

NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF LIFE SCIENCES





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martin.semric@gmail.com

Noragric  
Department of International Environment and Development Studies  
P.O. Box 5003  
N-1432 Ås  
Norway  
Tel.: +47 64 96 52 00  
Fax: +47 64 96 52 01  
Internet: <http://www.umb.no/noragric>

Declaration

I, Martin Semric, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Signature .....

Date .....

To the children who are forced to terminate their education  
due to the conflict  
human rights violations  
cultural insecurity  
or the pressure of the community



© Martin Semric, 22.November, Garhi Habib Ulah

Acknowledgement

Many people have helped me with this Master Thesis. Prof. Ingrid Nyborg, PhD., my supervisor provided primary sources of information, support during my fieldwork and open advice throughout. For insights, research facilitation, hints, material support and even a few nudges beyond the call of friendship I thank the staff from Right To Play Abbottabad. Special thanks to Prof. Bahadar Nawab, PhD. and my friends from COMSATS Abbottabad for helping to manage the fieldwork and to produce countless improvements. Additionally, many colleagues, friends and people around me made the thesis indirectly a lot better by proving me how we can make life better when using properly the power of emotions and knowledge, when given the opportunity to do so.

## Abstract

The research project is focused on the problems of everyday life of young people (15-24 years old) in the crisis-affected areas and the burdens from the social and political system they need to overcome while pursuing their adulthood. The Master thesis is based on the data gathered from individual qualitative interviews of affected youth from the post-conflict & post-disaster areas in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan, namely the Swat Valley, town of Mansehra, and its neighboring areas, town of Balakot and the Kaghan Valley. Project's aim is to explore how young people from these highly crisis affected areas perceive the changes and reconstruction of the society, and their participation in the development process of affected areas.

Young people constitute of 60% Pakistani population and in crisis affected areas are facing wide variety of problems. The most severe problems for youth, identified by the respondents from the earthquake-affected areas, are the social impact of the crisis, poor level of education, suppression of female education, lack of communal facilities and massive unemployment. Compared to the group of young people from earthquake-hit area, the major difference that participants from the conflict-affected areas identified, is the problem of the distrust to people in general and overwhelming fear caused by the unsolved problems with militants and resulting greater power of military over the region.

Evidence from the research suggests that rushed development policies and programmes implemented during the relief period did not bring positive effect; therefore I am focusing on youth and their deeper understanding of the social constraints, will to change recent situation and opinions and suggestions in adjusting of the policies of reconstruction of the system. My main research aim is to find out, how to approach young people in the most effective way promoting the change in their thinking, acting towards positive development in the crisis affected areas and to design the structure of an effective policies to avoid deepening the apathy of youth from the inability to pursue their livelihoods, militarizing the young males due to helplessness with their lives and helping to change the mindset and promote the betterment of the female education in both crisis-affected areas.

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## **1. Introduction to the topic**

The project, on which this Master thesis is based, is focused on the case of the post-conflict & post-disaster areas in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan, namely the Swat Valley town of Mansehra, and its neighboring areas, town of Balakot and the Kaghan Valley.

The effects of earthquake in Balakot and the Swat Valley conflict and disastrous flood have been devastating but also varied and gendered. Some parts of the population still need more conventional humanitarian assistance, while others are involved in processes of livelihood revival and long term activities. Young people constitute of 60% of Pakistani population and in crisis affected areas are facing wide variety of problems, mostly poor level of education and massive unemployment. Youth is the future of the region and is necessary to focus on their "internal" views to keep them in the region and avoid migration in the future to sustain socio-economic and complex political and social development according to their needs.

Project's aim is to explore how young people from these highly crisis affected areas perceive the changes and reconstruction of the society, and their participation in the development process of affected areas. The thesis aims to find out how young people experience and try to overcome different kinds of insecurities and troubles in the process of complicated socio-economic and political reconstruction of their regions, as they attempt to pursue their livelihoods in the post-earthquake Balakot area, after the relief period of reconstruction has ended and following the government and military counter-offensive against insurgents in the Swat valley.

To summarize the research area, I focus on the everyday life of youth in the affected areas, mostly on the question of psychological barriers of the human development in the post-disaster and post-conflict zones. In this rough setting obstructions to good development might appear anytime, in general I want to find out what is the mindset and the "will to change" of youth in the earthquake affected Balakot area. The relief period which has ended did not bring the promised effects, and the work of international actors proved to be unsustainable and seems to further worsen the deep apathy, marginalization of their problems and dependence of youth on the help from outside. Regarding the Swat

participants, I focus on the same problems comparing the data with the group from the Balakot area, while adding questions regarding the popularity and the impact of Islamic extremism among young people.

The purpose of study is to find empirical evidence about the assumption, that visions and needs of young people are usually omitted from the discourse of development in the reconstruction of disaster areas. Evidence from the literature suggests that policies and actions implemented did not bring positive effect; therefore I am focusing on youth and their opinions and will to change recent situation and whether their voice is heard in adjusting of the policies of reconstruction of the system.

My main research aim is to find out, how to approach young people in the most effective way promoting the change in their thinking and acting towards positive development in the crisis affected areas, to be able to design the structure of an effective policies to avoid deepening the apathy of youth from the inability to pursue their livelihoods, militarizing the young males due to helplessness with their lives and helping to change the mindset and promote the betterment of the female education in both areas.

## 2. Theoretical Part

### 2.1 Introduction to the theoretical part

At the beginning of the search for the answers of problems of the youth in the post crisis areas it has been inevitable for me to look at the youth from a wider sociological point of view, rather than as a purely development studies issue.

There is a wide array of theories trying to interpret lives of young people. The key challenge is to understand youth's lives in the field of competing theories, while focusing on the diversity and fluidity of the youth populations around the world as well as the inequality within the societies.

A book by Vappu Tyyskä, called *Youth and Society: The Long and Winding Road* is among many other a good starting point for challenging the myths about youth. The focus of the book is on the problems of youth in the western countries, but the concepts can be generalized for the problems of youth in the developing world as well. The aim of the book is to analyze the root causes of theories related to youth. As Tyyskä mentioned in the introductory part, "the popular, anecdotal, misleading, and negative views about young people need to be taken apart, the main argument of the book is to move away from dealing with youth as a problem to address the social, economic and political circumstances that are problematic" (Tyyskä, 2009, p.2). Through the creation and perpetuation of misrepresentations and myths about youth, an atmosphere is created in which young people are likely to be viewed negatively, subjected to increasing controls and given "little or no positive feedback at a stage of their lives that is supposed to be full of hope and promise" (Tyyskä, 2009, p.2).

In the beginning, the conceptual framework is explained. Author explains the ambiguity of terms and variables used to define categories such as youth, adolescence or young adults. There is a preference to define youth "not as a particular range, but as a social status" characterized by a period of life in which a person is either partly or fully dependent on others, usually adults and members of family, for the material support (Tyyskä, 2009, p.4).

However, the dependence should not be used as a sole criterion to define youth, since it may include other large segments of population. Therefore, the age limits need to be set. In my thesis I use the categorization of the UN for the age criterion, when referring to youth.

Recently, the United Nations and other international institutions have acknowledged the existence of a youth demographic that does not fit either definition precisely. The distinctions overlap and seem to conflict, making pinpointing “youth” within legal and working definitions problematic. The UN program defines youth within the age category of 15-24 years. The World Health Organization designates three different categories of youth – adolescents (10-19 years old), youth (15-24 years old), and young people (10-24 years old) (Kemper, 2005, p.8).

The differences between the legal and operational definitions of youth are important since international policymakers and non-governmental actors focus their attention on children in conflict, and “the international legal definitions create a framework for addressing child-specific needs” (Schwartz 2010, p.5). While the definition of youth or young adults may vary depending on the cultural background, youth has different needs from children and clearly has higher potential to affect the political situation and therefore influence the reconstruction process. The transition that youth face in the post-crisis societies with the personal transition from child to adult on social level requires the international community to create special programmes for a specific set of needs beyond rights protection. Therefore, “operations under a children’s framework might be inadequate” (Kemper, 2005, p.9).

## 2.2 Youth within a society

The range of youth issues seems to be loosely wrapped around education, work and youth culture, which are interpreted by a wide spectrum of theories. I will examine the classical theories of the role of youth within a society and compare it to the critical theories. While conservative or structural functionalists emphasize the disruptive features of youth and a concern how a social cohesion is best promoted, critical theoreticians tend to analyze the underlying inequalities, and are concerned about how to best respond to problems that arise. Conservatives want youth to be passive law-abiding and pliable so that their presumed negative tendencies can be harnessed towards maintaining the stability of the system. The group of classical, structural-functionalist theories can be criticized for putting pressure on

young people to adapt to the society rather than changing societies to accommodate them. Critical theories look at the society from a different perspective that is sensitive to power differences. In contrast to conservative theories, "critical theoreticians point to the institutionalized powerlessness of youth" (Tyyskä, 2009, p.10). As further the core of critical theories summarized Tyyskä, "authors of the theories are trying to point out problems young people are facing and find difficult to confront and change due to the rules and boundaries set by social institutions, including the family, the economy and the state" (Tyyskä, 2009, p.10). Critical theoreticians tend to view the youthful energy in positive terms, see the need of young people for encouragement so that they can live fulfilling lives and be an important source of social change towards a more just society. "The focus of postmodernist theories on agency and subjectivities adds to this by addressing the further fragmentation of the categories of youth and the need to take apart the multiple conditions and motives of young people" (Tyyskä, 2009, p.20).

### 2.3 Youth in the post-crisis areas

The focus of my thesis is specifically oriented on youth in the post crisis societies. Most of the literature related to the topic is dealing with the reconstruction of societies torn by the intrastate armed conflicts and the involvement of youth in such process. As the international community seeks to promote stability and maintain peace, it must seek to understand how to make post-conflict reconstruction efforts as successful as possible while addressing the needs of young people directly affected by the conflict. I focus on analyzing the psychological impact of crisis on the youth and the potential for youth agency in the post-conflict reconstruction. I will look at the attempts to understand youth roles after the conflict and the difference between the child and youth paradigms within the reconstruction policies.

The disparity has been explained by Schwartz, "Children are vulnerable and depend on adults and since they can't care for themselves, they easily become the innocent victims of conflict. Youth, on the other hand, have greater capacity than children to think for themselves and carry out actions on their own behalf. Thus, instead of being seen as innocent victims of conflict, youth are stereotyped as mischievous instigators and much of the literature on the youth focuses on their destabilizing potential" (2010, p.11).

Such ambiguous distinctions often lead to policies which don't reach claimed goals and my research focus is to look at the details from the point of the view of affected youth to help solving the political and social tensions and resulting problems.

Seeing youth either as destabilizers or as passive victims oversimplifies the evidence. Although young people often do participate in the conflict, there are many examples of youth becoming leaders in peace building and contributing to the reconstruction process. The youth's choice between resorting to violence and contributing to the peace process is influenced by intervening efforts during the reconstruction process. As young adults are becoming the leaders of the country, such dual potential needs to be managed well in the transition from the conflict to peace. Schwartz reached the conclusion that "the success of the post-conflict reconstruction depends on how well the specific needs of protection, reintegration and sociopolitical empowerment are implemented for youth" (Schwartz, 2010, p.4).

When children and youth live through the times of crisis the standard designation of childhood and adulthood might change. The crisis is generally associated with a forced "growing up" faster than usual, causing a psychological damage. Youth's experience of being a refugee, militant or a sexual slave drastically changes their personal identity either as a child, youth or an adult. Many young people might become orphans or heads of households responsible for taking care of other family members. "Such situation creates a tension between the reality of adult responsibilities and the economic and socio-cultural restraints that deny the power adults possess in the greater political and social community" (Schwartz 2010, p.6).

The structural role of the youth demographic is not the core focus of this paper but for the complex understanding the three main theories relevant to the relationship between youth and the post conflict reconstruction: the youth bulge theory, the greed-grievance model and the spoiler theory will be briefly summarized, based on the text from Schwartz (2010) pp.12-16.

The youth bulge theory is based on the logic that a large proportion of young men in the population will make a country more vulnerable to instability. For example, when a disproportionately large population of young people is seeking jobs or to enroll in the university, the infrastructure of the country will not be able to accommodate the demand.

Unemployment and poverty will be amplified, increasing the motivation towards violence and rebellion. The greed-grievance model examines the motive and opportunity for violence with an econometric model to predict the conflict. The cost-benefit analysis is used to understand the conditions in which the violent groups can most easily recruit the members. Such thinking identifies several factors that affect the opportunity-cost structure that make joining the militants a rational choice. The spoiler theory, reframed to a capabilities model examines the behavior of elite individuals, or groups seeking to thwart a peace process. The capabilities model adds the category of latent spoilers, weak actors who would oppose the implementation of peace, if only they had the materials to do so. While spoiler theory focuses on elites, the capabilities model can apply to youth behavior when a large youth cohort is considered for being a latent spoiler. Despite the high expectations for what a resolution of conflict might bring, in a peace environment youth are likely to lose much of the power they once held, facing poor economic opportunities, lacking access to a political forum. For example, if they keep fighting, it might sustain the feeling of belonging in the community and the power implicit in being armed.

All three models demonstrate the strength of a structurally based analysis in determining the behavior of youth in the conflict environment. Although these models explain the causes of the conflict and the role of youth in it, neither of them provides a complete structure for understanding the impact of youth population once the conflict is over. While the large population of youth might destabilize the society in the reconstruction process and the opportunity-costs might continue to drive the decision making process, due to the effects of structural changes and development programmes implemented, the situation might result in an opposite way. "While these models see youth as a destabilizing factor, such type of analysis suggests that youth roles have the potential to change given the proper conditions" (Schwartz, 2010, p 15). In such case, examining the conditions that youth face in a post-conflict society can help intervening actors find ways to change the structures of incentives and policies that lead youth towards destabilizing behavior and instead invest in the peace process. "If youth were given access to education, training and tools for proper income, had a chance to participate in the community patrols, or could join the youth groups with a true voice in local politics, they would have both the opportunity and the incentive to contribute to the rebuilding process" (Schwartz, 2010, p16). Since a post-conflict community is usually facing other humanitarian crisis, it is necessary to look at the detailed case studies to be able to identify the impact of changing structural dynamics on youth behavior to be able to create specific types of intervening programs and policies to be implemented.



## 2.4 NGOs and youth

NGOs became the leading institutional actor responsible for implementing the post-conflict reconstruction programs focused on youth. Power and responsibility for the implementation of development projects have been shifted to NGOs and the resources from the international organizations are often decentralized and reallocated to the local organizations to fit the purpose with local knowledge they possess. As summarized by Levy, field of peace studies, including studies on the reconstruction of the society are normative and prescriptive, as well as descriptive and analytical. Students of peace, crisis and development are not only intellectually interested in issues of youth and violence, but also motivated by the desire to effect positive change for the youth. "Some of the researchers and field workers though lack the critical reflection on their frames and underlying ideologies of their own practice. Such situation might lead to the naive idealism and disconnection from the youth rather than solidarity" (McEvoy-Levy, 2011, p.160). The ever growing pool of NGOs can however worsen the situation. The environment they operate is highly competitive with limited funding sources and the organizations might end up in a dysfunctional behavior, where their projects might tilt away from the altruistic goals towards "profit-seeking" objectives. "The NGOs' potential for helping youth varies depending on the type of programming, but how the program translates into impact on the ground is equally important" (Schwartz, 2010, p.20). This depends on how well are NGOs able to adapt to the environment they work at and whether they are able to avoid the traps of competition and successfully coordinate their efforts. The lack of realism about the policy process increases vulnerability to disillusionment and cynicism. Practitioners are often over-burdened, under-resourced and feel marginalized from the higher level of decision making, which would be able to bring the needed change.

## 2.5 Young females

The widely confirmed Millennium Development Goals along with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child provide a framework of values and desired actions with respect to children and adolescents. Those beneficial development goals will not be reached without proper involvement and substantial investment in adolescent females and other vulnerable groups of adolescents.

