, and it takes its toll on human beings of every age, culture,

religion and nationality. In other words, we are all vulnerable to this global scourge (İlkin 2008c: 10).[34]

İlkin's statement gives 'terrorism' a universal quality by doing the same to its targets, through including all these classifications of human beings (age, culture, etc.). This representation of ubiquity is done also without the actual use of the signifier 'global'. For example, Prime Minister Erdoğan (2007: 5) states that "[t]errorism continues to threaten the security of all free nations", while Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül (2005: 3) argues that attacks "in various parts of the world proves that no country is immune to terrorism".[35]

4.1.1   The duty to fight in concert

Given such a quality of the 'terrorist' threat, it is unsurprising that the Turkish actors generally infer from this that the only viable way to fight 'terrorism' is through international cooperation. This is referred to as a 'common struggle' (Pamir 2001: 9), a 'common defence' (Cengizer 2003: 24) or a 'common stance' (Apakan 2010c: 10), against a 'common problem' (İlkin 2005c: 7) or a 'common threat' (Apakan 2010a: 23). The rhetorical commonplace 'global' plays a part also here: Ambassador İlkin (2005b: 7-8) states that "[c]ombating terrorism should be a global and collective effort", while Prime Minister Erdoğan refers to "solutions on a global scale" (2009a: 32) and 'terrorism' as a "a grave security threat that needs to be addressed with a global commitment" (2009b: 17). Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan (2010a: 23) discusses the 'global fight against terrorism' and twice (ibid.; 2012b: 23) characterizes the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy as a 'historic step'.

In 2002, Deputy U.N. Ambassador Altay Cengizer (2002b: 5) draws such a conclusion explicitly, arguing that "the only viable option" is to "intensify international cooperation against terrorism". He is followed two years later by Ambassador Ümit Pamir (2004: 2), stating that "the quest to eradicate terrorism requires a sustained, comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all Member States of the United Nations" This trend continues with the politicians from the Justice and Development Party (AKP), with President Gül (2010: 24) arguing that 'terrorism' "cannot be countered without sincere, effective, cohesive and concrete international cooperation" and Foreign Minister

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34 I return to the rhetorical commonplace 'scourge' in section 4.4, due to its intertextual relevance.
35 The rhetorical commonplaces 'immunity' and 'immune' are used in this same way at several points (İlkin 2005b: 7; Gül 2005: 3; Apakan 2009: 6; Davutoğlu 2010: 19; Müftüoğlu 2011b: 26). Such organic metaphors are very conspicuous amongst the military officers and discussed more closely in section 5.3.

Davutoğlu (2010: 2) stating that "we have to act collectively and in full solidarity with one another".[36] Cooperation is even represented as something states have a duty to take part in. Besides Ambassador Pamir (2002c: 27) referring to this as a 'moral obligation' and Gül (2003: 4) arguing that "[w]e are duty-bound to eradicate that evil from the face of the Earth, and soon", it is most clear with Ambassador Apakan, who uses 'duty-bound' and 'obligation' at several instances (2010c: 10; 2010a: 26; 2012a: 25). The threat is also of a kind that does not allow for procrastination: "Events no longer allow any slackening of our actions. We have to move forward with a sense of clear purpose, and we have to move fast" (Pamir 2001: 9).

Two central points are illustrated by the above: Firstly, discourses are *reductions* of possibilities (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 37); they narrow the field of potential political practice (here: to full international cooperation as the only viable option). Secondly, it shows *securitization*: the moving of an issue from the realm of 'normal politics' into the exceptional state of 'security politics', opening for exceptional measures (Wæver 1998). Such acts of securitization on an *international* level are contingent on the established representations of 'terrorism' as homogeneous and ubiquitous; without this, it would be much more difficult to argue for extensive cooperation.

4.1.2 The one and only terrorist

Along with the emphasis on the commonality of the 'terrorist' threat and the need for concerted efforts, there are also explicit rejections of any attempt to differentiate between 'terrorists' (or forms of 'terrorism'), as well as of any form of middle ground in fighting them. The following statement by Ambassador Pamir (2001: 9) on October 1, 2001 is highly illustrative:

> There are no grey areas in the fight against terrorism, nor are there good terrorists and bad terrorists. This is the time for the international community as a whole and for States individually to condemn unequivocally all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations.

In similarly clear terms, Deputy Ambassador Cengizer (2003: 24) argues that "we cannot start to grade and arrange in some neat order the forms of terrorism; nor can we rightfully grasp the motivations behind terrorism. We cannot come up with degrees of leniency towards terrorism.

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36 Abdullah Gül became President in August 2007 after having been Minister of Foreign Affairs from March 2003 – August 2007 and Prime Minister from November 2002 – March 2003.

We cannot sensibly talk about 'better terrorism'". Though this tendency becomes less prominent after 2003, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2008: 11) uses similar terms in late 2008: "I take this opportunity to emphasize the following point in particular. We should now put an end to perceptions of 'good' terrorists and 'bad' terrorists, and avoid providing refuge to terrorists of 'others'. Terrorism is a crime against humanity, regardless of its source, pretext or ambition". It is also argued that the common fight will lose credibility or potency if some 'terrorist groups' are included while others are excluded, as when Deputy U.N. Ambassador Cengizer (2002b: 5) states that "we cannot sustain a credible fight against terrorism if we address the problem only partially and are selective with regard to the terrorist groups and organizations".

The representations of this section should be read in relation to the PKK-led insurgency in Turkey and the status of the PKK as 'terrorist'. The next subsection looks at how Turkey's own experiences are tied into the representation of 'terrorism' as one 'global' problem.

4.2 Relating the PKK insurgency to 'global terrorism'

The representations of 'global terrorism' and the need to condemn every 'terrorist' group needs to be understood in relation to Turkey's domestic concerns with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is one of the two foci of my specified research question. Successfully representing this specific conflict as part of a 'common struggle' against 'terrorism' has important effects in framing actions undertaken in the name of the Turkish state, as well as to what extent cooperation in fighting groups such as the PKK is politically sensible. We see this dynamic in its most simple form when U.N. Ambassador Apakan (2010d: 26; 2012a: 25) states twice that 'terrorism' "undermines global stability and prosperity" and therefore Governments have "the legitimate right" to combat it, or when Foreign Minister Cem (2001b: 11) argues that "we are all engaged in a fight – a justifiable, correct fight against terrorism".

There are many references to Turkey's own concerns and experiences with 'terrorism' in the data material, especially through the rhetorical commonplace 'suffering'. Most of the time this is followed directly by calls for international cooperation. Deputy U.N. Ambassador Murat Esenli (2002: 12) refers to Turkey as "a country that has suffered extensively from the scourge of terrorism" right before arguing that "[t]he only way to fight this global menace is to act resolutely and in unison". This is done similarly by Ambassador İlkin (2005b: 8), noting

that "[a]s a country which has long suffered from this scourge, Turkey has been calling for increased international cooperation in the fight against terrorism", repeating the argument half a year later (2005c: 7). On the politicians' side, Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu (2010: 19) explains that Turkey's "unfortunate and painful experience" has taught it "the indispensable nature of international cooperation in combating this scourge", while Prime Minister Erdoğan (2007: 5) refers to Turkey as "a nation that has experienced first-hand the bitter consequences of terrorism" before asking "the international community for an enhanced collective commitment and cooperation in the combat against this threat to humanity". When he further argues that "[a]n act of terror committed in any part of the world in essence targets us all", this must also be understood as echoing Article 5 of the NATO's Washington Treaty of 1949 (NATO 1949), which acknowledged that an armed attack on one of the countries of the Alliance would be considered an attack against all, directly involving the Security Council. The day after the September 11 attacks the Article was invoked by the United States, and it was decided that the Article covered these attacks, setting a precedent for 'terrorist attacks' emanating from abroad in general (NATO 2005).[37]

Interestingly, however, there is not a single *explicit* interpellation of the PKK into the 'terrorist' subject position in the speeches, as the Turkish actors never refer to it by name.[38] I argue that this has to be understood by the United Nations not having recognized the PKK as a 'terrorist organization' (in contrast, the military officers, who speak through the NATO, do use the name of the Party). However, the articulation between 'PKK' and 'terrorist' by Turkey – and by other countries – is sufficiently established to consider the Party as included in these representations; the *effect* of referring to Turkish 'suffering' like above will affect the PKK accordingly. Though the name is not used, some of the references to it are indeed clear. Ambassador Cengizer (2002b: 5) criticizes the European Union's current list of 'terrorist organizations' for being incomplete, arguing that "we cannot sustain a credible fight against terrorism if we address the problem only partially and are selective with regard to terrorist groups and organizations", noting his hope that "known terrorist organizations will be

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37 As an interesting side note here, Article 5 only includes attacks "in Europe and North America" in its wording (NATO 2005). This puts Turkey, with most of territory conventionally understood as in Asia, in an ambiguous position, especially as many PKK attacks have been launched from abroad (Northern Iraq).

38 Except for Osama bin Laden (Müftüoğlu 2011 [2]: 26) they do not mention any other specific 'terrorists' either.

included in that list".[39] In November 2007, Ambassador İlkin (2007b: 12-23) refers specifically to a recent loss of 15 victims to 'terrorism', urging for putting words into practice:

> Other countries which [are] going through or [have] gone through similar bitter experiences [will] surely agree that the only way to allay such pain [is] through a genuine display of commitment by the international community to resolutely combat and eradicate terrorism. The success of the Committee's work [will] be gauged not by the number of resolutions it produced but by how effectively the international community [can] act to eradicate the threat of terrorism.[40]

In the same speech he even argues that making distinctions regarding 'terrorism' can be *dangerous*, as if countries start "differentiating between terrorist acts targeting them and those targeting others […] sooner or later they [will] fall prey to the scourge of terrorism". In 2008, he (2008b: 19) also criticizes the United Nations, for having allowed a photographic exhibition in its building, conspicuous both in its lack of naming the PKK and its articulation to the 'common effort':

> Just two months ago, a photographic exhibition took place in this building that, unfortunately, included pictures of the members of a terrorist organization targeting Turkey. That terrorist organization has been declared as such by many countries and institutions, including the European Union […] Therefore, one cannot help but ask why and how those photos came to be displayed under the roof of the United Nations, which holds a central place in our counter-terrorism efforts.[41]

Note that the problem is not that the exhibition gave a positive impression of the PKK, but that it *included the picture at all*. A way to make sense of this is that the physical manifestation of a 'terrorist' could potentially destabilize the representations that facilitate grouping together diverse entities into one ubiquitous and abstract phenomenon, or at least the articulation of the PKK to this phenomenon.

There are many references in theto problems created by inconsistencies in countries' approach towards the threat of 'terrorism', sometimes alongside direct criticism towards the collective for betraying Turkey's own concerns. Foreign Minister Cem (2001: 9) refers to the "unfortunate de facto distinction made in the conceptual approaches of several countries

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39 At this point, the PKK was not on the EU's list of 'terrorist organizations'. It was added shortly after this speech, on May 2, 2002 by the Council of the European Union.

40 This quote is taken from one of the Official Records of a General Assembly session where the speakers' arguments are referred in past tense, without being changed further, hence my editing of the verbs here.
41 This was the World Press Photo exhibition of 2008 that took place in the lobby of the U.N. headquarters, including a picture of a PKK guerilla soldier walking in the forest with an automatic rifle.

between 'bad' terrorists […] and tolerated terrorists, who, while enjoying safe haven in the same country, incite, plan, finance and sometimes command terrorist acts in another", arguing that Turkey "has been victim of this double-standard approach". 'Double standards' is represented as something that must be avoided by several speakers (Gül 2005: 3; 2006: 8; İlkin 2007b: 12; Apakan 2009: 6). Deputy Ambassador Cengizer (2002c: 11) refers similarly to "the urgent need to put aside selective attitudes based on political motivations and tolerance for […] certain terrorist movements", noting that Turkey expects "all States to pursue a consistent and determined approach in fighting terrorism without any leniency whatsoever.

From the above findings we see that there is a consistent inclusion of Turkey's own 'sufferings' into the overall representations of 'terrorism' as a 'global' or 'common' threat that states have a responsibility to fight together – an inclusion that is dependent on the representation of 'terrorism' as one homogeneous phenomenon. Through its inclusion in this discourse, the PKK is also affected by the way the 'terrorist' identity is constructed on a general level, and it is to this part of the politicians and diplomats' speeches I now turn.

4.3   Fundamentally illegitimate: Elements of a terrorist identity

The above representations of 'terrorism' need to be seen as in a mutually conditioning relationship with the constitution of the 'terrorist' identity: By representing 'terrorism' as a homogeneous phenomenon, the corollary identity ('terrorist') is made possible, but at the same time the continuous representations of 'terrorist' characteristics will affect what 'terrorism' is (if for example 'terrorists' are represented as willing to use any means to achieve their goals, it will affect to what extent the phenomenon of 'terrorism' necessitates an urgent international response). It follows from this relation that characterizing 'terrorism' will also take part in shaping the 'terrorist' identity. The Turkish politicians and diplomats make what I identity as three main representations affecting this identity: [1] The articulation of 'terrorism' to single rhetorical commonplaces supporting an image of moral deficiency and illegitimacy, such as 'evil', 'monstrous' or 'heinous'; [2] the rejection of the possibility that 'terrorism' can ever have a legitimate goal; and [3] the representation of 'terrorists' as manipulative through the rhetorical commonplace 'exploit'.

4.3.1 Deficient morals

There are many instances of delegitimizing articulations to 'terrorism' in the speeches, especially during the first years of analysis. 'Terrorism' is referred to as an 'evil' or 'organized evil' (Pamir 2001: 9; 2002d: 15; Gül 2003: 4), as a 'monstrous crime against humanity' (İlkin 2008c: 10), as 'heinous' (Pamir 2002a: 10: 2003b: 40; 2003d: 20; Erdoğan 2007: 5; İlkin 2007a: 16; 2008c: 10); it is articulated to 'coldblooded murder' (Cengizer 2003: 24) and to 'oppression' (Cem 2001b: 11); and it is described as something that believes "everything and anything is acceptable as long as it sows the seed of fear, panic and desperation in people" (Esenli 2002: 12). Ambassador Pamir (2002c: 27; 2002e: 18) also articulates 'terrorism' to 'darkness', the effect of which depends on the naturalization of dark/light as a negative/positive dichotomy.[42] 'Terrorist intentions' are also differentiated from the sanity of the non-'terrorist': "I am sure that every sane person in the world is wondering what ominous developments can possibly be taking place right now in many a clandestine quarter at a time when modern technological devices could end up in the hands of individuals with terrorist intentions" (Cengizer 2003: 24). Such designations of the normal ('sane') and the abnormal ('insane') is a central aspect of how discourses distribute identities and are manifestations of power. By touching on such identities, Cengizer brings us to the second main element affecting the 'terrorist' identity.

4.3.2   The impossibility of justifiable cause

The 'terrorist' identity is also constructed through the representation that 'terrorism' can never have justifiable goals under any circumstances; choosing a 'terrorist' method immediately renders any legitimate goal null and void. This representation is especially prominent between 2001 and 2005, where there is almost no discussion of 'terrorism' without the actors mentioning this.[43] As telling examples of this, Foreign Minister Cem (2001: 8) states that "[n]o ideal, no cause and no end can justify terrorism. We should avoid spurious justifications for deliberate killing", while U.N. Ambassador Pamir (2004: 2) argues that "terrorism, irrespective of its motivations, objectives, forms and manifestations, can never be justified". This is repeated similarly by Prime Minister Erdoğan (2008: 11) when arguing that "[t]errorism is a crime against humanity, regardless of its source, pretext or ambition". The

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42 For example, the understanding of the Middle Ages as 'The Dark Ages' in contrast with the 'Age of Enlightenment', reflecting a backwards/developed dichotomy, is an imagery with long historical roots (Mommsen 1942).

43 For reference: (Cengizer 2001a; 2002a; 2002a; 2002c; 2003; Cem 2001a: 8; Gürel 2002: 26; Pamir 2002c: 26; 2004: 2; 2002e 18; 2003a: 18; Gül 2005: 3; İlkin 2005b: 7)

attacks of September 11 are represented as proving this specifically by Ambassador Pamir (2001: 9), stating that "[i]f there were any arguments that terrorists might also have a defensible cause, 11 September must have put this forever to rest".

The role of political motivation is very important in relation to such rejections of legitimacy. Ambassador Pamir (2002b: 26) fights the drawing of attention to such motivations when stating that "terrorism cannot be construed, let alone understood, as a potent tool in the pursuit of political ends. Violence and terrorism cannot and will not yield results". Deputy Ambassador Cengizer (2003: 24) does this similarly by making the following argument:

> The world has had enough swayers, false prophets and spin doctors, all condoning, in one way or another, the inducement of fear and revulsion in the masses of innocent people as a viable and genuine political method – and more often than not influencing States in that regard […] When we look into the history of terrorism, we clearly see that whenever political considerations exalt the idea of righteous murder, the basic truth of coldblooded murder is immediately adulterated.

Again the role of the PKK must be regarded as central, especially attempts of establishing the PKK under new names with more explicit political orientations. On November 15, 2003 the PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan People's Congress (KONGRA GEL), declaring its belief "that the political, social, cultural and economic rights of the Kurds can only be attained through democratic political struggle" (Kongra Gel 2003), and the year before it had already been re-established as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK). The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers to these changes as the PKK's "policy of appearing as a born-again legitimate organization and to convince the international community accordingly", characterizing the stated political (as opposed to violent) orientations as "merely a make-up" (MFA Turkey 2011). KONGRA-GEL and KADEK's stated divergence from the PKK is equally rejected by other countries, such as the United States (National Counterterrorism Center 2013).

