

NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF LIFE SCIENCES



**The impact of increased awareness on forest governance;  
A case study of the Mama Misitu awareness raising campaign  
in forest adjacent villages in Southern Tanzania.**



**By Siri Meinich**

**MSc thesis in Development Studies**

**Submitted to Norwegian University of Life Science  
Department of International Environmental and Development Studies  
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siri.meinich@online.no

Noragric  
Department of International Environment and Development Studies  
P.O. Box 5003  
N-1432 Ås  
Norway  
Tel.: +47 64 96 52 00  
Fax: +47 64 96 52 01  
Internet: <http://www.umb.no/noragric>

## **Declaration**

I, Siri Meinich, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.

Ås, December 15th 2010

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## **Abstract**

In response to the alarming rate of deforestation and forest degradation caused by illegal forest activities in Southern Tanzania, a collaborative civil society initiative called Mama Misitu was set up to raise awareness at village level regarding good forest governance and to support the implementation of participatory forest management (PFM). This study looks at how raised awareness may influence the key factors of good governance; participation, accountability and legal enforcement. The study also aims to examine perceptions among villagers in forest adjacent communities where Mama Misitu has been working, in relation to forest value, corruption and local ownership of the forest.

The study found that villagers emphasize conservational values of the forest, but seem unaware of its market value. Despite this lack of awareness, villagers seem to have a strong sense of ownership of the local forest. Corruption in the forest sector is perceived to be a local problem, and the majority of the villagers interviewed believe they can have an impact in the effort to curbing corruption. The study further concludes that awareness raising will have a positive effect on forest governance, strengthening the local institutions and their power relations with other forest stakeholders.

## List of Abbreviations

CBFM	Community Based Forest Management
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFO	District Forest Officer
DNRS	District Natural Resource Staff
FBD	Forestry and Beekeeping Division
FSU	Forest Surveillance Units
IM-FLEG	Independent Monitor of Forest Law Enforcement and Governance
JFM	Joint Forest Management
MCP	Mpingo Conservation Project
MJUMITA	Mtandao wa Jamii wa Usimamizi wa Misitu Tanzania (The Community Forest Management Network of Tanzania)
MNRT	Ministry for Natural Resources and Tourism
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PFM	Participatory Forest Management
PHPA	Public Hearings and Public Auditing
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
TFWG	Tanzania Forestry Working Group
TNRF	Tanzania Natural Resource Forum
TRAFFIC	The wildlife trade monitoring network
TZS	Tanzanian Shillings
VFC	Village Forest Committee
VLFR	Village Land Forest Reserve
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

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# **1 Introduction**

Illegal forest activities are inflicting disturbing pressure on forest land in Southern Tanzania. Weak forest governance has been unable to prevent the exploitation of forest resources. This study looks at a campaign called Mama Misititu, initiated by civil society organisations, and aiming to raise awareness in forest adjacent villages in the hope to bring about improvements in forest governance.

The introductory chapter illuminates the background information motivating the study. Further, the objective of the study, the problem statement, and the key research questions are presented.

## **1.1 Background**


As many other countries rich in forests, Tanzania has experienced high rates of deforestation and forest degradation during the last two decades. Between 1990 and 2005 deforestation was estimated to 412,000 ha per annum (FAO 2010). But unlike most other forest rich countries, illegal encroachment and charcoal production are believed to be more important causes for deforestation than illegal commercial logging (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b:6). In Tanzania more than 1 million urban households depend on charcoal as primary source of energy. Hundreds of thousands Tanzanians depend on income from small scale charcoal production or trade of such. It is estimated that more than 80% of the charcoal supply is illegally harvested, causing large revenue losses. To pursue illegal charcoal production would thus add income to the authorities, but the consequences for those losing their income or for the users as supply would decrease and prices increase could be dramatic. Monitoring charcoal supply is also extremely difficult as there are no simple means to mark charcoal as legal (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). The forests in Tanzania are mainly of low timber value density, and easy to access (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). Lack of forest management plans, 'open-access' policies, population growth and inefficient market regulation have increased the pressure on forest land (Blomley and Iddi 2009). The market for forest produce is characterized by many small companies, individual traders and middlemen (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). This puts Tanzania in a challenging situation when it comes to forest management.

In an attempt to decrease unsustainable depletion of forest resources the Government of Tanzania has taken several measures. The National Forest Policy of 1998, the National Forest Programme 2001-2010, and the Forest Act 2002 all encourage substantial decentralisation of forest management (URT 1998, 2002). It has been recognised that the authorities, central and local, are unable to administer the vast areas of forests without cooperating with the neighbouring communities. By giving these communities legal jurisdiction over the land the aim is to promote participation and local engagement in forest management (Blomley and Iddi 2009:9).

Tanzania was one of the first African countries to recognize local governance in the forestry sector. With pilot projects starting in the early 1990s, Tanzania is considered a leader on the continent with regard to participatory forest management (PFM) implementation (Tanzania Forest Conservation Group 2007). Initially PFM was driven by conservational interests. Later PFM increasingly was seen as a means to improve local livelihood and to reduce poverty (Schreckenber and Luttrell 2009). The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (2005), MKUKUTA in Swahili, further emphasizes the poverty alleviating purposes of PFM (URT 2005).

Establishing PFM is an ongoing process in Tanzania. A national survey from 2006 shows that of the approximately 35 million ha forest in Tanzania, 3,67 million ha was engaged in PFM (Blomley and Ramadhani 2007). As Fig. 1 illustrates, this figure will be higher today.

**Fig 1. Expansion of PFM from 1999-2008.**



Source: URT 2009 Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania 1993-2009, Blomley and Iddi.

Despite ample legal frameworks and ongoing efforts to decentralize forest governance, the exploitation of forest resources has continued. In 2007 Milledge et al in TRAFFIC, a wildlife trade monitoring network, released a report revealing widespread illegal logging, collusion among influential actors, massive revenue shortfalls and a chronic nature of petty corruption within the forest sector in Southern Tanzania. At village level there was persistent underestimation of the value of the logs, with local harvesters receiving as little as one per cent of the export price. Local government authorities lost substantial royalty income, collecting a mere 4% of potential revenue. Petty corruption, nocturnal transport and the “white washing” of illegally harvested timber by fraudulent documentation, made the situation difficult to control (Milledge et al 2007).

The underperformance of forest governance was not only due to capacity constraints. Rather, it was evidenced that powerful actors cynically exploited the system. Lack of awareness at community level, inadequacy in forest management, globalisation and the delay in implementation of forest sector institutional reforms, enabled high-ranked forestry officials in cooperation with domestic and foreign organised networks to benefit from illegal harvesting. Extensive informal linkages were found between senior government officials and timber traders and exporters. The completion of the Mkapa bridge across the Rufiji river in 2003, made this area of Southern Tanzania more accessible to the buyers of forest produce. The

combination of lack of awareness among local population and weak law enforcement, made the area attractive for both national and foreign traders. Beside the economic shortfalls affecting the forest adjacent communities, the forests were also depleted at an unsustainable rate, jeopardizing the livelihood for future generations, as well as posing long-lasting negative effects on the environment (Milledge et al 2007).

The massive extent of illegitimate activities and governance shortfalls within the forestry sector exposed in the TRAFFIC report were not new information, but it was well documented and increased the focus and attention to the problem<sup>1</sup>. Additional exposure in media also made it easier to attract donor funding to activities dealing with the weaknesses uncovered by the report. Under the umbrella of the Tanzania Natural Resource Forum, 17 civil society organisations (CSO) holding jointly over 10 years of project implementation experience in Tanzania, many of which were related to the forestry sector, decided to run an awareness raising campaign addressing some of the issues revealed in the TRAFFIC report<sup>2</sup>. The campaign was named Mama Misitu (Mother Forest in Swahili) (Mama Misitu PIU 2008).

## ***1.2 Aim of the study***

The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether awareness raising campaigns such as the Mama Misitu initiative are effective mechanisms to improving forest governance at the local level in Tanzania, and to what extent poor people may benefit from such initiatives.

## ***1.3 Problem statement and research questions***

Illegal forest activities and loss of forest and income deprive poor and forest adjacent communities in Tanzania of valuable resources (Milledge et al 2007). Generally, there is a lack of transparency in forest governance, poor downwardly accountability by forest officers and ignorance of forest laws and regulations by both local authorities and community members (Blomley & Iddi 2009). Combined with a weak capacity at the national, district and community levels to implement good forest management, forestry resources have been

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with consultant 13.11.2009

<sup>2</sup> A presentation of the partners is included in Annex 2.

captured by unscrupulous individuals and companies (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009a). Corruption, slow implementation of participatory forest management and foot dragging in law enforcement, make this problem difficult to solve.

Will increased awareness by people living in forest adjacent communities in Tanzania lead to improved forest governance that also benefit the poor? The key questions addressed by the thesis are:

- Is the Mama Misitu campaign focusing on the relevant information and how is the flow of information?
- Does access to information empower the local communities with regard to forest management?
- Are there mechanisms in place whereby local communities can act on the information received to improve forest management?
- Are there legal enforcement systems in place which can/will act on the information received?

#### **1.4 Structure of thesis**

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework for the thesis. Key concepts are introduced and explained, and the background information needed for the study is elaborated. In chapter 3 I present the research methods and provide a brief introduction to the study area. Chapter 4 presents the findings and results of my fieldwork, whereas in chapter 5 I discuss the findings in relation to key concepts of good forest governance. Finally, in chapter 6 my conclusions are summarized.

## **2 Theoretical approaches**

In this chapter I will first clarify the theoretical foundation of my study before the main concepts which are central for this thesis are elaborated. Thereafter, I will give a brief outline of forest policy in Tanzania, including a short presentation of participatory forest management. I then discuss the background of and lessons from various awareness raising campaigns in developing countries, before I give a more detailed description of the Mama Mimitu awareness raising campaign which is the focus of the thesis.

### ***2.1 Theoretical foundation***

To identify a theoretical framework to use in my analysis I have looked at the theories of Political Economy, Political Ecology and New Institutionalism.

Political economy is the science of how a country is governed, the relationships between individuals and society and between markets and the state, considering economic and political factors (Britannica Online Encyclopedia). Pioneer philosophers within this science were Adam Smith, David Hume and Francois Quesnay who at the mid 18<sup>th</sup> century ascribed the distribution of wealth to political, economic, technological, natural and social factors, rather than being the fate of Gods will. Political economy is a normative field of study. In the context of management of natural resources political economy focuses on the politics of resource allocation and extraction among competing people and interest groups in the society (Boyce 2002:7).

Political Ecology integrates the ecology and political economy perspectives (Blaikie & Brookfield 1987). It focuses on “power relations in land and environmental management at various geographical levels, from the local via the national to the global, and the interlinkages between these levels” (Benjaminsen et al 2009:4). The tension of conflicting interests goes both between society and nature as well as between various groups within the society (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987:17). Political Ecology is a normative field of study with a special focus on marginalized people. It uses critical perspectives and aim to deconstruct hegemonic

narratives around degradation and marginalization, environment conflicts, conservation and control, and environmental identity and social movements (Robbins 2004).