Economic and social assets of adolescent females and the vulnerable youth are needed to boost the strength of the economic base of the society. "Women who have control of their assets are more likely than men to invest their assets to improve the health and education of their children and other family members. Investing in girls when it counts most is not simply a question of economic justice, but economic effectiveness" (Population Council, 2009, p.9).

Universal primary school education is the minimum goal of most countries. The most deprived group of youth, in almost all countries, is rural girls' group. Though the gender gap is narrowing, "two thirds of those who have never been to school or are currently out of school are female. Female education, particularly participation and schooling during adolescence, is a development investment in terms of gaining the skills and knowledge necessary for working productively, the economic returns and social justice" (Population Council, 2009, p.15). Educated girls are more likely to avoid child marriage and have better maternal and child health outcomes. They are also more able and inclined to invest in the health and education of their children, particularly increasing the chances that their daughters will be educated. Although the amount of private schools for females is growing, as analyzed by Lloyd, Mete & Grant (2007) it does not eliminate the problems of the access to education for a large group of females particularly from the rural areas of Pakistan.

The other problems which are young females in Pakistan facing, is the early marriage. Majority of young females are married before reaching the age of 18. "Initiatives meant to serve young people have overlooked both girls at risk of child marriage and married girls, directing their attention mainly to unmarried, often school-attending populations" (Population Council, 2009, p.19).

Child brides often experience a sudden shrinking of their social networks, leaving them with few, if any, friends and peers. "Regardless of whether more-vulnerable girls are married early, or whether early marriage itself creates some of the vulnerability, or both, the fact is that married girls tend to be less mobile, have more limited social networks, may have less say in decision-making, may be at greater risk of spousal abuse, have less exposure to the media, and have less education than unmarried girls and/or slightly older married females" (Married Adolescents, 2003, p.33). Such social isolation can close them off from essential, and in many settings constitutionally guaranteed, rights. Married girls also typically have

limited control over resources, low educational attainment, and highly restricted mobility with little power in their new households.

“Social and health policies have paid minimal attention to child brides as a separate category, typically grouping all married women together regardless of current age, age at marriage, or characteristics of the marital partnership” (Bruce, 2007, p.1). Further research focus should be aimed at girls in the conflict zones who became widowed, divorced or abandoned due to the social pressure or the nature of the marriage. Females in such environment and with such social status are facing substantial social exclusion and extreme economic risks for their families.

## 2.6 Education for youth

Education is a critical component, which helps young people to develop a wide variety of skills and is essential step for a transition to adulthood. Education also belongs to the fundamental human rights and as seen in the history, improvement of education is an essential change for the betterment of the society. “Providing quality education in a safe environment and keeping children in school is a cross-cutting strategy that links a variety of development priorities. Appropriate, targeted policies and programs that help to keep young people enrolled throughout adolescence and connected to the social network that schools provide can have important impacts on their personal development and can minimize their vulnerabilities to the challenges that exist outside of the school environment” (Population Council, 2009, p.16).

Once the society is able to make sure that children have access and are able to follow the education, chances for the improvement in various aspects are higher. Besides the knowledge, children are learning life skills, daily routines or gender equity in a well designed and managed environment. According to The Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the state “shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be determined by law” (Section 9, 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment, p.15). Unfortunately, education system in Pakistan is not working properly, is deprived of any reforms from the government and malfunctioning in providing the right for education for the children and youth of Pakistan. As mentioned in the official report by the NEMIS-AEPAM, on the Education Development Index, combining the spectrum of educational

access measures, "Pakistan lies at the bottom, among other countries in the region, considerably below Sri Lanka. A similar result occurs when comparing data on the gross enrolment ratios and in the adult literacy rate measures" (NEMIS-AEPAM, 2011, p.2). The national educational policy should reflect the intensions of government towards goals the education system should provide for the country. The two overarching priorities articulated in the document are related to "the importance of education as a key driver for the economic growth and social advancement. The first priority is to widen access to education for all. Secondly, the improvement of the quality of education, particularly in the fields relevant for the goals and needs of the national economy is prioritized" (National Educational Policy, 2009).

### 3. Study settings

#### 3.1 How Pakistan works

As an introduction to understanding of the current situation in Pakistan, the most suitable description is from the internal view of a Pakistani journalist and social researcher Anatol Lieven. "Trying to understand Pakistan's internal structures and dynamics is complicated. Many of the same features of Pakistan's state and government which are responsible for holding Islamist extremism in check are at one and the same time responsible for holding back Pakistan's social, economic and political development. Pakistan is divided, disorganized, economically backward, corrupt, violent, unjust, often savagely oppressive towards the poor and women and home to extremely dangerous forms of extremism and terrorism – and yet, it moves, and is in many ways surprisingly tough and resilient as a state and a society" (Lieven, 2012, p.4).

According to Lieven, Pakistan is more important to the region, the West and the world than is Afghanistan mostly because of its demographic potential. "With more than 180 million people, Pakistan has nearly six times the population of Afghanistan (or Iraq), twice the population of Iran, and almost two-thirds the population of the entire Arab world put together" (2012, p.5). As author further continues, "the only means of influencing Pakistan has been through economic incentives and the threat of their withdrawal. However, economic sanctions are not a credible threat, since the economic collapse of Pakistan would play straight into the hands of the Taleban and Al Qaeda" (Lieven, 2012, p.7).

The various aspects of the society and situation in Pakistan from the point of youth are described in somewhat naïve form in the book of a young author Khan (2012). On the other side of the spectrum are the books of Rashid (2009) where author explains the most important threats to global security coming from the region of Central Asia, focusing on the political acts and decisions by Pakistani officials. Rashid's book *Pakistan on the brink* (2012) is focusing solely on the negative aspects of the decisions of local government and international actors dealing with Pakistan and the whole book calls for a general immediate change in the decision making over the whole society. To get the notion of author's view, "Unless both the military and the political parties put change and reform on the agenda, Pakistan will face a loss of political control, growing anarchy and violence in the provinces

and among ethnic groups, enormous economic catastrophe for tens of millions of people, natural disasters made worse by lack of government, and the everlooming threat of militant Islam, which could in time overwhelm the security apparatus. Pakistan poses a much more dangerous situation than even Afghanistan” (Rashid, 2012, p.207).

A way to understand the broader point of view on the key ideological struggle in Pakistan is to look at the Pakistani society as a highly conservative mass of different societies, with two modernizing impulses of Westernized modernity and Islamic Conservatism.

“The Western modernizers with a vague belief in democracy are crippled down by the conservative nature of Pakistani society and by the growing hatred for the United States and their allies, while the Islamist modernizers are crippled down by the same conservative nature of Pakistani society and the failures of similar programmes elsewhere in the world during the Arab Spring, as well as by the fact that the majority of Pakistani elites rejects their model for class reasons” (Lieven, 2012, p.29).

Iqbal (2005) explains in detail the background of the Islamic ideology behind the creation of Pakistan, concluding that Pakistan can only survive as long as the ideological integrity is maintained. Author also explains what the Islamic ideology should mean in practical terms in the life of the nation today and shows how the modern concepts of nationalism, constitutionalism and social justice are interpreted through Islam as “a broad, liberal, assimilative and dynamic way of life, which acknowledges change and has the capability of responding meaningfully to altered conditions of modern life” (Iqbal, 2005, p.8).

Radicalization of Pakistan and the tendencies towards the militancy are explained in detail in Saigol (2010), while Schmidt (2012) is looking to find the core of the problems behind the Islamic militancy in Pakistan through explaining previous attacks and their justifications in detail. Author concludes that even though the radical forces in Pakistan are not yet able to challenge the feudals and the army for the state power, unless any precautionary actions are taken, Pakistan might become “a magnet for jihadists around the world” (Schmidt, 2012, p. 230).

Rana & Sial (2012) look at the ground problem of radicalization within Pakistan through a set of quantitative analysis of surveys on socio-cultural, religious and ideological, political, economic and external factors, to measure trends and levels of radicalization in Pakistan.

The chapter on the radicalization of youth concluded in the clear preference among youth for peaceful and democratic means to effect the change. "Ensuring that such possibilities for change remain available and meaningful will be vital both in countering radical tendencies and preventing such tendencies from taking root among the young population, which forms the majority of the country" (p.113).

"The widespread frustration over the current state of affairs and resistance to ethnic and religious diversity among a large section of youth needs urgent efforts to counter it. Awareness and education campaigns need to seek to contextualize the threats of extremism among youth, while views on gender equality, particularly changing opinions on gender stereotypes, and the role and the influence of electronic media are promising" (Rana & Sial, 2012,p.114).

A fundamental political fact about Pakistan is that the society in its various forms is immensely strong while the state, whoever claims to lead it, is weak. Any group with the slightest power in society uses it to turn to their advantage the workings of the law and bureaucracy. As mentioned in Lieven, "barely 1% of the population pays income tax and the wealthiest landlords in the country pay no direct taxes at all" (Lieven, 2012, p.12). The lack of state services means, that much of the time, the state as such does not affect many people's lives either in terms of benefits or oppressions. "The presence of policemen, judges and officials may make it look as if the state is present, but much of the time these people are working on their own account, or on behalf of whoever has the most power, influence and money at a certain point, in a certain place" (Lieven, 2012, p.13).

While many consider the corruption as the elementary problem of the Pakistani political system caused by wrong governance, it is important to understand the role of defense of the honor and the interests of the deeply rooted kinship groups. These traditional bonds usually "outweigh loyalty to a party, to the state, or to any code of professional ethics, not only for ordinary Pakistanis, but for the most politicians and officials; corruption is the result not of a lack of values but of positive and ancient value of loyalty to a family and clan" (Lieven, 2012, p.14).

Pakistani society in general, but especially Pashtun communities living mostly in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are well known for its traditionalist conduct of life,

stereotyped as a martial ethnic, known by the tendencies to use violence and affiliation to weapons, which might be seen as big internal obstacle to development but on the other hand is the primary source of its strong internal resilience. However educated and willing to change, youth is always under the influence of the religious conduct, community, *pashtunwali* (the traditional Pashtun code), families and other traditional kinship bonds. Current situation in the post-disaster and post-conflict affected areas provides an excellent opportunity to examine the traditional social bonds regarding to the concept of human development, to an integrated understanding of generational and gendered relations in the reconstruction of society in such context.

Mukulika Banerjee (2000) is providing interesting insight about the non-military Pashtun resistance movement Khudai Khidmatgar under Badshah Khan from the 1930s which was opposing the British colonial rule over Pakistan. The movement was challenging the stereotypes of Pashtun code of honor (Pashtunwali), lineage and revenge and Pashtuns as fierce and volatile people who have risen up in a wild and hazardous environment in violent jihad. Badshah Khan was able to ground his ideas of non-violence in both Islam and the traditional Pashtun ethics driving individual and communal conduct. According to his words "Jihad in the real sense meant the struggle for the welfare and advancement of its followers" (p.148). Pashtun identity is connected to Islam and often symbolized and expressed in village social life; the pillars of Islam are embedded in local practices and social structure. Khan's demonstration of the Islamic basis of non-violence should have been enough to convince Pashtuns to embrace it with the practice of Pashtun code adjusted to conform to newly interpreted Islamic law. However, the reality was not that straightforward, because as mentioned in the text "Pashtuns are Pashtuns first, Muslim second and then Pakistani" (p.153). While respecting Islam is seen as very important part of being Pashtun, being a Pashtun is not equivalent with being a Muslim. The Pashtunwali is just as influential as Islam and even if non-violence would have been portrayed as authentically Islamic, it would have not been acceptable by Pashtuns if it had been seen to be in contradiction with the Pashtunwali. Taken together, the summary of author's argument is that "the ultimate vision of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was neither a better nation state nor a better religious practice but a better moral and social community" (p.165). Badshah Khan redefined and reframed the key terms of Pashtun code such as shame, honor, refuge and hospitality that it was not as great departure from their previous practice as it first seemed. The example shows that people make selective and innovative use of traditional cultural elements in order to frame responses and solutions to problems of their present times.



As Lieven argues on the issue of the strength of kinship loyalty, "Pakistani society is probably strong enough to prevent any attempt to change it radically through Islamist revolution. However, the society's ability to frustrate even the best-designed and best-intentioned attempts at reform and positive development are key factors of the downturn of the Pakistan's situation" (Lieven, 2012, p.15).

### 3.2 Youth of Pakistan

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, while the definition of "youth" varies regionally, culturally and even the official authorities use ambiguous terms to identify various stages of youth, for the statistical purpose I will stick to the UN categorization of youth as persons between the age of 15 to 24 years, without any prejudice towards different definitions and categorizations.

Pakistan has a large population that can be categorized within the UN's definition of youth. According to the latest available data from the 2007 UN Population Fund statistics, an estimated 103 million Pakistanis, or 63% of the population, fall under the age of 25 years. However, as a result of sustained poverty and maldevelopment of various sectors related to the youth issues, the majority of youth in Pakistan does not have the opportunity to experience a childhood with proper facilities needed for their personal development. Youth Literacy Rate is estimated to be 53%. Female youth literacy (age 15-24) conforming to the wider pattern in Pakistan, is even lower at 42.0% (UN Population Fund, UNFPA).

The illiteracy rate is surprisingly high, especially when focusing on the size of the country and the mass of young people behind the percentage. While doing a rough calculation, there is more than 17 000 000 illiterate young people (15-24) majority of them females in a country which according to the constitution secures the compulsory education up to the age of 16.

Total population of Pakistan	164 600 000
Population of Youth (15-24)	36 000 000
Under 25 Years	103 700 000 (63% of the population)
10-19 Years old	39 500 000
20-24 Years old	14 820 000
Youth Literacy rate (15-24)	53%
Female Youth Literacy (15-24)	42%

Source: UN Population Fund, UNFPA, 2007.

While the population of Pakistan is increasing and no ongoing reform of the education system is being implemented, it is inevitable that the numbers of youth falling in this category are on the rise. Young people form a crucial part of population which will take responsibility for the long term development. Unless the conditions for the personal and communal development of youth are improved, Pakistan will not only lose the opportunity to build upon the human potential it has, but it will suffer more from the related problems. The officials have to pay special attention in addressing the issues from which Pakistani Youth suffer. Communities need to work as public spaces offering opportunities to facilitate civic values, education, experience and action for the youth. The government needs to inevitably develop and implement policies which will address the complex issues of the lack of education, gender discrimination, child labor and resulting poverty and apathy. How well the Pakistan's education system prepares the millions of young people for the future will have deep impact on the internal stability, competitiveness, economic stability and the security of the country.

Pakistan has endured serious emergent situations in recent years causing collateral damage at a large scale. The schools have been the victim because of the school infrastructure not constructed to bear the unprecedented shock of the earthquake and neither the school administration nor the students were prepared to cope with such kind of problem. Although there were some adjustments in the school curriculum and learning materials to address the crisis related and disaster management issues, it seems like due to the dysfunctional educational mechanism, concepts could not be enforced appropriately. According to the National Educational Policy, "Pakistan's education system has now recognized the need for preparation of individuals and groups to grapple with the demands of emergencies through

organized and effective responses. Credible rehabilitation and disaster management plans need to be put in place to ensure early restoration of education service” (National Educational Policy, 2009, p.40). However, such policies, as mentioned with many other in the document, lack the methodology and plan, how to reach their goals. While reading the official policies and reports from the international organizations I wanted to balance the view and enrich my pool of knowledge before going for the field research with the information from other insider sources. I found a blog which runs under the Good Governance Forum called the Youth Leadership Pakistan where sources from a broad range of contributors are collected.

The report of British Council, Pakistan: The next generation (2009) and the report edited by Hathaway and Kugelman (2011) are summarizing opinions of Pakistani contributors and professionals working on the projects dealing with youth and the demographic and economical problems of Pakistan. The UNDP report provides an insight on programmes within the development assistance which were implemented after the crisis and flood in 2010-2011.