It is interesting that the tendency of rejecting legitimate motivation slows down from 2006 and out, though it is still mentioned at some instances, primarily by diplomats at the General Assembly (İlkin 2007b: 12; 2008c: 10; Çorman 2008a: 11; Apakan 2010a: 23). Except for the one clear instance by Prime Minister Erdoğan cited earlier in this section, the AKP politicians do not make such explicit references to motivations. The absence of this could potentially make the search for underlying factors – 'root causes' – more politically sensible, opening for

alternative representations and widening the field of potential action. Indeed, in parallel with this development, there is an appearance in some of the speeches of the argument that causes that *lead* to 'terrorism' must be fought as well. Ambassador Apakan (2009: 6) states that "while all forms of terrorism should be condemned unequivocally, the conditions conducive to it must be addressed", while Deputy Ambassador Fazli Çorman (2010: 10) argues that measures to prevent 'terrorism' can be effective only by addressing numerous "social, economic, political and other factors" contributing to its existence. President Gül (2010: 23) also touches on this, stating that the "root causes of conflicts ought to be addressed early on to create the conditions for sustainable peace and stability". It is important here that the AKP has made certain political approaches towards the Kurdish minority, such as expressing solidarity by Erdoğan visiting Diyarbakır, one of the biggest predominantly Kurdish cities (Onar 2007: 284), and by allowing the Kurdish-language *TRT6* state channel in 2009 (Pope & Pope 2011: 274), as part of the so-called 'Kurdish opening' or 'Kurdish initiative' launched by the government that year.[44]

Before 2006, the actors only point to underlying factors in relation to other (non-PKK) conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Pamir 2003e: 6; 2003d: 20). The exception to this is a statement by Foreign Minister Cem (2001: 9), but the way he points to underlying factors is quite different. Cem represents this as something 'terrorism' *uses* for its purpose, as the *active subject* rather than the *passive result*, arguing that it "feeds on deteriorating social, economic and political conditions". Such represented opportunism brings us to the third main element constructing the 'terrorist' identity by the Turkish actors: 'terrorists' as *exploitative*.

4.3.3   The 'exploiting terrorist'

Though there are not very many instances amongst the politicians and diplomats of referring to 'terrorists' as 'exploitative', I include this representation here because of [1] its significant intertextual relevance (see section 4.4); [2] its strong delegitimizing potential; and [3] its widespread use amongst the military officers analyzed in chapter 5. In two speeches in subsequent days in 2001, Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem (2001a: 10; 2001b: 11) states that the "terrorist network" has "taken root" in Afghanistan by "exploiting the Afghan

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44 The increasing emphasis on addressing underlying factors could potentially be explained also by a scholarly focus on 'root causes' of 'terrorism' (see e.g. Bjørgo 2005), gradually becoming prominent in political discourse as well.

people's plight". After this, there are no mentions of 'exploit' until 2010, when it re-emerges. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu (2010: 2) argues that "terrorists have proved to be extremely resilient in their ability to adapt to changing circumstances and to exploit every gap or loophole they find in our common stance"; that they "exploit opportunities and use every available technology presented to them in today's world"; and that they "benefit from freedoms inherent in our societies and exploit them for their own purposes, namely, to terrorize audiences and breed radicalization […]". According to Apakan (2010d: 26), "terrorist groups in various parts of the world attempt to exploit […] a humanitarian approach to gain international acceptance and recognition", repeating this two years later (2012a: 25).

What we see here are three ways that 'terrorists' are represented as exploitative: [1] by using inconsistencies in the approach of the collective Self in order to escape punishments and perform 'terrorist' acts; [2] by treating socioeconomic factors and problems instrumentally, as a way to gain support; and [3] by illegitimately claiming freedoms for furthering their causes. Again the understanding of 'terrorist' acts rests on an *a priori* assumption of ulterior motives and the conception that these are antithetical to the purposes of societal rights and freedoms. We see that these freedoms are conditioned on not being used for the 'wrong' purposes when Apakan (2012b: 23) states that "like all democratic rights, freedom of speech should not be abused. Incitement to terrorism, violence, racial/ethnic hatred and discrimination, or glorifying such acts, cannot be accepted or condoned".

Having now gone through the three main elements that discursively position the 'terrorist' identity in the speeches of the Turkish politicians and diplomats, the representation of 'terrorism' as a homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon, and the relation of the PKK through references to Turkish 'suffering', I will discuss the intertextuality of these representations. This shows clearly that the language used by the Turkish politicians and diplomats cannot simply be considered 'their own'.

4.4 Elements of intertextuality

The rhetorical commonplaces invoked by the Turkish actors do not arise out of nowhere, but reproduce components of earlier texts (such as earlier speeches by representatives of other states at the United Nations). Not everything can sensibly be said in every forum; the actors have to draw on common resources for making meaning. Tracing the historical deployment of such resources will also suggest something regarding who has been in positions to shape

discourse. This section will identify intertextual relations in the Turkish actors' representations of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' as Other. Intertextuality is of course central to the representations of Self-identity as well, but as it is exactly this I seek to identify in these representations (it is through the appeal to historically used modes of differentiation that Turkish actors are able to negotiate 'difference'), I have integrated this into the general discussion of the Self in the section following this one.

As a first example of intertextuality, the representation of 'terrorism' as a homogeneous phenomenon is present in all the United Nations resolutions concerning 'terrorism' since the first was adopted on December 18, 1972. From Resolution 40/61 (UN 1985), the specific phrase "terrorism in all its forms" appears, and from Resolution 48/122 (UN 1994), this changes to "terrorism in all its forms and manifestations" – an exact phrase used by many of the Turkish actors (Pamir 2001: 9; Çorman 2008b: 16; Müftüoğlu 2011b: 26; Apakan 2012a: 25). It is reproduced in many Security Council resolutions on 'terrorism' as well (e.g. UN 1998; 1999). In the latter of these it is also referred to as "terrorism affecting the international community as a whole" – a phrase which also used by Pamir (2001: 9).[45]

A second element of intertextuality is seen by the rhetorical commonplace 'scourge', which is used a plethora of times by the Turkish politicians and diplomats.[46] The use of 'scourge' has been widespread also outside of the United Nations. In the 1980s, U.S. President Ronald Reagan used the rhetorical commonplace several times, referring to "the evil scourge of terrorism", which had its origin in "depraved opponents of civilization itself" (Jackson 2005: 155). President George W. Bush, as well as members of his administration such as Colin Powell, also referred to "the scourge of terrorism" (ibid.: 73). 'Scourge' is found also in a series of United Nations resolutions, as in the aforementioned 40/61 (UN 1985), where it is referred to as "this criminal scourge", a rhetorical commonplace repeated in many of the subsequent resolutions. On the main page of the "UN Action to Counter Terrorism" (UN 2010), the organization writes that "[c]ountering this scourge is in the interest of all nations […]", while NATO (2012b) writes that it "will continue to fight this scourge, individually and collectively, in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter".

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45 See http://www.un.org/terrorism/resolutions.shtml and http://www.un.org/terrorism/sc-res.shtml for all of these resolutions.
46 For reference: (Cem 2001: 9; Cengizer 2002b; 2003; Pamir 2002a: 10; 2003c : 2; Gürel 2006: 26; Esenli 2002: 12; İlkin 2005b: 7; 2007b: 12; 2007c: 21; 2008b: 19; 2008a: 33; Erdoğan 2007: 5; Apakan 2010a: 23; Davutoğlu 2010: 19).

Lastly, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) repeatedly refers to "terrorism, a scourge of our times" (OSCE 2001). Such consistent repetition of the articulation between 'scourge' and 'terrorism' contribute to fixing the reality that 'terrorism' *is* a 'scourge', contributing to its position as a homogeneous phenomenon and to the urgency that is conferred upon measures to deal with it.

A third intertextual element can be identified through 'exploit'. Looking at the 2003 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* of the George W. Bush administration, the way 'exploit' is used is very similar to that of the Turkish politicians and diplomats. The Strategy argues that many 'terrorist organizations' "have little in common with the poor and destitute masses [and] exploit these conditions to their advantage" (The White House 2003: 22), and that they "will exploit global systems of commerce, transportation, communications, and other sectors to inflict fear, destruction and death, to compromise our national security, and to diminish public confidence and weaken our will to fight" (ibid.: 25). The 2006 Strategy writes that "[d]efeating terrorism in the long run requires that each of these factors be addressed […] diminishing the underlying conditions terrorists seek to exploit" (The White House 2006: 10).[47] This last phrase is found, reproduced verbatim, in many of the representations of Turkish military officers as well (see chapter 5). 'Exploit' can even be identified as used in a very similar way in academia: Hoffmann (2002: 312) refers to 'terrorists' who "seek[s] constantly to identify vulnerabilities and exploit gaps in U.S. defenses".

So far, the sections of chapter 4 have all focused on representations of 'terrorism'/'terrorist' as Other, and thereby on the first part of my specified research question**.** I will now move to addressing the second part of this question – how representations of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' are related to the representation of Self-identity, and how this enables the negotiation of Turkish 'difference' vis-à-vis the 'European' and 'Western' collective identities.

4.5 Constructing the common Self

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47 There are countless examples of the use of 'exploit' in the two Strategies. The 2003 version writes (e.g.) that "terrorist groups have become increasingly self-sufficient by exploiting the global environment to support their operations" (Bush 2003: 8); that they "exploit vulnerabilities within our critical infrastructure" (ibid.: 9). The 2006 Strategy writes (e.g.) that "[o]ur terrorist enemies exploit Islam to serve a violent political vision" (Bush 2006: 5); that 'terrorists' see "individuals as objects to be exploited" (ibid.: 10); and that they "exploit [the Internet] to create and disseminate propaganda, recruit new members raise funds and other material resources […]" (ibid.).

Chapter 3 emphasized the historical role of 'civilization' in European countries' designation of the 'non-civilized' Other – including the Ottoman Empire – eventually manifested in a formalized 'standard of civilization' defining the principles of 'international society'. We also saw how 'difference' persisted with the more 'Western'-oriented Turkish Republic. In the speeches analyzed in this chapter, the rhetorical commonplace of 'civilization' does indeed play a central role for Self-identity, represented as what 'terrorism' is threatening. Eventually 'civilization' becomes pluralized ('civilizations') by the actors, with 'humanity'/'humankind' moving to the position of what is mainly being threatened.

4.5.1 A threat to 'civilization'

The first clear reference to Self-identity appears just a few weeks following the September 11 attacks in 2001, and it involves 'civilization'. U.N. Ambassador Pamir (2001: 8) refers to "the carnage to which the United States and our civilization was subjected to on 11 September", suggesting thus that besides the United States as state, the common identity of 'civilization' was also targeted – a collective including Turkey. Later in the same speech he states that the threat of 'terrorism' "is to our common civilization and the United Nations is our common house". Two weeks later, Deputy Ambassador Cengizer (2001b: 11) repeats that "[t]he carnage that the United States and our civilization was subjected to on 11 September was beyond any description", and in April the following year he is equally clear (2002b: 4), stating that "[w]e know without a doubt that terrorism poses a very great danger to civilization as we know it". In October (2002c: 10) Cengizer points to 'civilization' again, arguing that 'terrorism' is "a threat to the very existence of individuals, of nations and of human civilization as a whole". His most conspicuous use of the rhetorical commonplace, however, is in 2003: "No longer does terrorism only strike at the very core of democracy and civil society; no longer does terrorism only hamper social and economic development. It does more than that. It has started to kill the very essence of civilization" (Cengizer 2003: 24). The image of 'terrorism' and 'civilization' being diametrical opposites is strengthened also by Deputy Ambassador Esenli (2002: 11), arguing that "terrorism does not have a set of rules to which the members of civilized societies in this room can relate".

We see here the continuation of what Bilgin (2009: 121) refers to as "the [Turkish] founding leaders' efforts to locate Turkey in contemporary civilization". The consistent invocation of 'civilization' in this way serves to secure Turkey's role on the 'right side' of the 'civilizational' identity that needs to be protected against 'terrorism'. We also see the role of

'terrorism'-as-Other in this dynamic. Similarly to how Campbell (1998a) argues that state identity is reproduced through 'discourses of danger', 'civilization' – and Turkey's position within it – is here reproduced through 'terrorism' as antithesis; as the constitutive Other. This simultaneously shows the adoption and naturalization of a rhetorical commonplace with roots in European practices of Othering, illustrating clearly the principle of hegemony. It is interesting here that Foreign Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel (2002: 26), in his one speech in my analysis, reproduces something close to the idea of a universal 'standard of civilization', referring to the United Nations as "establishing standards that should apply to all". According to Jackson (2006: 84), the idea of 'civilization' as defined by Europe was indeed central to the founding of the United Nations. Ambassador Pamir (2003c: 2) suggests the universal validity of the values safeguarded by the 'civilizational' Self when stating that "terrorism is a means of oppression directed at the very existence of human life, civilization and our common values – values distilled from the moment the human adventure started on Earth". In the last chapter I discuss problematic aspects of such value universalism.

4.5.2 'Civilizations' plural: dealing with essentialism

The way 'civilization' is represented above is not characteristic for the whole period of analysis; from mid-2003 and out, significant changes take place in the representations of Self-identity. Gradually, the *singular* conception of 'civilization' loses almost all its presence. In its place there is an increased emphasis on a *plural* understanding of the rhetorical commonplace ('civilizations'). In parallel, the politicians and diplomats begin to strongly emphasize cultural and religious diversity as very important positives. 'Civilization' also becomes marginalized in relation to 'terrorism', with' terrorism' primarily being represented as opposing 'humanity' or 'humankind' instead.

These changes coincide with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey in late-2002. The first speech of an AKP politician – that of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül in September 2003 – can actually be seen as marking a divide in the material. Gül (2003: 4-6) refers to the promotion of "harmony among civilizations" in relation to a meeting initiated by Turkey between the European Union and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). He does refer to 'civilization' singularly as well, but in a quite different way than the diplomats cited above. He uses it to refer the Middle East as "one cradle of civilization that had enjoyed peace and prosperity for centuries", directing in this way the

focus away from any exclusively 'Western' understanding of the concept. Gül also argues for many other 'challenges' besides 'terrorism' being important to deal with, adding 'racism and xenophobia' to this list.

After this speech of Gül, there are only two more instances where AKP politicians use 'civilization' singularly, by Prime Minister Erdoğan (2008: 12; 2011: 30). But in the first of these he simultaneously uses 'civilization' in its *plural* sense, and in the second he refers *critically* to 'civilization', arguing that "[n]o one can speak of peace, justice or civilization if the cry rising from Somalia is left unheard". After 2005 (İlkin 2005c: 7), the diplomats stop using 'civilization' singularly as well. Simultaneously, references to 'civilizations' cease to revolve around 'terrorism' as identity opposite, instead taking part in representations of inter-civilizational dialogue and harmony as essential to the common Self of 'humanity'. This includes being able to fight together: Deputy Ambassador Ersin Erçin (2005: 23) argues that "challenges and threats to the peace, security, welfare and progress of the world today have certainly made the need for a genuine dialogue among different cultures and civilizations more essential than ever". In 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan (2009: 35) states that

> each culture and civilization flourishes through the inspiration provided by the successes of other cultures and civilizations. As a matter of fact, our common values today, as well as our science, law and art, have been influenced not only by the ancient Greek and Roman civilizations, but also by ancient Eastern civilization.

By stressing the importance of 'Eastern' inspiration for 'common values', Erdoğan challenges a unitary focus on 'Western' values in a way similar to that of Gül above.

There are also many references like the above that do not involve 'civilizations' specifically but have a plural focus on *cultures* instead. According to President Gül (2008: 21), "[w]e must indeed remain extremely vigilant against the risk of further alienation between different cultures and religions". Prime Minister Erdoğan (2009: 35) follows this by stating that it is "essential to regard and understand diverse cultures not as the other, but as individual elements of humankind's cultural inheritance". Ambassador Apakan (2010b: 5) argues that today, "stereotypes continue to shape our perception of the other – the other who has a different way of life, cultural values or religious beliefs; the other who indeed enriches our life", noting further that "[a]s long as we value cultural diversity as a common heritage of humankind, we can attain the quest for social peace and harmony", and the year after (2011:

6) – quite similarly – that "cultural diversity is an integral part of the common heritage of humanity and an asset for the advancement of humankind".

We see here a conspicuous emphasis on 'humanity' and 'humankind' as nodal points for common identity. It is therefore of great interest to note that they take over the role as what 'terrorism' is mainly represented as opposing (instead of 'civilization'). Ambassador İlkin (2005c: 7) argues that 'terrorism' "obstructs the development of humanity", while Prime Minister Erdoğan (2005: 39) refers to it as "the enemy of humankind", and two years after (2007: 5) as "a heinous crime against humanity", repeating this the year after (2008: 11). This phrase is also repeated thrice by İlkin (2007a: 16; 2007b: 12; 2008c: 10) as well as by Ambassador Apakan (2010a: 23) and Foreign Minister Gül (2003: 4).

The discursive developments described here have a clear *material* manifestation in the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (AOC), which was established in 2005 on the initiative of the Turkish and Spanish Prime Ministers, along with former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. When the Turkish politicians and diplomats are referring to the AOC, it reveals both the pluralization of 'civilization' and the emphasis on common 'humanity'. Indeed, the tagline associated to the AOC logo is quite illustrative: "Many cultures. One humanity" (UN 2012). The first reference to the AOC is made by Deputy Ambassador Ersin Erçin (2005: 24), referring to it as "a genuine effort to prove that peoples of the world are not divided along cultural and religious lines, but bound by universal values that are derived from the foundation of humankind's *collective* wisdom*, conscience and drive for progress [emphasis added]". His statement underlines that essential cultural difference is *not* incompatible with universal values and common identity, using 'humankind' as anchor for such an identity. Foreign Minister Gül (2006: 7) does this similarly, arguing that the AOC wishes to "emphasize the elements that unite various societies around our common humanity", while Deputy Ambassador Fazli Çorman (2008a: 11) states its importance for "promotion of dialogue, tolerance and understanding among different cultures and religions". The AOC is even represented as a way to counter the threat of 'terrorism' itself: "The initiative, which is aimed at building bridges among diverse cultures and religions through our common values and ideals, could in fact be one of the most effective ways of dealing with all forms of extremism, including terrorism" (İlkin 2008c: 10).

I argue that four main perspectives can be taken towards these developments to the representation of Self-identity, and I will discuss these in the following section.