New institutionalism examines the impact of institutions, such as rules, regulations, norms and values, on social, economic and political behaviour (Andersson et al. 2005). Institutions provide bonds between community members and create an element of order and predictability (March and Olsen 2005). Through the provision of incentives or sanctions, institutions may influence choices of action in order to reduce opportunism and reinforce socially productive behaviour (Bates 1989). With regard to decentralization of forest governance, Andersson, Gibson and Lehoucq (2005) argue that local politicians will engage in forest management if they reap political or financial benefits by doing so. They look at the following conditions;

- The degree of fiscal and/or regulatory power granted to the local government.
- The strength of demands from local interest groups and hence the chance of politicians to be re-elected.
- Central government support and supervision. Central government can provide resources for the policy or impose costs for non-compliance.

In a new institutionalism' perspective the management of common forest resources will thus be guided by institutions, and the actors' perception of potential costs and benefits within these.

### **2.1.1 “The Tragedy of Open Access”**

Garret Hardin described in 1968 how free access to common land will lead to degradation. As each individual will get the full benefit of the resources he/she extracts, the cost of loosing these resources will be carried by the whole community. This rationale will encourage excessive extraction of resources and thus lead to degradation. Elinor Ostrom, among others, later argued that communities would protect their commons by developing institutional arrangements, and that Hardin's “Tragedy of the commons” rather would apply to open access resources, which are free to all and where rules for use do not exist (Boyce 2002)

With the view of new institutionalism, institutions would help to prevent such exploitation of resources by providing information about other actors, limiting the choices of action or



structuring interaction between the actors. In this way uncertainty is reduced and the likelihood for collective arrangements in order to ensure optimal use are increased (North in Gibson 1999:10).

In a political economy perspective, open access to resources is not equally available to everybody. The process of extracting the resources will usually require investments and will thus be more available to wealthier actors than to the poor. Access to nature capital is further filtered through political and economic institutions, favouring the wealthy possessing relatively more power than the poor and powerless. Equally, the negative consequences of environmental, or for this thesis' case, forest, degradation will be unevenly distributed as the poor more often will depend on the forest to sustain their livelihood, and thus will be harsher affected by its degradation. For the richer actors incentives for environmental protection will be a trade-off between personal profits, the longer term desire for sustainable resource extraction, and the wish for environmental conservation. Frequently many of the actors benefiting from extracted resources are physically distant from the source, and do thus not directly carry the cost of degradation themselves (Boyce).

Boyce (2002:4) suggests three possible explanations how this unequal distribution of benefits and costs between 'winners' and 'losers' is possible:

- the losers may belong to future generations and are not able to defend themselves,
- the losers lack information or are unaware of the problem, and do therefore not raise resistance,
- the losers are aware of the problem, but they lack the means to defend themselves against the winners imposing environmental costs on them.

Whereas the first explanation may call for the exploiters' sense of responsibility, the second demand awareness and access to information. For the third, available mechanisms for holding the winners accountable will be essential. In this regard power relations will be very important and I will therefore briefly discuss this concept.

### 2.1.2 The notion of power

Power is a relational and dynamic notion. Nuijten (2005) has by following Lemke (2003) identified three types of power relations. First, there is power as strategic games, where an actor will try to manipulate possible actions of others. Examples can be moral advice, ideological manipulation, economic exploitation or sensible argumentation. Second, there is institutional power, such as rules, principles and laws, which is a more systematic and rational regulation of conduct of the various actors. Finally, there is the structural power, which reflects domination achieved through hierarchy and structural subordination. This latter form of power relation is often rigid and more difficult to change (Nuijten 2005)

A comparable understanding of power as strategic games can be found in Raik et al (2008). With their agent-centred understanding, power has two dimensions, *coercion* and *constraint*. The former implies that one agent holds power to *force* another to do something, whereas the latter implies that the agent can *prevent* another from doing something. In order to also consider social conditions another dimension of power is added, - the structural view. Following this view, power exists outside of the individual and evolves by the individual's position in the social structure. Examples of such influencing factors can be gender, race and class. By combining the agent-centred and the structural view, Raik et al (2008) present a *realist* view, where power evolves from both social position as well as individual qualities.

In reality the formal and identifiable power structure of an organisation, a community or within natural resource management, rarely reflects how the power relations work in practice. Rules and democratic procedures are often replaced by informal relationships, decisions taken outside the board room and information sharing in undefined circles, which make up an informal and often different power structure (Nuijten 2005). Corruption and powerful alliances may also circumvent formal rules and regulations, in favour of those with privileged access to economic or political power and strategic information (Benjaminsen & Lund 2003).

Decentralisation in natural resource management involves changes in existing power relations. New actors and new institutions come about through local participation. Natural resource management require technical expertise, but also good skills in such fields as negotiation, discussion, persuasion, communication and decision making (Brechin et al 2003 in Raik et al 2008). Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2010) have identified nine different means

that actors may possess to obtain power in environmental management. They include direct and indirect, structural, strategic and institutional dimensions of power, and are available to stakeholders to various extents.

- Economic resources may have influence on economic development. Private company owners and NGOs are examples of actors holding such power.
- Land rights and entitlements may give the power to regulate or restrict the use of land. The acquisitions of land rights by external actors have in many areas excluded the local population from the use of resources.
- Political power influences political decisions. The shaping of legislation, regulations and budgets are examples of the use of such power.
- Influence over public administration. Such influence can be exerted by political actors, private companies or the bureaucracy. Strategically placed employees may misuse their position to their own interest.
- Discursive power and persuasion. By eloquent expressiveness decision makers can be influenced.
- Information. Unequal access to information may change the basis for decision making, giving advantages to actors controlling the flow of information.
- Violence and coercion can be exercised by state actors within and outside the law, by large organisations, rebels and by criminals.
- Passive resistance - the weapons of the weak (Scott 1985). People appear to play along, but resist by disobedience, obstruction, sabotage or foot dragging.
- Individual characteristics such as gender, class, nationality, age and ethnicity, may give different influencing capacity.

Many of these types of power identified by Benjaminsen and Svarstad can be seen as means to obtain the dimensions of power described by Boyce (2002). He views the following dimensions of power as relevant to the stakeholders' influence on environmental management;

- Purchasing power is the base for evaluation of environmental goods and services, and influences what gets produced.
- Decision power is the ability of influencing decisions in your best interest.
- Agenda power is the ability to decide what topics to include or exclude from the agenda.

- Value power is the ability to influence the objectives and desires of others.
- Event power is the ability to influence circumstances around the decision which are to be made, and in this way manipulate the outcome of the decision.

For this thesis it is of interest to identify the dimensions of power relevant in natural resource management as described by Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2010) and Boyce (2002) and the distribution of such power between the different stakeholders in the forest sector. How are power relations between various actors within the forest adjacent communities, between community level and district authorities, and towards external private actors such as logging companies? Will knowledge and information successfully be disseminated through awareness raising campaigns and will the process of implementing PFM strengthen the power of the forest adjacent villagers, and their ability to influence forest governance, to hold authorities accountable and to pursue legal enforcement?

## ***2.2 Key concepts and definitions***

In order to discuss the thesis' objective of improved forest governance, I will first elaborate my understanding of governance, forest governance and the key factors of these concepts; transparency, accountability, participation and enforcement.

### **2.2.1 Governance**

Good governance is regarded as one of the key aspects of poverty reduction and sustainable development. Its' definition has changed over time, it is subjective, and has been dominated by Western standards and values (Punyaratabandhu 2004). In general, good governance is regarded as a result of a combination of participation, accountability, transparency, the rule of law and predictability. Sometimes it also includes democratic practices, civil liberties and access to information (Punyaratabandhu 2004:2). The doctrine of the separation of state powers into legislative, executive and judicial functions enables checks and balances, and limits the possibilities for abuse of power by the state. Equally important is the protection of human rights, encompassing principles such as freedom of expression and equal right to

protection from discrimination and the right to equal access to public services (Palamagamba n.d.),(UN n.d.).

The Poverty Task Force of the Asian Development Bank has constructed a table for good governance indicators in Vietnam (see Table 1). I have slightly modified this table to make it relevant also for developing countries in other continents.

**Table 1: Good governance indicators**

Outcome	Transparency	Accountability	Participation	Predictability
A stronger, more efficient public service which is capable of implementing policy and delivering better services to people at all levels	Extent to which information is publicly available regarding services, policies and planning arrangements at all levels	Degree of redress that the poor can obtain when faced with poor access to and/or low quality services from the Public Service  Whether civil servants are being paid and promoted in accordance with merit	The extent to which the poor has an opportunity to participate in the policy-making and implementation process at the local level	Extent of access of the poor to basic government services such as health, education, infrastructure, water and power at the local level
Better and more transparent public financial management	Level of budget transparency regarding central, provincial and local taxation, budgeting, and spending patterns for each sector	The extent to which expenditure that is incurred at all levels of government is open to independent scrutiny and reporting	Whether the poor has the opportunity to participate in budget formulation at each level of government	Extent to which, at the national level of expenditure that is targeted to pro-poor purposes is predictable from year to year
Wider access to justice and equal opportunities.	Extent to which decisions and verdicts of courts and tribunals are publicly available  Extent to which the means of redress are made available	Ability of the poor to access the court and tribunal system to seek redress, including against Government agencies	Extent to which there is a process for consultation with civil society in the process of preparation of laws, decrees and regulations	Extent to which the law is applied by all institutions fairly and predictably in all fields of activities, including in the resolution of administrative disputes
More participative and responsive government, particularly at local levels	Extent of formal recognition of the role of civil society in government at all levels	Extent to which local government is responsive to and follows up problems that are raised with them by the poor	Extent to which local democracy has been implemented in each commune so as to improve the opportunities for public participation, downward accountability and community monitoring.	Extent to which services provided at the local level to the poor are delivered in accordance with client charters
A government which prevents, and fights, corruption at all levels	Extent to which information on corruption is made public	Extent to which there are institutional mechanisms for pursuing corruption	Extent to which there are institutional mechanisms available to civil society to raise issues of corruption	Extent to which laws for combating corruption are effective

Source: Based on Punyartabandhu (2004).

The table focuses on openness and dialogue between those holding power and the civil society. As illustrated, the words ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’, ‘participation’ and ‘predictability’ are central for the trust in good governance. Applying these concepts to public services, financial management and the rule of law, equality and fair treatment of all citizens

is the aim. Important tools in this process will be the respect for human rights, freedom of expression and a free press/media, and a well functioning democracy with multiple political parties as well as independent civil society organisations.

Of special interest with regard to this thesis is the relation between governance and corruption. Robbins (2000:428) describes corruption within natural resource management as follows: “corruption is the bending of explicitly equitable state institutions around structures of regional and local social capital to create unequal distributive outcomes”. I will look further into corruption in relation to the concept of forest governance.

### **2.2.2 Forest governance**

Forest governance involves balancing conflicting ideas, i.e. the commercial versus the conservational values. Whereas extraction of valuable resources may create much needed financial support, there are also strong forces behind the need of conservation for environmental reasons.