The report of Francis et. al. (2009) suggests that the psycho-social interventions play vital role on the employment of youth, and vice versa. They must not only include counseling in managing the past trauma but also the provision of skills. While the elimination of poverty has been shown to be an important factor in determining psychosocial well-being, the implications for employment, employability and productivity, especially among youth, need to be examined through evaluation of current intervention programmes.

While such type of research and contributions might yield new insights, the purpose of my inquiry is not to generate conclusions about the youth in process of post-crisis reconstruction, or to deeply analyze the flaws of the educational system. My aim is similar to what depicted Schwartz in her paper, “to unveil, gather, explore and compare the data about to locate possible causal relationships” (Schwartz, 2010, p.25). By allowing both in-case and cross-case evaluation of the different variables on the overall level of post-crisis reconstruction, my case study design allows the comparative analysis of the relationship among youth, examining the peer pressure, intervening reconstruction actors and stability within society without any previous studies focusing on youth in Pakistan. The value I look for is not drawing finite conclusions but to identify future topics and paths for exploration in the field.

### 3.3 Methodology

The story behind my research started with the questions about the actual state of the society in Pakistan. The more I was reading from different sources, the more complicated was to create an opinion on the problems which are young people facing and how can society function in such difficult natural, civil and bureaucratic conditions. After reading through the reports from governmental branches, reports from the international organizations, articles by western scholars and by the Pakistani and western journalists I was facing various contradicting conclusions. At that point it was inevitable for me to travel and experience the situation by myself, with the burdens set by the limits of my own framing of functioning society but prepared to listen to the opinions of local people with an open mind. Since I have always preferred the direct exposure and believe that it is the best suitable method to reach data on issues of the social problems I tried to build a methodology of my research according to that scheme. Since the UMB and COMSATS have well established partnership I managed to travel to Pakistan and enjoy the benefits of the ongoing project including cooperation with partners of COMSATS and the whole necessary infrastructure needed to conduct the research.

I built the research on the scheme of individual interviews with as many respondents as I was able to reach from a broad range of the social, economic, hierarchical and professional background. Majority of interviewees was directly affected by the crisis; some others were either policy makers or directly participating in the development projects which were aimed to help to overcome humanitarian problems in those areas. My aim was to spend as much time in the field, talking to a wide variety of different people in different settings, actively participating in the meetings and social events, to be able to grasp some knowledge of daily routines of young people and their cooperation with others to get closer to their social setting. In the end, the goal was to create a "micro ethnography" of the selected areas affected by the earthquake and the humanitarian crisis within the limitations of my research. The main part of the research was enriched by the data from interviews I managed to conduct during the limited field visit in the Swat valley. Since the number of interviews was significantly lower and it took a short time span of 4 days, data could not be used as firstly planned, to become a comparative study with the main area of research around the town of Balakot. However, interviewees provided slightly different views and pointed at different

problems while being affected by similar levels of shock and humanitarian crisis. Information they provided are enriching the whole view of Pakistani youth on the situation and problems the society is facing.

The research is based upon qualitative data gathered from individual semi-structured interviews of youth (15-24 years old) from the earthquake affected areas supplemented with interviews from the conflict and flood affected areas. All interviews have been recorded on the voice recorder, all interviewees were aware that they have been recorded and agreed upon it. I preferred to use the help and service of a female translator who has been able to make contacts to female respondents who would be otherwise unwilling to talk to a male only researcher. Recording of the interviews proved to be a wise decision because many of the interviews were recorded in complicated settings such as the market place, school break or cricket match and in many other interviews the flow of the talk would be disturbed by taking notes. The final sample of respondents was being built gradually, starting with a few participants provided by the contact persons, afterwards through creating new contacts, known also as a "snowball sampling" who opened new areas, keeping the sample as balanced, rich and unbiased as possible.

The qualitative methodology approach I tend to prefer has been summarized by Ezzy (2010) who argues that "the emotional framing of interviews plays a major role in shaping the content of interviews" (p.168). Qualitative researchers typically focus on the articulated aspects of the interview and put aside the significance of their own and the interviewee's, emotions. The article argues that all interviews are emotional and embodied performances and that "good interviewing is facilitated by a reflexive awareness of, and engagement with, the emotional, embodied, and performed dimensions of the interview" (p.169). Social science research methodology is designed to train researchers to be attentive to their data, to perspectives of participants and patterns of meanings. However, conducting an interview is also emotional, and performed, which does not negate curiosity or the ability to listen. "Careful reflection on the emotional framing of the interview is an important part of reaching good data" (p.170).

Areas we visited during the field visits needed to be discussed in advance due to the security reasons; remote villages were accessible only within a limited range of time. In some of the areas we could not conduct any interviews, since people were either not willing to talk, or we were limited by the time possibilities. Nevertheless, I was able to "be present" in the area

and observe the social life in the streets, trying to understand what are the underlying causes of the unwillingness of locals to participate. In general, even though we were able to talk to many young people, some of the questions were left without answers due to the fear of consequences it could cause if made public, or in general as a part of topics which are taboo in Pakistani society.

Number of interviewees has been balanced by gender and the level of crisis imposed on an individual. The range of participants includes Afghan refugees, disabled, orphans and other minorities among the youth.

Interviewees from the Balakot/Mansehra region were interviewed directly in the field in their typical setting within their villages. Students from the earthquake affected zones were interviewed at the COMSATS campus in Abbottabad. The unexpected meeting with a local political leader happened at the co-education primary school in Kawai village, coaches participating on the projects of Right to Play were interviewed during their trainings in Abbottabad. Professionals working in the development sector have been identified through my previous respondents and interviewed in the temporary office at COMSATS Abbottabad campus. Due to the security reasons, interviewees from the conflict affected areas were identified via the Hujra NGO working on projects with the youth in Swat. Interviews where the support of a local contact person was necessary were conducted in the office in Saidu Sharif town in Swat and nearby safe villages around.

Concerning economic and field support, the ongoing cooperation between COMSATS and UMB covered the field expenses and translator while the international non-governmental organization Right to Play facilitated some of the field visits sharing information through their local staff that provided access to the interviewees through the field informants.

I tried to examine recent problems of youth in the post-crisis areas from their internal perspectives and focused mostly at the social pressure and insecurities they have to challenge when pursuing their adulthood. My aim was to identify the ways how organizations should approach young people to create the change of their mindset (the 'to do mentality') because I assumed the apathy and unwillingness to change their situation is the underlying cause of the problems young people are facing. Conducting individual interviews, trying to avoid biases created by the social pressure during the group interviews, I have been looking

for the common patterns about the solutions participants identified for solving complex problems of the post-crisis regions, and youth within that context and their individual perceptions of future.

### 3.4 Limitations

I am aware about ethical limitations which might be caused by the vivid and harsh memories and the variety of other constraints due to the nature of conducting research within Pakistani society. The conduct of interviews was case sensitive, gendered and discussed in advance with academics with previous experience within this particular setting. All participants were provided informed consent, their identity will not be revealed and the recordings of interviews which might in any chance unveil the identity of respondents will be kept confidential. A proportion of the sample of respondents might have passed the age criterion for the definition of youth I use, and there wasn't any way to check their age and eligibility for interviewing. Even though they might have been slightly over the limit, during the time of the crisis, they had certainly been within the range of youth age criterion, which should not affect their perception of crisis.

Due to the time caused limitations of the research which had been conducted due to the visa and residence permit restrictions within the limited time period of 6 weeks in November/December 2012 sampling and time period in certain areas was adjusted to reach the widest range of interviewees. Due to security limitations and further restrictions caused by the difficulty to obtain the NOC (No objection certificate) issued by the Pakistani Ministry of Internal Affairs for the stay in the Swat region, data covering the part of the conflict affected youth needed to be gathered within 4 days of restricted stay in the Mingora town. Therefore, the information from the conflict affected areas is only used to broaden the view on the youth related problems, not as a comparison of two different settings.

### 3.5 The Kashmir Earthquake

Areas I visited within the main part of the research were struck by the unprecedented earthquake in 2005. The whole section of this paper including the figures and effects of the earthquake is based on the report of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI Report, 2006). On October 8, 2005, at 8:50 a.m. local time, a magnitude  $M_w=7.6$

earthquake with the epicenter located approximately 19 km north northeast of the city of Muzaffarabad struck the Himalayan region of northern Pakistan and Kashmir.

The Pakistani government's official death toll as of November 2005 stood at 87,350, although it is estimated that the death toll could reach over 100,000. According to the data from EERI Report, approximately 138,000 were injured and over 3.5 million rendered homeless. As mentioned in the report, according to government figures, 19,000 children died in the earthquake, most of them in widespread collapses of school buildings. It is estimated that more than 780,000 buildings were either destroyed or damaged beyond repair. Out of these, approximately 17,000 (67%) school buildings and most major hospitals close to the epicenter were destroyed or severely damaged. The numerous vital roads and highways were closed by landslides and bridge failures. Several areas remained cut off via land routes even three months after the main event; power, water supply, and telecommunication services were shut down for varying lengths of time (EERI Report, 2006, p.2).

Such horrible effects of the earthquake were shock for the whole Pakistani society, however for such devastating results officials were blamed for a lack of preparation on the situation. Firstly, as participants told me, local people did not previously receive any training on how to behave during an earthquake, even though the region is a earthquake prone area and secondly, public buildings were poorly constructed without any building code limitations set by the authorities. At the time of earthquake, almost all schools were open and functioning with the classes being held. Buildings such as schools and hospitals collapsed and caused big number of casualties, due to non-seismic design, low quality construction and improper design. Detailed causes of the destruction and recommendations for the reconstruction and implementation of a construction code are explained in the Haseeb et al 2011.

The intensity distribution estimated is closely associated with the rupture zone. "Outside the narrow (5-10 km) width of the rupture zone, the signs of damage appeared to be fairly minor. Within the rupture zone, the city of Muzaffarabad suffered great damage (IX-X on MMI scale), and the city of Balakot was almost totally destroyed (X on MMI scale)" (EERI Report, 2006, p.5). "The Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale is a seismic scale used for measuring the effects of the earthquake and is distinct from the moment magnitude which is a measure of the energy released, usually reported for an earthquake. The scale quantifies the effects of an earthquake on the Earth's surface, humans, objects of nature, and man-



made structures on a scale from I (not felt) to XII (total destruction)" (Wikipedia article: Mercalli Intensity Scale).

As the scientists from the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute summarized the situation, "The earthquake affected a population of approximately 3.5 million people either directly or indirectly, and the logistics of administering aid and relief efforts have been extremely daunting. In addition to the numbers of deaths, the human cost includes amputees, orphans, unhygienic conditions resulting in disease, and severe malnutrition. The early days of the disaster response were marked by uncoordinated efforts among a whole host of organizations involved in relief work. There was little information on who was doing what and little oversight over the relief projects" (EERI Report, 2006, p.7).

Secondary effects of the impact were the exposure to the harsh winter conditions, lack of water supply, damaged electricity and phone lines, leaving thousands of people cut from their relatives, problems with managing the displaced populations in the shelter camps, distribution of the humanitarian aid and the prevention of disease in camps. As reported from the interviewees, social and cultural issues were creating endless difficulties. "Diseases such as diarrhea, respiratory infection, and scabies in crowded tent settlements have sprung up in the weeks following the earthquake. Instructions on hygiene were published to raise the level of awareness among the affected population. According to a World Bank estimate, \$3.5 billion were needed for reconstruction and rehabilitation of affected areas" (EERI Report, 2006, p.8).

### 3.6 Swat insurgency and its consequences

Keeping in mind what I have summed up earlier about the notion of Pakistani army and the state of the Pakistani society, the Islamist militants' takeover in Swat in 2007-2009 was widely seen as a sign that they could extend their control from the tribal areas to the "settled areas" of the NWFP and further towards Islamabad. As explained by Lieven, "such takeover was not a question of Taleban moving into Swat from outside but rather a overwhelming local movement which placed themselves under the banner of the Pakistani Taleban but remained completely autonomous" (Lieven, 2012, p.462).

Initially, as elsewhere the Taleban won much local popularity by eliminating local drug-dealers, kidnappers and other criminals whom the Pakistani police had been unwilling, or unable to deal with. However, the Taleban then began to attack local leaders, policemen, military related personnel, shop-owners and a massive campaign against the girls' schools. The result was an increasing control over Swat. In all, "238 schools were destroyed (mainly those for girls) out of 1540 in Swat valley, others were occupied and turned into militant bases" (Lieven, 2012, p. 467).

A certain Pashtun nationalist element was also present in the nostalgia for independent Swat. It had been a Pashtun state under Pashtun princes, using Pashto language for administration and justice, whereas in the NWFP as in the rest of Pakistan, the local language had been overrun in government, higher education and social status by either English or Urdu. This history is of immense importance in explaining what happened in Swat and why the militants' temporary seizure of power in Swat was not necessarily a forerunner of similar development elsewhere. Lieven wrote, "Maulana Fazlullah, who in 2007 placed his movement under the wings of the Pakistani Taleban seems to have dreamed of re-creating the princely state as an independent Islamic emirate like Afghanistan under the Taleban with himself as Emir" (Lieven, 2012, p.464). Swat has previously been a tourist destination, considered as one of the most attractive places in the whole Pakistan and has been more developed than the majority of the country. In 2009 the Taleban actions escalated and bombings of Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, bombings in Lahore and public beating of a 17 year old girl in the streets of Swat revived the mixed feelings of the supporters which occurred after the bombings in the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad in 2007.

"These attacks showed Pakistanis that the Taleban were by no means just good Muslims interested in promoting Islamic behavior and Islamic justice, which many non-Islamists throughout the NWFP and Punjab had persisted in believing, but aimed at overthrowing the existing state and imposing their own rule" (Lieven, 2012, p.459). However, these developments alone would mostly probably not rock the boat of the Taleban and provoke a massive backlash or a strong counter offensive against the Taleban. As Lieven explained in detail, the tipping-point came in the second week of April 2009 when the Taleban sent hundreds of their fighters in the Buner province, which was a completely insignificant place in itself. Although the Buner is close to Islamabad, it is divided with rugged mountains, but militants were able to control the Tarbela dam which provides northern Pakistan with much of its electricity and also the motorway linking Islamabad and Peshawar. To understand the

wider context, Pakistani Military is widely respected authority, which creates the notion of being the only functioning part of the state apparatus. "By 2010 the Pakistani military, including men serving in paramilitary units consisted of more than 800 000 people and spending on the military took 18% from the national budget. Meanwhile, it has undermined the ability of Pakistan to provide essential services to their citizens" (Lieven, 2012, p. 174). In the end, "the fall of Buner was a sign, which produced a feeling that the prestige of military was at that time on the line, meaning that If the military failed to fight back, people would begin to think they would never fight back. Finally, it made it even more difficult to resist the growing pressure from Washington to take tougher action against the Pakistani Taleban" (Lieven, 2012, p.460).

Pakistan military launched a massive offensive against Taleban groups in Malakand region of NWFP in the last week of April 2009. "The operation was chosen as a last resort after the failure of two agreements of the provincial government, first with the local Taleban group, led by Mullah Fazlullah, and second with defunct Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) headed by Sufi Muhammad. Taleban had refused, in violation of the agreement, to lay down their weapons even after the promulgation of the Nizam-e-Adl regulation which agreed on the use of the Shariah conduct of justice in the restive region" (Rana, 2009, p.9). Such act had shown that militant movements were not really interested in implementation of Shariah but in keeping the power over the region for themselves.

The resulting successful but heavy military operation called The Black Thunderstorm, especially its part Rah-e-Rast which last till the beginning of June 2009 caused major destruction around the town of Mingora and its outskirts, with many civil casualties and massive humanitarian crisis with the internal displacement of more than 1.2 million of people from the Swat valley (Detailed information on Wikipedia page: The Black Thunderstorm). A little more than a year later, as many of those internally displaced people were returning to a stabilized Swat, the worst flooding in the history of the region created a new crisis that threatened to undo what little development progress on the reconstruction of society, the military, civilian government and international actors had achieved. The policies implemented and consequences of combined effects of the displacement crisis are explained in detail in Fleischner (2011), Mezzera (2009) and Zafar (2011).