4.5.3 Reading the developments to Self-identity

Firstly, the plural conception of 'civilization' and the emphasis on 'humanity' and 'humankind' can be seen in relation to the idea of a 'clash of civilizations'. After the September 11 attacks there was an increased focus in public and political discourse on 'essential' differences between 'civilizations', strongly related to many viewing these attacks (as well as bombings in Bali, Madrid and London) as proving Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis (Neumayer & Plümper 2009: 712), a thesis assuming 'civilizations' as being monolithic and homogeneous, and seeing 'Islamic civilization' as defined by its 'anti-Westernism' (Said 1998).[48] The increased prominence of such essentialism could challenge representations of Turkey, with a population that is almost exclusively Muslim, as part of *one* common 'civilization' along with 'the West' – something that has traditionally been a goal of the Turkish political and military elite (Tank 2006: 464). By emphasizing diversity as an asset rather than a challenge, and by reconfiguring the basis of common identity to 'humanity', this can be counteracted.[49] An essential point here is that 'terrorism' *continues* to serve the role as the constitutive Other, by being represented as external to 'humanity' rather than to 'civilization' in the Turkish actors' speeches.

A second way to conceptualize the positive emphasis on cultural and religious diversity is in relation to the 'Islamist' background of the AKP and the historically secular character of the Turkish Republic. According to Tank (2006: 464), the rise of the AKP has led to questions over the 'Western' quality of Turkey's identity, increasingly emphasizing its character as a "progressive, democratic, Muslim state". From 2002, Turkey was increasingly represented as a Muslim rather than secular partner by the United States, with the AKP gradually accepting this definition as well (Østereng 2011: 34). Critics have been pointing to the AKP as continuation of political Islam in different clothing (Oğuzlu 2010: 676), though the Party, "despite its pro-Islamist roots[,] has wholeheartedly embraced the goal of Turkey's EU

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48 Huntington himself has even commented that his thesis predicted the context from which the September 11 attacks emerged (Pew Forum 2006).

49 The dynamic here is actually reminiscent of Bartolomé de Las Casas' representation of the indigenous Other described in chapter 3, where replacing the 'civilized'/'non-civilized' dichotomy with 'humanity' opened for commonality through making possible a move from Other to Self ('believer'/'nonbeliever'), and – importantly – delegitimized enslavement.

membership and taken the political reform process in Turkey the farthest" (Rumelili 2007: 92).[50] Though they have been directed mostly towards perceived authoritarianism, such skepticism has received an added impetus with the popular demonstrations against the government that are ongoing in Turkey at the time of writing (June 2013). With the discursive drawing of attention towards such 'Islamist' characteristics, one would expect a need to reconstitute 'commonality', or at least to explain 'difference'.

A third perspective on these developments is the articulation between 'terrorism' and religion/Islam, which has been increasingly made after the September 11 attacks. Noor (2010: 56) argues that the "image of the all-pervading and all-powerful Muslim terrorist […] feeds the discourse of the 'war on terror'", while Gunning and Jackson (2011: 369-370) argue that the term 'religious terrorism' has become "ubiquitous in public debate", and that the relation between violence and religion has "a long genealogy in Western scholarship". The more such an articulation becomes established, the harder it is to reproduce an international discourse on 'terrorism' without at the same time reproducing this relation. Interestingly, there are many examples of the Turkish politicians and diplomats breaking this articulation. Already in November 2001, Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem (2001a: 8) states that "terrorism does not have a religion", and that "[t]o identify terrorism with any religion is a sacrilege against all religions". This breaking is repeated by subsequent Foreign Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel the year after (2002: 26). There are even more instances during the rule of the AKP, alongside the already cited statements on religion and culture (Gül 2005: 3; 2006: 8; Apakan 2009: 6; Çorman 2010: 10; Müftüoğlu 2011b: 26).

A fourth – and alternative – way of looking at these developments in Self-identity is that of Tank (2006: 466-468), who asks "whether Turkey's 'forgotten' Islamic identity can prove to be *instrumental* in its relationship with the West [emphasis added]", referring to the "utility of having a selective identity". In this account, Islamic identity is a 'marketable' attribute – a positive to *begin with* given the today's situation, rather than a stumbling block that needs to be overcome. Tank argues that Turkish politicians are emphasizing Muslim identity in order to represent Turkey as a interlocutor between the 'West' and the 'East', a trait useful for a United States' led democratization project in the Midde East, writing that Erdoğan and Gül argued in

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50 Skepticism has also involved Prime Minster Erdoğan specifically. Though he stated that he had broken with radical Islamism during the campaign leading to the 2002 elections, he had nonetheless earlier been excluded from parliamentary politics due to "perceived Islamist provocation" during a 1997 rally (Pope & Pope 2011: 322).

2002 for Turkish inclusion in the European Union *on the basis* of its Muslim identity, rather than despite it (ibid.: 470). Turkey can thus become the 'necessary Other' rather than just the Other (ibid.: 476). The differences to the other points made in this section must not be overstated, however: 'Humanity' can still play the same role in this account, contributing to "blurring the 'civilizational' boundary and weakening the essentialism of cultural attributes ascribed to East and West", as Tank argues herself (ibid.).

Before moving to chapter 5 and the analysis of Turkish military officers' representations of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist', I will discuss one more aspect of the representations of Self-identity by the politicians and diplomats, namely the continuation – even increase – in reproduction of liberalist discourse across the developments discussed above.

4.5.4 The persistence of liberalist discourse

The pluralization of 'civilization' and the emphasis on cultural and religious diversity in the politicians' and diplomats' speeches from 2003 is somewhat deceptive, to the extent that it gives a clear impression of challenging 'European'/'Western' hegemony. Though several of the actors focus on the value of diversity and emphasize 'Eastern' inspiration, this takes place alongside the reproduction of elements of *liberalist* discourse, which has roots in the Enlightenment imaginary of Europe I discussed in chapter 3 (Mouffe 1993: 9-13) – and thus similar roots as the aspects of Othering manifested in the 'standard of civilization'. I identify this reproduction through the invocation of rhetorical commonplaces such as 'human rights', 'democracy', 'rule of law' and 'good governance', often in associative chains. After the coming to power of the AKP there is a *strengthening* rather than a challenging of such commonplaces.

Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül's (2003: 5) first speech at the United Nations is again illustrative. While he points to the Middle East as a 'cradle of civilization' and emphasizes 'spiritual values' as compatible with 'contemporary living standards', he also states that "[m]y government's reforms at home reflected a sustained effort to promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law, civil society, good governance, accountability and gender equality to the highest standards set by the United Nations and the European Union", suggesting the subordination of the 'Eastern' cultural factor to these 'standards'. This is even clearer in a statement by Prime Minister Erdoğan (2009: 35). While he does argue that "our

common values […] have been influenced not only by the ancient Greek and Roman civilizations, but also by ancient Eastern civilizations", he argues that the Alliance of Civilizations should contribute to "shaping a global civilization based on universal values centered on democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights, gender equality, young people and media". The representation of equal inspirational value thus becomes subsumed to a significant extent by reproducing a discourse with strong 'Western' origins, hindering the universally valid in being a synthesis of equally important 'Western' and 'Eastern' inspiration.

Considering for example 'good governance', its liberal (and 'Western') origin is clear. The term became prominent in the early 1990s as part of donor agencies designating conditions that needed to be met by donor recipients, a policy led by the World Bank. According to Harrison (quoted in Nanda 2006: 275), the Bank's "liberal worldview" has been imposed on states – foremost in Africa – through promotion of governance reform. Jones (2013: 50-51) argues that 'good governance' has been part of a discourse that "reproduces a racialized imagination deeply entrenched in the structures of Western thought. If we follow Jones' assertion that 'good governance' is fundamentally tied to the idea of 'failed states', then it is equally important that the debate on 'failed states' has revealed "a dogmatic assumption and wishful thinking that all states will – in the long run – converge towards a model of Western liberal democracy" (Hagmann & Hoehne 2008: 43). Again we see quite clear parallels to the way 'civilization' became increasingly articulated to governance reform in its use by Enlightenment Europe (see section 3.1).

Chains of such commonplaces, including 'human rights', 'the rule of law' and 'good governance' amongst others, are reproduced by several others than only Gül and Erdoğan in the later years of analysis (Davutoğlu 2009: 9; Apakan, 2010c: 8; 2012a: 25; Müftüoğlu 2011a: 13). This increasing invocation is interesting considering the AKP's orientation towards the European Union and criticisms from European countries regarding for example Turkey's human rights record (Rumelili 2007: 66). By emphasizing 'human rights' in relation to the fight against 'terrorism', such criticism could potentially be somewhat alleviated. There are even several references to 'terrorism' being a threat to 'human rights' specifically (Pamir 2001: 9; Cengizer 2002c: 10); Gürel 2002: 26; İlkin 2005c: 7; Apakan 2010a: 23; 2010d: 26; 2012a: 25). It is also interesting to see that such liberalist discourse is reproduced *in parallel* with the Turkish actors emphasizing the value of cultural and 'civilizational' *diversity*,

because of the *universalism* of liberalism (Mouffe 1993: 13). If we follow Onar's (2011: 465) point that discourses do not need to be internally consistent and can display internal tensions, however, it is perfectly possible for the Turkish actors to make both these representations at the same time. A last reason why liberalist universalism is important here is the way it affects the discursive position of the 'terrorist', through its proclivity for conceptualizing antagonism as radical and threatening Otherness (Mouffe 1993). I elaborate on this in the final chapter.

4.6 Summary

Having reached the end of chapter 4, we can sum up the main insights from my analysis of Turkish politicians' and diplomats' representations of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist'. I identify six main points; three related to the Other and three to the Self.

[1] The politicians and diplomats represent 'terrorism' as a homogeneous and 'global' phenomenon that can only be viably fought through unequivocal international cooperation, rejecting distinctions between 'terrorists'.

[2] The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is tied into this 'global' phenomenon through references to Turkish yearlong 'suffering' from 'terrorism' and the castigation of other states for using 'double standards' in their treatment of 'terrorists'

[3] The 'terrorist' identity is discursively affected by three elements especially: the representation of moral deficiency, the rejection of any possible legitimate cause, and the references to 'terrorists' as 'exploitative' in various ways.

[4] In the first 2-3 years of analysis, 'terrorism' is represented as a threat to a 'common civilization', securing Turkey's position of the 'inside' of an identity that has been historically important in designating Ottoman – and Turkish – 'difference'.

[5] From 2003, 'civilization' becomes pluralized ('civilizations') and there is increased emphasis on cultural and religious diversity being positives to the common Self, which is centered on 'humanity'/'humankind', still with 'terrorism' as constitutive Other. These changes should be understood in relation to the 'clash of civilizations' thesis and the articulation of 'Islamism' to the AKP.

[6] Discursive elements with 'European'/'Western' origins stay intact through these developments by the persistence – even increase – in the use of rhetorical commonplaces common to liberalist universalist discourse.

5.

'Terrorism' and the Turkish Military, 2006-2011

Chapter 5 has two goals. The first is to strengthen the insight into the representations of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' as Other, and how the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is tied into this, by diversifying the data material from that analyzed in chapter 4. The second goal is to examine whether a different Self-identity is represented in opposition to the 'terrorist' Other by the Turkish military actors, compared to the politicians and diplomats, and to see whether there are traces of negotiating 'difference' vis-à-vis 'European' and 'Western' collective identities also here. I discuss the reasons to expect such differences below, in section 5.1.

All of the data analyzed in chapter 5 are taken from the NATO *Centre of Excellence: Defence Against Terrorism* (COE-DAT), which was inaugurated in June 2005 in Ankara, Turkey. It is one of 18 NATO *Centres of Excellence*, but the only one focusing on 'terrorism' specifically.[51] Among many activities, the Centre arranges courses, workshops and symposia on 'terrorism' which are widely attended; as an example, the 2010 symposium had 600 participants from 80 different countries. Though the Centre is manned by personnel from several countries the bulk of the officers, and all of the civilian workers, are Turkish (COE-DAT 2013). There are two main reasons for choosing this Centre as source: Firstly, it offers a way of accessing Turkish military officers' representations of the phenomenon of 'terrorism' in *English*, which are not in overabundance; secondly, it is a Centre which has been subjected to very little – if any – scholarly research. I analyze the opening and closing speeches at three of the Centre's biannual symposia on 'Global Terrorism and International Cooperation', which are held by high-ranking Turkish officers, and I analyze all articles written by Turkish military officers in the 21 issues of the Centre's newsletter between 2007 and 2011. 2012 is not included because in this final year the issues no longer include such articles. All of the data are accessible on the Centre webpage: http://www.coedat.nato.int/.

The chapter is structured similarly as chapter 4, beginning with the main representations of 'terrorism' as a homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon, and 'terrorist' as a fundamentally

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51 The Allied Command Transformation (ACT) that supervises all these Centres of Excellence is situated in the United States (NATO 2012).

illegitimate identity. After this I move to the construction of the Self, comparing this to the representations of the politicians and diplomats. Before moving to the actual representations, however, I will discuss why the military texts could be hypothesized to offer alternative representations of 'terrorism' and Self-identity, especially as compared to those of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) politicians.

5.1 Background: Clashes over Turkish identity

The relationship between civilian rule and the military in Turkey has often been strenuous. There were military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980, and the military has generally had a significant presence within the state apparatus (Çelik 2000).[52] According to Eccarius-Kelly (2011: 23), the Turkish military has acted "as an independent power broker and operate[d] beyond the constitutional controls of democratically elected governments". The traditional role of the military in safeguarding Kemalist nationalism and secularism is important here; the 1980 intervention and the social engineering that followed it were built on the belief in a "permanent Kemalist blueprint for Turkish society"; the military emphasizing the duty of saving 'state unity' as a pretext for interventions (Pope and Pope 2011: 152).

However, the 1999 acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country to the European Union ushered in a wave of reforms that reduced this role of the military. Such reforms were brought forward even more strongly after the coming to power of the currently ruling AKP in 2002 (Gürsoy 2012: 191-192; Kanci 2009: 368). As an example of reform, civilian control was given over military institutions, including the transformation of Secretary General of the National Security Council through a 2003 constitutional change (Kanci 2009: 368; Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy 2010: 415). Though the military still plays an important role, "a new *modus vivendi* has been reached between the armed forces and the civilian government" (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy 2010: 415). By itself this shows one of several possible sources of tension between the military and the (AKP) politicians.

The approach to the 'Kurdish question' is another point of possible divergence. Kemalism has historically been central to interpreting the PKK as an existential threat to the state, a tendency going all the way back to the inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923, with its

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[52] In addition to these interventions, the ending of Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party government in 1997 has been referred to as a 'post-modern coup' (Onar 2007: 276), intended to "curb the rise of political Islam" (Pope & Pope 2011: 311-312).

emphasis on 'unity'. Considering that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan argued in 2005 that every Turkish citizen shared a common supra-identity but could legitimately proclaim also another sub-identity (such as being Kurdish), as well as being the first head of state to refer to the 'Kurdish problem' (Onar 2007: 277-284), anathema to ardent Kemalists, we see grounds for discursive conflict that could be manifested in representations of the PKK and 'terrorism' in general.

The role of religion in society is also an important aspect here. The Turkish military has generally been a guarantor of the secular (laicist) character of the Turkish state, protecting the principles established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's government in 1923, where nationalism displaced religion and traditionalism "as sources of political unity and legitimization" (Çelik 2000: 195). According to Tank (2006: 466), the military has historically feared that if traces of past Muslim identity (from the *ancien regime* of the Ottoman Empire) are not suppressed, they could "destroy the achievements of the secular state". When the AKP came to power, the military establishment expressed concerns for its 'Islamist' ambitions, with party leader Erdoğan having been arrested for 'Islamist sedition' in 1997, after having read an Islamist poem at a political rally (Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 532). The association of the AKP to a reversal of secular trends was especially marked after controversies relating to the role of the headscarf in 2005, when the European Court of Human Rights upheld the Turkish ban, with Kemalists criticizing Prime Minister Erdoğan's reaction to this as revealing a hidden project of 'Islamization' (Onar 2007: 279-280). Judging from the large demonstrations in many Turkish cities that are ongoing at the time of writing (June 2013), which – besides being directed towards perceived authoritarianism from Erdoğan – have also included expressions of fears for increasing religious conservatism (The Telegraph 2013a), this seems to be a point of growing importance. The military officers could thus be expected to put less emphasis on representing cultural and religious diversity positively than what we saw of the politicians and diplomats, as well as on breaking the articulation between 'terrorism' and Islam.

The question of accession to the European Union is also a source of potential conflict. Though the military declared its support for the accession to the European Union in 2003, many Kemalists have generally been skeptical to the EU and ambivalent to Turkey's relation with 'Europe' and 'the West' An important reason is the circumstances from which the Turkish Republic arose, with the European victors of World War I dividing up most of the remaining Ottoman Empire through the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, ushering in the Turkish war of

independence. According to Onar (2007: 284), criticisms of Turkey by European actors have been increasingly read through "the prism of the Sèvres syndrome" relating to this dismemberment at the hands of Europe, with committed nationalists believing that plans to partition the Turkish Republic have never ended in the eyes of Europeans (Pope & Pope 2011: 55). The AKP, on the other hand, stated from the outset its intention of being accepted to the EU (Oğuzlu 2010), going on a "whirlwind tour of European capitals in pursuit of a date for accession negotiations" (Onar 2007: 278) right after its coming to power. The pro-EU discourse of the AKP at its inception emphasized 'democracy', 'human rights' and 'individual rights' – which we have seen reflected in the analysis in chapter 4 – and this could therefore be expected as less prominent amongst the military officers.

The perhaps clearest manifestation of tensions between the AKP and the military is the now more than five-year long investigation into the alleged existence of a clandestine network called *Ergenekon*, with ties to the Turkish military and with the goal of overthrowing the current AKP government (Today's Zaman 2013a; Balcı & Jacoby 2012: 137). The judicial process is approaching its 300th hearing, currently with 275 defendants. Critics have been pointing to the investigation as an elaborate political stifling of secular opposition (Jenkins 2009: 10); by the main opposition party CHP it has been referred to as "an 'inquisition' of government critics" (Reuters 2012). It is of utmost interest here that several of the high-ranking military officers in my analysis are currently accused, or have been convicted, as part of the Ergenekon process or as part of the related *Balyoz* court case, which deals with an alleged coup plot dating back to 2003.[53] In relation to these cases, the 'terrorist' label has interestingly been invoked, for example by "membership of an armed terrorist group" being one of the allegations made against two former high-ranking generals in July 2008 (Balcı & Jacoby 2012: 138).