Historically in Africa, forest conservation was enforced by state control or private property rights. Through the establishment of national parks and protected areas local communities were denied access and excluded from their traditional use of the forest. This policy was known as ‘fortress conservation’, and was the common approach until the 1980’s, often supported by international conservation agencies (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Over the last two decades there has been a change of focus. Forest governance is increasingly seen as a domain of local communities, through approaches as Participatory Forest Management (PFM). The main objectives are to obtain a more effective control and strengthen conservation of forest reserves as well as to secure economic benefits and poverty alleviation for the local communities by sustainable resource extraction (Lund et al. 2009).

Corruption within the management of natural resource management is a major challenge and an important reason for unsustainable use. Corruption encourages overuse and complicates control. It creates a black market where the seller is not the legal owner and the prices are commonly undervalued. No benefits are accrued for preservation of the natural resource or returned to the public/real owner (Robbins 2000). In a neo-classical economic perspective a

solution to this would be to increase the individual property rights and in this way ensure that a 'correct' price is set and over-exploitation discouraged. Marxists do not support this view, and see the privatisation and capitalization of communal property as the main problem making long term conservation to the best of the common difficult (Robbins 2000). Another reason why corruption makes forest management unsustainable is inordinate elites who often exclude knowledgeable resource users and thus disrupt the flow of information related to the conditions of the natural resource and the decision makers (Robbins 2000:432).

According to Robbins (2000), it is not the lack of state control that allows corruption to evolve. On the contrary, by establishing institutional command over the forests, the state is generating circumstances for corruption to occur. Where the control over forest resources is given to a limited number of officers, the case of preferential licensing and bribe demands are more likely to happen. However, within the social and cultural context of these institutions, they may not appear to be corrupt, but rather accepted as legitimate establishments of resource management (de Sardan in Robbins 2000).

The transformation from open access forests to controlled use of the forests has thus created a market for corrupt practices. The diverging interests of forest use will put an extra challenge on the institutions to act in accordance with good governance. The principles of transparency, accountability, participation of adjacent communities and a reliable and effective law enforcement system should be major objectives, in order to minimize illegal logging and corruption and to secure poverty alleviation. In this thesis I will look closer at these principles of forest governance.

### **2.2.3 Transparency**

Transparency is one of the key factors of good governance and is about public access to information. It is often associated with a reduced level of corruption. Both donors and investors will look at the level of transparency as part of their risk assessment procedures.

The Transparency Task Force at Brookings University defines transparency as the "openness of institutions; that is, the degree to which outsiders (such as citizens or stockholders) can monitor and evaluate the actions of insiders (such as government officials or corporate

managers)” (Bellver and Kaufmann 2005:5). Kaufmann (2002) defines transparency as “increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political information, which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders”.. A more extensive definition is given by Transparency International on their web-site; “Transparency can be defined as a principle that allows those affected by administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to know not only the basic facts and figures, but also the mechanisms and processes. It is the duty of civil servants, managers and trustees to act visibly, predictably and understandably”.

“Understandably” implies that information shall be presented in an appropriate way so that all stakeholders are able to process the information. The stakeholders’ level of education is an important factor influencing this ability (Kolstad and Wiig 2008). Their availability of time and physical access to the information will be other factors.

For the purpose of this thesis, transparency will be defined as the extent to which villagers and other stakeholders get access to reliable and relevant information with regard to local forest management, and to what extent this information is appropriate for holding those in charge of forest management accountable for their actions.

#### **2.2.4 Accountability**

Jenkins and Goetz (1999) refer to the following components of accountability:

- “Officials must explain – i.e. account for - their actions”, which in this sense make accountability almost synonymous with transparency.
- “Officials must take responsibility for their actions”, either judged on procedural ground or in terms of impact.
- “Officials made accountable by voters through elections”

In Policy Forum (2009:6) on the Tanzania Governance Review 2006-2007 accountability, based on Lawson and Rakner (2005), is defined as a chain of 3 processes. First **transparency** shall ensure enough openness and access to information so that interested parties can make informed judgements. **Answerability** means that decision makers are obliged to show that their decisions are reasonable, rational and within their mandate. Finally, **controllability** shall ensure that deviation from the first two principles may be sanctioned.



One may further ask the question; to whom are you accountable? In democratic states decision makers must adhere to publicly agreed policies, values, and objectives. Authorities will not only be horizontally accountable to their own reporting system, public audits and legislation, they will also be vertically accountable to citizens through elections and attention given by media and civic engagement. “One of the paradoxes of accountability relationships is that they put less powerful actors – individual citizens – in a position of demanding answers from more powerful actors”(Goetz 2008:3).

For the purpose of this thesis, the term accountability will be used for answerability towards citizens, i.e. the local population adjacent to forest reserves.

### **2.2.5 Participation**

Participation is embraced by many actors within development and natural resource management. Its’ definition vary, but usually includes involvement of stakeholders in decision making regarding priority setting, policy making, resource allocations and access to public goods and services (Rahman 2005:2). The term is widely used and often misused. Mikkelsen (2005), building on Chambers (2002b:1995), has classified three main ways in which the word participation is employed. First, it is used as *cosmetic label*. To suit the requirements of donors and governments, the word is symbolically included in planning and reports, whereas in reality the projects are run with a traditional top-down approach. Second, it describes *co-opting practice*. Locals are encouraged to contribute with their time and labour in order to reduce costs. “Often this means that ‘they’ (local people) participate in ‘our’ project”. Third, it is used to describe an *empowering process*. Local people own the projects, do their own analysis, take command, and make their own decisions. “In theory this means that ‘we’ participate in ‘their’ project” (Mikkelsen 2005:54).

The variation of the use of the word participation has lead many scholars to define participation as a graded concept, dividing the understanding of the term into levels of participation. There are several models of variation in participation, but generally they start with a level of minimal interaction between local stakeholders and decision makers and goes up to full ownership of a project by the local stakeholders. An example of such a model is listed in Table 2:

Table 2: **Typology of participation**

<b>Typology</b>	<b>Characteristics of each type</b>
Manipulative participation	Participation is simply pretence, with “people’s” representatives on official boards, but who are unelected and have no power.
Passive participation	People participate by being told what has been decided or has already happened. It is a unilateral announcement by an administration or project management without listening to people’s responses. The information shared belongs only to external professionals.
Participation in information giving	People participate by giving answers to questions posed by researchers and project managers using questionnaire surveys or similar approaches. People do not have the opportunity to influence proceedings, as the findings of the research or project design are neither shared nor checked for accuracy.
Participation by consulting	People participate by being consulted, and external agents listen to views. These external agents define problems and solutions, and may modify these in the light of people’s responses. Such a consultative process does not concede any share in decision making and professionals are under no obligation to take on board people’s views.
Participation for material incentives	People participate by providing resources, for example, labour, in return for food, cash, or other material incentives. Much <i>in situ</i> research falls into this category: rural people provide land, but are not involved in the experimentation or the process of learning. This is commonly called participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging activities when incentives end.
Functional participation	Participation seen by external agencies as a means to achieve project goals, especially reduced costs. People participate by forming groups to meet pre-determined objectives related to the project, which can involve the development or promotion of externally-initiated social organisation. Such involvement does not tend to occur at the early stages of project cycles or planning, rather, only after major decisions have been made. These institutions tend to be dependent on external structures, but may become independent in time.
Interactive participation	People participate in joint analysis, which leads to action plans and the formation of new local institutions or the strengthening of existing ones. It tends to involve interdisciplinary methods that seek multiple perspectives and make use of systematic and structured learning processes. These groups take control over local decisions, so that people have a stake in maintaining structures or practices.
Self mobilisation / active participation	People participate by taking initiatives independent of external institutions to change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for resources and technical advice, but retain control over how resources are used. Self-mobilisation can spread if governments or NGOs provide an enabling framework of support. Such self initiated mobilisation and collective action may or may not challenge existing distribution of wealth and power.

Source: (Pretty 1995), (Twyman 1998 referred by Rahman 2005:3).

A related word to participation is the notion of *local ownership*. It might be understood as “to involve the widest possible participation of those who are supposed to be the beneficiaries” (Helleiner 2000). Ownership refers to ‘owning a problem situation’ and ‘owning the resources to address it’ (Mikkelsen 2005). Further, local ownership has to do with attitude. Beneficiaries must move away from dependency and actively engage at all levels of projects, involving local institutions and government. “Ownership cannot be given – it has to be taken” (Helleiner 2000). Or as Brockington (2006:122) expresses it: “new power structures or rights which are fought for are likely to be stronger because their presence will have required the active engagement of the villagers”. And the “paradox suggests that rights may be stronger if they are won, not given” (ibid.)

For this thesis, it is important not only to assess the *degree of local participation*, but also to see *who* the participants are.

### **2.2.6 Enforcement**

There are formal and informal enforcement. Formal enforcement refers to the jurisdiction of the state. Court systems, police or agencies acting on behalf of the state ensure that laws, regulations and formal agreements are adhered to. Punitive measures may be imprisonment, fines or loss of mandate for offenders. Informal enforcement refers to social norms and social pressure. Punitive measures may be social disapproval, loss of reputation or retaliation.

Enforcement is further embedded in the following principles; *prevention, detection and suppression* (Contreras-Hermosilla 2001) . *Preventive* measures are aimed to reduce the opportunities for illegal actions. With regard to forest governance, examples include increased transparency and accountability in forest related decisions, reduction of discretionary power of forest officials and the provision of improved checks and balances within forest management. The civil society may also contribute to preventive measures by promoting public awareness or through political pressure. Private actors such as large international corporations may influence market forces by reducing demand for non-certified forest produce.

*Detection* of forest related illegal acts depends on baseline information and monitoring systems. Unannounced inspections or verification of documents by cross checking various

information sources may reveal irregularities. Cooperation with NGOs and environmental groups may provide useful information, as might the pledge for reward (monetary or other) to ‘whistle blowers’.

*Suppression* refers to the punitive measures as arresting or imposing financial penalties on forest offenders. This is a risky procedure which may provoke violence. Corruption is generally widespread in low income countries, both within the law enforcement agencies and among criminals, and entrenched criminal syndicates might be dangerous to challenge. Further, lack of capacity in many forest law enforcement bodies causes illegal actors to go free even if detected. Intensified focus on these problems by donors, NGOs and media may pressure the authorities to prioritize law enforcement (Contreras-Hermosilla 2001).

Where formal enforcement is not obtained due to incapacity or unwillingness by the legal enforcement system, the community might impose social sanctions on local forest offenders. In small communities complaints and loss of reputation may create social pressure to comply with acceptable behavioural standards<sup>3</sup>. Reaction from family members and social relations may persuade forest offenders to act in accordance with the local forest law.

In this thesis, enforcement reflects any measures, whether formal or informal, that is suitable for reducing illegal behaviour.

## ***2.3 Forest governance in Tanzania today.***

### **2.3.1 Policy and legislation**

In 1998, for the first time since 1963, a new National Forest Policy was approved. The new policy opened up for substantial decentralization of forest management (URT 1998a). Through the establishment of Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFR), communities were encouraged both to manage and own their local forests. The policy aims to improve forest conditions in the substantial area of forests that are not included in National Forest Reserves

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<sup>3</sup> Interview with consultant 07.05.2009

by giving adjacent communities legal jurisdiction over the land. The rationale being that local participation and responsibilities would encourage these communities to engage in forest management (Blomley 2009):9.