Zafar concluded in his analysis: "While the large-scale violence has decreased, there is by no means a sense of peace in the Valley or surrounding areas. And with each passing day it

seems more unlikely that the government in Islamabad is capable of providing the type of reconstruction, development, legal reforms, and governance that would effectively address local grievances. As long as these grievances remain, the battle for Swat will not have been won" (Zafar, 2011, p.7). Mezzera pointed on a deeper consequences of the reconstruction of the society: "A second potential threat originating from the current crisis is linked to the unavoidable tensions that arise once large (though temporary) resettlement flows take place, putting additional pressure on often already strained local natural resources and basic services, and on existing delicate ethno-religious balances" (Mezzera, 2009, p.4).

As Fleischner stated, "While civil organizations have been instrumental in providing the humanitarian relief in response to the floods, their ability to push for better governance has been noticeably limited by the presence of the army in the region. Local civil organizations managed to bring progress in better government accountability, rebuilding of the infrastructure and schools, but fail to represent the voices of poor and females and are heavily influenced by those who may be opposed to political reforms that might change the way land is titled, taxes are collected, or political appointments are made" (2011, p.7). While non-governmental organizations and donor programs have been able to meet some of the demand for education and health services, public education is of notoriously poor quality. Even more rapid decline in education has taken place largely because of the both manmade and natural disasters in Swat valley. "Under the Taleban governance, insecurity and the closing of schools for girls made access to education nearly impossible for young people across the valley" (Fleischner, 2011, p.8). Mezzera pointed at the crux of the problems described earlier in the description of the current state of the Pakistani society, "The facets and causes of Pakistan's protracted crisis are multiple and should all be properly recognized and dealt with. The origin of such a redemptive process, however, should be based in a genuine attempt to turn Pakistan's formal democracy into a substantive democracy, whereby citizens are truly put in the position to decide the country's destiny regardless of all the patronage, elite, ethnic, tribal, military and religious powers that constantly try to harness the country's governance system" (Mezzera, 2009, p.6). Summing up the analysis of the current situation shows, that while the army's reconquest of Swat in the summer 2009 has proved that it will fight to preserve Pakistan and that in fact Pakistan will be preserved in the situation in which it stands now, the implementation of particular development programs will not focus on general reorganization of Pakistani society and elimination of the Islamic militancy in the region.

## **4. Findings from the Balakot Area**

### 4.1 Introduction to the findings from the post-earthquake area

The aim of my research is to fill in the gap in the knowledge about the problems of youth in the crisis affected areas. Young people I managed to interview and receive information about, their daily life and everyday problems has been responsive and mostly glad to cooperate. I discovered that quite a number of them were persuaded that my research will bring a kind of monetary benefits for them and their families, but some were highly informative and keen to talk about the challenges from various sources they are facing.

The objectives of the research were to analyze all the aspects of “a daily misery” of the young people in the crisis affected areas. I kept asking the participants on their family setting, daily routines, how their families were affected by the crisis, what changed in their lives after the crisis, and what are the perceptions of future of themselves and the community they live in.

Main focus points were to find out to what extent the youth from different geographical (rural, semi-urban, urban areas), crisis affected (light impact, heavy impact), economical and educational background react to the problems they have to overcome in the phases of rebuilding the society. I questioned their participation in the humanitarian and development projects and also their cooperation with other people within the community, focusing as well on the gendered view at the problems. Overall, the layouts of questions in the interviews were aiming to discover how the participants look at their future and whether the notion of change, needed for the improvement of the society is rooted in their minds. Even though it is hardly possible to measure the “willingness for change” among the participants, it is possible to analyze through their plans for the future, steps they are taking for their own betterment and the activities within the community and among the peers, to clearly identify the individuals with the “change-maker mindset”.

The crux of the problem I discovered is that the majority of the young people do not feel satisfied with the options for their individual development they have in the areas they live. From all the steps taken by various actors such as international NGOs, Pakistani government and local organizations for the reconstruction of the everyday life, very little is widely considered as positive for the long term development of the society. The shortcoming of the projects was its non-sustainability and limited time, scope and reach among the youth.

Another widely perceived problem was the ability of some influential individuals to grab their chance and take over the ongoing projects by their newly created local organizations, misuse the funds and leading to the point that projects have been terminated from the side of donor organizations. Such major acts and mainly other minor challenges and constraints keep eroding the trust not only in the local officials, but also the organizations themselves. Unless the conduct of project planning, recruitment of locals, implementation and evaluation is improved, development actors might completely lose the trust of people and closing the door for further cooperation. Therefore, throughout the conduct of research my major aim changed to look for recommendations on how to make development projects in such torn areas, soaked with distrust (particularly by youth) to officials; appropriate, efficient, inclusive and working for the betterment of the society.

#### 4.2 Social impact of the crisis

Balakot proved to be highly unsure about the future. It seems to be caused by two unique aspects. Firstly, the area had been struck by the unprecedented earthquake and nobody is sure if any other strike is not coming at any time, since the area had been marked as a "red zone" where the earthquakes might happen anytime. Second aspect with the marking of a red zone and resulting policies is the inability of government to act. Government officials stated that the whole city of Balakot will be moved to a new spot marked as a New Balakot City close to the town of Mansehra, however not a single family had been moved since the announcement of 2009. People are less willing to start their own business because they are still unsure if they will be forcefully moved to the new place at any time. A 24 years old college passed, unemployed male stated, "People really want to move from this area, government announced constructing the whole new town of Balakot. We people know what houses we want and need. If they give us the money, we can do it by ourselves, better and quicker. Honestly, nothing has happened yet. No one has been moved there, because

government hasn't started building the town. We people are stuck in the middle of the political talk" (Interview 14).

Regarding the policies about the New Balakot City I couldn't get more clear answer from the local political leader, "New Balakot City is never going to be built" (Interview 34).

A male, who has been employed by the organization as a facilitator and project manager and now, runs his own business in Kaghan valley stated, "At that time when I was walking on the ruined villages, on the slopes of mountains I understood that the whole system collapsed. People lived as families, in the small villages, everyone had his own job, things to do, also in the community and it was gone in a matter of minutes. ... Society is much different; one can say it was backward and basic, before. Few houses in a village, many mud houses, now people want children to get educated, do not live with their animals anymore, but have also lost this community feeling, unemployment rose, as a whole, it's progressing, they want a better life, for themselves, not for the community. They are poor, besides agriculture and tourism don't have any other source of income" (Interview 40).

The other social impact of the earthquake was the unseen chance for the poor people to receive a decent financial help and start from the beginning. It destructed the social inequalities since both the rich and poor were left powerless, without any place to stay, and received the same kind of support. As the 24 years old female working for various development projects stated, "The poor people tried to get as much from the benefits as possible. They marked the goat stalls as their other house, to receive funds for the reconstruction ... On the other hand, the collapse made the change-makers in the society muted. Educated, formerly middle class people left. I met a guy I knew, with an MBA, polishing shoes in the street in Islamabad" (Interview 8).

A different point of view provided a 19 years old girl from Muzaffarabad, a university student from a well off family, "A big change occurred in the social behavior; people misused all the help provided. They stopped respecting others (in the wider context meaning "us"). Everyone could suddenly get access to all the luxuries, mobiles, television or kettle. People received money! Some got really high amount and moved up from their class, lost the respect to previous hierarchy and their own history. Values of the society vanished. I could go and tell the officials my husband is dead to get money and come back to him to our house. ... Respect is now related only to money. People compromise on their honor and

refuse to help each other without monetary benefits. We had big houses and cars, only us. Now everyone became so materialistic because they have the chance of buying various stuff as well. ... People care only about satisfying their own needs" (Interview 17). This level of impact of the crisis seems to be connected with grievances caused by the uneven distribution of the humanitarian aid. Understanding the situation of the victims of the crisis pursuing their livelihoods is essential for preventing creation of conflicts and sustaining good relationship between organizations and the public.

### 4.3 Livelihood security through development projects

In the first settlements in the area of Attir Shisha I interviewed a few young males ranging from the age of 18 to 24, and I found out a few aspects that kept repeating in other areas which were not struck as heavily by the crisis caused by the earthquake with the epicenter in the nearby town of Balakot. Regardless of their level of education, people were very little aware about the problems of the communities, living not too far from their areas. Firstly I was not sure if it has been caused by the lack of information coming from the heavily struck areas or the misinformation spread on the local basis. Individuals were little interested in participating in the development projects since they did not have the urge of helping other people, referring to themselves as not being in such a good financial setting to be able to help anyone else but themselves. The impact of an earthquake ruined only a few houses in the area, the Government High School (GHS) for males was partly damaged and comparably to other areas reconstructed in a short time span of three months, funded by the Turkish government. Non-paid participation on the humanitarian projects has been limited only to the family members and close relatives.

An 18 year old male student stated. "No local people were involved in the reconstruction of the school since workers were not given a daily wage. ... Nobody was helping to NGOs free of cost" (Interview 1). On the contrary, other interviewees kept telling stories about participation in several projects, since there was a rumor in the community that I am from an organization looking for active individuals to participate on a different project. Such pattern of behavior repeated in other areas which prove that young people are in a difficult economic situation and they are willing to make up stories to get the attraction of organizations that should carry on their activities in the areas. The truth we discovered later was that several individuals honestly participated in the immediate relief period after the



earthquake, traveling to the Balakot area, helping to extract the dead bodies from the ruined houses and helping to bury them in the mass graves. Such acts of being insincere to researchers and people from the organizations seem to be widespread, resulting from the poverty caused by the high level of unemployment and individuals looking for alternate sources of income coming from the participation in the development projects. All the participants mentioned that the society became less opened than before the earthquake. People tend to prioritize the well being of themselves and are less involved in the communal life. A 22 years old male shop assistant stated, "If I get a salary I will participate in the projects, otherwise not" (Interview 4).

Another problem identified, was the termination of the water supply project which has been caused by the unwillingness of locals to pay their shares within the project. The other 24 years old male interviewee stated. "It is government who owns the well. It is their role to provide us water, why should we pay for the pipelines? ... Anytime government does work on a project they bring their own workers, we can get hardly any job on those projects" (Interview 3).

Small scale farmers are in the most difficult situation since they usually do not have sufficient finances to sustain their business when any unpredicted situations occur. Therefore the educated individuals are looking for any kind of job, which could secure themselves and also their families.

One of the positive aspects which evolved from a difficult economic situation is that people are looking for a side income more than before, as an 18 years old male farmer summarized, "Those who can work and find a job, will take it, previously boys in my age did not use to work once the family had been financially secure" (Interview 5). On the other hand, the price hike, inability to find a stable job, persistence of the old problems including the lack of educational facilities and very little interest of officials about the youth gatherings and appeals motivate individuals to sustain their livelihoods through migrating from the area. "I have been taught how to start my own business. I have been provided with some money, which was not enough in our area to run my own shop. There is no hospital, no job opportunities, not even a proper sports ground. ... I want to move to the town and never go back" (Interview 5).

Although the facilities for youth increased after implementation of several projects on education and activities, focused only on boys, most participants consider their lives better after the crisis; the lack of college has a deeper impact. "Many families can not afford to send their boys for the college in Mansehra because of the commuting/living costs. Those boys are jobless, hanging around; once in a while they get some daily wage work and spend most of their money on drugs. ... Most of the 15-18 years old boys are involved in the drug abuse" stated a 23 years old male, a college passed farmer (Interview 2). Sport activities which were part of the project aiming to cut down the level of drug abuse and raise the awareness are taking part only during the school time. "In the afternoon, boys have plenty of time and nothing to do but drugs" he continued (Interview 2).

In a same area but the other village of Kalabat I managed to interview physically disabled male and female who compared to other interviewees from that area were more proactive in looking for alternative way of earning for their livelihood. Because of their injuries caused by the earthquake they have been offered some minor refund, which could not cover the expenses for rebuilding their house or pay for the trauma they experienced, but managed to get some trainings and buy necessities for running their own business. As the 19 years male who works as an assistant at the local tailor shop stated, "I lost my mother I can't do any sport activities, I can't afford to pay for the expenses of commuting to Mansehra for college studies. I can hardly migrate away, but I am trying to do my best, earn some money in the shop and I could possibly study privately in the evenings. ... Though, I can't help the community I can hardly help myself" (Interview 12).

The 24 years old female interviewee could not move without the assistance of her young sister, who vice versa could not attend the school classes, because of the need to take care of her older sibling. The disability allowed her only to work on the ground with minor agricultural help. "Government promised to refund the building of a new house. Look, from the money we couldn't even build the walls. I can't move, if the earthquake strikes again, I will die under this mud house. My younger sister was never allowed to study, she is helping me all the time. I wish she could study and I could move by myself and go out. But no one is willing to help me to go out" (Interview 13).

#### 4.4 Awareness and participation in the projects

The other group of interviewees was selected from the youth which has been actively working in the connection with the international NGO Right to Play (RTP). Those participants were clearly more informed about the situation in the heavily earthquake hit areas even though some of them did not come from such areas, neither had worked there. Participants identified subtle problems and even proposed solutions for them. Even though their level of education has been the same as with other participants, the level of awareness and the aspect of "the will for change" have clearly been higher.

In Sherpur, a village in the Mansehra region where the RTP implements their Youth as a Leader program (YAL) a 23 years old female, college passed interviewee who works as the RTP hired private teacher summarized her situation and activities, "I have eight females privately educated at my place. I can't provide them with textbooks but I'm trying to do my best. It's a shame that nobody will allow them work after they pass my courses. However, I believe that once you educate females, they will spread the knowledge among other people in the household. Families keep coming and telling me they will pay for my extra coaching and I answered, you rather stop promising me the money you will never bring I am doing it for the benefit of the children" (Interview 29). Such views are proving the assumptions from the literature discussed earlier about the impact of education on the awareness of the situation and the will to participate for the communal benefits.

Major problems identified, included the inability of youth to act because of the lack of a communal political platform. A male working actively as a sports coach with youth in Balakot stated, "We know the problems, we have skilled people, we are willing to work, but we are waiting for someone to hire us. ... How can we start big projects without the will of government? We don't even have resources to bribe anyone, not to pay the whole projects" (Interview 6).

While staying at the campus I had the chance of interviewing a 27 years old male who is active within the youth projects on the international scheme. At the South East Asian Youth Congress he has been picked and awarded the prize of a Junior Leader of Pakistan. His work experience, understanding of the complexity of the problems of his home area of Chitral was straightforward. "Youth is a key factor in developing our society. While the education sector is poor, people are illiterate; they get involved in genocide and suicide bombings. Educated

people rarely cause problems. If human sources develop, countries will develop" (Interview 33).

Active individuals, who came through a set of trainings and case specific education in the development sector, understand the problem of migration beyond the scope of regular youth. "Youth needs the exposure of living abroad, the bottom up approach. Everyone here wants to leave. I'm disappointed that many youth leaders want to flee abroad, see and enjoy the nicer world and stay there. Engineers work in hotels, lawyer as a waiter in restaurant in the US. They are the solution for our country, we have the power to clean it and we serve it (Interview 33). Such statements point out the general tendencies towards migration from the areas, but on the same hand prove that once individuals do get the access to education and platform to build their projects, they tend to value the option they have been offered and stay and help for the community.

While visiting a Kaghan Memorial Trust school in the mountain area of Kawai in the Kaghan valley, on the cricket field, I accidentally met and talked to a local political leader and to ask him on his point of view on the development challenges and the education problems in the area, previously identified by the youth I interviewed.

The politician proudly stated, "My family is in the politics for more than 50 years. I have been the Nazeem for 8 years, being the head of development agency in this area. Thank god, our family is known for actually doing development in this area. People do know when the help is not delivered" (Interview 34).