Before moving on, a caveat should be made: A discussion like the one above easily reproduces essentialist notions of how various 'camps' are fundamentally incompatible with each other – eternally so – as they represent different interests. This is not in any way my intention. I am pointing to various oppositions and tensions in Turkey that have been

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53 Retired General and former Deputy Chief of Staff Ergin Saygun was arrested in March 2012 as part of the *Balyoz* case (Hürriyet Daily News 2012), while retired General and former Chief of Staff İlker Başbuğ was arrested in January 2012 for allegations of planning to overthrow the government (NYTimes 2012). In addition to this, retired General and Deputy Chief of Staff Aslan Güner was referred for arrest at the end of February 2013 for his role in the 1997 'postmodern coup' (Today's Zaman 2013b).

repeatedly pointed to, as these offer nodes through which to compare the representations and look for manifestations of difference. In this view Kemalism, Islamism, secularism, modernism are all *discourses*, not static variables (Çelik 2000) – but of course discourses that can be highly conflicting.

I now move to dealing with my specified research question, one the one hand analyzing representations of 'terrorism' as phenomenon and 'terrorist' as identity, seeing how the conflict with the PKK ties into this, and on the other analyzing the representation of Self-identity and whether this suggests the negotiation of Turkish 'difference'. Section 5.2 covers the representation of 'terrorism' as homogeneous and ubiquitous, consistent with that of chapter 4, showing how the PKK is related to this 'global' fight. Section 5.3 discusses the construction of the 'terrorist' identity. While this is also quite similar to that of the politicians and diplomats, here it includes the use of organic metaphors where 'terrorism' as 'illness' or 'infection' is threatening the healthy social 'body', and the construction of the identity is more direct (rather than benig done through 'terrorism'). Section 5.4 looks at the representations of the common Self by the Turkish military officers. Although the officers emphasize the role of the nation-state more than the politicians and diplomats, and though some of them explicitly challenge the idea of 'universal values', the similarities are more conspicuous than the differences. However, the impression of 'terrorism'/'terrorist' serving as the constitutive Other for negotiation of 'difference' is strengthened, with many instances of breaking the articulation between Islam and 'terrorism'.

5.2 The common threat and the common duty

The representation of 'terrorism' as a homogeneous and ubiquitous threat, though there may be differences in manifestation, is present amongst the Turkish military officers like it was amongst the politicians and diplomats. The perspective offered is thus that two states can be fighting the same 'terrorist' phenomenon though the conflicts are taking place in different parts of the world and with different groups. General and Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök's (2006a: x) statement at the first NATO Centre symposium that "we must admit that there exists a single type of 'terrorist' threatening our lives, our values and the stability all around the world" is illustrative here. In a similar fashion, General Aslan Güner (2010: 157) states that "the terrorist threat has been transformed into a real threat to the entire world", while Colonel Özden Çelik (2010: 36) argues that "terrorism can be seen everywhere, in every

nation and society, regardless of level of development, political system and demographic structure". Colonel Arif Ekmen (2007: 7) shows the perceived homogeneity clearly by arguing that

> Today we are faced with a new kind of terrorism that does not emanate from one country, one religion or even one group, but from the networks than span the globe from East to West and North to South, irrespective national boundaries and frontiers. The attacks so far have left victims from over 80 countries, and suspects have been arrested in 60 different states. Since this new terrorism is dynamic and amorphous by its nature, efforts to combat terrorism today must be flexible, comprehensive and coordinated.

The rhetorical commonplace 'global' plays a central role also here, articulated as 'global terrorism', 'global phenomenon', 'global dimension' or 'global threat' at several points (e.g. Tokgöz 2011: 32; Büyükanıt 2008: 3; Güleryüz 2007: 25; Özkök 2006a: x) Amongst the military officers, homogeneity is represented through the 'terrorist' *identity* as well, foremost by the assumption that all 'terrorists' think or act similarly. Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 14) refers to "the terrorist mindset", while Colonel Oğuz Kulpcu (2010: 21) refers to the "nature of terrorist behavior". Though it is admitted that no empirical findings shows this form of homogeneity, this is discussed not as a theoretical impossibility, but in a way suggesting that it could be found, given sufficient evidence: "Claims that terrorists all have the same psychology and mindset have not been proved yet" (Çelik 2011: 28); or "[t]here is as of yet no identified universal terrorist personality pattern" (Ersen 2008: 23).

The representations of 'terrorism' as homogeneous and 'global' enable the argument that all states are threatened, that they cannot remain passive, and that there is an obligation to take part in the common fight. General Yaşar Büyükanıt (2008: 9), Chief of General Staff from 2006-2008, argues that "no nation has the luxury of being indifferent to the events developing even in the remotest parts of the world", while Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 13) states that it "threatens all countries to the same degree without making any distinction between developed and developing ones". Many countries "haven't taken their lessons yet" (Denizer 2008b: 8), and "those who pose an indifferent attitude towards it, sooner or later would be drown [sic] in the blood of terrorist victims" (Özkök 2006a: xiv). Even if countries might not be suffering right now, the fight against it is still important "to all nations in the world which may suffer from it in the future" (Kiliç 2007: 20). Because of this all-encompassing threat, states are responsible for recognizing "every kind of terrorist organization as a common target without

making any discrimination among them" (Özkök 2006a: xiv); acting "as if they have a common enemy – the terrorist" (Güleryüz 2001a: 24).

5.2.1 The 'new terrorism': The September 11 attacks

Several of the military officers represent the attacks of September 11 as proving 'terrorism' as having a specific nature – including this ubiquitous character – or as initiating a new phase in the fight against it. According to Colonel Ahmet Tuncer (2007: 3), the attacks revealed 'terrorism' as an "asymmetric threat […] with a changing profile" and were a reminder of "the transterritoriality, transnationality and unpredictability of terrorism"; they made it "absolutely clear that the world was never going to be the same, and that it faced something new" (Kulpcu 2010: 20). By General and Deputy Chief of Staff Ergin Saygun (2008: 255) this is underlined most clearly:

> The messages that can be deduced from the 9/11 attack could be listed as follows: None of the states of the world is exempt from terrorism. Terrorism occupies a position that cannot be confined to a single state or region […] and therefore [i]nternational cooperation is required in struggling against it. It was only after 9/11 that people all over the world were able to comprehend what terrorism was, and what they were confronted with.

Because the September 11 attacks happened how they did and where they did, they could happen to anyone, marking a new phase characterized by an increased need for cooperation and the realization of what 'terrorism' really is. When conclusions are represented as self-evident in such away, one should be conscious of the interpretative effort that behind the cause itself: the attacks did not *have* to be read in any definite way. Such readings open up a whole range of possibilities for action – and, importantly, marginalize others. Campbell (1998a: 15) argues that invoking "the advent of a new phase in world politics" leads to the acceptance of a given rendering of the past, conferring legitimacy on whoever makes such a representation (he is discussing the United States). The same argument can be applied on representations of what the *new* phase is about; it takes part in shaping the anvil on which policies are forged – including the response to events, such as the September 11 attacks. This reveals how Turkey can be represented as part of a Self that is collectively struggling with this ('post-9/11') phase, which opens for including the conflict with the PKK. Before showing how the military officers make this inclusion, I will show how they express concerns for the lack of a universal definition of 'terrorism'.

5.2.2 Definitional concerns

One aspect of 'terrorism' that is practically absent amongst the politicians and diplomats but subjected to in-depth discussion by the military officers is that of *defining* 'terrorism'. The argument made generally consists of two elements: [1] The acknowledgement that there is no consistent, general definition of 'terrorism' available, and that states operate with diverging definitions according to their own interests;[54] and [2] the relating of this to a weakened international collective effort in fighting 'terrorism', often described as the 'main reason' for failure, advocating for finding a definition for future cooperation (e.g. Sarica 2007: 15; Güleryüz 2007a; Büyükanıt 2008: 20). There are no instances of characterizing the search for a universal definition as a theoretical impossibility or a futile endeavor for any other reasons. As argued by Colonel Özden Çelik (2011: 15), "[t]he fact that the international community has failed to reach a generally-accepted [sic] definition of terrorism does not mean that the concept of terrorism is indefinable". Rather, in most instances where the issue of definition is brought up, it is argued that efforts should be made to find such a definition. Using the lack of a definition as argument *against* a common struggle is explicitly rejected by Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt (2008: 20) and Deputy Chief of Staff Ergin Saygun (2008: 227).

Notwithstanding the acknowledgment of issues related to the definition of 'terrorism', some of the officers seem to take no issue with offering idiosyncratic (and quite colorful) definitions. Colonel Kenan Tokgöz (2011: 31) argues that "terrorism can be perceived as the 'killing of innocent people inhumanly by some psychopathic persons for reasons that never can be legitimized'", while Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 7) follows his discussion of the definitional problem by stating that "[n]evertheless, for the purposes of this analysis terrorism is defined as an act and a tactic used by a small set of extremists to fight against an overwhelmingly powerful opponent while surrounded by a large population who mostly just want peace and quiet". Captains Ibrahim Can and Nesip Öğün (2008: 23) argue that it is the lack of a common definition that forces every state to find one of its own: "What should a government do to combat terrorism in the absence of an internationally accepted definition of terrorism? The answer is straightforward: every country needs its own definition and legislation".

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54 At several instances, the officers actually illustrate their argument by referencing the study of Schmid's and Jongman's (1988) that was discussed in chapter 2, section 2.5 (Özkök 2006a: ix; Tokgöz 2011: 32; Çelik 2011: 17)

A statement by Colonel Çelik (2011: 15) suggests a central premise in the discourse within which the military officers are speaking and writing: A consequence of not finding a definition is that "the perpetrators of violent acts could continue to raise the defence that they are not included within the definition of terrorism". If a group that is characterized as 'terrorist' successfully refuses this label, this reveals a loophole in the current definition of 'terrorism', rather than bringing up a discussion of whether or not the label is justified in the first place. Though the officers are speaking abstractly and unspecifically, this shows *a priori* understanding of such groups being 'terrorist' in reality – it is just a question making this official. The PKK is exactly one of these groups that the officers argue need to be unequivocally recognized as such.

5.2.3   Turkish 'suffering': Interpellating the PKK

Though the PKK was never referred to in name, the analysis in chapter 4 revealed a consistent relating of the conflict with the PKK to abstract and ubiquitous 'terrorism', specifically with references to Turkish 'suffering'. Such references are present also amongst the military officers, but there are two differences especially as to how the PKK is implicated. Firstly, the PKK is mentioned explicitly by the military officers; secondly, the criticisms of other states for not unequivocally condemning it are stronger; with the officers more clearly fighting alternative identities for the PKK. In most of the articles of the newsletter, the PKK is never mentioned, but this should be expected from the general technicality of the articles (writing for example specifically on topics like 'money laundering'), and from their having a narrower audience compared both to the symposia speeches and the U.N. speeches. The instances of explicit interpellations are however very clear.

The connection between the PKK and the homogeneous phenomenon of 'terrorism' is made quite clear already in the opening speech at the first Centre symposium by General and Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök (2006a: x):

> We are a nation who has suffered from terrorism and a nation with thousands of martyrs because of terrorism […] For the past 35 years, Turkey has become the target of terrorism fueled by ideological, ethnic and religious hatred […] and more than 30 thousand Turkish citizens have been the victims of the bloody terrorist organization PKK/KONGRA-GEL. Being one of the countries that suffered a lot from terrorism, Turkey quite well understands the pains and the agony felt by the nations targeted by terrorism.

Özkök is communicating that the conflict with the PKK is a manifestation of a general phenomenon, by suggesting Turkish identification with other countries as a result of its own experiences with 'terrorism'. General and Chief of Staff İlker Başbuğ (2010: 8) reiterates this relation when stating that "Turkey has been fighting against PKK terrorist organization [sic] for more than 30 years", arguing further that "[s]tates and nations have to be ready to pay this price when necessary, as well". Deputy Chief of Staff Ergin Saygun (2008: 227) even argues that the PKK "constitutes a threat not only for Turkey but also for the international community at the same time". In a newsletter article, Colonel Halil Sarica (2007: 18) refers to Turkey as "a country suffering from terrorism for almost 40 years", arguing that "cooperation can only be possible by recognizing and evaluating every kind of terrorist organization as a common target without making any discrimination among them", while Captain Baki Gündüz (2009: 18) writes that "Turkey has been facing the terrorist threat from the PKK/KONGRAGEL terrorist organization for over a quarter century".

The rhetorical commonplace 'martyr' in General Özkök's above quote is worth stopping by. It is used also with reference to the casualties of Turkish soldiers at the hands of the PKK in the "General Overview of the Terrorist Activities" for the months October – December 2009 (Ak & Akyol 2009: 10), referring to "[s]even soldiers martyred during an armed attack". This is repeated in the Overviews for April – June 2010 (Erün & Akyol 2010: 8) and July – September 2010 (Erün & Özkan 2010: 12). 'Martyr' is also use by Colonel Tuncer (2008: 11), referring to "soldiers martyred in the conflict". When the military officers are articulating the commonplace to the fight against 'terrorism' in this way, it represents higher justifiable cause through its traditional association to (divine) self-sacrifice. This point is made even more interesting as in the article directly following that of Tuncer, Colonel Arif Ekmen (2008: 15-17) refers to 'martyrdom' – here in relation to 'terrorist' motivations and the way it provides "religious approval and glorification" – as something that "has a strong logic [but] not one that most of us can relate to", and which "runs counter to 'our' sense of logic".

The PKK is also included into the general representations of 'terrorism' through criticisms of unspecified 'nations' or 'European states' for being inconsistent in their condemnation of 'terrorist' groups and not always including the PKK. Chief of Staff Büyükanıt (2008: 10) refers to "continuing irrational practices and tolerance" which "harm[s] the security environment we strive to establish", arguing that "UN sanctions should be imposed on such countries". Deputy Chief of Staff Saygun (2008: 227) likewise states that European States

"turn a blind eye to the activities [of] the PKK and protect it". 'Double standards', a rhetorical commonplace used by many of the politicians and diplomats, is used also by the military, referred to as something that must be avoided (Güleryüz 2007a: 21), or as "the biggest obstacle in front of the international efficient defence strategies against terrorism" (Denizer 2008a: 8). The quintessential example of such criticism, however, is given by Lieutenant Colonel Kenan Tokgöz (2009: 31), who replicates his point twice in practically verbatim form (2010: 37; 2011: 32):

> Nations have been condemning terrorism with the harshest available terminology when they suffer from it, but otherwise prefer to turn a blind eye to the sufferings of other nations. For example, the PKK Terrorist Organization, which is responsible from deaths of thousands of Turkish citizens including not only the soldiers and police officers, but also civilian people, women and children and even babies, is in the list of terrorist organizations of both the EU and the US, but when we look at the certain media channels in these countries, they still present the PKK as a guerilla or insurgent group.

Tokgöz is specifically rejecting the alternative classification of the PKK as a 'guerilla group' or as 'insurgents' – rhetorical commonplaces belonging to or at least intersecting with other discourses. He even refers to the idea of "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" as an "illness" (Newsletter, July 2009). The annual repetition of this point by Tokgöz shows the continuous struggling with such alternative classifications. This same 'terrorist'/'freedom fighter' opposition is problematized by several other officers (Özkök 2006a: ix; Denizer 2008a: 40; Kulpcu 2010: 25). The rejection of such alternative identities is understandable in the sense that their acceptance would be a challenge to the legitimacy that is conferred on state practices represented as part of a fight against 'terrorism' (e.g., for acts of 'counter-terrorism' to make any sense, they need to successfully be related to 'terrorism').

Having covered how the conflict with the PKK is articulated to 'terrorism' as homogeneous and ubiquitous, the next section will analyze representations relating to the construction of the 'terrorist' identity, dependent upon 'terrorism' being a homogeneous phenomenon.

5.3   The illegitimate 'terrorist' identity

The main representations positioning the 'terrorist' identity follow by and large the same pattern as by the politicians and diplomats, with similar main elements: [1] 'terrorism' and 'terrorists' as morally deficient, [2] the condemnation of 'terrorist' motivations, and [3] 'terrorists' as being 'exploitative'. There are some differences, however. Firstly, the

representations of deficient morals are more explicit, to a higher degree involve the 'terrorist' identity directly, and include an extensive use of dehumanizing organic metaphors. And secondly, instead of rejecting the possibility of legitimate motivations, the military officers primarily make a series of allegations as to what the driving forces behind 'terrorism' are. In the following, I will go through these three main elements, adding a separate subsection for the organic metaphors due to their gravity and extensive use.

5.3.1   Vicious and remorseless

The articulation of 'terrorist' (or 'terrorism') to recurrent rhetorical commonplaces that place it on the negative side of crude moral dichotomies, contribute to constructing a strong enemy image. Captain Olcay Denizer (2008b: 9) refers to the "vicious circle" of terrorism, while Captains İbrahim Can and Nesip Ögun (2008: 23) characterize it as a "vicious threat" (Newsletter, May 2008). General Yaşar Büyükanıt (2008: 6) refers to "the terrorists' evil purposes", while Deputy Chief of Staff Aslan Güner (2010: 160) point to "their corrupted ends". The destructive nature of 'terrorists' is also unpacked in more elaborate terms. Discussing qualities that are central to 'terrorists', Colonel Arif Ekmen (2007: 10) mentions the lack of "[e]motions of [p]ity or [r]emorse", and the capability of "killing innocent, men, women and children in cold blood", while Major and Course Director at the NATO Centre, Ümit Güleryüz (2007b: 26) proposes that "[t]he ideology or psychology of a particular terrorist group may lead to fascination with poisons and disease". Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Uğur Ersen (2008: 28) argues that 'terrorist organizations' "feed on terrorist events and destruction", and if individuals attempt to leave such organizations, "as a minimum, they are exposed to physical and psychological torture".