The right for communities to own, manage or co-manage forest was made law in 2002 through the Forest Act (URT 2002). The Forest Policy 1998 and the formalization of communities' rights through the Forest Act 2002, clearly illustrate the commitment by the Tanzanian government to decentralize forest management and support the implementation of Participatory Forest Management (PFM). The priority of PFM implementation is further emphasized in the National Forest Programme 2001 – 2010, which provides the strategic framework and plan for the implementation of the Forest Act and Policy (Blomley 2004).

### **2.3.2 Participatory Forest Management (PFM)**

In Tanzania there are two types of PFM, Joint Forest Management (JFM) and Community Based Forest Management (CBFM). The distinction between these is important. CBFM enables the village to own and manage their forest, and get all the revenue as well as cost in relation to this (Meshack and Raben 2007). Studies reveal, however, that CBFM contribute little to income at household level, as revenue is captured by the community authorities (Schreckenber and Luttrell 2009, Blomley and Iddi 2009). The district authorities will have a monitoring role, and may deliver some services against an agreed percentage of revenue. JFM involves reserved land owned by central or local government, and management responsibilities, costs and benefits are shared between the village and the owner of the forest in accordance with their agreement. In forests valued for its' high bio-diversity and where there is a strong conservation interest, JFM have been promoted by conservational organisations in the hope to secure local support. Adjacent communities to these protected forests will, however, have limited access to extract resources, whereas their responsibilities and costs may be considerable (Meshack & Raben 2007).

To manage the forest at local level, a Village Forest Committee (VFC) shall be democratically elected by the Village Assembly. The VFC shall act as a sub-committee to the Village Council and shall be accountable to both the Village Council and the wider Village Assembly. By-laws and forest management plan must be developed and approved by the Village

Assembly, but the enactment of these regulations lies with the District authorities. When the villages have managed their forest in accordance with the management plan for 3 years, they may request for formal “gazettment” (URT 2007).

At the district level there shall be a harvesting committee making decisions on harvesting after applications from the villages. The villages are represented by a village chairperson and a village executive officer in this committee (Rufiji District Executive Director Office). The village representatives, however, have limited influence, as the district representatives are holding the key positions<sup>4</sup>. The district forest officers (DFO) are working on a wide variety of forest issues, including support to the PFM at village level and law enforcement. They are often under pressure to comply both from lower district levels as well as from central government (Williams 2009). The DFOs are responsible to the District Council.

At the national level, within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT), the Forest and Beekeeping Division (FBD) is responsible for the development of forest policy, legislation, and sectoral leadership. As a consequence of the TRAFFIC report the FBD was reorganised and strengthened. Under the department of Forest Utilization, the Forest Surveillance Unit (FSU) was reinforced to secure revenue collection, surveillance and monitoring of harvesting and trading of forest produce throughout the whole country (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009).

Initially, as the FSU intensified their monitoring effort there was a substantial increase in the capture of illegal forest produce. Despite the initial success there are claims that FSU has been allocated reduced operational budgets since. The capture has also decreased. Possible reasons for this might be an increase in law compliance by traders, that illegal actors became more sophisticated in hiding their activities, or resource constraints experienced by the FSU. In addition the FSU are occasionally drawn to assist resource constrained DFOs which are further limiting their capacity (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009).

At the time of my visit to Tanzania in November 2009 there was planned for the establishment of additional agencies to strengthen the forest sector in Tanzania. The Tanzanian Forest Service will be a self financing executive agency and is designed to simplify

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<sup>4</sup> Interview with forest consultant 23.11.2009.

the chain of command within the forest sector, as well as holding jurisdiction over its generated income and budget (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). Further, The Independent Monitoring of Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (IM-FLEG) is aiming to formalize the relationship between official institutions in the forest sector and independent monitoring organisations (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b)

## ***2.4 Awareness campaigns in developing countries: origin and experiences***

In this section I will examine the experiences of some awareness raising campaigns in developing countries, initiated by external researches, the national government or by local grassroots movements. The campaigns can be seen to have a common theoretical foundation within political economy, political ecology and new institutionalism, and central concepts are transparency, accountability, empowerment and good governance.

### **2.4.1 The ‘jan sunwais’ method from Rajasthan, India**

In their paper “Accounts and accountability; theoretical implication of the Right-to-information Movement in India” Rob Jenkins and Anne Marie Goetz examine the impacts of a campaign organised by a small grassroots activist group named The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan, demanding increased accountability of local authorities. Concerned about how the central government’s efforts to enforce minimum wage regulations, and to secure subsidised prices of food and necessary commodities, were undermined by corrupt local government practices, MKSS developed a radical method to call for accountability. By publishing official documents at village meetings, MKSS believed they would not only discover, but also prove malpractice undertaken by the local authorities. Several “jan sunwais” or public hearings were organised beside the formal structure of the village assembly, and documents such as official expenditure reports, bills for services or purchase of materials and employment registers were read out loud. In this way villagers could discover if their name unrightfully was listed as recipients within an anti-poverty scheme, or if billings and expenditure were paid out for work never performed (Jenkins and Goetz 1999).

There was, however, major resistance among local government officials against this information campaign. The resistance was so strong that village-level development officers went on a state-wide strike, claiming they should only be liable to government audit, not to public investigation. For illiterate persons which needed assistance in order to fully understand and verify the content of a document, MKSS needed not only access to the information, but also to obtain a copy of it. A certified copy was also a requirement in order to prove and legally pursue malpractice. MKSS depended thus on sympathetic bureaucrats to obtain the required papers. There were no punitive measures for officials that failed to comply with giving out information, and there were both resistance and procrastination on the part of the administration on demanding investigation of corruption cases exposed through these public meetings. These obstacles limited the impact of the ‘jan sunwais’ (Jenkins and Goetz 1999).

The method of ‘jan sunwais’ has unsuccessfully been attempted by other activist groups elsewhere. Their failure may be caused by of lack of sensitisation of both the local people and the officials of the rationale and possible impacts of such exercises. “The negative result demonstrated, among other things, that a movement’s impact is critically conditioned by the route through which people arrive at the decision to assert that information is theirs by right” (Jenkins and Goetz 1999:10).

#### **2.4.2 Newspaper campaign to improve schooling in Uganda.**

The government of Uganda initiated this bottom-up campaign after a public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) had discovered extensive theft of public grants intended for primary schools. The majority of the grants were detained by local government officials and politicians, whereas only 20% reached the original purpose – the schools. By publishing details of the grant program and dates and amounts of transfer to the districts in national newspapers and in their local language editions, the schools were enabled to improve the follow up their rights (Reinikka and Svensson 2005).

An assessment of the results of this campaign is quoted by Reinikka and Svensson (2005). Their approach was to measure each school’s access to information in terms of distance to



nearest newspaper outlet, as well as directly testing the head-teacher's knowledge of the grant program. Overall, the campaign turned out to be a huge success. While the average school in 1995, before the campaign started, received only 24% of entitled grants, by 2001 this figure had risen to over 80%. There were, however, variations in these figures and it was found that there was a strong correlation between a school's distance to the nearest newspaper outlet and its headmaster's knowledge about the grant program. The schools that were best informed also experienced a larger decrease in local capture of funds. This further influenced both the enrolment to the schools and pupils' test results (Reinikka and Svensson 2005).

Paul Hubbard (2007) examines this campaign in relation to the financial, economic and information reforms in Uganda during the period 1995 to 2001. Prior to the information campaign, there had been very little knowledge about the various grant programs for schools. The capitation grant, on which the campaign focused, constituted only a minor part of government school funding (12% if received in full). In 1997 an educational reform decided that schools should be free to attend for up to four children per family. To compensate the schools for the loss of tuition fees previously paid by the parents, the capitation grant was revised and doubled. The huge boost in enrolment that derived from this reform further increased the schools opportunity and need to draw funding from the capitation grant. This increase in government transfer out to the districts was accompanied by stricter routines for monitoring and control. This was further emphasized by donors, as funding was given subject to accountability conditions. Information on grants, salaries and finances was to be published on public notice boards, and radio programs both informed and urged parents to monitor school funding. It is, thus, difficult to measure the relative impact of the newspaper campaign compared to impact of the structural reforms in education, finance and information in Uganda during the same period. It should be noted that in this case the distribution of information was used as a preventive measure, enabling the beneficiaries to secure their rights, rather than a punitive measure for sanctioning misdeeds in the aftermath.

### **2.4.3 Community based monitoring project in Uganda**

Another project calling for participatory control is Martina Björkman's and Jakob Svensson's Community Based Monitoring Project in Uganda. The project, or rather a field experiment, was initiated by foreign researchers motivated to find a method the local community could use to improve the inadequate public health services to the poor. Unlike the two other examples of awareness raising campaigns, the malpractices were not primarily caused by corrupt practices, but rather a result of mismanagement and weak incentives by health personnel to perform satisfactorily. Through report cards, the users of health dispensaries were supposed to give feedback on their perception of the service rendered, and improve the situation through local action. The project aimed to address two major constraints, namely access to reliable and structured information and community members' ability and willingness to act on this information (Björkman and Svensson 2007).

The collection of reliable and structured information was important as such information cannot be brushed aside as anecdotal, partial or irrelevant by the service providers. Further, the information gathered must be made known to the local community members in a way that encourage action. The conclusion from extensive piloting indicated that merely reporting the findings would not motivate community members to act. Instead a participatory approach was chosen, where the community members themselves actively examined the information gathered. Invitations to participate were handed out to various spectra of the population, such as young, old, women, mothers, disabled and leaders. In this way they could avoid the problem of elite capture. The information was then communicated at village meetings using interactive methods encouraging people to participate. The objective of the meetings was not only to share information, but also to develop a collective strategy and action plan for monitoring and improving service delivery (Björkman and Svensson 2007:10).

In such community based monitoring there is a potential risk of 'free riders' as everyone rather wish that someone else shall do the job. There are also limits to the community members' ability to sanction as beneficiaries of rural health programs are often perceived as socially inferior to the health care workers. There had been little motivation for health care workers to improve their efforts as salary and promotion possibilities had been more dependent on seniority than merits and competence. Formal sanctions such as dismissals were

rarely practiced and then only after severe abuse of their position (Björkman and Svensson 2007). There was, however, a possibility for community members to give some social reward or punishment through social and political connections.

Participating community members and health care workers were brought together and through role-play exercises and discussions they agreed upon a shared action plan including ways for community monitoring. These exercises worked out well, and the results of the intervention concluded with an improvement in both quality and quantity of health care provision.

#### **2.4.4 Discussion**

All the three campaigns described above calls for accountability through transparency and access to information. Intended beneficiaries are encouraged through awareness to demand their lawful right to public services from local governments. Three critical issues for at least the ‘jan sunwais’ and the citizen report card projects to succeed seem to have been: *participation*, or how local community member are motivated to take action; *access* to relevant and reliable information; and the local community members’ *ability to sanction* malpractice. I will look further at each of these issues.