Regarding the problem of female education I was given a not really surprising answer from the political leader, "A high school is present in Balakot, fully functional. There are also shelter primary schools in Balakot. Maybe there are some deficiencies. I'm not talking about the girls. ... We had a girl's college before, which is being reconstructed. If someone doesn't want to come through the school you can't force them to do so. As a representative of this area, let me tell you, girls that don't go to the girls high school, are doing it from their own will. There is no peer pressure from the society"(Interview 34). As I had it proved by many interviewees, the school was just about to be finished and opened when the earthquake hit and the school is not being rebuilt at all.

The political leader continued in his analysis of the female education, "The family mindset is important. My own example shows people how to act; look my daughter is attending a coeducation school in Abbottabad. My sister is a doctor, now living in Canada. We are working on that! We won't have a problem with female education. The female dropouts from the school are not the representation of the society. That's few odd cases, 13-14 years old girl dropouts are not from the community of Balakot. They might happen anywhere else, but not here" (Interview 34). Both the teacher and various female participants stated that one of the main problems is the female dropout rate is high and still rising.

The attitude of the local political leader shows the inconsistency of what politicians do, what they talk about and what policies are they implementing, or not implementing in this case. It is obvious that when majority of the society agrees about the suppression of the female education, politicians will not try to rock the boat and open such issues for a discussion, the importance for the development of the female education is close to zero.

Regarding the problem of the high amount of unfinished development projects in the area the political leader explained his point of view, "Lots of NGOs committed to build schools but in the end, disappeared. They either didn't have the capacity to fulfill their plans, or the donors refused to fund the plans according to proposals. ... The dilemma of NGOs is that they only work in areas which are approachable, that donors could it, which is against the needs of people. The results need to get publicized. However, media didn't come here to take pictures" (Interview 34). According to the local development workers, more than 60% of the projects have been unfinished mostly due to some financial frauds and resulting financial incapability of organizations to sustain the activities.

To provide the answer from the opposite site of the spectrum, I asked the former project manager from the Kaghan Memorial Trust about his experience with the issues of unfinished projects in the area, "The biggest obstacle in solving problems in our country is the bureaucracy. I was an administrator of school, when I needed to get things done, there wasn't any way. You can't imagine how corrupted the system is. From my own example, I needed to pay 12% extra of the costs to the department of development. They don't even ask sympathetically, they are rude; it's our right, pay and you'll get the project approved! There was no way out of that. Taxes added, other expenses and accountant, the government machinery takes 35% of the project, if I'm getting 5% as my profit, what would you expect?! It's almost half of the budget. Bureaucracy is well paid for such incompetence,

and we pay them again with the project money! Those are the reasons why the projects ran out of money and are not finished” (Interview 40).

On the other hand, based on his long term experience, he also proposed a solution for the problem, “The only way how to clean the system, is to put reliable, responsible and competent people in the positions in the apparatus. Those who can implement policies and make things work. They work only when the pressure comes up. Wipe up the bureaucracy and recruit it from the youth, they will suddenly have jobs, they will be satisfied with policies they implement, and perform the job fair, in good faith, they are not corrupted” (Interview 40).

If the frustrating situation in the political apparatus is not going to change, in the end, many such talented and educated change-makers will change their minds and might surrender. The former project manager concluded his analysis, “People worked hard to help their communities, but you can't forget to develop personally, move yourself in your life as well. People volunteered for 6 months or a year, that's all you can do for the community. You can hardly find youth in those villages, either they went for education or once they moved down, migrated permanently. Once you experience the city, different kinds of business it's hard to go back and live in the mountains. For a month, I can go and play my role, but you know... Let's have a look at the example of a hospital. There are hardly any doctors; people have to travel to Abbottabad, or Mansehra to get a proper health care. Nobody can get doctors to work there. If the government employees don't perform their job properly, how can you expect young people from the community to give up his job and to go and work for the development of the community instead?” (Interview 40).

#### 4.5 Education

While talking to growing number of participants, the deficiencies of the educational system of Pakistan seemed to be even more shocking than depicted by the literature. The main problem of the area is the lack of educational facilities rather than job opportunities for the youth, as been marked in the areas less exposed to the crisis. Most of the children casualties during the earthquake happened in schools during the classes since the shocks happened in the morning time. As many interviewees mentioned, it has been difficult to persuade parents

again to send children back to school since they have been frightened that the earthquake will happen again and their children might die in schools. Organizations have been providing a support not only for children but also for parents to make sure the educational system would recover from this unprecedented shock.

Findings from the interviewees from the areas heavily struck by the earthquake seem to be consistently more proactive, their ability to react to problems, will for the education, including females and small scale entrepreneurship tends to be higher. Young males I interviewed had strong traumatic experience from the crisis and the changes the society needed to get over. I preferred to focus on their participation in the reconstruction than to let them depict all the details from the earthquake times. All the interviewees spent a long time (between 6 months to 1.5 year) without any proper education, besides some classes held in the tents or a short-term psychosocial support provided by the international organizations.

The current situation in the public education system has been summarized by a 19 years old male who earns for his livelihood as a shop assistant, "I'm sitting here while supposed to be at school, but at the government schools nobody really bothers to check the presence. Teachers are not interested and always missing, there are no checks on them, why should be on us? ... If they fire me out, for 600 rupees they will re-admit me. We don't even have the proper building yet, no officials ever came to check how is the construction and education running. Just before the exam time we get some extra coaching and pass easily" (Interview 15).

The complex problems related to the reconstruction of schools have been depicted in detail by a 24 years old male from Balakot, "At the time when the earthquake hit, I was at the college. At first we thought it wasn't an earthquake, but that India had thrown a nuclear bomb upon us. ... College has been closed for six months, afterwards it was very slowly rebuilt after the phases held in tents, many teachers were injured, or died and even now, seven years after, the education system here is not working as it should be. Teachers are needed, the reconstruction is still continuing. There is only one high school and one college for the whole district. College for the girls was being built when the earthquake hit us, it has not been reconstructed ... Girls Higher Secondary School was held for a long time in the shop, they still don't have a proper building. The society changed, people prioritize their own well being, government pays little attention. Nowadays, nobody is thinking about rebuilding

the girl's college" (Interview 14). When I went to visit the female higher secondary school, it seemed that no classes were going on; teachers were sitting in front of the tents and were not willing to talk about the situation.

As been mentioned in interviews, most of the youth males, including the previous two respondents, are lacking the basic facilities such as playgrounds in their neighborhoods and are unhappy about the level of education provided at the government high school in Balakot. During my visit of the school, students were climbing through the hole in the wall, running to shops to buy food, and only two teachers were present in the six freshly rebuilt classrooms inside.

A 22 years old university graduate from Balakot, who runs his own online business, had a clear opinion on the problems youth are facing, "Youth does not have any opportunities in this area. Opening a park financed by western donors is not a solution. Youth needs education and proper job opportunities. There is very low standard of education and people can't get any technical education. Youth is not financially backed, they can hardly move to other area and study. They are locked here, becoming beggars because of poor education possibilities. ... Organizations built schools, but haven't trained proper teachers, money could have been used more wisely, all the locals involved have been corrupted" (Interview 28).

In contrast with the frustration from the education sector, majority of the affected young males have been active in various community projects, or have ideas which could be implemented for the betterment of the community. A 24 year old male respondent commuting on a daily basis from a remote village Sarbani to Balakot explained his contribution for the communal benefits, "We created the unity in my home village. Whenever the road gets damaged I announce it in the mosque and on the other day we organize the youth and try to rebuild the road" (Interview 27).

A 16 years old student from the government school told me during the break between classes, "I am concerned about the waste in the city and about the mess on the streets. I do usually pick up the garbage and throw it in the bins, or burn it. Government provided the bins, but people continue throw the garbage around the bin, not inside, truck come to pick the bins very rarely. ... If we could print some pamphlets asking people to keep the town clean and organize a small group of boys to help to clean the streets, life would be much nicer here" (Interview 25).



Another 16 years old male student from Balakot, who was interested in studying the information technology told me, "I asked the teacher in school to give us lectures in English also, since I had some classes earlier in English and it was difficult for me to switch to Urdu and learn mathematics. Nothing changed. It was only few of us that wanted the classes in English. It is weird because all the higher education is taught in English; it would be much easier for us to adjust" (Interview 26). The frustration from the situation has been partly caused by the fact, that many of the young people in the area were exposed to the private education funded by the NGOs in the relief period for free, and after the programs ended, they could not afford to pay for private education and needed to switch to public school with much lower quality standards of education.

Young males in the area are well aware about the lack of centres for the technical education for them and about the necessity for female education, which might be the result of trainings provided by several organizations in the relief period after the earthquake. A 24 year old male respondent from Sarbani who had shown me the work of the local organization proved to be active despite limitations caused by his family setting, "Organization should work more on the social mobilizing, through such activities people can learn how to cooperate, learn from each other and try to solve complex issues such as the dropout of school. ... The lack of facilities, no proper traveling means, and only one female school per union council is permitted by the law. How can our girls manage to walk 14 km to the school? ... Our plan is to support the already existing co-education school in my village and broaden it up to the 10<sup>th</sup> grade to make sure females can reach at least some level of education" (Interview 27).

Female participants provided me with a lot of information about the gendered view on the post earthquake relief period and especially the female education problems in the affected areas. The problems mentioned in the literature on young rural females, especially their vulnerability in the post crisis setting (e.g. Bruce, 2007, Lloyd, Mete & Grant 2007, Married Adolescents, 2003, Population Council, 2009) were proved by a wide variety of interviewees from the Balakot area. Immediately after the earthquake, before people have been provided with the tents and shelters, females were insecure, sitting on the ruins of their houses. Many locals preferred their daughters to get married quickly to the army officers and have the chance to leave the area, avoiding getting taken over by random men. However, some of the military personnel disappeared and the girls need to get formally divorced, to be able to marry again. As the interviewees admitted, their families feel tricked and ashamed.

Interviewees understood their complicated situation, being females trying to reach a certain level of education in a very fragile environment where social pressure on the family can rise immediately, leaving them without any chance of pursuing their educational goals. 25 years old disabled female from Balakot explained the typical sequence of measures taken against females, "After passing some age limit, people stop sending girls to schools; the first priority is to get married. Even If they get education, they allow teaching jobs only. Is it caused by the mindset or the peer pressure, who knows? Whatever parents say, we must do it. Any objection is a big disgrace to family" (Interview 22).

During my field visit to the Garhi Habib Ulah government high school, those females who were allowed to talk, provided me with a completely different insight on the problems related to female education compared to other, generally older participants, mainly from Balakot town. As one 16 years old student boldly stated, "The biggest problem of our society is female education, people are not willing to send girls to schools. Just up the secondary level, afterwards they are never allowed to leave the house. ... My neighbor was so keen to study but her father did not allow her, she insisted, went to the market bought the uniform and her father had beaten her afterwards and forced her not to go. ... Being a female, you are not allowed to do anything on your own" (Interview 18).

Most of the females have been pushed to leave the education, since people generally tend not to have interest in educating females during the crisis times, "When female gets education, gets married and disappears, she can't help the family anymore, while males can stay and help financially to the rest of the family. ... Financial incentives for the families by various organizations, to send their females to schools play a small role; there is no solid reason behind it. Once they don't want to send them to school, they won't" (Interview 7) said a 21 year old uneducated female from Balakot.

Females I interviewed in the school felt privileged for being able to study, even though they understood that they might not be able to continue after reaching a certain age. A 16 years old high school student from Garhi Habib Ulah told me, "There should be some activities for females who are not allowed to attend school classes. But if their parents don't allow them to go to school how will they let them go out for other activities?" (Interview 18).

Some families surely are willing to send their daughters to vocational centers, because the practical knowledge such as sewing and embroidery can bring some additional income for the family, before the daughter gets married. Still, through the stories I heard, many girls need to find their own way how to get the training, "There aren't any ongoing projects for females just the vocation centre. I go there very often and learn much, but my father is not aware. I am sure I will never tell him. My mother knows, but she will not tell him either. I like it so much! I want to sew clothes and earn money for it. We also make candles, jams and pickles. ... When my father is not at home I always go there. ... He does not even know I am being interviewed. He is not here so he will never get to know" (Interview 23) whispered a 16 years old illiterate interviewee from Balakot.

The girls must put a lot more effort to persuade their parents to let them go to school. A 17 years old student, who comes from a family with strong religious tendencies, told me, "I have to finish all the house works before I leave for the education, since I am the only sister remaining in our household. A car is picking me from the doorstep, otherwise I could not go. I am very good in studies; therefore my parents will let me continue. Parents are very strict on me but they are doing it for my own security" (Interview 19). Such examples show, that it is not solely the religion, which is setting the burdens on the female education, but mostly a decision of a family.

When the social pressure regarding the female education is persistent, majority of the families rather take the easier path of not sending females for education, which is generally culturally accepted, rather than taking the risk of becoming socially excluded from the community for educating their daughters. The story of 17 years old educated female supports the social pressure argument and depicts the situation in Balakot, "Females never think of changing things on their own and it will take a long time to change the minds of people. It's difficult to move to Mansehra and pay the costs of education, persuade the family it's necessary and helpful. It's a mere pressure of the community; people usually talk to the father about them being unhappy of a girl walking around, because our daughters will also ask us to let them go outside" (Interview 20).

A bunch of other problems resulting from the social pressure of the community were identified. In the earthquake affected areas, religious leaders and their peers sustained its power over social issues within the community. A 24 years old male respondent from Balakot stated, "Religious leaders forced people to shut down annual festival in Naran; they kept

repeating the earthquake was punishment from Allah for organizing the festival. They are indirectly limiting the use of television cable channels, since the television is supposed to be against our religious perspectives. Everyone with the television dish on the wall is announced in the mosque, disgrace is pushing people to not use them. We don't have any freedom to watch what we want" (Interview 14).

During my research I listened to many stories regarding bizarre situations caused by the earthquake with surprisingly positive outcomes. A 25 years old female from Balakot explained the change that occurred in their family, "Grandfather had a strong influence on our family. He didn't like the female education at all. However, after he died under the ruins of his house, my sisters could continue their studies" (Interview 22).

Educated females are facing the challenge from the family, not allowing them to work. Rumors and myths have been spread immediately after the organizations started recruiting females for the needs of project work. 17 years old educated female from Balakot explained the situation in detail, "If I have the chance I will work on the female rights. I want to bring the change but I can't do it alone, other females need to step forward. Families are not allowing girls to work with NGOs. Locals have in their minds that during the earthquake NGOs came and were not behaving properly with females. There is a rumor that some females who worked with international NGOs are missing and some others were raped. If one person talks, it might be a rumor, when many talk, it must be some hidden story behind" (Interview 20).

Rumors and constant communal negotiations about what is over the limit of cultural acceptance have a negative impact on especially on the educated individuals within the community. A 24 years old female whose highly educated husband works on a governmental development programs summarized her experience, "I'm not employed because I could not get the government job and the family is not letting me work privately. Right after the earthquake I have been offered so many work opportunities but my family did not allow me to work. ... I attended the workshop and my brother was asking me why did you go there? Who allowed you to go? I could get the education, private master's degree and a teaching course but have absolutely no option to work, since family is not willing" (Interview 21).

Another story with the same message is from a 22 years old female university student who works as a teacher in Kawai. "It's a shame I can't talk about the lack of educational or sport

facilities for females in public because everyone would talk about me. Such as the lack of the government girls college which was almost built before the earthquake but collapsed. People talk about the school, but no proper effort has been done. Education of boys is considered to be of higher priority. Females should get married first; if they go to college they might lose their values. Even the family members keep saying, you are in a coeducation university, you should be careful. When I completed the education, people keep talking proving that complex, they will not marry their sons to more educated girls, because they are much more aware about their rights therefore we can't hold them. Females usually say that. If she's educated she can talk very well and argue against the mother in law. Uneducated females are not such confident to talk" (Interview 35). Analyzing the surprising message from this story adds another factor to the unwillingness of parents to educate females, caused by the social pressure, where education makes rural girls less interesting as future brides. It is essential for international actors to raise the awareness about the possibilities and benefits of female education to fight this generally accepted backward thinking.