'Terrorists' are also represented as lacking compromise. The same Ersen (ibid.) argues that 'terrorists' "have a tendency to see things in black and white", while Colonel Özden Çelik argues that "[t]here is no set target for the terrorists; you are either with them or against them" (2011: 23); a quote that gets an interesting hue in juxtaposition with George W. Bush's quote in relation to the 'war on terror' that "[e]ither you are with us or you are with the terrorists" (CNN 2001). A rather bizarre story by Ersen (2008: 30), referring to the PKK, illustrates further the 'terrorist's' lack of remorse:

> There was a demonstration in one of the cities in eastern part of Turkey [sic] and the terrorist
> organisation provoked the population for aggresion [sic]. They provoked the children, placed

them in front of the group and instructed them to throw stones to the police. The children threw stones to the police but the police reacted in a very different way. While defending themselves with shields, they started to distribute bananas to the children. The children stopped throwing the stones and ate the bananas. Of course, this may not be applicable in every occasion.

The 'terrorists' are remorseless to the extent that they will use children both as weapons and shields. The police view children differently and are apparently already equipped with bananas, giving them away as an act of reaching out, while using actual shields to protect themselves. This representation of using civilians as 'shields' is quite established in relation to 'terrorism'; for example, representatives of the Israeli state have repeatedly referred to Hamas in such a way, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interestingly making this description through the reference to Hamas as 'exploiting' civilians (MFA Israel 2009).

In some instances in the officers' accounts, 'terrorists' are even discursively stripped of their human qualities, either in a direct sense, by representing 'terrorism' as 'inhuman' (Başbuğ 2010: 8), by referring to 'terrorism' as a 'monster' (Özkök 2006a: XIII), or by likening 'terrorists' to animals. As an example of the latter, Lieutenant Colonel Uğur Ersen (2008: 28) compares 'terrorists' to dogs, noting that a test where dogs are repeatedly subjected to electrical shocks in order to make them change their behavior "provides remarkable results", arguing that it "may be a good example for the psychological conditions of the terrorists inside the organization". The most extensive contribution to the dehumanization of the 'terrorist', however, is through a set of organic metaphors to represent both Self and Other, which I discuss in the following subsection.

5.3.2 The social body and the illness of terrorism

There is an extensive use of organic metaphors in the military officers' representations that deservee special attention because they strongly delegitimize and dehumanize 'terrorists' by representing 'terrorism' as 'virus' or 'illness' to the healthy social 'body'; and because they illustrate the central role of intertextuality. In the opening speech at the first NATO Centre symposium, Chief of Staff Özkök (2006a: viii) describes 'terrorism' as "the gravest social illness of our century", while General Büyükanıt, (2008: 11), subsequent Chief of Staff, refers to 'terrorism' as "the pestilence of our era". In the newsletters, Colonel Arif Ekmen (2008: 19) characterizes "[s]uicide terrorism" as a "virus which has now mutated out of control", while Captain Nesip Öğün (2008: 20) refers to "the terror that spreads throughout the world

like a vermin". In relation to the definition of 'terrorism', Colonel Kenan Tokgöz (2011: 32) argues that "[d]efining a problem means diagnosing an illness. To be able to treat the illness effectively, you should first diagnose it properly". Lieutenant Colonel Ersen (2008: 25-26) makes a portrayal of 'infection' with more 'scientific' terminology, arguing that

> [w]hen the target population is difficult to reach, the terrorist organisations use the infection method. In this model, a trusted agent is inserted into the target population to influence potential recruits through direct, personal appeals […] Infection is likely to be most successful in large governmental organisations such as the policy or the military.

The idea of 'terrorsim' being alive (thus with a potential of being 'killed') is supported also by its articulation to rhetorical commonplaces such as 'lifeline' or 'nourish', representing it as needing 'oxygen' and living within an 'ecosystem'. A statement by Chief of Staff İlker Başbuğ (2010: 10) serves as an example: "The terrorist organizations try to shape the ecosystem they are in […] Therefore, a major aim must be to transform the ecosystem feeding terrorist organizations into a system that shortens the life of these organizations". Lieutenant Colonel Ergün Erün (2010: 16) writes in a similar fashion that "ungoverned regions" provide "fertile ground for terrorist to nourish".[55]

If 'terrorism' is an 'illness', it needs a target for such 'infection'. This target is a metaphorical understanding of the Self as a healthy *body*, of which 'terrorism' is naturally not a part. A statement by General Büyükanıt (2008: 12) is perhaps the most illuminating: "It is certain that, as long as [terrorism] remains within our body like a cancer cell, wasting our efforts in seeking to name terrorism, instead of wiping it out, will merely spread the cell to our whole body and worsen the pain". General Özkök (2006b: 263) argues that it attempts to "infect our world without minding time, place and power", making the goal of the collective "not to acquire immunity to this virus, but to destroy the virus completely as one of the greatest shame [sic] of history of mankind". Besides the obvious potential for delegitimization in describing the Other as 'illness' or 'infection', one should be attentive to the way the metaphor of the social 'body' affects the general representation of conflicts. This type of bodily metaphor "renders complex problems simplistically [… and] mandates (often violent) intervention as the appropriate course of action that will result in a cure" (Campbell 1998a:

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55 The rhetorical commonplace 'fertile ground' can be identified in the 2003 U.S. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* as well, which states that "we will […] ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation" (White House 2003: 23). It is an often articulated commonplace to 'terrorism' in general (a Google search on 'terrorism fertile ground' is revealing).

75). Acts of securitization also become more effective when the referent object can be represented as something whose *survival* is threatened; responses must be given, or else "the unit […] will no longer exist as an independent and sovereign body" (Staun 2010: 412-413).

This representation of a social collective (generally the state) as a body with multiple interdependent parts, and the Other as an 'illness', has strong historical linkages. The body politic metaphor dates at least back to antiquity and was consistently used throughout the Middle Ages, but more importantly in this regard, such a representation has been reproduced throughout modern political history, often with derogatory Otherness following along (Musolff 2010; Campbell 1998a: 75ff). Winston Churchill, for example, described 'Bolshevism' (a form of Communism) in a way quite similar to the Turkish military officers above: "[I]t is not a policy; it's a disease. It is not a creed; it is a pestilence […] It breaks out with great suddenness; it is violently contagious; it throws people into a frenzy of excitement; it spreads with extraordinary rapidity; the mortality is terrible, so that after a while, like other pestilences, the disease tends to wear itself out" (quoted in Campbell 1998a: 156). Without making any further comparison beyond pointing to similar derogatory Otherness, such metaphors to describe the illegitimate Other were also used by Adolf Hitler in *Mein Kampf*, referring to the Jew as "a parasite in the body of other peoples […] a sponger who like an infection bacillus keeps spreading […] as soon as a favourable medium invites him. And the effect of his existence is also similar to that of spongers: wherever he appears, the host nation […] dies out after a shorter or longer period" (quoted in Musolff 2010: 25).

The historical role of the metaphor becomes even more interesting when we see it directly related to how Turkey has been portrayed by representatives of 'Europe' or 'the West'. In 1914, British Prime Minister Lloyd George described the Turkish people as "a human cancer, a creeping agony in the flesh of the lands which they misgoverned" (quoted in Pope & Pope 2011: 59), and in 1919, The *New York Tribune* wrote that "the Turks have always been a parasite and a stench in the nostrils of civilization" (ibid.), which also shows the role of 'civilization' in this drawing of identity boundaries. The metaphor also found its way into the political discourse of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. One of his statements is paraphrased by many of the military officers in my analysis: "Mankind is a single body and each nation is part of that body. We must never say 'What does it matter to me if some part of the world is ailing?' If there is such an illness, we must concern ourselves with it as though we were having that

illness" (COE-DAT 2013). Atatürk uses the metaphor as an argument for *cooperating* against bodily 'ailments': 'terrorism' being such an ailment in military officers' representations.

5.3.3 The motivations of terrorists

As briefly noted already, the military officers make a series of allegations as to what the motivations of 'terrorists' are, in slight contrast with the politicians and diplomats, who generally reject the idea of legitimate motivation. These motivations of 'terrorists' are generally represented as symbolic, with the 'terrorist organization' wishing to "affect the masses with its activities" (Özkök 2006a: viii) in a way that "destroy[s] the regime's authority, ability to govern and legitimacy" (Tokgöz 2009: 32), or that "prov[es] that officials, institutions and symbols can be attacked without being able to defend themselves" (Tokgöz 2011: 34). What this effectively does is "to drive a wedge between the people and the authorities", leading to a situation where "the terrorists are seen as freedom fighters" (Kiliç 2007: 16). The way this is discussed again shows an *a priori* understanding of 'terrorist' illegitimacy: Though 'terrorist' acts are not legitimate *in reality*, the audience might believe that they are if the 'terrorists' are successful in driving this 'wedge'. General Saygun (2008: 230) shows this perspective when stating that "[t]he terrorist organizations try to prove that their terrorist acts are legitimate, that their acts are supported by large masses of people, and that they are engaged in justifiable conflicts, by alleging that they represent large groups".

The officers' discussion of motivations often reads the 'terrorist' through a form of distorted cost-benefit rationality where both the protraction of conflict and a high amount of casualties become positives to the 'terrorists'. Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 17) argues that the "whole point of the terrorist attack is to do something horrific to provoke massive retaliation", and that they "usually want a protracted war", while Colonel Arif Ekmen (2008: 16) – commenting on the low costs of 'suicide operations' – argues that "this modest sum yields a very attractive return: on average, suicide operations worldwide kill about four times as many people as other kinds of terrorist attacks". Such characterizations depend upon a given understanding of the 'terrorist mindset', allowing for the argument that "the actual damage to the people, even their supporters, is a benefit, not a cost of terrorist action" (Kiliç 2007: 16). Establishing this mindset facilitates the placing of the whole burden of casualties in a conflict on the side of the 'terrorists'**,** although by 2002 in the case of Turkey and the PKK, more than four times as many PKK fighters had been killed than military soldiers (Jacoby 2010: 99-

100). Captain Baki Gündüz (2009: 18) refers to the PKK as "responsible for killing more than 30.000 Turkish citizens", while General Özkök (2006a: xiii) argues that "more than 30 thousand Turkish citizens [have] been the victims of the bloody terrorist organization PKK/KONGRA-GEL". The total death-toll in this conflict is generally put at between 20,000 and 40,000 (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 19; Pope & Pope 2011: 255).

A striking side to these discussions of motivations is that there are almost no mentions of motivations *beyond* the creation of fear or the undermining of public trust in authorities. Though political goals are mentioned at a few points, they are not discussed with any degree of specificity. When there is such an emphasis on protraction or destruction, but not on any *ultimate* motives, the result is a circularity where the 'terrorist' fights to prove the legitimacy of a fight that ultimately consists in proving legitimacy. From this it becomes almost a given what practices (e.g.) the security forces can sensibly undertake; when specific identities are distributed, the right approaches easily become defined at the same time (Weldes 1996).

5.3.4 The manipulative terrorist

Thus far, we have seen 'terrorists' being represented as morally deficient, as 'illness' hurting the healthy social 'body', and as having motivations mostly restricted to the undermining of public trust and the protraction of violent conflict. The last element I will emphasize here is the representation of 'terrorists' as manipulative, often including the rhetorical commonplace 'exploit' that we saw used in chapter 4. However, as there are also many instances of representing a manipulative nature that do not include 'exploit' specifically, I will go through examples of these first.

There are three main ways that 'terrorists' are represented as manipulative. The first is the manipulation of public opinion. In his 2008 symposium speech, General Büyükanıt (2008: 6) argues that "[t]errorist organizations constantly manipulate international public opinion through the biased information that they circulate, and that "[t]rapped by the misinformation of terrorist organizations public opinion may, therefore, serve the terrorists' evil purposes". In a similar fashion, Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 20) writes that 'terrorists' realize that the government needs the trust of the people "and can use fiendishly clever strategies for eroding this trust and fomenting resentment and hatred". The second way is related to freedoms that the 'terrorists' cannot legitimately claim. Deputy Chief of Staff Ergin Saygun (2008: 226)

states that "wanted terrorists can manipulate the freedoms provided to them by the democratic system for their own ends, using *as a pretext* the basic shared values of the civilized world such as minority rights, individual rights and liberties, and freedom of speech [emphasis added]", while General Büyükanıt (2008: 10) refers to the supporters of 'terrorism' "acting *under the guise* of freedom of speech [emphasis added]". The third involves recruitment to 'terrorist' organizations. As an example, Colonel Arif Ekmen (2007: 8) argues that "[t]errorist organizations gain the youth through social and psychological methods in line with the face-to-face propaganda". In all of these arguments we see the reproductive nature of discourse: The characterizations of 'manipulation' build on an existing understanding of what the 'terrorist' identity is (and what the nature of the mentioned freedoms is), but at the same time the invocations of such representations in practice serves to reproduce them.

By looking to a 1946 statement by U.S. Senator James Eastland (quoted in Jackson 2006: 134 [emphases added]), speaking about the position of Germany vis-à-vis 'Western civilization', we see an aspect of intertextuality also for such representations of manipulation:

> [T]he time has come for the American people to be told what it would mean if Germany […] were to be incorporated into a totalitarian tyranny, masked *under the guise of a modern democracy*, *manipulated* by a *vicious* and sadistic minority of totalitarian Communists who have preached openly throughout the world the doctrine that there is nothing left in western civilization worth preserving […]

Note the highly similar way that the 'outside' is separated from the 'inside' both in the representation of 'Communists' and 'terrorists' as the Other. Many of the same rhetorical commonplaces ('under the guise', 'manipulate') are even invoked in order to do this. Rather than seeing such similarities merely as expressions of a 'universal' human tendency of castigating the Other, a discourse theoretical perspective will emphasize how rhetorical commonplaces are reproduced throughout time and find their way through various contexts.

The rhetorical commonplace 'exploit' plays a central part for such accounts of manipulation, following the same thematic pattern as above. The intertextual links to the U.S. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* of 2003 and 2006 are even clearer here than amongst the politicians and diplomats, as the specific phrase "to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit" (The White House 2003: 6, 23; 2006: 10) is virtually copied by Colonel Arif Ekmen (2007: 12) and Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 18). There are also other

references to this 'exploiting' of socioeconomic factors for recruitment. Ekmen (2007: 8-9) argues that "the economic social and psychological needs" of young people are "being exploited" for recruitment by "terrorist organizations", while General Büyükanıt (2008: 5) refers to "people […] living on the brink of starvation", and that "[t]his state of affairs is exploited most effectively by terrorist organizations" As a final example, General Özkök (2006a: xiii) refers to stopping the 'exploitation' of "political, economic and social problems" in the Middle East.[56]

Having now covered all the main representations that form the 'terrorist' identity, some general observations can be made: All of them contribute severely to *delegitimizing* this identity, and thus whoever is successfully interpellated into it. When 'terrorists' are (e.g.) manipulative, intent on prolonging conflict and without compromise, this also discursively marginalizes any question of whether 'counter-terrorism' and 'terrorism' can be mutually reproductive; 'terrorism' becoming so detached from Self that there is no real ground from which to argue that the actions undertaken by the Self might in fact stimulate 'terrorism'. Instead we see questions such as that of Kiliç (2007: 15), asking whether we are "capturing, killing, deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the terrorists are recruiting, training and deploying against us". And simultaneously as the 'terrorist' is delegitimized, the Self is relationally *legitimized*. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I turn the focus to this Self that is opposing 'terrorism', and thus to the last half of my specified research question: How do the main representations of 'terrorism'/'terrorist' enable the negotiation of Turkish 'difference' vis-à-vis 'Europe' and 'the West'?

5.4   Representing the common Self

The goal of this section is to consider which collective identities the Turkish officers draw on in their representations; either strengthening or diversifying the insight from chapter 4 into how the concepts of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' can take part in constituting Self-identity. By the politicians and diplomats, Turkish 'difference' was negotiated through 'terrorism'/'terrorist' as the constitutive Other. Turkey was initially represented as part of the collective Self of 'civilization', which after 2003 gradually was both pluralized and

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56 We see that the way 'terrorists' interact with socioeconomic factors necessarily involves an element of exploitation, without this being described in any further detail by the actors. It is however necessary for the stability of the 'terrorist' identity, as 'terrorist' and (e.g.) 'humanitarian worker' are mutually exclusive identities.

marginalized in favor of 'humanity'/'humankind'. There was also an increased emphasis on cultural and religious diversity being positives to the common Self, and on breaking the articulation between 'Islam' and 'terrorism'. Through these changes, a discourse with 'Western' origins was upheld through the prominence of liberalist universalism, even as the AKP politicians drew attention towards 'Eastern civilizational' inspiration.

At the outset, I expected significant divergences from the above in the military officers' representations of Self-identity. These expectations were met to a partial degree at best. Apart from explicit criticisms of 'universal values' by General and Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt (2008) and Captain Olcay Denizer (2008), a generally stronger focus on the role of the nation-state amongst the officers, and less use of both the plural and singular form of 'civilization', similarities to the accounts of the politicians and diplomats are actually more conspicuous than differences. For example, there is extensive reproduction of liberalist discourse and several instances of breaking the articulation between Islam and 'terrorism', with the negotiation of Turkish 'difference' being performed in a similar fashion as in chapter 4. I will begin by discussing the critical accounts, though they are not representative of the whole material, as this is where the divergences from chapter 4 are most clear.

5.4.1 Rejecting universality: an alternative representation

Though the military officers are consistently referring to 'terrorism' as a homogeneous and common threat that needs to be fought in concert, some of the officers express skepticism towards this commonality being one centered on any conception of 'universal values'. In these accounts the Self is mainly characterized as a collective of *nation-states*. The strongest carrier of this representation is General Yaşar Büyükanıt (2008: 8). The following statement is indeed clear:

> [D]eveloped countries are manipulating some values in the name of 'universal values', in line with their interests. While trying to translate the values presented as universal values into practice, microstructures in developing countries are activated. Because of this, the developing countries, which are quite susceptible to outside intervention during their transition process, experience major trauma and chaos

Here we see that 'trauma' (another organic metaphor) is not articulated to 'terrorism', but to the intervention of 'developed countries' into 'developing countries', under the pretext of 'universal values'. Even 'manipulation' is articulated to this same subject position. Büyükanıt

furthermore argues that "[t]he prosperity created by the developed nations has enabled the formation of a common identity among the communities in those nations, an identity that ensures the continuation of their prosperous state" (ibid.), which needs to be understood as implicating some conception of a 'Western' identity. Büyükanıt is clearly representing Turkey not as part of this identity, in contrast to the general pattern in the United Nations speeches. His arguments underline a given way of mobilizing rhetorical commonplaces ('universal values') for a purpose (continuation of a 'prosperous state'), one that is exclusive of many of the statements of the politicians and diplomats, where common values are represented as universal (e.g. Pamir 2003c: 2; Erdoğan 2009: 35).