With regard to participation, the ‘jan sunwais’ was arranged by an organisation which driving force was the local residents in combination with some activists. They addressed problems well known to many poor community members, such as very low wages and lack of access to subsidised food. The poor were directly affected by these shortcomings, but had not been able to prove the malpractice. The exposure of fraudulent mechanisms through ‘jan sunwais’ validated local knowledge, stimulated local dissatisfaction and encouraged local participation to uncover and protest against corruption (Jenkins and Goetz 1999).

The community based monitoring of public health services in Uganda, was on the other hand initiated and set up as a field experiment. The availability of proper public health service is an issue of concern of the poor. The project’s objective was not only to produce information about the negligence of health centres, but rather to encourage community members to participate in the planning of an action plan in order to improve and monitor service delivery.

Their approach had many similarities to participatory rural appraisal (PRA) (Björkman and Svensson 2007). Community members should themselves gather, interpret and analyse the information. Deshingkar and James in Mikkelsen (2005) have under the heading “The Tyranny of Tools – Concerns about PRA from the field” described how “facipulation” help communities to identify pre-defined project focuses, as if it was their own discovery. Another concern about PRA is how existing social structures may be reinforced as the elite capture the new roles at the expense of the marginalised which the intervention intended to help (Mikkelsen 2005:80). In order to steer clear of the latter participants were invited from different segments of the society. To avoid influencing local initiatives the survey team of the experiment withdrew from the meetings after the initial stages. Data collection and analysis were, however, supervised by the evaluators, securing the quality of the data throughout the project. The field experiment was brought to large scale, involving 55000 households. It is nevertheless uncertain to what extent these participatory processes and their outcome will be able to be maintained in the longer term (Björkman and Svensson 2007).

The access to reliable information is another major challenge. The emphasis in participatory monitoring is usually on the generation of information from the grassroots (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). The citizen report card project is an example of this. The large scale of information gathering ensured that service providers hardly could brush the information aside as unreliable, biased or irrelevant (Björkman and Svensson 2007). For the ‘jan sunwais’ method access to information was a goal in itself. They had no legal entitlement to obtain official documents, and as the activists generally were met with resistance by the local government officials to hand over information, they depended on cooperation with friendly bureaucrats. Likewise was the public hearings organised outside the statutorily recognised village assemblies. The ‘jan sunwais’ method thus implied confrontation with the authorities, both with regard to access to the documentation and later to demand officials to explain apparent discrepancies (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). The consequences for those engaged in revealing confrontational information can be serious if those in power are challenged (Mikkelsen 2005). This confrontational aspect has caused the NGOs engaged in participatory development rarely to focus on the right to information. Most NGOs aim to maintain a good relationship with the local government in order to secure their daily operations which often embrace partnership with the same authorities (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). The act of auditing official documents is further seen as a technical skill, normally limited to literate and educated people. To involve poor and illiterate people in this process has not been seen as productive. The ‘jan sunwais’

method exposed the potential these groups have to engage in collective action (Jenkins and Goetz 1999).

Finally, to avoid the notion of “powerless awareness” holding the information of abuse is of no use if there are no sanction possibilities available. In both cases mentioned above legal punitive potentials were limited. Even where ‘jan sunwais’ had uncovered corrupt behaviour, bureaucrats could through foot-dragging avoid legal action (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). In the case of health service dispensaries in Uganda, the process of dismissing health personnel was cumbersome and had to be taken through several instances up to the top district level, which was rarely done. And as the remuneration system of health workers were more determined by educational qualifications and seniority, rather than their job performance, there were no financial incentives for health personnel to increase their effort. The community had, however, a possible authority through social rewards and sanctions that affected the health workers’ reputation. The quality of health services was more often discussed in local council meetings. Complaints or appraisals by the users may have motivated staff to improve their performance. Colleagues, family or friendly relations may have further promoted the social prestige of doing a good job (Björkman and Svensson 2007). The resistance of bureaucrats and local government officials in the ‘jan sunwais’ case may be harder to combat with social measures, as colleagues and senior officials tended to protect each other against allegations from the socially inferior and marginalised groups. The role of media or democratically elections may have additional impact.

The issues of participation, access to information and sanction possibilities will be thoroughly discussed later in the thesis.

## 2.4.5 The Mama Misitu Campaign

The Mama Misitu awareness raising campaign was initiated as a response to Milledge et al's TRAFFIC report of 2007. It was a collaborative initiative, drawing on the diverse experience by the various partners. The objectives of the campaign were identified as (Williams 2009):

1. Forest adjacent communities become aware of the economic value of forest resources and begin to demand and receive benefits arising from sustainable forest management.
2. Key forest governance issues are recognised and addressed through increased stakeholder awareness and the adoption of appropriate stakeholder actions focused on stopping the illegal timber trade and promoting best practices in forest management.

To obtain these goals, the following six issue groups addressing the recommendations proposed by the TRAFFIC report were planned for (Mama Misitu PIU 2008):

1. Increasing stakeholder awareness about the economic value of forests and the need for improved forest governance.
2. Challenging corruption and encouraging improvement of moral values.
3. Improving stakeholder understanding of forest harvest compliance supported by increased availability of information.
4. Increasing local awareness about law compliance and improved prosecution of forest crime.
5. Emphasizing the need to strengthen PFM and improve the speed of its roll-out.
6. Improving stakeholder awareness about the need to increase timber export standards.

The campaign should be run at both the national and the local levels. For the local activities it was decided to start with a pilot phase in the districts of Rufiji and Kilwa. The pilot phase should run for 12 months. Thereafter, there would be an evaluation process before implementing the campaign on a larger scale. The main donor for the pilot phase was the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Williams 2009).

### *Campaign activities at the national level*

On the national level it started with a grand launch of the campaign with the guest of honour Dr Wangari Maathai. This was the main story in the next issue of the magazine FEMA, reaching millions of readers, produced and distributed by Femina HIP, one of the campaign partners. Except from the article in FEMA, however, there have been very few articles in the national printed media.

The branding of the campaign such as the Mama Misitu motto and logo was also developed and promoted at the national level. Printed materials such as leaflets and information brochures, as well as promotional merchandise such as T-shirts, khangas, caps and polo shirts with the Mama Misitu message, were produced centrally for distribution at local level (Williams 2009).

TV-spots encouraging people to call in and report law infringement issues in the forestry sector were produced. The Project Implementation Unit (PIU) received some 50 calls a day as a direct response after each broadcast. The information was passed on to senior staff within FBD which would then seek to take appropriate action. However the PIU was not sufficiently prepared to handle such response from the general public, and arrangements for receiving the calls and appropriate protocols were not in place (Williams 2009). Further a forest crime drama was recorded and broadcasted on radio in 8 episodes. These episodes did not give any opportunity for feedback, and there were no other monitoring mechanism in place to evaluate how these shows were received (Williams 2009).

The Mama Misitu Campaign has a well designed web-site. But, it has not been updated since the start of the campaign. No reports on progress, events or accounts have been posted. Further, clear statements from government leaders denouncing corruption in the forest sector were planned to be made public. However, this was not achieved due to lack of cooperation from government leaders (Williams 2009). PIU has also produced law compliance packages and harvesting guidelines, but these have lagged considerably behind time schedule and had at the time of the rapid interim evaluation in may 2009, just started to be distributed at local level (Williams 2009).

*Campaign activities at the local level.*

At the local level a 12 month pilot project of the Mama Misitu Campaign was chosen to be conducted in the Kilwa and Rufiji districts. This area had been identified by the TRAFFIC report as prone to extensive illegal logging. As one of the poorest areas in Tanzania, much of the population is dependent on the forest for their livelihood. Adult literacy rate in the two districts are as low as 51 – 52% (URT 2005), which is much lower than the average for Tanzania. Forest coverage in this area is Miombo woodlands with some patches of coastal forest.

**Map 1: Rufiji and Kilwa – the pilot districts for the Mama Misitu campaign**



Source: Rapid Interim Report (Williams 2009).



The leading implementing partners for the Mama Misitu campaign were Mpingo Conservation Project (MCP) in Kilwa and WWF Matumbi Kichi Coastal Forest Project in Rufiji. Both these organisations had established programs and connections with district authorities as well as villages in which they were already operating (Williams 2009). A cooperating partner in both districts has been the association of community based forest management (MJUMITA).

The Mpingo Conservation Project is based in the Kilwa district where some of the greatest remaining stocks of Mpingo are to be found. The area has experienced a high rate of illegal logging. MCP is promoting sustainable utilisation of the forest, creating awareness about the real value of timber, enabling villagers to demand an appropriate price from loggers. In addition the MCP is working alongside the DFO in Kilwa assisting the development and implementation of PFM in the district.

The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has long experience from Tanzania. Concerned about the preservation of Miombo woodlands, WWF is working with local communities, governments and organizations, encouraging the use of natural resources in a more sustainable way. Their objectives are to increase the local population participation in natural resource management and to secure a non-discriminatory access to forest produce, as well as promoting alternative livelihoods (WWF Tanzania Office's web-site)

MJUMITA is a network of Community Based Forest Management Associations aiming to encourage participation of forest user groups in the management and conservation of neighbouring forest resources. The network covers 16 regions in Tanzania, with more than 70 CBOs working under it. By sharing information and empowering marginalized groups, as rural poor and women in particular, MJUMITA is working to enhance competence of forest adjacent villagers to improve forest governance as well as their livelihood by gaining income through forest activities (MJUMITA 2008).

The pilot phase of the awareness raising campaign was carried out in 11 villages in Rufiji and 10 villages in Kilwa. Prior to the implementation a Knowledge Attitude and Practice study (KAP) was undertaken in 15 villages, 14 of these in the pilot districts and 1 village in Morogoro as a control. Four workshops were organised for local partners and district staff in

order to increase the understanding of the campaign's objectives and issues, and introductory meetings with village governments were carried out (Williams 2009:13).

A drama group, recognisable from the TV spots, performed on road shows in the targeted villages. These events aimed to raise awareness on the importance of natural resources and to trigger public concern on illegal harvesting. Some 200 – 300 villagers would gather and raise attention on issues such as corrupt behaviour of forest officials, nocturnal transports of illegal forest products, the involvement of village leaders and government officials in illegal harvesting and a demand for more information on harvesting procedures (WWF 2009). An interactive video documentary, developed in cooperation with the FBD's Zonal Extension Unit, was also shown around in the villages, followed by a village meeting. At the events promotional merchandise with the Mama Misitu message was distributed (Williams 2009). In Rufiji district the local leading partner organized a world environment day, marking the day with schoolchildren presenting songs and poems and a local drama group performing (WWF 2009). In both pilot districts a school competition was organised. These competitions attracted many parent and community members and did thus reach out to more than the youngest generation. All the participating schools were awarded with merchandise such as footballs, exercise books, T-shirts, caps and monetary gifts (WWF 2009). I was told that the songs were still sung by schoolchildren, even also by the village assembly<sup>5</sup>.