The perceived reputation of organizations in general is low, mostly lowered by sustaining myths about the negative impact on the morale of females. The story of a 24 years old female depicts the situation locals keep in their minds when talking about the effects of the work of NGOs, "They are spoiling the young girls. Organizations give them a job and indirectly increase their vulgarity ... they receive the car with an air condition, cell phones, 50-60 000 rupees salary, and they travel around, have breakfast in the Green Valley Hotel in Mansehra and dance and eat in the evening in Osmania in Abbottabad. After the project is finished and there is no more finances to cover such expenses, girls will find their own wrong means to sustain such high life. ... Before the earthquake, no girls from Balakot were known in these facilities. The cell phones and all other stuff are spoiling them. ... Indeed, nobody can force you to spoil, or stop you in being spoiled, but my family never allowed me to work for these reasons" (Interview 21).

In the spectrum of various opinions on the female education and benefits their participation can bring to the community, I was able to identify active individuals who participate in the projects and were able to overcome the difficult situation females are facing when willing to study and work for the betterment of society, with slightly bitter ending of a 23 years old teacher who actively participates in the development projects, "My father could not send me to the graduation school because of the pressure of the society even though we both wanted very much. So I had to take the private studies, but I couldn't do the science subjects I

wanted to, you can only take the arts subjects privately. ... I'm getting married in April, to an illiterate labor worker. By birth we have been engaged, I can't oppose. I hope my future husband will not force me to stop teaching. So far he has no objections" (Interview 29). Regardless of the effort individual is willing to invest to overcome the social pressure of the community; some of the traditional kinship bonds seem to sustain its dominance in the long term run.

#### 4.6 Tensions within the society

The conflicts for resources in the post-crisis relief period, when people were looking for the alternatives to sustain their livelihoods, opened critical ethnic tensions. Pashtun migrants, who settled in the area immediately after the earthquake are blamed for all the robberies, crime and stealing valuables from the ruined houses, 24 years old male earthquake victim from Balakot shared his memories, "In the town, all shops collapsed. Those who survived ran immediately home, to save their families. When they arrived back, all the valuables and money was gone. ... A Pashtun man was cutting the hands of females to get the jewelry. They came to our houses, to help us cleaning the ruins and our valuables disappeared" (Interview 14).

A 19 years old male student from Balakot explained the situation from a wider perspective, "The social life became normal again but the brotherhood and love is decreasing, people trust less to each other, we don't know each other. People from the nearby villages migrated to the town and number of Afghan refugees has increased. Pashtun people are coming from the tribal areas, and since than cases of robberies increased ten times. ... One person always has to stay at home. Pashtuns usually rent the house and start the businesses on the ruins of the town, since local shop owners could not afford to restore their houses and shops at once. ... In the market, most of the shops are owned by them. These people came here voluntarily to help but than grabbed the chance to make living here" (Interview 15). These tensions seem to be caused more by the economic rather than ethnic character. Pashtun migrants who were able to restore the shops in Balakot town are widely considered as enemies who took the sources of livelihoods from local shop-owners during the crisis, when they have been unable to respond. It seems that locals look for the causes of problems of their community anywhere else but not in their passivity. Though, without further research,

one can not draw finite conclusions about what consequences this ethnic division might cause in the future.

To reach a broader view on the ethnic tensions, I looked for representatives from the migrant side of the conflict. 25 years old highly educated Pashtun female from the Kohat region who migrated to Abbottabad provided some of her experience about the ethnic tensions. "Pashtuns are problematic in some areas because of their conduct of life. People are afraid that if all Pashtun tribes united they would not be able to challenge us. ... We Pashtuns don't trust to any political means. I don't think elections do change anything. We don't even trust the police; we rather created a community security system back home for our village. Even though Pashtuns are targeted in many areas, here in Abbottabad people are friendly. My students always ask about us Pashtuns. I was irritated in the beginning than I created some tolerance towards it. As a teacher I can create a gradual change. Those people can change others and use their minds positively for the benefit of society. We all have to face our problems and work on overcoming them together; put our shares for the common solution. I see positive results in school from my approach. I'm strict but keeping students motivated. I am learning a lot from people and I'll try my best to educate people under my hands" (Interview 32). While experiencing some differences, the ethnic division in the areas less affected by the crisis, is not of economic character and seems not to create significant problems for the migrants or the communities.

To understand the differences of living in the refugee colonies I made a contact with an Afghan refugee who works as a couch for the Right to Play NGO. A 22 years old male explained me the conduct of life in the segregated community in Mansehra town. "We all live in tents, 4500 families in a separate colony; I lived there for my entire life. Legally, we can't construct a house, whenever people want to move out, they will experience problems. Your house is demolished; therefore you can't sell it to anyone else. You can't cross the border without a special permit which is extremely expensive to get. They irritate persons who managed to move in, asking how they bough the house, where is the person they bought from. If you can't bribe at that time, they demolish the house. Even though the organizations are working, Afghan refuges don't have any rights so far. ... We were not allowed to go to the streets during the Muharaam since the majority is accusing us from the terrorist attacks. We don't have the food, where would we get the bombs from? Lots of rich people live within the community, the landlords who fled from the conflict. Only those can secure themselves from the harassment of police. In any other country after a certain period of time you get

the nationality by birth I am here, I live there for my entire life, still don't have the Pakistani nationality. We will never get the Pakistani nationality" (Interview 41). According to the experience of the Afghan migrant, the situation in the segregated closed migrant areas is much worse compared to Pashtun migrants who had the opportunity to settle down in standard communities and the violations of human rights are occurring on the daily basis.

The situation depicted by the respondent can be used for supporting the arguments of Anatol Lieven. "The law, the judiciary and the police authority is a matter of constant negotiation, with violence or the threat of it, played on either side. Such negotiated nature of the state applies to the workings of democracy, where it does not reflect the people, or the electorate, but the distribution of social, economic, cultural and political power within the Pakistani society" (Lieven, 2012, p.27).

The respondent elaborated the details of the conduct of local police officers, "It used to be our conduct to move for summers from hot areas around Peshawar here to Abbottabad, but police banned renting houses for Afghan refugees. Police is discriminating us. Police is not allowing people to sell fruits on the vans, because of blocking the road, while all other non Afghanis can sell it. Officials keep teasing us, when the western forces leave Afghanistan, they will send us back to our 'homes'. This is my home, I want to live here. The organization for monitoring Afghan refugees suppresses us more and more. I am trying to solve such issues, but there is nobody to talk to. Those who make our days so tough are there to help us" (Interview 41). Such experience further proves the assumptions presented in the books of Lieven (2012) and Rashid (2012).

In Pakistan, the state is not responsible for most human rights abuses. A very different situation compared to the western world, where the oppression comes chiefly from too strong states. "In Pakistan, the vast majority of human right abuses are not from the state strength, but from the state weakness. Even when they are committed by state policemen, they are not on the orders of the government, but are the results of an individual will. The situation in Pakistan demonstrates the frequent irrelevance of democracy even in the area where it should instinctively make the difference, namely human rights" (Lieven, 2012, p.25). Through these constant threats on the vulnerable communities performed by the actors that are supposed to do the opposite, help individuals overcome their situation and prevent ethnic conflicts, one can hardly imagine any progress without the help of international actors.



As the young male summarized the little potential for the improvements in the development, "We afghan refugees live very backward life and we lack in all sectors, therefore people are happy to receive any help, at least something is provided, even though many times the needs are not properly addressed. There are many problems, how youth can address them when need to earn for the survival of the families? Youth has to earn for their living, they can't participate in the programs all day long. We are stuck in the middle, not Afghans anymore, hence never becoming Pakistanis, not getting the identification card, or the respect" (Interview 41).

#### 4.7 Distribution of aid and distrust in organizations

The equal distribution of foreign aid is throughout all affected areas seen as a challenge. Many individuals realized that much of the aid did not reach people who needed it. Corruption, social hierarchy and increasing distrust in organizations are seen as a burden which is hardly possible to overcome.

An educated, unemployed 24 years old male from Balakot explained his opinion, "After the 7 years from the earthquake I can say that foreigners are more kind-hearted than our government. However, much of their help has been lost somewhere in Islamabad. We didn't receive the better goods. ... In the market in Abbottabad people have been selling the aid marked stuff. Government provided humanitarian aid to local political leaders and they distributed it in the community as they wanted" (Interview 14).

A 19 years old female student from Muzaffarabad explained the situation in her home town, "The local landlord, received the aid on behalf of the poor. He took some poor people to the office, register the help on them and get the aid. He never distributed it to those who needed it the most. ... All but the military aid went through these offices. People are fighting over these issues all the time (Interview 17).

A 21 years old male interviewee from the remote village of Sarbani, which was heavily struck by the earthquake and also well served by many relief projects stated about other sources of distrust towards NGOs, "Organizations distributed a lot of help, but have not trained us. Life after the earthquake is much better and slightly easier. ... However, people don't trust in

organizations they do not participate in the meetings. In the beginning, for the first 1.5 years it worked, and then people get tricked by fake NGO promising them land. Locals didn't bother to ask on their identifications; here people are unaware and uneducated. Some people came, identified themselves as workers, collected from people some share of money and disappeared, and this happened several times"(Interview 36). As it has been mentioned in several interviews rumors about the kidnappings of females from the refugee camps with helicopters from the earthquake affected areas are widespread. While the workers from the international NGOs are blamed it is almost impossible for any of the actors to explain or refute such accusations.

As mentioned earlier, the humanitarian work in the relief period has been generally done on a fast-track basis without a proper assessment and as a result created social tensions, supported the passivity and distrust in organizations throughout the communities. A 19 years old male, who has been personally involved in a development programs stated, "Some NGOs haven't worked on a real need basis. They talked only to one person in a village, and given the help to that person only, who was responsible for distributing it further. Some people become much better off especially in the remote villages. ... People got used to be given stuff without any participation. They used to tell us, come and give us something. If you don't have anything for us, we are not bothered" (Interview 15). Such actions often created rumors about those individuals who were trying to act more actively to help their communities. As a 23 years old female teacher summarized the situation in the area of Sherpur, "People are accusing my father of being corrupted, because all the NGOs talk to him when they arrive to the area. They didn't like him being so active and they also wanted the bit of the cake, however we are not getting any benefits. If we are so corrupted how come our street is not paved? If you are too active, all others will envy you and blame for all the bad things. You are getting everything that's why you are active! I want to teach, and work for the projects a lot! But the community pressure is so strong, they will judge us and we will have hard times when they will see me or my father outside" (Interview 29).

25 years old female from Sarbani village explained the core of the problem of participation in the programmes and challenges her family is facing for being active citizens, "Villagers keep relying on other people, always wait for someone to come and help them. They are unwilling to pay the share in the reconstruction of our society. Wait for someone to come and give them everything. People are not really addressing any problems. Not willing to start from their own side, especially when dealing with money. After the earthquake and so many

organizations coming providing stuff without any share people changed, got spoiled. If anyone asks for any marginal amount of money people will not cooperate. They even spread rumors when they see anyone coming to our house, NGOs are coming to our house therefore we are getting some extra benefits from NGOs. - Why not us? Why should we give from our pocket? They used to get things for free all the time. People only kept shouting, we want something, give us something, we don't want to hear you speak or any trainings, give us something. People cooperate only for benefits they got. Whenever someone comes to talk to us, we are afraid what will people think if we occasionally receive a tent or anything else" (Interview 37).

A critical view on the local population has been outlined in the experience of a former project coordinator from Kaghan Valley, "I'll be honest. They are lazy. If I would have to hire someone, I would prefer someone from the city, Lahore or such than to my locals. As I was working with international NGO, my cousins as well, we used to sit together and discuss things, how we can improve our work. Locals were initially relying on help, 100%, not doing anything but begging. ... It was hard for us as development workers to negotiate with them, get them to do work, instead of sitting and waiting for someone to get in and help them out of the situation" (Interview 40). Respondent further unveiled the impacts of a poor evaluation of the programmes, "Problem with our people is that they exaggerate things. Community centers are there, but services provided are not functional. They build excellent programs which were aimed at the communal use of tractors for agricultural work but they handed them to unreliable people. They had given it to people who are not interested in developing the area, to those who could talk, beg and be grateful, but in the end, didn't care at all. These people don't have the mental approach to do things, keeping it, maintaining you have to figure out, how! Should we call the ACTID from southern Punjab to repair your tractor?" (Interview 40).

The passivity and pure monetary incentives for the participation in the projects is an obstacle for further planning of development programmes. As a 25 years old male from the remote village of Sarbani, where a variety of projects has been implemented stated, "Before the earthquake, if you asked one person for a help, 10 of them came. Now they answer with a question, how much will you pay us? What will you give us? People get used to receive things for free. Though we have not passed any training on skilled development, which were available only for people with some level of education. ... I can't say the unemployment is

the biggest challenge, it's the education, the next generation is going to suffer because of this" (Interview 39).

From the perceived situation, the social impact of the crisis seems to be of the same severity as the material and human cost caused by the earthquake. A 22 years old female teacher from Kawai explained the communal hierarchy and impact of the crisis on the social order, "Before the earthquake, there were three classes of people in Balakot, rich, middle and poor ones. The middle class was shy to wait in line for the humanitarian help therefore they had difficulties with receiving the aid. Those who had money and approach to political leaders got the government help much easier. ... There used to be a clear distinction between rich and poor people. After the earthquake all are roughly on the same level. People lost their patience for not getting a proper response from the government, behavioral change is apparent. The loss of respect, caused by the status change. Wealthy people can not show off with big houses anymore. Government prohibited building big houses because of the red zone restrictions" (Interview 35). In the end, the situation looks that the upper class is in favor of development programmes, since they are able to profit from any interventions, the lower class is enjoying the benefits of effortless receiving of the help from the international actors without much participation and the middle class is fading away, with little options for a good education, limited space for entrepreneurship and low interest of international actors in helping to solve this issues.

A general tendency to not trust NGOs seems to be based mostly on rumors and details of the conduct that are not culturally acceptable. As a 22 years old female teacher from Kawai explained her own experience, "People accuse NGOs of increasing the vulgarity of females. Both genders work in NGOs together. People don't like the idea, using the same cars, they don't want them to work together, people insist on separate schools and force females to wear the veil. At home I couldn't tell my parents I work for an NGO. I told them that I work for an organization, which they accepted" (Interview 35). Such stories can be used as a source for further planning of the conduct of future development programmes. Once researchers and practitioners will be aware about the details which should be carefully implemented, the public opinion on NGOs might get better.

## 5. Findings from Swat Valley

### 5.1 Introduction to the findings from the conflict-affected area

To broaden the scope of my view of the problems Pakistani youth is experiencing I tried to get exposed to the post-conflict zones of the Swat valley and talk to the local youth who needed to come through several post-crisis insecurities resulting from the Islamic militancy in the area, the military operation and the devastating flood in a short time span. Since the crisis hit only a few years ago, and some of the threats are still persistent in the area, participants had shown more vivid memories and were less willing to talk about a broad variety of sensitive issues. Due to the security reasons and the limitations of the NOC permit for staying in the Swat valley I conducted the research in the areas around towns of Mingora and Saidu Sharif. The Lower Swat was not as heavily struck by the flood in the 2010 as the northern Upper Swat valley but it was severely hit by the militancy in 2009 and afterwards with the military operation against the Taleban and all the consequences implied by the heavy fights in their home area. I focused this part of the research on the different aspects of crisis and the post-crisis development, mainly the issues of militancy and questions about the steps taken for the reconstruction of the society and problems connected to them.

Due to the cultural limitations I wasn't allowed to take part during the interviews with females and we needed to leave some of the areas where the respondents feared or were not willing to talk without explaining us the reason. Some of the interviews were conducted in the office of the HUIRA organization. Respondents, mostly students from the nearby college were more opened to talk when not directly in their home areas. These tendencies seem to be the result of the persistent fear from being seen approached by foreigners, or anyone unknown for the community in their households.