Büyükanıt offers an alternative representation of Self-identity where the fight against 'terrorism' – though still global – is centered on the 'nation-state' as lowest common denominator. Rather than an opposition between 'terrorists' and 'universal values' (or even any common 'civilization'), the 'terrorist' is contrasted with the nation-state as Self:

> [T]errorist organizations perceive the nation-state structure to be the biggest obstacle threatening their very existence. The aim of the terrorist organizations is to damage, shake and then destroy this structure […] Because of this, as nation-states we have to think internationally and act regionally (2008: 7)

This is communicated similarly when Büyükanıt (ibid.) argues that the "major guarantee against [terrorism] is again the nation-state with its strong institutions, as well as international organizations for cooperation formed by the nation-states". Notice that Büyükanıt does indeed point to a supra-national collectivity, but that this is explicitly bound to the nation-state, not to common 'civilization' or 'universal values'. Büyükanıt does also invoke 'humanity' as a larger collective identity, but this is still a collective centered on the nation-state. He (2008; 7, 9) argues that that "humanity needs an entity like a 'state' which transcends individuals", and he paraphrases the statement of "the great Leader Atatürk" mentioned in section 5.3.2, of 'mankind' as a unified body where the 'organs' are nations.

Considering statements given domestically by Büyükanıt, the above accounts are unsurprising. In Turkey he has argued that "universal values like human rights and rule of law" have been "used as a shield to protect terrorists" (Hürriyet Daily News 2001);[57] rather

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57 Note that Büyükanıt is employing here the very same 'shield' metaphor that I discussed in relation to 'terrorists' in section 5.3.1

than what should be safeguarded in the fight against 'terrorism', such values are making the fight *harder*. In a speech at the opening of the 2007-2008 educational year of the Turkish Military Academy, he stated that "there is no power strong enough to divide Turkey", emphasizing that the "national and secular state […] is and will continue to be our very reason for existence" (Hürriyet Daily News 2007). And though Büyükanıt was the one to declare the Turkish Army's support for joining the European Union (EU), he referred to the EU as "the geo-political and geo-strategic ultimate condition for the realization of the target of modernization which Mustafa Kemal Ataturk chose for the Turkish nation", while also underlining as counterproductive "the efforts of foreign circles to achieve their own goals in Turkey by putting forward the supreme ideals of the EU and bringing the Turkish Armed Forces into the agenda on every occasion". In these statements we see traces of what Onar (2007: 284) refers to as the 'Sèvres syndrome'; the continued fear of European intentions of undermining Turkish state 'unity', from which follows a skepticism towards any narrowly defined universal value-collective. This impression is strengthened by Büyükanıt's statement, during the same declaration of support, that "so-called friendly countries, instead of supporting our fight against terrorism, protected the leader of a terrorist organization […] and used the values such as human rights and the rule of law as a shield against these enemies of mankind" (Hürriyet Daily News 2003).

Büyükanıt is not alone in expressing this discursive opposition. Chief of Staff and General Hilmi Özkök (2006a: ix) – though his accounts are much more ambivalent – argues that the fight's *most important* parameter is that "each nation should respect the political, economic, cultural and religious sensitivities in another country, especially the border security and territorial integrity of all other countries", expressing thus a similar concern for the ontological security of the nation-state. In the Centre newsletter, Captain Olcay Denizer (2008b: 8) argues that 'terrorists' try to 'erode' and 'destroy' the nation-state structure. He also makes a longer critical statement in an earlier article (2008a: 41), which is both clearly critical and includes the role of the PKK:

> [I]t is hard to believe that people, global civil societies, states or international organizations show the same interest, sensitiveness or 'consciousness' to every similar case. It was not until May 2, 2002 that the European Union finally entered on its list of banned terrorist organizations the two deadliest networks directed against Turkey: the PKK and DHKP-C, which killed thousands of innocent people. Why did the EU wait so long? […] What about the global norms? […]It is not the

'global, universal norms' that force the states to act, it is the national interest. In other words, every nation has its own concerns and every nation follows in its own interest.

Nations are interacting in a self-help environment, and they act according to the 'national interest', *not* according to some overarching norms that bind them together; a quite 'realist' view of international relations – and a contrast to the reproduction of liberalist universalism of many of the other officers. It is the 'terrorist' challenging of the ontological security of the nation-state that is central to radical and threatening Otherness, not any opposition to 'universal values'. In section 5.4.3 we will see contrasts to this in the references to values by the high-ranking officers (besides Büyükanıt). Before this I will move by the ambiguous attitude towards 'common' or 'universal' values in the newsletter articles.

5.4.2 The newsletter articles: ambiguous identity

While the criticism towards a common identity centered on 'universal' or 'common' values is quite clear in the above statements, this is far from unequivocal amongst the military officers. It is not even the dominant trend: In total there are very few explicit criticisms towards such conceptions amongst the military officers. But at the same time there is little clear embracing of such conceptions, making the overall impression ambiguous. This is primarily true for the newsletter articles, which do not always define the Self from which the Officers are writing (the officers invoke a common 'we', but often without defining it). This suggests that the negotiation of 'difference' plays a less important role here. Again the articles' technical nature, discussing for example the phenomenon of 'suicide bombing' or 'money laundering', and their narrower audience must be seen as explanatory. When the officers do define a common Self-identity opposing 'terrorism', this is seldom articulated to values. The following statement of Colonel Arif Ekmen (2007: 11) is typical here: "Terrorism threatens all states, their allies, interests, and the world community". There is both a set of states with separate interests and allies *and* a 'world community', but this is not explicitly oriented towards 'common' or 'universal' values.

Having said that, some statements reproducing both a singular conception of 'civilization' and rhetorical commonplaces from liberalist discourse are worth stopping by, especially the account of Lieutenant Colonel Halil Sarica. He (2007: 15) refers to 'terrorism' as a threat to "our security, to the values of our societies and to the rights and freedoms of our citizens", arguing (ibid.: 18) that "good governance and the rule of law, with professional police and

security forces who respect human rights" is a central part of "our global counter-terrorism effort", as well as that "human rights and the rule of law should be core values for our counter strategy", which if sacrificed by the common Self, will be "handing a victory to the terrorists" (ibid.). Sarica (ibid.: 5) also makes a very interesting reference to a singular conception of 'civilization', central to the negotiation of 'difference', arguing that "[t]he target of terrorism is not a single society culture or civilization, but the whole 'humanity and civilization'". During World War I the Allied Powers referred to the mass killings of Armenians during the War as "these new crimes by Turkey against humanity and civilization" (U.S. Department of State 1915). These are events that have ever since been a headache for the Turkish state due to strong international condemnation and references to this as a 'genocide' – a word which used in Turkey still is a reason for getting arrested (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 25). By differentiating this from 'terrorism', Sarica is simultaneously moving Turkish identity inside of it. This exact same statement is repeated by Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök (2006a: x) as well.

Having discussed briefly how the newsletter articles give an ambiguous impression of Self-identity and its relation to 'common' values, I move to the other high-ranking officers besides Büyükanıt holding speeches at the symposia, where there are clearer references to 'common values', reproducing liberalist universalism in a similar way as the AKP politicians.

5.4.3 Embracing 'common values'

Divergences from the account championed primarily by Büyükanıt and Denizer in section 5.4.1 are most apparent with the other high-ranking officers. In his 2008 speech, General Ergin Saygun does not at all mention the 'nation-state' in relation to Self-identity, but he does reproduce a chain of rhetorical commonplaces reflecting liberalist universalism, representing these as common to the collective, 'civilized' Self, by referring to "the basic shared values of the civilized world such as minority rights, individual rights and liberties, and freedom of speech […]" (ibid.: 226). By Saygun mentioning 'civilized' here we see how these discourses intersect. Former Chief of Staff and General İlker Başbuğ (2010: 7) makes a similar representation when stating that "[t]errorism threatens the common human values, democracy, freedoms, human rights, including the right to live, which are the products of centuries-long giant efforts and sacrifices", himself also omitting the 'nation-state'. Başbuğ (ibid.: 8) even shows a multi-faceted understanding of the concept of 'security' itself, stating that it is "a holistic entity […] an all-out renovation initiative which aims to place human needs in the

locus of new security" – reproducing here an idea of 'human security' with liberal underpinnings (see Begby & Burgess 2009). The day after Başbuğ, Deputy Chief of Staff Aslan Güner (2010: 157) asks "how to fight terrorism while preserving our human rights and liberties, democracy and shared values", referring also to 'terrorism' as constituting "the greatest challenge to human rights and international peace and security" (ibid.: 161).

It is very interesting to see these high-ranking officers speak about 'terrorism' in a way that converges significantly with the politicians of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), especially considering that Başbuğ, Güner and Saygun have all been arrested since January 2012 on allegations of participation in plans of overthrowing the government (Güner for involvement in the 1997 'post-modern coup'). It is also of interest due to earlier interventions of the Turkish military and the changes these ushered in. After the 1971 intervention, elements of the constitution were curtailed due to concerns for state security, leading to the repression of trade unions and restrictions on the freedom of university campuses (Pope & Pope 2011: 104). And after the 1980 intervention, Chief of Staff Kenan Evren stated that "we have to sacrifice some personal rights for the security of the community" (Marcus 2007: 84). Somewhat confusingly, however, there is apparently no perceived incompatibility in emphasizing 'democracy', 'freedoms' and 'human rights', and at the same time stating that though "the freedom of the press […] should be respected in every way, it should be kept in mind that freedoms must have their limits especially when they start damaging the society" (Başbuğ 2010: 12).

Rather than seeing these accounts by the high-ranking officers solely as manifestations of personal beliefs, they should be considered to reveal discursive constraints; the officers are speaking within an international discourse which most likely diverges significantly from a Turkish military discourse on domestic security concerns, conditioned by certain ways of discussing 'terrorism' and the collective Self. This is not to say that the officers cannot have gradually adopted such a discourse domestically as well – the accession process to the European Union and the fact that most rhetorical commonplaces from liberalist discourse are prominent in the last years of analysis suggests a possible change across time. If so, the concept of 'Europeanization' would be pertinent to describe this. Though the concept is often used in a way that makes the 'European' appear as a thing that gets put into political actors' minds, leading to certain policies (Müftüler-Baç & Gürsoy 2010) or in a way that sees the orientation towards "EU foreign policy norms and practices" through the prism of rational

calculation which hides decision-makers' 'true' nature (Oğuzlu 2010: 658), we could instead adapt it to discourse theory by understanding it as the gradual socialization into a discourse.

In any case, the adoption and employment of rhetorical commonplaces such as 'human rights' and 'rule of law' is a way of negotiating 'difference', as for example Turkey's 'human rights record' in relation to the Kurdish minority and the fight against domestic 'terrorism' has been subjected to repeated international criticism and been a source of differentiation from the EU. As argued by Pope and Pope (2011: 38), the language used by 'the West' in such criticism is very similar to that used by 19th century Europe against the Ottoman Empire. When the high-ranking officers are talking about 'terrorism' as a threat to 'basic shared values' of the 'civilized' world, or as a threat to 'democracy', 'freedoms' and 'human rights', they are thus shifting the perspective and becoming the safeguard of such principles against the Other threatening to undermine them. What the 'real intentions' of these officers are (for example, whether they are 'faking' it or not) is less interesting; we are interested in the actual enunciations that construct the reality of the fight against 'terrorism'.

5.4.4 Breaking in the name of religion

Because of the traditional role of the Turkish military in safeguarding the secular (laicist) characteristics of the Turkish state, with the military even today suppressing traces of Muslim identity so as to not endanger the achievements of secularism (Tank 2006: 466), one could expect the representations of religious factors in relation to 'terrorism' to reveal clear differences to those of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) politicians, especially as my studied time span (2006 – 2011) covers a period of increased skepticism from Kemalism regarding the possible 'Islamist intensions' of the AKP (Onar 2007).

Only certain aspects of these representations are reflected in the material. Divergences are seen by there being very few references to plural 'civilizations' and none to the importance of (e.g.) 'Eastern' inspiration to the common Self, as well as few references to religion in general – especially in the newsletter articles. But these divergences notwithstanding, there is not a single instance of reproducing an articulation between Islam/religion and 'terrorism' (though Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök (2006a: xiii) does mention 'religious hatred' as one of the driving forces behind 'terrorism' at one point). There are however many instances of *breaking* such an articulation, as well as expressed concerns for conflicts deriving from cultural difference.

Colonel Arif Ekmen (2008: 19) argues that religion "must not be made to seem synonymous with terror", and that "[t]he focus should not be on Islam", while Captain Olcay Denizer (2008b: 9) – one of the two officers expressing skepticism towards 'universal values' – writes that the term 'Islamic terror' leads to unconscious association of those with religious identity to 'terrorism', which makes "different cultures go away from each other rather than combining them".

Similar concerns are expressed by the high-ranking officers. Özkök (2006a: xiii) argues that

> identifying some cultural codes in the world as more prone to terrorism […] will not only make it difficult to understand the real causes of terrorism, but also serve the radicalization of the masses, which have nothing to do with terrorism […] At the point reached so far, the most frightening development should be a clash of civilizations […] Shouldn't the mankind who managed to split atom [sic], be able to overcome the prejudices of people against each other?

Here we see an explicit fear of the Huntingtonian 'clash of civilizations' that I discussed in section 4.5.3; a representation that became more salient in political discourse after the September 11 attacks. Four years after Özkök, Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ (2010: 8) even argues that articulating 'Islam' to 'terrorism' would even serve the purposes of the 'terrorists', noting that "identification of the heavenly religion of Islam with terrorism would also serve the political aim of global terrorism". Even General Büyükanıt,who has earlier warned that 'fundamentalism' in Turkey has "acquired dangerous proportions" (Onar 2007: 280), and who warned that the military would protect Turkish secularism from 'centres of evil' in relation to the election of Abdullah Gül as President in 2007 (Minority Rights Group International 2011), breaks this articulation, though he is more indirect:

> [A] number of researchers, when categorizing terrorism, put certain adjectives in front of the word terrorism which will lead people to think that certain cultural codes are more prone to terrorism. Such an approach may give rise to dangerous results, such as the emergence of prejudices in determining the real sources that feed terrorism […] because some fixed ideas are far from scientific objectivity (2008: 8-9).

A conclusion to draw from this is that the negotiation of Turkish 'difference' vis-à-vis 'Europe' and 'the West' due to its Islamic character, is *more important* than the safeguarding of secularism and explicit distancing from the discourse of the AKP politicians. If they so wished, it would most likely be possible for the officers' to represent the increasing role of religion in societies as offering (e.g.) a 'breeding ground' for 'radicalism' and 'terrorism', but

instead of observing anything like this, we rather see those types of argument represented as *supporting* 'terrorism', as in Başbuğ's account above.

5.5 Summary

Before moving to my final chapter, I will briefly reiterate the main points of chapter 5. Again there are six main points to emphasize:

[1] The military officers represent 'terrorism' as a homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon very similarly to the politicians and diplomats, expressing the need for a 'common struggle' which there is an obligation to take part in.

[2] The PKK is linked to this abstract phenomenon of 'terrorism' through many references to Turkish 'suffering', including several clear criticisms of other countries' approaches towards 'terrorist groups', sometimes explicitly implicating 'European countries'. In contrast with the political/diplomatic accounts, the PKK is here consistently mentioned in name.

[3] The 'terrorist' identity is constructed as fundamentally illegitimate through representations of moral deficiency; dehumanizing organic metaphors; allegations of motivations where protratcted war and high casualty counts become positives; and as 'manipulating' or 'exploiting' socioeconomic factors, freedoms and people.

[4] In the representations of Self-identity there is an alternative representation that is not present with the politicians and diplomats, carried foremost by Chief of Staff from 2006-2008, Yaşar Büyükanıt, expressing skepticism towards an idea of 'universal values'.

[5] While the main tendency amongst the officers, especially in the Centre newsletter, is one of few explicit references to Self-identity, there are several instances of negotiating 'difference', including the reproduction of elements of liberalist discourse in a way quite similar to the (AKP) politicians and diplomats.

[6] Contrary to my initial expectations, there are very few signs of the military officers demonstrating a different approach to the relation between 'terrorism' and religion/Islam to that of the politicians and diplomats, with many of the officers breaking this articulation.

6.

Representing 'Terrorism': Discussion and Conclusions

> To put all living things that aren't human into one category is, first of all, a stupid gesture –
> theoretically ridiculous – and partakes in the very real violence that humans exercise towards
> animals. That leads to slaughterhouses, their industrial treatment, their consumption. All this
> violence towards animals is engendered in this conceptual simplification which allows one to
> say 'animals' in general.
>
> - Jacques Derrida, in the documentary *Derrida*

The goal of this thesis has been to analyze how Turkish politicians, diplomats and military officers represent 'terrorism' as phenomenon and 'terrorist' as identity internationally. I wanted to see how these representations tie in the particular conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), as well as how they contribute to the construction of the Turkish Self, especially the negotiation of its historical 'difference' vis-à-vis a 'European' and 'Western' collective identity. The goal of this last chapter is to summarize the findings from my analyses, to discuss how representations of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' can affect political practice, and to offer concluding remarks – including a tentative view towards the future of the conflict with the PKK.