By the roadside at the entrance of many of the targeted villages there were put up Mama Misitu signboards. These functioned as a daily reminder of the campaigns message – stop illegal harvesting of forest products – Take action! (WWF 2009).

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<sup>5</sup> Interview with forest consultant 30.11.2009



Mama Misitu signboard by the road at Nyamwage village.

According to Williams (2009), activities at the local level were affected by delays in delivery from the PIU, which again was restrained by uncertainties and delays in funding from the Finnish Embassy in Dar es Salaam. One of the challenges identified was that the roles and responsibilities between the PIU and the implementing partners were not clarified. Given the variety of approaches used by the implementing partners, sufficient learning time is required in order to run such a collaborative project smoothly (Williams 2009).

There were some spill over effects to areas outside the pilot area as relatives had spread the Mama Misitu message forward to non-participating villages. Both the implementing partners and the PIU had received requests from neighbouring villages wanting to join the campaign (Kahyarara 2009). Similar requests had come from other areas in Tanzania, even from Ghana, Mozambique and Malawi<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> Interview with consultant 18.11.2009

### 3 The study area and research methodology

This chapter first presents the study area in Tanzania. Thereafter, I discuss the methodology applied in my field research. I visited Tanzania during the period 10th November to 11th December 2009. Most of this time I spent in Dar es Salaam, interviewing academics, consultants and forest professionals, and also preparing the field trip to Kilwa and Rufiji districts. I spent one week in these districts, of which 3 days in the villages. Before and after my trip to Tanzania I conducted desk research, following up on some issues by e-mail and searched for secondary data.

#### 3.1 The study area

I visited 3 of the villages targeted by the Mama Mitsu Campaign in the pilot districts. These villages were chosen by the leading implementing partner, primarily based on accessibility as the rainy season had started. The villages were Ruhawe and Mavuji villages, both situated in Kilwa district, and Nyamwage village in Rufiji district. I shall briefly point out some specifics of each village.

**Map: Ruhawe and Mavuji village – Kilwa District**



Source: Google Maps. The villages are placed very inaccurately on the map. I did not succeed in finding any map with these villages marked, and have placed them solely by memory of driving distance and direction.

Ruhatwe village is situated distant from the main road. It has a population of 794 people. Ruhatwe has established Community Based Forest Management (CBFM), and is one of the villages where the Mpingo Conservation Project has been working actively. The village originally designated Village Land Forest Reserve (VLFR) of 1000 ha, but due to an enduring border dispute with Migeregere village, this area was exploited by loggers raiding most of the finest trees. Ruhatwe then allocated a new forested area and have now VLFR of 1706 ha. They have not yet managed to make an operational harvest plan (The Mpingo Conservation Project). I was informed that they did not experience any buyers approaching for forest products.


There are 15 democratically elected members in the Village Forest Committee, 6 women and 9 men. Twice a week they organize forest patrol on foot with 5 people. These patrols aim to prevent illegal logging<sup>7</sup>. I interviewed 11 villagers in Ruhatwe. Of these were 6 men and 5 women, age ranging from 22 to 72 years old. Their educational level was relatively higher than in the other case villages. One of these respondents in Ruhatwe had completed Standard 4; seven had completed Standard 7; two had finished Form 4, and the last and oldest respondent had received adult vocational education. The sampling procedure will be explained in chapter 3.4.1.

Mavuji village is situated on the main road between Dar es Salaam and Lindi, and have much easier access to the markets than Ruhatwe village. The village population is 1000. Much of the land surrounding Mavuji has been leased out to the Dutch Bio-shape company, which until 2009 also employed many of the villagers. Mavuji village has assigned VLFR of 1000 – 1500 ha, but is still in the process of implementing PFM. The VFC has 14 members, who are responsible for forest patrol by the end of each month. I interviewed 14 villagers in the Mavuji village, 6 men and 8 women, age ranging from 19 to 66. I also interviewed 3 of the VFC members, all men.

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<sup>7</sup> Focus group discussion 24.11.2009

**Map: Nyamwage village – Rufiji District**



Source: Google maps.

Nyamwage village is situated at the junction to Mkapa Bridge and Utete and has good access to markets. The village has established CBFM and their VLFR is 1500 ha. Previously there was extensive illegal logging around Nyamwage, where villagers made a living of selling logs to business people who passed by on the road. WWF has provided support to establish alternative income sources for the villagers such as vending and bee keeping. Saving and credit groups have also been established. These groups have received training on entrepreneurship, leadership and group management. Group members are now also leaders for other factions, some elected into the VFC<sup>8</sup>. The VFC has 18 members, 9 of each sex. I interviewed 6 villagers in Nyamwage, 3 men in the age 64 – 68 and 3 women between 32 and 40 years old.

### **3.2 Analytical foundation**

The nature of my research objective made me choose a qualitative approach. For a start I had more questions than ideas and my approach between theory and research was thus inductive. In an inductive stance the theory is the outcome of the observations and findings (Bryman 2008). As usual in social and qualitative research my ontological position may be defined as social constructivism, meaning that perceived reality is produced through social interaction and is in a constant state of change (Bryman 2008). Thus follows an epistemological consideration of interpretivism. Interpretivism makes up a contrasting epistemology to the

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<sup>8</sup> Interview with forest consultant 30.11.2009

positivism which is commonly used in natural sciences, and is concerned about the *understanding* of human behaviour.

In order to conceptualize the problem of corruption and forest governance, I decided to focus on the Mama Misitu awareness raising campaign. This implies a case study design, which “entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case” (Bryman 2008). This limits, however, the possibility for generalisation and external validity of my findings.

Ideally, I would have chosen the grounded theory approach. Grounded theory indicate that analyses and data collection is going on simultaneously, enabling the researcher to develop interpretations to focus on for further data collection (Charmaz 2003). Due to a timeframe of merely 1 month for my field work as well as limited financial resources, this was, however, not feasible. I only managed to arrange for one trip out in the field. Both before and after this field trip I gathered information from CBOs, consultants and academics located in Dar es Salaam. This information was used to plan and prepare the field work, whereas much of the information collected after the fieldwork was used to verify or explain my findings in the field.

### ***3.3 Stakeholder identification***

Prior to the fieldwork at the district and village levels, I identified the stakeholders in relation to forest governance. Sources for this exercise were the TRAFFIC report, the proposal for the Mama Misitu campaign downloaded from the Mama Misitu web-site, as well as other relevant literature. The stakeholder analysis have been reviewed and updated as I gained more information during the research process.

#### ***Villagers/community members:***

This is a diverse group of people whose interests, well being and capacity may vary. Marginalized individuals may engage in illegal forest activity such as charcoal making or poaching, more out of necessity than free will. They may feel ‘fatalistic’ to the prospects of their future. Their workforce may be exploited by actors that are not acting in accordance with forest policy and law. Other villagers may be relatively better off, better educated or situated with regard to power relations and social status. Gender differences might be an issue.

***Village leaders/Village forest committee members:***

The village leaders and VFC members are elected by the village assembly, and are probably not among the poorest in the community as these often will be unable to meet the costs of participation (time spent in meetings, forest patrolling etc). Each member's influence may vary within the committee according to social status, power relations and ability to speak up at meetings. Village leaders and members of the VFC are in position to demand bribes and participate in other corrupt activities.

***Forest inspectors:***

In the villages I visited forest inspection is carried out by members of the village forest committee. They are not paid to do this work, but fines and confiscation of illegal goods will benefit the committee and the village council. When discovering irregularities in the forest, information is supposed to be given to District Forest Officer (DFO). The 'thief' is supposed to be handed over to the police. But generally "they do not manage to catch them – they run away"<sup>9</sup>. Forest inspectors are in good position to demand/accept bribes, by turning 'a blind eye' to illegal activities uncovered during patrol.

***Road check point officers:***

Road check point officers shall control that the owners of transported forest products have paid for and obtained a transit pass. If the payment is not in order, the owner of the products must leave the vehicle at the check point and pay at the closest cashier office. For the check point at Migeregere this means to borrow a bicycle up to the Nangurukuru roundabout and then take a taxi or bus to the District Council Office in Kilwa Masoko. This is a fairly long journey and the payment procedure must take several hours. The road check point officers do not receive any salary. Instead they are paid a share in percent of the revenues collected for the transit permits. Their payment is, however, sometimes delayed. There are also huge seasonal variations in the traffic pattern. I was informed that the officers working at the road check points often are related to village leaders. Road check point officers are in a good position to demand/accept bribes.

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with village forest committee member 26.11.2009



***Traders/transporters:***

Traders of forest produce are seen by many as ‘the bad guys’ (Kahyarara 2009). According to the TRAFFIC report, traders carrying legal goods were also prone to corruption. Considering the lengthy procedures if acting in accordance with regulations, traders may find it tempting to offer bribes in order to create short cuts.

***District Forest Officers (DFOs):***

DFOs experience major challenges in supporting PFM and law enforcement in the districts. At the same time they are severely resource-constrained. This situation may affect their professionalism and morale negatively (Williams 2009). There had been allegations of corrupt practices against the DFO in Rufiji (Kahyarara 2009). The DFO is responsible to the District Council, and not to the FBD (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). District Forest Officers are in good position to demand/accept bribes.

***The central government Forest and Beekeeping Division (FBD):***

The Forest and Beekeeping Division in the ministry shall not be involved in local level forest management. They have, however, had problems with corrupt officers. The FBD could improve communication and cooperation with other public agencies such as the police for more effective road check point control and the Ministry of Finance for improved flow of payments back to the local communities.

***The central government Forest Surveillance Unit (FSU):***

The Forest Surveillance Units are the FBD’s monitors. Their main objective is to prevent illegal logging and improve law enforcement. The FSUs are established to cover the entire country in seven terrestrial zones and one marine unit. The FSU possesses more than 20 vehicles and 2 boats for patrolling. By mid 2009 the 8 units had 71 well educated staff members. Resource constraints are, however, limiting their capacity. The boats are for instance only operational one week every month (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). FSU officers are in a good position to accept/demand bribes.

***Civil society/NGOs:***

Anti-corruption policies are on the agenda of most donors. In order to attract funding, the majority of Civil Society Organisations will include anti-corruption measures in their projects. Loss of reputation will be severe if they themselves are caught in corruption/illegal activities. Usually NGO/CSOs will aim to maintain a good relationship with the government and avoid confrontation with the authorities.

***Donors/international actors:***

Donors attach great importance to the principles of accountability and transparency. Control of financial flows is often a condition when funding.

Each of these stakeholder groups possess different amounts of power and motivation for engaging in forest activities. Opposing objectives and conflicting interests can probably be found between, and also within, the various groups. Institutions, relations and perceptions of potential costs and benefits will influence their behaviour with regard to the process of decentralizing and improving forest governance. In order to illuminate the situation from various sides, I aimed to obtain information from as many stakeholder groups as possible.

***3.4 Research method***

Before, after and to some extent during my field work I conducted desk research, searching for secondary data through the library, databases available on the internet, and official and ‘grey’ government papers. This documentation supplemented the information provided by key informants. The use of secondary data has the benefits of being cost and time efficient as well as to ensure high quality on a much wider set of data than would otherwise have been obtained. Secondary data may, however, be both complex as well as emphasising other variables than the key variables ideal for own research (Bryman 2008).