In general, youth in Swat Valley is experiencing the same set of challenges as youth in the Balakot earthquake-affected area. There is very little job opportunities, and although the education system is becoming more advanced after the implementation of various development projects, the facilities and prospective job opportunities for the graduates are

insufficient. Tendencies towards the favor of development organizations and their interventions are higher because the benefits have been provided not long time ago. The major difference compared to the group of young people from Balakot area, is the problem of the distrust to people in general and overwhelming fear caused by the unsolved problems with militants and resulting greater power of military over the region.

While Pakistani military is surprisingly solid institution by the standards of the developing world, repeated actions which had overthrown Pakistani government had created the notion that Pakistan is basically an army with the state. Even in the times when the military are not directly ruling over the country, it dominates it from behind the scenes. As a secondary effect, severely limited funds available for education, development, infrastructure and medical services are sustaining its power.

Building my argument upon the findings from interviews, the underlying problem of the reconstruction of society in Swat is the agenda of the army. Once the militants have been suppressed, military instead of handing the power to local politicians and police stayed in the region to secure the area. However, the majority of people are persuaded that army is creating fear of repercussions and through their actions created more problems than it solved. Still, due to the power relations fear and the distrust, respondents were not willing to admit directly almost any problems related to the presence of army. Due to the same reason, when asking on the tendencies in favor of militants in their areas the answers used to be hidden under the veil of symbols and lies.

## 5.2 Social impact of the crisis

Youth from Swat Valley I managed to interview depicted the current situation in the society in general as a state of uncertainty with a very low level of trust among citizens, resulting from the high amount of fear from several sources.

A 22 years old male from the corner shop in Saidu Sharif explained his view on the current situation in the society, "Social life is normal but we still have the fear that militants will come back again and we will need to face them. You can't really distinguish who is good and who is bad. If this happens again, we won't stay here at any costs. I don't want to live

through such situation ever again" (Interview 42). Another female participant from the rural area of Charbagh stated, "People are frightened. They don't help each other; they are scared that army will punish them because of any connection to the families of Taleban fighters. People have learnt the lesson. Because of one guy, the whole family and relatives suffered" (Interview 47). An 18 years old female student whose family was directly threatened by Taleban described her situation as follows, "We couldn't do anything at that time. Hence, we can't face Taleban even now. Especially when we go out, parents guide us, don't say anything about the militants, they will find a way to harm you" (Interview 43). Such statements are proving the assumption that despite heavy military presence in the region, the insecurities were not solved and the threats either from militants or army can reach anyone from the whole spectrum of society.

It is hardly possible to understand the pressure on the young individual facing researcher, or any development workers coming to the area. Life threats, not only for the individual, but the whole family keep participants reluctant to talk, and without any hesitation telling lies for the security reasons. An example is from a 16 years old female respondent from the area of Kabal which was heavily affected by the conflict and repercussions of the army due to massive popularity of Taleban in the area, "During the conflict, we have been heavily affected, we needed to rent a house in Mingora and stay there for a couple of weeks, till the area was cleared by the army. I am not willing to talk about militants. I am not interested in it at all. I am not sure if they are good or bad. I don't want to talk. If they are good, they should stay, If not they should leave, the same applies to the army. I don't know. Army is constructing the houses, cleaning the streets. We received some help after the conflict, I don't remember their name. We managed to reconstruct our house only 4 months ago. We still don't know if it was army, or militants who destroyed it. *Nobody from this area joined Taleban.* Social life is normal, we feel safe now. Education in our area is better than anywhere else. We have a college for girls and a playground for boys. There is no major problem now. Females were scared to go to school, threatened by militants; schools were destroyed; now they are not afraid anymore. No other major problem in the area anymore. Future will be good for all of us" (Interview 56). When listening to such misleading answers, one can assume that the fear of repercussions hand in hand with the fear from causing trouble to the whole family through participation, or saying something wrong must be enormous.

A family hierarchy is a dominant factor of creating opinions of the youth and on the same hand is a limiting factor of participation in the communal gatherings. As an 18 years old male respondent from Islampur mentioned, "There is a pressure on us, youth, from the family, relatives and elders. Once we want to discuss things, they stop us. According to them, we are very young; don't know the right way how to speak. We are not allowed to speak in front, talk about our needs. It is the major problem, whenever we say something, we got the answer that we lack the experience, we don't know what's right and wrong and we should keep quiet. We never argue with them. Even though we are more educated, aware about the problems, we can't speak. We will be punished by the family later ... If youth is allowed to look for solutions, it would bring the change; we have the knowledge, the will, but lack the power. It can hardly be solved by any other actor, but the elders. We show much respect to them (*Pause*)" (Interview 55). These strict traditional tendencies are one of the dominant factors why the youth groups don't have any political power on the communal level. The active participation is further lowered by the fact that during the conflict, militants were targeting local leaders and the will to participation is lower caused by the fear and recent memories. As a 19 years old male college student from Matta stated, "Nobody is willing to go in front. We have seen so many militancy issues, everyone is afraid; if I come in front nobody will stand by my side. It's not a trust issue, its fear to stand up and speak up" (Interview 45).

### 5.3 Lesson from Taleban

I focused my questions about the Islamic militancy on the gradual change in the perceptions of Taleban. As I assumed people depicted their own experience and afterwards started looking for the changing patterns of the behavior of militants which unveiled their true interests. People explained the tendencies towards the support of Taleban mostly through the spread of Islamic ideology, implementation of Shariah and partial successes in the local political governance. As a 26 years old female from Charbagh admitted, "Taleban held speeches in the radio on Islam and Quran. Since we are very emotional about religion, they were saying very good things; people were in favor of them" (Interview 47).

The 19 years old male student from Saidu Sharif added, "In the beginning people supported Taleban. They did a good job, took actions only against thieves and corrupted officials.



People put trust in them" (Interview 45). Another student, 17 years old male from Islampur stated, "Firstly, they didn't have any weapons, but cars with very loud prayers were driving around. When they see them with weapons, people realized how militants use the money provided to them" (Interview 54). A 15 years old female from Charbagh added some local knowledge and details, "There were a huge number of militants in our area, I had seen many of them, during those days, they have been living and hiding in schools. In our area they have been hiding in the government primary school for girls which is neighboring our area. In the beginning they behaved very nicely. They taught us Islam and recite holy Quran, but afterwards started killing people without any reason" (Interview 46).

A couple of interviewees were not afraid to talk about the details of the conduct of militants.

Most of the interviewees were depicting the moment when Taleban changed their approach to people as shocking. The lack of awareness about the agenda of militants seems to be fueled by the will of the majority to bring justice in the conduct of Shariah. Religious tendencies and explanations seemed to be only an excuse for the urgent need for the political change which seemed to be common in the whole Swat valley.

A 17 years old male student from Islampur told passionately the details of the change of the perception, "Everyone was in favor of them. They spread the Islamic preaching via fm radio. Young generation used to listen to it and trust them. People stopped to trust them because of many blasts occurring here in Swat" (Interview 54). A 19 years old male student from the Saidu Sharif College added further details, "In a nearby village they killed the religious leader, locals started to complain, they didn't want them in the area anymore. In the beginning they brought the justice which vanished immediately. On the top of that, army started bombing villages because of the presence of militants. ... Militants were forcing us to wear narrow trousers, and short hair, beating us, If not dressed properly" (Interview 45). Young graduate, 26 years old male, who had previous experience from work with international organizations explained further details from Ballogram, "Once anyone opposed them, or their use of resources, he was killed. They even started announcing it in the radio. Previously, were preaching Islam, reading Quran, now they only said names of people. This man from this village said this against us and we will kill him. They started forcing us to not shave our beards, closing the barber shops, beating people, threatening people to death; all barber shops and music shops were closed. ... First, they came with a plan, people were not aware of. They received the money and bought guns which they turned against people who

financed them. People were building madrassas with their own hands, for free; they considered it as very important and good to have the Islamic law and religious education. Main motivation for the people was the implementation of Islamic law and justice" (Interview 49). After such an experience young people proved raise of awareness about any kind of Islamic militancy, and admitted that religion was not necessarily the single motivation for joining militants. Despite the constant fear, perceived by previous answers, the majority of respondents also talked with high confidence about the eradication of Taleban in the Swat valley, which might have been caused by the persistent presence of military forces in the region.

As a 26 years old female from Charbagh stated, "Militants are not good people, religion is not about being in the mosque all the time and pray, our religion is about being nice to each other, helping people and supporting the family. If you do this, you are a good Muslim. Militants forced people to be in the mosque all the time, and those were not willing to follow them were threatened. This certainly isn't the right path to follow" (Interview 47). A 22 years old, educated male field informant from Kanju told me, "I was beaten by militants many times, because I used to shave my beard, they destroyed my cell phone because of the memory card, I've been hit by the car, my friends died in the street fights, when we tried to secure our house. I've seen all of the things. Those who held the dead bodies in their hands will never support Taleban. Some of those who moved away are still supporting them. Once the youth will have jobs, will be involved in the social life, will study, will not fall back to the militants trap" (Interview 59).

Further explanations of the causes of the support and the change of the perception of militants were explained by the 18 years old female student from Saidu Sharif, "If people were aware and educated, they would not be in favor of militants. Local, poor people were the fuel of Taleban. They have been paid, if they had other option before, things would have been different. ... I am not aware about anyone from my neighborhood that joined the Taleban, since we were away at that time, but especially villagers joined. The reason is poverty and non-education. They weren't aware of the consequences it will bring" (Interview 43). Another point of view has been provided by an 18 years old male student from the Saidu Sharif college, "Most of them, uneducated, didn't have finances; therefore they joined and have been killed by the army. Those who resigned and deserted Taleban were imprisoned for some amount of time and than trained by the army. One of them, my friend, joined militants, was captured and held for 3 years and than became an electrician in

Malakand. Few of them were pushed by families, but many joined by their own decision, when Taleban announced that each family should donate one fighter, many joined because of the fear. Money they snatched and the ransom money was distributed equally amongst the militants. I don't think that religious people were more motivated to join. Mostly the ones who couldn't see the hidden agenda of Taleban believed them" (Interview 57).

It seems that the poverty and lack of opportunities, together with the honor and monetary benefits of joining the militants were the rational choice for a wide variety of young males. This perception has been supported by the opinion of a 17 year old uneducated, unemployed male from Quambar, "Most of the people joined Taleban because they were so powerful. They had given guns to young boys and paid them a lot to support the families. People were afraid and the other reason to join was to help the family financially and get the power and fame. There have been many criminals who joined them. They could suddenly live freely, nobody dared to oppose them. ... But I don't want to say anything more" (Interview 51).

#### 5.4 Consequences of military operation

Whether one speaks of democracy, the judicial system, the police, political parties, elections, or human rights, words which are commonly use to describe the Pakistani state and the political system often mean something quite different than what observers think they mean. As widely mentioned in Lieven (2012), the only Pakistani institution which actually works as it is officially meant to is the Army. "In the army, the internal content, behavior, rules and culture match its official form, including its tendency to seize power from the weaker and confused institutions" (Lieven, 2012, p.21). The process of the eradication of Islamic militancy in the region started with a massive military operation, which was supposed to be followed by coordinated network of humanitarian assistance. Army was supposed to sustain peace and help organizations to deliver the development assistance. However, the presence of army is still strong in the area and the outcomes of policies the army imposes on the local communities are not always positive.

As mentioned by several participants, army is able to sustain security in the region. As a 26 years old female from Charbagh mentioned, "I was much more frightened before. I used to visit the NGO office but it was always in my mind that once militants will come, they will kill me immediately, since I worked for the organization. I think that militants will not come

while the army is here. I am sure people will not support them as before, because they had seen what horrible things happened to their families because of the conflict and they also feel scared of being killed by the army." (Interview 47) It seems that the most efficient policy of the military to hold the Islamic militancy back is to threaten the people, in a same way as Taleban did, back in 2009. Male development worker, 26 years old from Ballogram said, "Taleban will not come back. They won't find any support. First reason is that they aren't good Muslims as they are pretending. The other reason is the fear from the army. If you offer a glass of water to a militant, they will find you and jail you. Many of those suspected supporters of Taleban who are in jail were forced to help militants, 2-3 years in the jail, it is unfair!" (Interview 49).

The other techniques of military were depicted by a 21 years old male student from Saidu Sharif College, "People from my neighborhood captured a man and delivered him to the army. They won't come back after seeing what army did to them. Some of the captured ones switched to army and received the training; they can give army the insider's information" (Interview 58). Further details were explained in a conversation later, "Those who switched from Taleban to army and received the training have to inform army about their movement and have to check-in every week, intelligence is covering them. People don't trust such people. It needs some time. Once they joined the right side, they can't come back to Taleban, their family would be killed. Army used to arrest fathers, brothers of militants, and released them only after receiving the militant. Those who came from prisons have changed, they will not support militants anymore, they are scared" (Interview 58).

Many other participants talked openly about the negative aspects of the military presence and their procedures affecting the daily life in the region. The lack of official communication with locals, general distrust in authorities and spread of rumors on the communal level are not anyhow helping to solve this situation. A female college student from Saidu Sharif, 18 years old, explained her point of view, "They haven't done anything good for our society. Neither Taleban nor the military. They are both spreading rumors, blaming each other, and threatening people. We don't know the core of the major problem and no one knows the whole story" (Interview 43).

Even though the policies of army aimed at eradication of the Islamic militancy are straightforward and powerful, due to their oppressive nature might boost the revisionist tendencies towards militancy and the fight for freedom from oppression. As a 17 years old,

uneducated male from Quambar said, "There are still some people who still support militants. If army leaves now, they will invite the militants back here" (Interview 51). As a 23 years old female from Charbagh stated, supporting this argument, "I can't say if militants are good or bad. If I say they are bad, they will find us here. If I say they are good, army will do the revenge. We will be with those who talk about the Allah almighty and help us" (Interview 48).

To broaden the view on the military presence, as one would expect, permanent actions of the military are creating new conflicts where other are attempted to be solved. Influence of the army is especially opposed by the youth regarding their everyday activities, which are distracted by the need to pass military checkpoints.

Furthermore, the inability of army to solve the issues of bombings despite the enormous control of local population is decreasing the legitimacy of the military operation in Swat. As a 17 years old male student from Islampur mentioned, "We are sick of army now. There aren't militants in the area anymore, the operation is over. Long lines of cars, they check everyone, three times a day. We are always late to school. We do have student cars, why do we need the NOC? We can't argue against them, since they have guns. ... If they think it is necessary for their security, they should stay, armed. Not to do us problems. The army might stay here to monitor the situation, but not to check us, locals. Army created the telephone helpline. It's not the help for us, but them. You should call them when you spotted militants. How does it help us?" (Interview 54). The other point of view has been provided by an 18 years old female student, "One problem with the army is the checkpoints. Militants however come here these days only because of the army. They control every single car, van, bus and person. Every checkpoint is being targeted. They are doing it for us, but due to targeting army, local people are killed. Army however should not leave, since Taleban will come back more powerful. Army is the cause of attacks, but should rather not leave. Problem can be addressed only if the military people stay here for a long time. Once they leave, we will have to stay at home again" (Interview 43).