6.1 Summary of the politicians' and diplomats' representations

The politicians and diplomats speaking at the United Nations between 2001 and 2012 unequivocally represent 'terrorism' as a homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon – a threat with a 'global' reach that affects everyone either now or eventually. This is tied to the conclusion that the only way to fight 'terrorism' is through a 'common struggle', of which there is a duty for all members of the collective Self to take part. There are no attempts to distinguish or differentiate between 'terrorists', and even several instances of rejecting such distinctions, arguing for the avoidance of 'double standards' and for condemning 'terrorism' in 'all its forms and manifestations'. The references to 'terrorism' are unspecific, as it is not explained what makes a given event a 'terrorist' event, and as no specific actors are mentioned (except Osama Bin Laden once). Though the PKK is only pointed to indirectly, for example as "a terrorist organization targeting Turkey" (İlkin 2008b: 19) or "a terrorist separatist organization" (Çorman 2008a: 11), it is tied into these representations through

references to Turkish yearlong 'sufferings' from 'terrorism'. Several times the politicians and diplomats do this while criticizing the use of 'double standards', of which Turkey has been a victim, arguing for "the urgent need to put aside selective attitudes based on political motivations and tolerance for […] certain terrorist movements" (Cengizer 2002c: 10).

The representation of the phenomenon of 'terrorism' makes possible a unitary 'terrorist' *identity*. I argued that this identity is affected by three aspects in particular: [1] the articulation of 'terrorism' to rhetorical commonplaces supporting a crude image of immorality, such as 'evil', 'heinous' and 'carnage'; [2] the rejection of the idea that 'terrorism' can ever have a legitimate motivation, including seeing political goals as any form of justification; and [3] the representation of 'terrorists' as 'exploitative', taking advantage of socioeconomic factors or 'democratic' rights and freedoms to further their illegitimate causes. While these representations are contingent on an established position of the 'terrorist' as *a priori* illegitimate in the discourse, illustrated by the many intertextual links to (e.g.) U.S. 'counter-terrorism' strategy, they take part in reinforcing this very same position. Through its implication in the representations, the PKK is also discursively affected by these aspects of the 'terrorist' identity.

As for aspects pertaining to Self-identity, 'terrorism' is represented mainly as a threat to the existence of common 'civilization' at the beginning of the period of analysis; as put by Deputy U.N. Ambassador Altay Cengizer (2003: 24), "it has started to kill the very essence of civilization". This 'civilization' is tied to common values represented as universal, as when Ambassador Ümit Pamir (2003c: 2) refers to them as "distilled from the moment the human adventure started on earth". I showed that by invoking 'civilization' in this way, the Turkish actors are reproducing a rhetorical commonplace historically rooted in European discourses of Otherness, to which both the Ottoman Empire and Turkey have been subjected. Representing 'terrorism' as a threat to common 'civilization' serves as a way of moving Turkey closer to both 'Europe' and 'the West', securing its position on the 'inside' of the boundaries of identity. In this way, it is a continuation of what Bilgin (2009: 122) refers to as the Turkish founding leaders' of negotiating 'difference' through "lifting Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization".

From mid-2003, however, the singular form of 'civilization' gradually loses its presence in the United Nations speeches. This development coincides with the coming to power of the

Justice and Development Party (AKP) in late-2002. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül's first speech (2003) marks a divide in the material , as he pluralizes 'civilization' while also pointing to 'spiritual values' and adding 'racism and xenophobia' to a list of threats that includes 'terrorism'. Alongside the increased use of 'civilizations' from this point, there is a strong emphasis on the value of cultural and religious diversity, with several references to the U.N. Alliance of Civilizations (AOC), of which Turkey was one of the initiators. By Ambassador Baki İlkin (2008c: 10) the AOC is even represented as a way to deal with 'terrorism' specifically. There are also several instances of pointing to the importance of inspirations from 'Eastern civilization' to the common Self. As part of these developments, 'civilization' – both its plural and singular form – is marginalized in opposition to 'terrorism', with 'humanity' and 'humankind' taking over the role as the main uniting identity for the common Self, and thus as what 'terrorism' is represented as threatening. I argued that this must be understood in relation to the 'Islamist' character of the AKP, as well as to the increased focus on essential 'civilizational' differences and the articulation of 'religion'/'Islam' to 'terrorism' after the September 11 attacks. The invocation of 'humanity'/'humankind' deals with the potential hurdle presented by the recognition of essential 'civilizations', ensuring the continued negotiation of Turkish 'difference', still with 'terrorism' as the constitutive Other. There are also many specific attempts by the Turkish actors of breaking the articulation between 'terrorism' and Islam.

The last important point emphasized in chapter 4 was that even though the politicians and diplomats increasingly point to the importance of different cultures and 'Eastern' inspiration from 2003, there is actually a strengthening of the hegemony of liberalist universalism, a discourse with origins in the European Self that the Ottoman Empire grappled with. I identified this through rhetorical commonplaces such as 'democracy', 'human rights', 'good governance', 'rule of law' and 'civil society'. Prime Minister Erdoğan's (2009: 35) statement that the AOC should bring forth one "global civilization based on universal values centered on democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights, gender equality, young people and media" is illustrative of this continuation of universalism.

6.2 Summary of the military officers' representations

In most respects, the military officers speaking and writing through the *NATO Centre of Excellence: Defence Against Terrorism* represent the phenomenon of 'terrorism' and the

'terrorist' identity similarly to the politicians and diplomats, with 'terrorism' being a homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon – a common threat – that necessitates urgent cooperation. Distinctions are rejected also here, as there is a "single type of 'terrorist'" (Özkök 2006a: x), and one "terrorist mindset" (Kiliç 2007: 14). Several of the officers represent the September 11 attacks as events that revealed the 'true' nature of 'terrorism'. There is however an explicit concern with the definition of 'terrorism' amongst the officers, in contrast to the politicians/diplomats. The lack of a common definition is acknowledged and problematized, but as a practical and temporary rather than theoretical obstacle. It is thus argued that the search for a definition should continue, and that the lack of such cannot be used as a reason not to cooperate.

Like in the United Nations, the military officers consistently relate Turkish 'suffering' from 'terrorism' to this joint struggle, but here the PKK is referred to *in name.* The PKK is even represented as a threat in and of itself to 'the international community' (Saygun 2008: 227). There is also harsher criticism towards other countries (never specified more than 'European states') for not unequivocally condemning the PKK, in a way that shows the officers rejecting alternative identities for the PKK, such as 'guerrilla' or 'insurgent' group. As was the case with the politicians and diplomats, 'double standards' are consistently represented as a problem and an obstacle for cooperation. The repeating of such arguments across years (even by the same actors) shows the persistence of such a discursive struggle (e.g. Tokgöz 2009: 31; 2010: 37; 2011: 32).

The 'terrorist' identity is generally formed by the same three elements as described above for the politicians and diplomats. But in addition to these there is an extensive use of dehumanizing organic metaphors, representing 'terrorism' as 'illness' threatening the healthy social 'body'; a metaphorical language with clearly identifiable intertextual links, including to European and 'Western' designations of the inferior Turkish Other. The identity is also to a larger characterized directly rather than affected by characterizations of 'terrorism', as is generally the case by the politicians and diplomats. And instead of rejecting the possibility of legitimate motivations, the officers make allegations as to what the motivations of 'terrorists' are, establishing a cost-benefit rationality where high casualty-numbers and protracted war become positives to the 'terrorist'. The signifier 'exploit' is present also amongst the military, here with the specific phrase "diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit" (Ekmen 2007: 12; Kiliç 2007: 18) exactly copying the *National Strategy for*

Combating Terrorism of the George W. Bush Administration (The White House 2003: 6; 2006: 10).

I argued that for several reasons related to the historical position of the Turkish military in safeguarding Kemalism, and to the 'Islamist character' of the AKP having become an increasing topic (Onar 2007), there could be divergences in how the military represent Self-identity in relation to 'terrorism'. However, my analysis showed this only to a lesser extent. Though the officers emphasize the role of the nation-state more strongly than the politicians and diplomats, though the invocations of 'civilization' or 'civilizations' are much less consistent, and though there are some explicitly critical perspectives towards the idea of 'universal values' (Büyükanıt 2008; Denizer 2008), similarities are more conspicuous than differences. There are several attempts at breaking the articulation between 'Islam' and 'terrorism', and many invocations of rhetorical commonplaces reproducing liberalist discourse, similar to those described for the politicians and diplomats. The latter is especially clear with the three high-ranking officers to hold the last symposium speeches at the NATO Centre (Generals Ergin Saygun, İlker Başbuğ and Aslan Güner). Their convergence with the AKP politicians' representations of (e.g.) 'shared values', including 'human rights', 'individual liberties' and 'freedom of speech', is interesting for three reasons: [1] All of these three have been arrested since January 2012 for alleged participation in plans to overthrow the government (Güner for his participation in the 'post-modern coup' of 1997); [2] during earlier military interventions, leading officers have represented the curtailing of 'individual liberties' as justified; and [3] international critique of Turkey's approach towards the PKK has involved exactly rhetorical commonplaces such as 'human rights' or 'democracy'.

In total, the main conclusion to draw from the representation of Self-identity is that the negotiation of Turkish 'difference' and the conditioning effects of the discourse within the officers are speaking are stronger than any need to express fears of 'Islamization' and divergence from the AKP. Besides the above, there are two other interesting instances that suggest the negotiating of 'difference' through 'terrorism' as constitutive Other: 'Terrorism' is represented as threatening 'humanity and civilization' (Sarica 2007: 15; Özkök 2006a: x), which is the exact combination of rhetorical commonplaces used by the Allied victors of World War I to condemn the Ottoman Government in contemporary Turkey for mass killings of Armenians during the war.

6.3 Representing the terrorist Other: consequences

Having given a summary of both my analyses, I will discuss the way the Turkish actors' representations of the Other, which are mostly consistent across the two sets of texts, can take part in shaping a policy field. This is important, as discourse analysis does not merely wish to expose representations of identity; it sees identity as ontologically interlinked with *policy*, and political discourse as the striving for creating stable connections between the two (Hansen 2006: 17ff).[58] Throughout, I exemplify my arguments with statements from the data material.

6.3.1 Legitimizing the Self

The way the Turkish actors construct 'terrorism' as phenomenon and 'terrorist' as identity has significant consequences for framing the Turkish government's and security forces' approach to the conflict with the PKK. The invocation of an all-encompassing but unspecific phenomenon of 'terrorism', and the representation of this as a critical 'security' threat that involves the whole world, confers legitimacy on those in positions to enact policies in response (Hansen 2006: 35). Such legitimacy is even explicitly claimed in my analysis, as when Deputy U.N. Ambassador Huseyin Müftüoğlu (2011a: 13) refers to "the legitimate right of Governments to combat terrorism", or when Foreign Minister Cem (2001b: 11) argues that "we are all engaged in a fight – a justifiable, correct fight against terrorism".

Several of the Turkish actors' statements are acts of securitization *par excellence*, such as arguing that 'terrorism' has "become one of the most pervasive and critical threats to the security of the world" (Can & Öğün 2008: 30). Such statements most definitely put political pressure on dealing with the issue quickly and effectively; creating a 'state of exception' where normal political rules do not apply and emergency measures can be taken (Hansen 2011: 529; Wæver 1998; Agamben 1998).[59] Through the articulation of the conflict with the PKK to the general phenomenon of 'terrorism' we see how this can include geographically restricted conflicts. When the articulation between 'terrorism' and (e.g.) 'critical security threat' becomes fixed, it also allows for a high degree of urgency, illustrated by Deputy U.N. Ambassador Altay Cengizer (2003: 24) arguing that "endless theorizing" cannot "hijack the

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58 This relation importantly goes both ways: Identities are reproduced through the enactment of policy as well (Campbell [1] 1998; Hansen 2006).
59 Parts of the Kurdish-dominated South-East in Turkey have indeed been referred to as subjected to a "Turkish state of exception" (Öktem quoted in Jacoby 2010: 107).

practicalities of our common defense against this enemy of mankind and civilization"; the threat is too immanent and important for splitting hairs or discussing needlessly.

The exceptional state can also allow for representing efforts taken in response to 'terrorism' as not constituting armed struggle or acts of war, though they involve many casualties and severe infrastructural destruction, but rather as part of an unavoidable fight or a higher cause (where government soldiers become 'martyrs', as seen in the analyzed newsletter). This argument is made by Deputy Ambassador Müftüoğlu (2011a: 13), stating that responses to 'terrorism' "do not constitute armed conflict and cannot be considered as such" (2011a: 13), a stand taken also by Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan (2010d: 26; 2012c: 25). The use of organic metaphors by the Turkish military officers contribute to this same effect, as when Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanit (2008: 11-12) refers to 'terrorism' as "a cancer cell" and "the pestilence of our era"; the fight becomes the remedy against a disease rather than war or armed battle against a conventional enemy.

By comparing the Turkish actors' representations of 'terrorism' to how Deputy U.N. Ambassador Fazli Çorman (2011: 30) represents the issue of 'climate change', we see some interesting parallels that shed light on the role of securitization:

> There can be no doubt that climate change continues to be one of the most pressing and complex issues facing humankind today. It is vital to find a global solution to this problem. We have absolutely no time to lose […] It is also very clear that the risks posed by climate change cannot be met by any single State. We are faced with a common challenge and we must tackle it with a spirit of shared responsibility […] This long-term dedicated effort will also contribute to development, prosperity, peace and security on our planet

Çorman uses a very similar selection of rhetorical commonplaces as those used in relation to homogeneous 'terrorism' (it is a 'common challenge' that cannot be fought single-handedly by states; there is no doubt that it is one of the most severe issues of our times; there is no time to lose for the sake of 'security on our planet'). The de-territorialization and securitization of 'climate change' is similar to that of 'terrorism', both represented as overarching and critical threats that absolutely need concerted efforts, but without any true degree of specification. When they blend together discursively like this into abstract concepts, it marginalizes the human aspect of the phenomenon of 'terrorism'. One could argue that there are actual similarities between the two in that their manifestations often take place

unexpectedly both geographically and temporally, but firstly, this is not the case for everything labeled as 'terrorism'; secondly, so do many acts enacted by national governments; and thirdly, it takes the homogeneous understanding of 'terrorism' as premise, dissolving differences between (e.g.) the September 11 attacks and violence committed in a domestically or regionally restricted insurgency like that of the PKK. And such an argument notwithstanding, any political act successfully represented as countering 'terrorism' will appear more legitimate through its articulation to this global and abstract security imagery. Note that many of the Turkish actors' speeches are, after all, held at the *Security Council*.

6.3.2 The terrorist as *homo sacer*

A severe consequence of representing the 'terrorist' identity as fundamentally illegitimate is that it clears the ground for the universal treatment of whoever is successfully interpellated into this identity. We see this suggested when U.N. Ambassador Ümit Pamir (2003c: 2) states that "as there are no good terrorists", they all "deserve to be treated in the same manner". A similar dynamic is reflected by President George W. Bush having, according to Desch (2008: 33), represented 'terrorists' as "so evil that they have placed themselves 'beyond the pale' of civilization and thereby forfeit[ed] the protections due to its law-abiding citizens".

Here I argue that the 'terrorist' identity starts to resemble the archaic Roman *homo sacer*, as the concept is understood by Agamben (1998): a person that can be killed by anyone without incurring punishment, as he or she is placed outside of the boundaries of normal citizenry – "an outcast, a banned man, tabooed, dangerous" (Fowler quoted in Agamben 1998: 79). Historical dynamics in Turkey stand illustratively in relation to this: Many activists from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) that were removed from state structures following the 1980 coup became parts of 'Grey Wolf' paramilitary gangs, deployed to predominantly Kurdish areas under exceptional rule, and were involved in "murder, bombing, armed robbery, torture, kidnapping", amongst others (Jacoby 2010: 102-104). Equally illustrative is the so-called 'village guard' system of local militias fighting the PKK, "sponsored, equipped and managed by the Turkish state" (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 10), which by 2000 included 65,000 armed men and up to 400,000 family members (Jacoby 2010: 102). According to Human

Rights Watch (2003), these 'village guards' have been involved in "a wide range of lawless activities, including killing and extortion".[60]

The lacking emphasis on specific motivations of 'terrorists' plays a central role in constituting this position, as when the goal of a group or entity is represented as primarily to prolong conflict and create attention-drawing devastation, it can be sensibly dealt with in a different manner than if the goals emphasized were, for example, to fight ethnical discrimination. When Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 16) argues about motivations of 'terrorists' that "[t]here is a symbolic goal of showing that the more powerful enemy can be touched and deeply harmed, but even that is not the real goal. The real goal is to provoke massive retaliation", he is at the same time discursively closing the circuit; there is nothing to look for beyond these goals. As we have seen, this also makes it possible to lay the blame for the entirety of casualties in a conflict at the hands of the 'terrorists'.

This *homo sacer* is important also for Self-identity. Agamben's (1998: 84) argues that "the sovereign and *homo sacer* present two symmetrical figures that have the same structure and are correlative: the sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially *homines sacri*, and *homo sacer* is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns". Put differently, what we see is exactly the constitutive function argued earlier for the 'terrorist': Though 'terrorists' are discursively excluded from the boundaries of normal citizenry, they are nonetheless *included* in an important relation between identities, performing a function as that "upon which a community or a society constitutes itself and its moral order" (Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2006: 296).

The tainting of the 'terrorist' identity also makes it difficult to have any *other* identity. If 'terrorism' is (e.g.) a threat to 'humanity' or the 'security of the world', it becomes extremely hard to simultaneously be a 'freedom-fighter' or a 'political activist'; we even see actors in the analyses challenging such alternative identities. Because of this, the representations of the Turkish actors have a *totalizing* effect. Once established, the identity has significant impetus even without the association to any form of action. We see this when Deputy Ambassador

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60 This is not to say that a given government knows or sanctions everything that goes on at every given time (much of what has taken place in Turkey has actually come to light through the *Ergenekon* investigations (Jacoby 2010: 108)). My point is rather hegemonic representations of the radical 'terrorist' Other can frame violent practices and affect for example to what extent it is sensible to prosecute those having targeted 'terrorists'.

Cengizer (2002c: 11) states that "it is important to ensure that there is no safe haven for terrorists in any country, regardless of their motivation or the type of crimes they have committed". The identity of being 'terrorist' also becomes very hard to *challenge,* because attempts to do so are represented in a way where they end up proving the manipulative nature of 'terrorism'. The 'terrorist' is an enemy to (e.g.) democratic rights and liberties, and does not have a legitimate right to them – they have to be 'exploited'. The same is the case with the participation in activities that could challenge representations of 'terrorism' as 'evil' or without remorse, such as 'humanitarian work'. The construction of the identity makes these acts *a priori* instrumental, grounded in some other ulterior (and illegitimate) motive.