During my fieldwork in Tanzania, I interviewed 20 key informants consisting of consultants, academics and forest officials. I also attended the presentation of the Mama Misitu Campaign’s evaluation report at the Finnish Embassy in Dar es Salaam. During the field trip to the three villages, I spent one day in each and interviewed 34 villagers, of whom three did

not complete the full questionnaire and therefore was deducted from the sample<sup>10</sup>. In addition, I interviewed two employees at the Migeregere road check point and three Village Forest Committee members. In the first village visited, I also conducted a focus group discussion with VFC members.

Qualitative interviews is the most popular and common method in development studies. These interviews are often ‘conversational’ at the same time as being controlled and structured. Some questions and topics will be predetermined, whereas many questions will emerge during the interview (Mikkelsen 2005). Semi-structured interviews, using an interview guide or checklist have the advantage of being matched to individuals and circumstances. Logical gaps in data can be anticipated and closed. The flexibility does, however, reduce the comparability of responses (Patton 2002 cited in Mikkelsen 2005).

All my key informants were interviewed in a semi-structured way. Instead of having a fixed set of questions I used a check list. The checklist was adjusted to suit each specific respondent, although I tried to include the same topics in order to obtain comparable information. The flexibility of my questions enabled the interviewee to elaborate on preferred issues. I was also free to add questions and follow up as topics of special interest emerged.

In the villages I used a *standardized* or *structured open-ended interview* method. All the respondents were asked the same questions in the same order. Most of the questions were unrestricted and the respondents were encouraged to elaborate, give multiple answers and if possible also real life examples. This interview method facilitates organisation and analysis of the data, as the respondents answer the same questions and thus increase the comparability of the answers. It does, however, also limit the flexibility to follow up on particular circumstances (Patton 1990 referred to in Mikkelsen 2005). On a few occasions when the respondents gave information of special interest and relevance, I did nonetheless add some extra questions to get more details on these issues. When approaching each respondent I introduced the questionnaire as being about forest governance. My special interest for the Mama Misitu campaign was not revealed until the last questions.

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<sup>10</sup> The questionnaire is presented in Annex 3

Initially in the first village I visited, I organized a *focus group discussion*. The participants were 7 members of the VFC, 4 women and 3 men, plus the village chairman. The topic for this discussion was how the village forest was managed. There are several practical challenges when conducting a focus group discussion. Ideally notes should include not only exactly what is said, but also how it is said and by whom. Taking precise notes and at the same time leading the discussion, is difficult. Bryman (2008) therefore suggests that focus group discussions should be recorded and subsequently transcribed. I was reluctant and did not bring a recorder as I feared this would restrain the participants from answering more sensitive questions about corruption. I experienced, however, that the group dynamics probably was a greater restraint to answering these questions. Even though I got answers as “if it is corruption in this village it is not open” and “the corruption is there but it is hidden”, the prevailing answer was that there “are no problems with corruption nor any nepotism in this village”. The focus group discussion clarified some of the issues of forest management, such as how decision making is done, cooperation with the district forest officer and the organising of forest patrols. I decided, however, not to undertake more focus group discussions as I considered it more fruitful to interview the participants one by one in privacy.

During all my interviews, and during my visits to the field, I intentionally observed as much as possible. Of special interest was any form of human interaction with the forest. Simple observation is a non-participant situation where the observer has no influence over the situation observed (Bryman 2008). Small episodes, informal conversations during bus journeys and varied observations that I found relevant were written down in my diary.

### **3.4.1 Sampling**

I applied different types of sampling methods to identify the key informants and representatives from the villages.

#### *Key informants*

Key informants were identified through purposive sampling. Purposive sampling means that participants are chosen in a strategic way in relation to their relevance to the research questions, aiming to find participants holding a variety of key characteristics (Bryman 2008). To achieve this I used the snowball or chain sampling method. This implies that the

researcher uses one relevant respondent to identify and access other relevant respondents (Bryman 2008). Initially, I made contact with a few central professionals who guided me further to other relevant key informants. Some of my preferred informants were, however, not present in Dar es Salaam at the time of my visit there. I also intended to visit TNRF which is located in Arusha, but due to time constraints this was not feasible. I did, however, interview representatives from a variety of institutions to illuminate the chosen topics from different perspectives.

### *Villagers*

My aim was to identify a representative sample of people to interview in each village using a stratified random sampling method. Stratified random sampling implies that the population is divided into relevant categories before the samples are identified from each category entirely by chance (Bryman 2008). For my research these strata or categories would be related to gender and age. I faced, however, several constraints in applying the actual sampling procedure. First, the villages in which I did my interviews were picked by the leading partner of the Mama Misitu campaign in the area. As the rain season had started, their choice of villages depended on accessibility. Secondly, I did not have access to any lists of the village population or any maps over the villages to create a sampling frame. Thirdly, and most important, was my time constraint. With only one day in each village I preferred to spend as much time as possible doing interviews rather than the sampling process. Most important then was to ensure that the sampling was controlled by me and not influenced by the village leaders or any other local authority person. The respondents were thus identified by me as the translator and I walked through the village, approaching approximately every third house we passed, aiming to cover the whole village during the day. As it was difficult for me to distinguish any differences between the houses, the way villagers dressed, or other criteria that might unconsciously have influenced my choice, I believe the sampling was free from such bias. And as we kept on interviewing from 8 am to 5 pm, we also met people that would be out on the fields or at work parts of the day. The only factor consciously influencing my sampling procedure was that I attempted to interview approximately the same number of men and women.

As we entered the first two villages, we informed that we also wanted to speak to VFC members. These were gathered by other villagers or came as they heard the word.

### 3.4.2 Quality of the data gathered

In quantitative research reliability, replicability and validity of the data are important criteria for assessing quality. Reliability refers to the stability in the measure over time, whether there is consistency in the relations between indicators and to what extent observers have been consistent in categorizing and structuring their observations. Replicability means that the measures and procedures of the research shall be replicable by someone else. This requires a detailed explanation of all research procedures. Validity refers to the relevance of an indicator, to what extent the measures really reflect the explored concept which will reflect the integrity of the conclusions derived at from a research (Bryman 2008). Evidently, such measurements are not applicable in social qualitative research.

Guba and Lincoln (cited in Bryman 2008) have developed alternative criteria for the abovementioned terminology that are more suitable for assessing qualitative data; trustworthiness and authenticity. Trustworthiness refers to *credibility* as following good practices in research, *transferability* as in avoiding quick generalisations and recognizing depth rather than breadth of the data, *dependability* as keeping complete records of all phases of the research process, and *confirmability* as striving for objectivity and acting in good faith. Authenticity represents a fair treatment of all responding participants, as well as to what extent participating in the research help members better to understand, or empower them to improve their situation (Bryman 2008).

Assuring the quality of my findings in relation to Guba and Lincoln's criteria, I strived to do the following: Triangulation of the data (representing credibility) was primarily done against secondary sources such as evaluation reports, official documents and other relevant literature. I did also verify some information by asking experts/consultants. This has, however, not been possible to do to a full extent, obliging me sometimes to rely solely on the information received. There might therefore be some discrepancies in my data. With regard to transferability, all the respondents were asked the full questionnaire, given the needed time to reflect upon each question, and encouraged to give as comprehensive and detailed answers as possible. I also tried to interview representatives of as many stakeholder groups as possible, accessing information from different perspectives. All original notes gathered through observations and during interviews are kept for later reference.

### **3.4.3 Permission to undertake the research**

Before leaving for Tanzania I had applied for a Research Associateship with the Sokoine University of Agriculture in Morogoro. I also brought a confirmation of my student status from the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB). Considerable time of my first weeks in Dar es Salaam was, however, used to get all the formalities right. Before going out to the field I received an introductory letter from the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Forest and Beekeeping Division, which I presented to the District Executive Officer at my arrival in Kilwa. A representative from the Mpingo Conservation, the local leading partner for the Mama Misitu Campaign in Kilwa, also wrote me an introductory letter in Swahili, addressed to the village leaders in the two villages we visited, as well as the village where the road check-point was located.

For ethical reasons and out of respect for the communities I visited, it was important for me to follow this official procedure.

### **3.5 Ethical considerations**

As described above, I put great care into getting the formalities around my field research in accordance with local regulations. Further, I was concerned about the principles of informed consent, confidentiality and consequences (Bryman 2008). Before starting each interview, my translator presented me as a student, explaining the purpose of my research and underlining my independence not being associated with any organisation. Each interviewee was then asked if they wanted to participate. Two women wanted to withdraw from the interviewing after answering approximately half my questions. Their answers have not been included in the sample. I did not ask their reason for withdrawal, but in one case in the Nyamwage village I felt it was a consequence of other people listening in. During my visit in Ruhatwe and Mavuji villages, my translator was very conscious of this problem both with regard to finding a discrete location for the interview as well as asking possible intruders to leave, pausing the interview until they were out of ear shot. In Nyamwage I did not manage to cooperate in the same way with my translator. Although we started the interviews in discrete locations, my presence caused attention, and people would sometimes approach during the interview. With regard to consequences my questionnaire did not include very sensitive questions. There

seemed to be openness about the corruption problem. Most villagers willingly answered all my questions, although one respondent clearly changed her answer when the village leader came within ear shot. Since I left the area once my research was finished, not having had any contact with these villages afterwards, I cannot say with certainty that there have been no consequences for the participants, but I do not believe so.

When it comes to ethical considerations of interviewing my key informants, I presented myself and informed about the purpose of my study, at the time of making appointment for the interview. With regard to these respondents, I feel that my strongest ethical consideration is to interpret them correctly.

For the ethical considerations towards the institutions I represent, UMB and through my associate researchship with Sokoine University, I aimed to behave correctly and respectful towards all participants. I believe there was never any situation occurring that could damage the institutions' reputation.

### ***3.6 Limitations of the study***

The main limitation I experienced was my short timeframe and limited resources available for field research. This influenced the sample sizes, sampling procedures and the possibility to improve the questionnaires during the research. I also had limited possibility to go back to the interviewees to verify or elaborate on uncertainties. A wider sample would have reduced the uncertainties related to my findings. I also should have aimed to access the KAP analysis undertaken in the campaign's pilot area, as this could have given me valuable and relevant information to compare my finding with.

Further, my personal background, subjective views and lack of local cultural understanding, have influenced the interpretation of information received through interviews, social interaction and observations. My appearance as a 46 year old white European woman may have misled them to believe that I rather was a representative of a NGO or other international institution, which again might have influenced their answers and behaviour towards me. My limited understanding of Kiswahili increased the possibility for misinterpretation. The role of the translator in the field was thus critical. During my research in the Kilwa district, I



communicated well with my translator, and I was very satisfied with the way he avoided to lead the respondents, giving them time to reflect, and ensured the privacy throughout the whole interview. In the Rufiji district I did not attain an equally good cooperation with the translator. He was appointed to me by the village leader. On several occasions I felt he was leading the respondent, influencing the sampling process or not taking enough care to keep intruders out of ear shot. Being a resident of the village and a possible friend of the village leader he may also have influenced or restrained some respondents. I therefore finished off the interviewing process in this village after only 6 interviews. Finally, I experienced the fact of being all by myself in an unfamiliar setting as quite challenging. There were many occasions where I wished for advice or a discussion partner, both with regard to practical arrangements as well as with academic dilemmas.