Military holds the power over all the political and social issues on the communal level. Most of the participants therefore did not dare to oppose policies implemented, to secure themselves and their families from further tensions and investigation by military. As a 23 years old female from Charbagh said, "Not only army killed many, but destroyed their houses and captured their land. I am not in favor, or against the army. If they can bring the peace,

their actions are right. If they can't, they should rather leave today ... Military is doing a good job by threatening the small criminals, there is much less robberies than before" (Interview 48). This viewpoint has been explained by a 17 years old student from Islampur, "We were frightened of both Taleban and army. They were searching our houses, collecting weapons and than scanning your houses, doing mess and took the weapons. If you argued, you got beaten. We don't leave our houses much often even now. They keep checking our ID, asking where I am going, what I am going to do" (Interview 54). Further details were explained by a 15 years old female student from Charbagh, "Army came to our houses three times a month, gathering all the people from our area to one house and searching our own houses, looking for guns and traces of militants. Nowadays they only continue searching markets and shop-owners" (Interview 46). On the other hand, an 18 years old male from Kabal told a story from his own village, depicting the military as selective in their policies towards the disarmament of local population, "Someone who knew us robbed the room where we used to hide our guns, but since we buried them in the ground, they couldn't find them. Army didn't took them, since they were aware we have some opened issues with militants and we supported the army before. Army only took the guns from the people in favor of militants. ... Those who supported army are also frightened now. Once the army leaves them alone, militants might come back and do to the revenge" (Interview 57).

Further clashes on the communal level are caused by the failed distribution of power over the local problems. Police forces were supposed to take over the situation after the official military operation was over, however the current situation has been depicted by a 18 years old, unemployed male from Kabal, "Army checks our identity cards, but police is more problematic, they keep asking us many questions, hence nobody is respecting them. Army is ruling over this area, not the police. Army asks only once, they act afterwards. Whenever we argue with police, they take us to the station, and make up some false accuse, than you have to pay. We don't argue anymore" (Interview 57). The similar point of view has been provided by a 19 years old male student from the college in Saidu Sharif, "People don't listen to police unless there's a soldier with them. If they hand over the charge, people will start respecting police. Police is not as strong, I doubt they can fight Taleban, but army is irritating us. ... The biggest problem of young people is the resistance against army, we often got beaten. We never told this to our representatives. What will they do? The power is in hands of the army" (Interview 45). Conflicts caused by the policies of the military are not only about the redistribution of power, but essentially influence the livelihoods of local population. As a 17 years old male student complained to me, "Army forced us to cut down

the orchards, been forced to stop cultivating some crops, because If the militants will come again, they will have a place where to hide. ... We need more schools and fewer soldiers in the streets. I want my proper gardens again. I can earn more money from them, I am attached to them. If the schools are rebuilt, future will be better" (Interview 44).

Summarizing actions aimed at the eradication of Islamic militancy and sustaining the peaceful reconstruction of the Swat Valley, it seems that policies implemented by the military are further polarizing the society and keep the local conflicts unsolved, leaving the supporters of militants harshly suppressed and opened towards the tendencies to join militants again and the supporters of army vulnerable to threats, once the military operations will be over.

### 5.5 Education

As I found out in the main part of my research, overcoming the problems of the education system is one of the biggest burdens for Pakistani youth. In the beginning, a 17 years old male from Quambar summarized the main education problems in the Swat Valley, "The biggest problem of our area are the parents who are not willing to send their children to school, they prefer to let them work somewhere, create income. Parents are limiting the studies of both males and females. Schools for girls are far from this area, people are not willing to send them for studies, adding to that, 90% of people is not interested, because of the cultural acceptance and resulting social pressure. No organization has worked on this issue till now. ... I left the studies 6 months ago, in the 8th standard! I am not doing anything now; I am planning to learn some skills in painting the cars. There is not any community organization in our village to help me" (Interview 51). Another male respondent, a 19 years old student from the college of Saidu Sharif presented his opinion, "I'm not satisfied with options for youth, not many schools there, even in those, the quality is very poor. All of the students are in overcrowded classes; many prefer to leave the school. Though I am not aware about all the reasons. ... Sisters are not studying anymore. Girls are not interested in studying; they left by their own decision, though it is not accepted in our village to get educated" (Interview 44).

Such contradicting words about the female education led me to ask and analyze the situation from a female point of view. A female student from the college in Saidu Sharif elaborated on her situation, "Taleban says schools and educated people are destroying the society. Youth can't do anything, since they are targeted together with the educated ones. There is no kind of a youth group and such activities in our college. All are scared. Educated people rather disappear than to be targeted. I am unsure about being active in any way. Everyone always says, you will be saved, but looking at Malala's case gives you the lesson. She sacrificed her life for the education but I don't want to target myself" (Interview 43).

An interviewee from Charbagh, a 15 years old female told her story, "Even though there are no problems with militants anymore, families are more conservative than before. It's caused by the people in our neighborhood. Parents keep telling us, that they will talk about us in a bad way, since we allowed females to go outside the houses. A big drop-out from school happened after the whole militants' issue. There used to be 30 girls from our area in school, it's only 3 of us nowadays. During the days, when we were on our way to school, they stopped by the bus stop and told us, we will be killed. Only two girls are attending the college. During the trainings, NGOs stressed the importance of education, but people did not listen and care much about female's education" (Interview 46).

Concluding on this opinion, it seems that being a female, the main problem of the area is the life threat caused by the will to get educated. Society in Swat is more conservative compared to the Balakot area. The active participation in the area is limited by the consistent threat from unknown sources. Peer pressure is significantly higher, presence of life threats, unknown level of the militancy supporters and distrust among the people within community are extreme burdens for female education. As one 19 years old female college student explained the details of her everyday struggle for reaching education, "Many girls were forced to stop studying at the colleges because of life threats and drivers unwilling to drive them. During their era they sent threats to everyone who send their girls to schools also to females not wearing burkas. At St. Mary's school they accused us of getting the Christian education. Three students I know stopped. They were attending school before, but families did not allow them after" (Interview 43). As she further continued, the political goals are further complicating the situation, "Education institutes are targeted as well. Guards told us we are not safe here anymore. We are threatened since we named our college after Malala Yousufzai. They actually changed the name forcefully. Honestly, it was a bit of attention seeking when changing the name. Our college shouldn't have been changed, since Malala



haven't study at this college, she wasn't even at this level. They should rather name a welfare fund or a hospital, not the college. ... When I was interviewed by CNN I told them that I am happy the name of the college was changed, people started saying, you will be targeted, you will be killed. I started to feel threatened as before again" (Interview 43).

## 6. Research conclusion

While listening to the recordings of interviews, feelings and recommendations of the Pakistani youth, among its broad variety I found a common pattern in their responses and tendencies towards participation.

I was surprised that the majority of participants who were willing to participate in changing the communal life for the betterment of the community were from the younger part of the youth spectra (15-19), mostly the high school students. Boys were able to identify problems overarching their own environment, while girls were uniformly persuaded that the female education should be the first priority for the development of the areas. Both of these findings show that people, who have the chance to get education, regardless of its level, are much more aware about the problems and value the relative chance they have been given for their future through education.

Older participants (20-25) who experienced the relief period after the earthquake in Balakot proved to be more sceptical about the activities which should aim for the improvement of the communal life. Participants tend to focus on sustaining livelihood of their families and consider the unemployment as the biggest problem of the area.

In general, they value the education less, since it is not helpful for reaching the work opportunities and participation in the development programmes is valued only when considered as directly beneficial for the individuals. Persistent poverty in the region is considered to be caused by the mishandling of the reconstruction of the crisis hit areas, not as a result of the passivity of locals.

Participants identified possible solutions in creating more governmental jobs, which are seen as the only long term stable source of income. Female participants were in general sceptical about their participation in the projects, due to the social constraints caused by either the family or peer pressure from the community. It is hardly possible to create more governmental jobs in the region and participants were aware of it, while at the same time they identified the possibility of creating jobs through technical education for young males, who could create a critical mass of skilled workers. Such skilled workers are seen an incentive for investors to build factories in the region.

## 7. Recommendations

At the local level, youth carry an emotional meaning; they act as a power which can't be controlled by the global frameworks. Youth are seen as an opportunity, threat, victim, or an agent. They may come to symbolize the nation's suffering and existential peril, or its triumph and hope for the future. "In different contexts youth might be seen as a revolutionary vanguard, as moral guardians, as amoral thugs, and, in some places they are seen as a mix of all of these. Symbols as "child", "youth", or "next generation" might represent both continuous hatred and aggression, as well as a rationale for concessions, negotiations, visions, progress and peace" (Mc Evoy-Levy, 2011, p.161).

The agenda for a positive change in the region should aim at to reduce the impact of systematic problems. The protection of human rights should strengthen the systems that monitor and report on violations including the right for education, especially for the females. In the areas I visited is an urgent need to change the mindset of people towards recognizing the vital role of education for improvements in the crisis related emergencies. The gap which has been created between the humanitarian aid and long-term development assistance has been caused by the mismanagement of unfinished projects. The EFA (Education For All) Global monitoring report on Armed Conflict and Education (2011) outlines in detail the concrete measures for reversing the failures of protection, provision, reconstruction and peace building that the UN system and international community can take to help education to fulfill its potential.

Evaluation of such projects which could be done through local partners of donor organizations can benefit on various fields. On one side, the unemployed educated individuals, who have the local knowledge, can be hired by organizations to evaluate the projects and boost the local economy. On the same hand, the motivation for the educated youth creating solutions from the insider's viewpoint should make the projects more efficient and in the end, might be a successful plan for improving the reputation of non governmental organizations and their work in the region. The pathways to youth civic engagement are described by Camino & Zeldin (2002) as a "public policy consultation, community coalitions for youth development, youth infusion in organizational decision making, youth organizing and school-based service learning" have the potential to productively touch the lives of a broad range of youth and their communities. The goals however can not succeed unless

certain qualities are present. Three of the most critical are ownership, youth-adult partnership and facilitative policies and structures (p.218). It seems that the most important step which development actors need to take is to test the feasibility of as many pathways as possible. The infusion of youth in the civic life of communities will be possible only when the young people will choose which opportunities will fit the best for them and their communities. A well built infrastructure is needed to support the pathways. All the actors involved need to put effort in implementing education and experience, "to help adults perceive youth as contributors to community and to provide the support - ownership and partnership - that young people require to develop and to succeed" (Camino & Zeldin, 2002, p.219).

Set of recommendations from the field includes a variety of improvements of existing programs, such as the focus on inclusion of youth rather than containment or appeasement, developing the best practice management of community work via different aid instruments, inclusion of females which are often under-represented in policies, undertaking the context-specific analysis, analyzing the key risk factors and creative programming in unaddressed areas such as identity, values and beliefs. "Another key aspect is to find ways how to integrate youth issues into existing programs, and ensure they are properly implemented" (Hilker & Fraser, 2009, pp. 6-8).

Kurtenbach (2008) stresses the point of view at the crisis-affected youth as not being the "lost generation" but the central connector of the society (p.10) and Mac-Ikemenjima (2008) supports the same attitude with policies focused on "improved education through retraining teachers, reviewing the curriculum, training skilled vocational and career guidance counselors and promoting the non-formal education. Investments priorities for employment should support the youth entrepreneurship linking education system to formal employment" (pp. 148-149).

All of these changes unveil the potential of education to be a dynamic force in the lives of young people, and one that overlaps responses that take into account the diversity of their experiences and needs, from protection to livelihood and psychosocial healing. In order to prepare a solid foundation for their future, it is imperative that young people have adequate, equitable opportunities and flexible access to both formal and non-formal education, as well as vocational training opportunities that can ensure their livelihoods. Such measures will engage more youth in the activities, resulting in tilting their mindset towards active

participation aiming for the positive development of the areas. With such steps taken, involving young people as leaders in assessments, advocacy and programs of action, a chain reaction of change will set in motion which will “not only help to protect the rights and livelihood of the small numbers of young people involved in specific tasks but, with continued support, will ignite a fire of constructive societal change” (Lowicki, 2005, p.29).

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
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### 9. APPENDIX A

1. Map of the research area of the Earthquake-affected youth



Source: Google Maps

2. List of interviews from the Earthquake affected area with place and the date when recorded.

1. Male 18, Attir Shisha, 15.November 2012, villager participating in the projects, farmer
2. Male 23, Attir Shisha, 15.November 2012, villager participating in the projects, student
3. Male 24, Attir Shisha, 15.November 2012, shop assistant
4. Male 22, Attir Shisha, 15.November 2012, unemployed
5. Male 18, Attir Shisha, 15.November 2012, shop assistant
6. Male 32, Abbottabad, 17. November 2012, Right To Play Coach
7. Female 21, Abbottabad, 17. November 2012, Right To Play Coach
8. Female 24, Abbottabad, 17. November 2012, Right To Play Coach
9. Female 24, Abbottabad, 17. November 2012, Right To Play Coach
10. Male 19, Kalabat, 19. November 2012, unemployed
11. Male 21, Kalabat, 19. November 2012, unemployed
12. Male 19, Kalabat, 19. November 2012, physically disabled villager
13. Female 24, Kalabat, 19. November 2012, physically disabled
14. Male 24, Balakot, 20. November 2012, teacher participating in the projects
15. Male 19, Balakot, 20. November 2012, high school student
16. Male 24, Abbottabad, 21. November 2012, student from COMSATS
17. Female 19, Abbottabad, 21. November 2012, student from COMSATS
18. Female 16, Garhi Habib Ulah, 22. November 2012, high school student
19. Female 17, Garhi Habib Ulah, 22. November 2012, high school student
20. Female 17, Balakot, 23. November 2012, unemployed, educated
21. Female 24, Balakot, 23. November 2012, unemployed, educated
22. Female 25, Balakot, 23. November 2012, unemployed, uneducated, physically disabled
23. Female 16, Balakot, 23. November 2012, unemployed, illiterate
24. Female 21, Balakot, 23. November 2012, unemployed, uneducated
25. Male 16, Balakot, 26. November 2012, high school student
26. Male 16, Balakot, 26. November 2012, high school student
27. Male 24, Balakot, 26. November 2012, actively participating villager, educated
28. Male 22, Balakot, 26. November 2012, actively participating villager, educated
29. Female 23, Sherpur, 30. November 2012, teacher, hired by Right To Play
30. Male 24, Sherpur, 30. November 2012, educated villager
31. Male 25, Sherpur, 30. November 2012, uneducated villager
32. Female 25, Abbottabad, 3. December 2012, Migrant from FATA
33. Male 27, Abbottabad, 4. December 2012, Youth Leader, internationally active
34. Male, Kawai, 5. December 2012, Local Politician
35. Female 22, Kawai, 5. December 2012, teacher, female high school
36. Male 21, Sarbani, 11. December 2012, actively participating villager

37. Female 25, Sarbani, 11. December 2012, actively participating villager
38. Female 22, Sarbani, 11. December 2012 uneducated, illiterate
39. Male 25, Sarbani, 11. December 2012 uneducated, actively participating
40. Male 27, Abbottabad, 12. December 2012, former project leader
41. Male 22, Abbottabad, 12. December 2012, Right To Play Coach, Afghan refugee

### 10. APPENDIX B

- 1. Map of the research area of the Conflict-affected youth.



Source: Google Maps

2. List of interviews from the Conflict affected area with place and date when recorded

42. Male 22, Saidu Sharif, 7. December 2012, street shop keeper
43. Female 18, Saidu Sharif, 7. December 2012, college student
44. Male 17, Saidu Sharif, 7. December 2012, college student
45. Male 19, Saidu Sharif, 7. December 2012, college student
46. Female 15, Charbagh, 8. December 2012, student
47. Female 26, Charbagh, 8. December 2012, uneducated villager
48. Female 23, Charbagh, 8. December 2012, uneducated villager
49. Male 26 Ballogram, 8. December 2012, formerly active participant, teacher
50. Male 17 Quambar, 8. December 2012, uneducated farmer
51. Male 17 Quambar, 8. December 2012, uneducated, unemployed
52. Male 18 Kaladhri, 8. December 2012, uneducated shop assistant
53. Female 15, Islampur, 9. December 2012, uneducated
54. Male 17, Islampur, 9. December 2012, high school student
55. Male 18, Islampur, 9. December 2012, high school student
56. Female 16, Kabal, 9. December 2012, uneducated
57. Male 18, Saidu Sharif, 10. December 2012, college student
58. Male 21, Saidu Sharif, 10. December 2012, college student
59. Male 22, Saidu Sharif, 10. December 2012, Hujra project staff