This is a relevant point for the conflict with the PKK specifically. When leader Abdullah Öcalan declared in 1993 that the goal of the PKK was no longer a separate nation-state, but "decentralisation and the democratic rights of Kurds where they live [...]" (quoted in ICG 2012: 29), emphasizing the fight for Kurdish rights continuously after this, little was changed as a result. The Turkish population generally still views the party as separatist, as do several European politicians, police and 'counter-terrorism' officials (ICG 2012: 13; 29).[61] What is interesting here is not whether or not the goals of the PKK are actually 'separatist', but that the persistence of such an opinion, notwithstanding the PKK insisting otherwise, can in part be explained by the construction of 'terrorist' identity.

6.3.3 Marginalizing long-term solutions

Another important consequence of how 'terrorism' as phenomenon and 'terrorist' as identity are represented by the Turkish actors is the marginalization of *dialogue*. A central aspect of discourse analysis is to note conspicuous absences, and representations of the importance of dialogue are most definitely absent in both sets of texts – except for between 'civilizations', which all constitute part of the common Self. When "terrorism does not have a set of rules to which the members of civilized societies in this room can relate" (Esenli 2002: 11), it is not surprising that dialogue becomes unviable. The following statement by former Vice President Dick Cheney reveals the same dynamic from the perspective of the United States: "Such a group [as al-Qaida] cannot be held back by deterrence, nor reasoned with through diplomacy […] There will be no summit meeting, no negotiations with terrorists. This conflict can only

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61 Öcalan had already stated that the goal was not a separate state three years before this, but at that point he added "at least not for another 40 years" (Gunter 1994: 4).

end in their complete and utter destruction" (quoted in Desch 2008: 26). Again we see a point with an interesting parallel in the conflict between Turkey and the PKK. When Abdullah Öcalan stated in 1993 the wish of the PKK for "peace, dialogue, and free political action within the framework of a democratic Turkish state"; and the hope "that the Turkish authorities will understand that this question cannot be solved militarily and that the Kurdish people [...] and their rights cannot be ignored" (quoted in Gunter 1994: 17), this was interpreted as a sign of weakness by Turkish officials and used as an incentive to crush the PKK, rather than as an opening towards a peaceful settlement (Gunter 1994: 18).

A similar point could be made regarding arguments that 'terrorism' needs to be dealt with from a more long-term, structurally oriented perspective, which are present only to a very low extent in the analyzed material. However, we have seen that in parallel with the declining frequency of representations of 'terrorist' acts being impossible to justify amongst the politicians and diplomats, there is an appearance of such arguments. This suggests that if a significant amount of the most fundamentally delegitimizing representations of 'terrorism' – and, especially, 'terrorist' – were to be challenged and disappear, this would open up the discursive space for arguing for the need to address 'root causes'.

6.3.4 Involving the third party

The way 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' are constituted also facilitates the castigation of specific states for not actively doing something about 'terrorists' inside its own borders, potentially opening for representing violent intervention into such states as legitimate.[62] In November 2001, Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem (2001a: 9) argues that

> [the] anti-terrorist struggle has to be all-encompassing and deal with all centres [...] It should
> address all countries that harbour and tolerate terrorism or that are indifferent to terrorist groups
> that incite or actively plan, finance or command terrorist operations executed in another country.

Similarly, when Chief of Staff Büyükanıt (2008: 10) argues that states' "irrational practices and tolerance" should be met with U.N. sanctions, it shows clearly the potential effects of complacency – as well as how the United Nations can be represented as a protector of this stance. We thus see that even *indifference* can lead to actors or states ending up on the wrong side of the struggle against 'terrorism'; the discourse places the threat in a position where one

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62 The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan comes to mind here, where Turkey participated as part of the ISAF force, commanding it between June 2002 and February 2003, and between February and August 2005.

is forced into doing something about it – a clear manifestation of securitization, though here on an international level. Hansen (2006: 35) touches upon this with a pertinent argument:

> [Q]uestions that are included in the discourse of national security only if they pose a threat to the national Self […] are articulated as 'international security problems' which the international community has a responsibility for countering [...] Conceptually, this has led to the formulation of new security concepts that draw upon the traditional urgency, power, and responsibility of national security, yet *indicates a distance* by the use of terms such as 'common security' [emphasis added].

What happens here is exactly that which I emphasized in section 6.3.1; that "the issue is moved out of the realm of the strategic and 'selfishly national' and re-located within the 'higher grounds' of the morally good" (Hansen 2006: 50) – though it is importantly still tied to state power.

The last point I will make in this subsection is that representations of 'terrorism' as homogeneous and ubiquitous can affect to what extent international economical and military support is made politically sensible. Bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States can be understood through such a perspective. The successful representation of the two countries fighting the same 'terrorist' enemy – though there is no PKK presence in the United States – can make increased U.S. military support to Turkey more politically viable. Much of the historical support given by the United States has been used by Turkish governments for policing areas dominated by the PKK and involved in the insurgency. But from having peaked in 1993, military assistance to Turkey had gone down drastically in five years, to $5.7 million in 1998 (total assistance and arms sales was $2.46 *billion* in 1993) (Jacoby 2010: 102-103). From the mid-2000s, however (during the 'war on terror' and moving into my period of analysis), the two countries began cooperating more closely against the PKK. Turkey and the United States signed a "Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue To Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership", which specifically included "the fight against PKK and its affiliates" (U.S. Department of State 2006). They also initiated other forms of cooperation, such as a retired U.S. Air Force General becoming "Special Envoy for Countering the PKK" (Jacoby 2010: 106).

I am not arguing that these developments must be seen as simple and exclusive consequences of the PKK and (e.g.) al-Qaeda being represented as manifestations of the same phenomenon. Any such policy would have to be rendered sensible in a much more complex sense, and

would have to resonate with U.S. political discourse in general, as well as with the population. But strict rational considerations of strategic interests (such as the 'stability' of the Middle East) fail to grasp the way a discourse on 'terrorism' can take part in shaping the field of sensible policy, through distributing identities. As an example of this dynamic at play, Jackson (2006: 29) argues that the successful representation of Berlin as a "bulwark of 'the West' against 'the East'" in the period following World War II made possible a policy proposal of increased financial support to the city by the government in West Germany. For the case of 'terrorism', an example of the framing of such commonality is seen shortly after the September 11 attacks, when U.N. Ambassador Pamir (2001: 9) states that "[t]hroughout the tumultuous years of our fight against terrorism, the United States always stood, and at times singularly, by Turkey. Now, in the hour of need, Turkey firmly stands by the United States", a statement practically copied by Deputy Ambassador Cengizer (2001b: 11).

6.4 'Terrorism' in the perspective of universalism

Before giving some concluding remarks regarding the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK, and on the possibility of changing the political language that frames it, I will briefly discuss what I see as problematic aspects of the universalism that is at play in the Turkish actors' representations, and how they affect the constitution of the conflict.

I argue that there are *two* universalisms at play in the representations of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist'. The first of these, though it does not *explicitly* propose universality, is the naturalization of the nation-state as the fundamental political unit and the legitimate source of violence and coercion – what Campbell (1998a: 199) refers to when he argues that political has been "subsumed by and made synonymous with the state". The second is the liberalist universalism already discussed in the analyses, grounded in the expectation of the eventual convergence of all towards a set of universal values – what Mouffe (1993: 13) refers to as an "Enlightenment universalism of an undifferentiated human nature", oriented towards "Man in the abstract". Both of these are rooted in the Enlightenment imaginary that emerged in Europe during and after the Religious Wars, which I described in chapter 3, and they are thus related. For example, when the military officers are referring to 'failed states' or 'weak states' (Sarica 2007: 18; Erün 2010: 16; Başbuğ 2010: 8), they are reproducing elements of a debate rooted in the belief in the convergence of all on the 'Western liberal democracy' (Hagmann & Hoehne 2008: 43), and not only the primacy of the nation-state system.

Both of these universalisms are present in both sets of texts that I have analyzed. Though the politicians and diplomats – in contrast with the military – do not explicitly ground Self-identity in the 'nation-state', they are nonetheless speaking from a perspective where its position as the lone source of legitimate violence is *a priori* given. This is not changed by their appealing to supra-national collective identities. For example, 'Europe' has always been grounded in specific cultural and ethnic values, with the nation-state being its *enabling* factor rather than an alternative to it; it is "constructed on the same symbolic and cultural terrain as nation states" (Shore quoted in Rumelili 2007: 55). As argued by Waltz (2000: 21), international institutions serve national rather than international 'interests' more than anything. Even Immanuel Kant (2009: 26), liberalist *par excellence*, argued in his proposition for a 'league' between nations, that it would not "aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and secure the *freedom* of each state in itself". This supremacy of the nation-state did not appear out of nothingness in Turkey, but was brought into Ottoman discourse through interaction with Europe, subjecting the non-European to Otherness that was eventually grounded in forms of social organization (Jones 2013); the Ottoman "horizon of expectation" increasingly depending upon "the historical experience of Europeans" (Wigen 2013: 26).

The problem with this universalism is that 'terrorism' becomes a *discursive* threat; it destabilizes this naturalized position and thus the ontological security of the nation-state. From this perspective, organized non-state violence becomes very difficult to conceptualize, increasing the proclivity for representing 'terrorism'/'terrorist' as a radical Other threatening existence (Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2006: 296). There is nothing new about this type of problematic. For instance, the hegemonic Christian framework at the time of Saint Augustine was discursively protected by representing the Manicheans – who challenged the idea of an omnipotent God – as the heretical Other which could be legitimately persecuted (Connolly 1991: 3). 'Terrorism' as alternative mode of legitimizing violence can be regarded similarly, needing to be purged in order to contain integrity; the 'terrorist' becoming – as argued – the *homo sacer*. The organic 'body politic' metaphors used by the Turkish military officers are important here. According to Staun (2010: 413-414), such metaphors are common to "modern securitization language games", supporting the construction of the nation-state as "something natural, necessary and unavoidable".

Today it is not Turkey's status as a proper *nation-state* that is questioned or used as grounds for Otherness; the exclusion is rather from a larger value-collective on the basis of cultural factors**,** whether we understand this as 'Europe' or 'the West'. As noted in chapter 3, when the Ottoman Empire became included into the European states system, it was not fully included into 'international *society*', if understood as such a value-collective and not merely as a system of states. The inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923 on a new common myth that distanced Turkey from its Ottoman past brought Turkey closer, but did not complete this process: Insecurities related to the construction of Turkey as 'different' are understanding its international relations today as well (Bilgin 2009: 122). It is here liberalist universalism takes over most of the heavy lifting. It appeals to what Rumelili (2007: 66) refers to as the discourses emphasizing the 'inclusive' aspects of European identity, where it is *acquired* characteristics that are the grounds for 'difference', not inherent ones. These include its 'human rights record', the degree of political stability and the military's political involvement (ibid.). By the Turkish actors' representing 'terrorism' as a threat to 'human rights', and by stressing the need for (e.g.) 'democracy', 'individual liberties' and 'good governance', they are thus talking within a discourse where there is room for movement towards Self.

However, this liberalist universalism also entails problems for the position of 'terrorists'. I agree with Mouffe (1993) that liberalism fails to see the fundamental role of the Self/Other distinction for the political – for the reproduction of a given political community. From the perspective of this thesis, a truly universal and ontologically secure political community – what Kant (2009: 19ff) referred to as "the objective goal of the human race" on the grounds of universal values – is a theoretical impossibility. Here a discourse on 'terrorism' plays an important role, however. By removing the 'terrorist' from the realm of the 'universal' altogether (for example as opposing 'humanity' in its totality), the role of a constitutive Other is upheld; as what is keeping the universal from truly unfolding. The problem is the radical and threatening Otherness that follows with this. This helps explain Desch's (2008: 26) argument that the liberal tradition (of the United States specifically) has not been able to see the threat of 'terrorism' as something that can be contained, but instead must be eliminated.

To sum up, the difference between *in*security and *a*security must be stressed: Insecurity is not the diametrical opposite of security; in both there is the presence of the "security problematique" (Wæver 1998: 56) – it is just a question of whether or not there is a response

to the threat. This is why 'terrorism' can serve *both* as a threat to the above universalisms *and* as a conditioning factor at the same time.

6.5 Rewriting 'terrorism'

I will end this thesis by offering some thoughts on how the issue of 'terrorism' can potentially be conceptualized in a way that does not support radical and threatening Otherness, and which suppresses rather than encourages cycles of violence. This is by no means an apology for violent acts perpetrated by the PKK, of which there is every reason to be critical. But if we accept that violent responses from two parties can enter into a mutually reproductive cycle, then there is every reason to point out how discursive constructions contribute to such cycles.

Arguments have been made within new theoretical perspectives on the relation between identity and Otherness, that the Self/Other divide does not necessarily have to entail the delineation of a *threat*. Rumelili (2011) argues for moving away from the one-dimensional security dichotomy of e.g. Campbell (1998a), dividing instead between 'security-as-being' and 'security-as-survival'. Here the question of whether the Self feels *ontologically* secure does not have to be related to whether it feels its *physical* security threatened. Because ontological security (having a secure identity) can be achieved without the representation of threat, this clears the ground for desecuritization. While this is a very welcome and important insight, the question is how applicable it is to the issue of 'terrorism'. Due to the construction of the 'terrorist' identity, and to the naturalization of nation-state primacy discussed above, it seems highly unlikely for the 'terrorist' to become a *non-threatening* Other. If possible this would entail what Hansen (2011: 539) refers to as *change through stabilization*: "a rather slow move out of an explicit security discourse" requiring the mutual recognition of legitimacy. But judging from the analyses of this thesis, the concepts 'terrorism' and 'terrorists' seem too saturated with negative articulations for desecuritization to be likely. Hansen (ibid.) even points this out, arguing that "the Global War of Terror does not entail a similar space for recognition and accommodation" as did the détente of the Cold War. The concepts are also *abstract* to an extent that facilitates the adaptation of an international discourse on 'terrorism' to specific (and far from 'global') conflicts, such as with the PKK.

What is perhaps a more likely way to counter radical Otherness in the conflict with the PKK – or perhaps a precondition for what Rumelili (2011) is arguing for – is a direct challenging of

the discourse of 'terrorism' itself. One way of doing this is by emphasizing contingency and problematizing the social reality that this discourse reproduces, rejecting the crudeness of the categories being used and the dehumanization of the 'terrorist' identity. Here my thesis – in all its humility – is a contribution. But academia cannot carry this weight alone; critical perspectives would have to gain a stronger foothold within general public and political discourse. This does *not* mean seeing violent ('terrorist') acts as something that doesn't have to be dealt with or taken seriously, but to re-conceptualize it as something else than for example "a very great danger to civilization as we know it [that] threatens the fundamental rights of the individual and endangers the fabric of societies everywhere and at all times" (Cengizer 2002b: 4).

Here there is a potential in politicians rearticulating the identity of the PKK (to something else than 'terrorist'), which could facilitate the identification of political solutions (Hansen 2011: 542). This is of course far from an easy task and can incur severe political costs.[63] There have been examples of this dynamic in Turkey, when attempts at political approaches towards the 'Kurdish question' by the AKP have been followed by strongly critical rhetoric from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), declaring the AKP as dangerous and "accusing it of treason and weakness", as well as of "bringing about more terrorism as they are saying more democracy" (Celep 2010: 136-138). For these reasons, such a move would take time. Though the conflict reached a cease-fire in March 2013, the prevalence of the language of 'terrorism' does not seem to have changed. Responding to the currently (June 2013) ongoing popular protests in Turkey, sparked on Istanbul's Taksim Square in response to the government's plans of building a shopping mall in Gezi Park, Prime Minister Erdoğan has referred to the protesters as "living arm in arm with terrorism" (Reuters 2013), even accusing some of them in being "implicated in terrorism" (The Telegraph 2013b). Again we see demonstrated the plasticity of this potent concept.

For future research in this field, I consider three elements in particular to be of high interest. Firstly, it would be interesting to look more closely at developments to the representations of

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63 An example from the United States is illustrative here: In the second Presidential debate of the 2012 campaign, Governor Mitt Romney accused President Barack Obama for spending 14 days before referring to the 2011 attack on a U.S. diplomatic outpost in Benghazi, Libya – which illustratively took place on September 11 – as 'acts of terror' (CNN 2012). Afterwards there has been some controversy as to whether or not he did, but here the point is that this example shows how politically hurtful a seemingly arbitrary choice of words – the deviation from dominant discourse – can be.

'terrorism' and 'terrorist' in Turkish *domestic* discourse – and to compare it with the language used towards an international audience. This would illuminate further the role of 'terrorism'/'terrorist' as constitutive for Self-identity, and it would allow for tracing changes that have rendered politically viable attempts made by the AKP to engage politically with the PKK – as well as how these are discursively challenged, for example by the MHP. Secondly, a discourse theoretical approach could be employed from the perspective of the 'terrorists', examining how central PKK actors construct the conflict they are a part of and how such a reality supports acts of violence, including against civilians. The third element is already suggested at the introduction to this thesis: to carry my theoretical approach over to other specific conflicts between nations states and 'their terrorists', seeing how a similar identity-'difference' function plays out.

My approach in this thesis has shown that a discourse theoretical approach can be employed not only one-dimensionally, in order to draw attention to problematic aspects of the labels being used in political discourse, but in a way that more fully respects identities as being relational; even opening for seeing how the identity of the Self can be reconstructed through the Other of the 'terrorist'. The theory has also allowed me to see the myriad consequences of this function for representing the reality of a given conflict – to see who is put in a position of *a priori* illegitimacy, and who is put in a position of *a priori legitimacy*. A statement by İsmet Ocakçıoğlu, President of the Turkish Court of Appeals in 1992, reflects this in telling simplicity and can serve as an endnote here: "It is entirely in keeping with the rules of the democratic State of Law for the State to use the instruments and methods used by the terrorists in order to prevent terror" (quoted in Gunter 1994: 13).

7. References

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