## **4 Data analysis and findings**

Results and findings of the study is presented and discussed in this chapter. To analyse the data collected from villagers in Kilwa and Rufiji districts I entered all answers given into an Excel spreadsheet. My questionnaire was unchanged throughout the interviews. Although most of the questions were open ended, I received many similar answers that could be categorized and clustered. By categorising the respondents, I looked for patterns of awareness, types of information received, accessibility, how they perceived corruption, and whether they trusted the VFC or not in relation to gender, age, tribe, education, and which village they lived in.

Information received from the key informants was not comparable to the same extent as they had influenced the issues raised during the interviews according to their interests and knowledge. Using my checklist for the interviews as a starting point, I gathered their answers according to these topics. These interviews took place both before and after I went out in the field. The information received in the start was useful to prepare for the field work, whereas much of the information received after was used to verify or explain my findings in the field.

### ***4.1 Perceptions of forest value.***

On the question; “is forest conservation important?” all respondents felt that this was very much so. When asked to elaborate on why (multiple reasons encouraged), the three most common answers given were water catchments, environment conservation and shelter for wild animals. Other reasons given were conservation for future generations, provide fresh air, avoid disasters, that the forest is good for climate, good for soil, and it helps communities to live in peace. Twelve of the 31 respondents also answered that the forest provides timber or building materials such as grass for roofing, poles, and timber for windows, doors and furniture. A few also mentioned that the forest provided firewood, medicine, mushrooms or fruits for household use. Most of the respondents appreciating the forest for such commodities came from Ruhatwe, and may be a result of the village being located distant from the main road. The forest being an important source for economic income was not mentioned at all.

These answers reflect a conservational attitude. It may, however, be the result of their perception of me, telling me what they believed I wanted to hear. The Mama Misitu Campaign or other NGOs may have sensitized the villagers about the need for forest conservation. Or the process of establishing PFM may have put their attention to the need for forest preservation. Tom Blomley and Said Iddi describe in their report *Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania 1993 – 2009* how communities will focus on conservation and protection rather than sustainable utilisation. They come to this conclusion by the following logic: CBFM has mostly been established in areas threatened by unsustainable harvesting or already degraded forests. The motivation for introducing community control has thus been more to conserve forest values than to capture economic benefits from sustainable harvesting. By-laws and management plans have been concerned about protection, conservation and restrictions of use. There is further a prevailing narrative of the need for forest conservation, nourished by media reports on illegal logging, climate change, declining water flows and so forth (Blomley and Iddi 2009:41).

Through my interviews with academics, forest professionals and natural resource consultants I got the same impression that communities seem to give priority to conservation over economic utilization of the forest. But this might not only be motivated by the wish to protect the forest. Other reasons for not harvesting may be lack of knowledge of regeneration rate, lack of operational harvesting plans, or lack of agreement on benefit sharing with the district authorities. There might also be traditional reasons for forest conservation, such as saving for dry season grazing, cultural or ceremonial uses (Blomley and Ramadhani 2007; Blomley and Iddi 2009).

Another issue focused on by the media has been the phenomena of land grabbing by large international companies. One example is the Dutch company Bio-shape that in 2007 acquired large areas in the Kilwa district for bio-fuel plantations very cheaply. This case was referred to by several forest professionals and natural resource consultants whom I interviewed. Overall there is now more awareness by communities of the value of forest, and some similar attempts of land acquisition by large companies have been avoided later (Kahyarara 2009). I attempted, during my stay in Kilwa Masoko, several times to contact the person in charge of the Bio-shape plantations, but I did not succeed.

The income potential of commercial harvesting is probably less recognized at the village level. I was informed about how some villagers were selling illegally harvested Mpingo logs very cheaply to a big commercial company. Despite being told of the real value of Mpingo, they could not comprehend such a huge figure. If forest adjacent communities had realized just how large the value of some forest produce was, they would probably also have been more positive to work for a sustainable extraction of these resources<sup>11</sup>.

#### **4.2 Information provided by Mama Misitu.**

Unlike many other projects which primarily aim to train village leaders, Mama Misitu address people at all levels<sup>12</sup>. Most villagers I interviewed had heard about the Mama Misitu campaign, although how they received the information varied. Whereas villagers in Nyamwage had heard about the campaign at village meetings and seminars, villagers in Ruhatwe mentioned the drama performance as the most common answer. None of the villagers in Mavuji mentioned to have seen the Mama Misitu merchandise such as khangas, caps and T-shirts. This probably reflects the campaign activities undertaken in each village. Their understanding of the campaign's mission was, however, more similar; that it should raise awareness about the importance of protecting and conserving the forest. The perception of forest value seemed to be environmental rather than economic; "protect the forest", "not cutting trees" and "protect the forest for future generation" were common answers. Further, their answers included wordings as "raise awareness", "educate" and "tell". Only two villagers used the word "mobilize". I do not know whether this is a result of translation or if they perceived the message to be a call for everybody to act responsibly with regard to forest conservation, rather than an encouragement to villagers to act on illegal activities committed by others. "Stop illegal harvesting – take action!" was nevertheless the message in the campaign's logo, which was printed on the village signboard as well as on leaflets, T-shirts, caps and khangas distributed during the campaign activities. I saw many villagers wearing these items, during my visit to the field. To what extent the Mama Misitu TV-spots and radio programs reached the attention of the villagers, and the poor in particular, is uncertain. I was told the TV spots had not been seen by the targeted population in Kilwa<sup>13</sup>. Of the villagers interviewed only one said she had seen the TV spot (Mavuji village) and only one had heard

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<sup>11</sup> Interview with consultant 10.12.2009

<sup>12</sup> Interview with campaign partner 17.11.2009

<sup>13</sup> Interview with consultant 13.11.2009

any of the radio programs (Ruhatwe village)<sup>14</sup>. The drama performance, interactive video show and village meeting would have been equally accessible and understandable for all attending villagers.

The Mama Misitu Information package does, however, aim to inform about a broader and more differentiated message. As described in the Rapid Interim Evaluation report, Mama Misitu has the potential to play a more important role raising awareness on law enforcement, best practices in forest management and harvesting, addressing bureaucratic delays in forest management processes as in CBFM and JFM, and on improving governance with regard to accountability of local district staff, councillors, village government and FBD officers.

Although not widely distributed at the time of the evaluation, the PIU has produced both a law compliance package and harvesting guidelines to be circulated at local level (Williams 2009: 10). Such information will enable villagers to both know and demand their rights with regard to both transparency of forest management decisions and accountability of those responsible for these. Raised awareness on these issues may also strengthen the position of the VFCs contra district authorities, logging companies and other possible stakeholders. It is recommended that through interactive communication at the local level, the campaign will be able to develop a clearer understanding of information needs, and adjust their efforts thereafter (Williams 2009.).

The evaluation report by the University of Dar es Salaam points to several omissions in the Mama Misitu message. First, as villagers are requested to stop illegal forest activities, they should be provided with information on alternative livelihoods such as substitutes for their forest produce or alternative income activities (Kahyarara 2009:26). This criticism was joined by several of the consultants and forest officers I interviewed. Poverty and lack of legal income activities force many villagers to breach the law more out of necessity than of their free will. Second, the destruction of mangrove is a serious problem in the Kilwa district, but this was not addressed by the campaign. Neither was the situation of those villages not having their own forest, but still depending for their livelihood on criminal forest activity. Focus was on the illegal activities undertaken **in** the forest, whereas no attention was given to the further handling of the illegal products. The villages on the shore of the Indian Ocean are important

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<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that the question did not specifically ask if they had seen or heard any of the TV spots or radio shows, they were rather encouraged to mentioned all the ways in which they had received any information about the Mama Misitu campaign.

outlets for logs and timber. Villagers assist illegal harvesters by providing cover or by assisting in loading for sea transport (Kahyarara 2009).


The omissions have to be weighted up against the feasibility of making the awareness raising campaign too complex. Is the message created in order to mobilize for social action or to assist villagers in finding alternative livelihoods? It may be easier to succeed in motivating people if the message is kept simple. In order to maximise the synergy of running the campaign simultaneously on national and local level, the message should be easily recognisable. This leaves limitations on local adaptability of the message. In Nyamwage village I was told the focus had been on alternative livelihoods such as vending or beekeeping. This was, however, provided by the local leading partner and was not part of the original campaign<sup>15</sup>

#### ***4.3 Information provided by PFM, village meetings and notice boards.***

I will first look at what information PFM makes available for community members, and how it is presented. According to the Forest Act 2002 # 7 “the Director and all officers appointed under this Act **may**, where it is appropriate to do so, provide and disseminate information and guidance, in writing by order or notice to members of the public in connection with the implementation of this Act” (URT 2002) (bold added by me). Further, under part III Forest Management Plans #12, #13 and #14, regard shall be taken of the views of local communities in the vicinity of the forest, and a detailed draft shall be made available for the public at the office of all village councils in the vicinity of the forest reserve. The forest management plan draft shall then be explained at one or more village assembly meetings, and any comments shall be taken into account. The village land forest management plan shall seek to have broad and general support from local authorities, users of the forest and other stakeholders. The village council shall, after appropriate publicity to the matter, hold one or more village assembly meetings to hear and consider any comments by community members. The village assembly shall approve the plan (URT 2002). In CBFM communities, the forest management plan shall thus be available at the office of the village council. It is read out loud at the village assembly which also is giving its approval. For JFM which is an agreement between parties, the village assembly will not have the same authority.

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<sup>15</sup> Interview with campaign partner 30.11.2009



Source: Community Based Forest Management Guidelines (URT 2007)

The forest management plan does, however, not include enough detailed information for the villagers to easily hold the VFC accountable. In some communities there has in addition been developed a harvesting plan. On the Mpingo Conservation Project's web-site<sup>16</sup> guidelines for such harvesting plans can be found. These include details for how to achieve accountability and transparency. Section 5 in the harvesting plan describes how announcement of upcoming harvesting should be posted on the village notice board at least 2 days before harvesting takes place. The announcement shall include details of who (name of company and their representatives) made the request, when the request was received and date of approval as well as the dates when the harvest is expected to take place. Further, the area where harvesting is to take place, the species type and quantity timber to be cut, estimated in number of logs and approximate number of truck loads must be included. The announcement shall also inform about expected income and the actual price paid for the timber (The Mpingo Conservation Project). This is, however, only an example of how a harvesting plan may be formulated, and not imposed by law. Written information through notice boards will further only be accessible to literate individuals.

The Community Based Forest Management Guidelines (2007) include instructions for record keeping of income and expenditure, permits, receipts, patrolling, offences and fines, and minutes. Quarterly reports shall be submitted to the DFO. The District Forest officer shall

<sup>16</sup> [http://www.mpingoconservation.org/gc\\_cd\\_rules\\_n\\_procs.html](http://www.mpingoconservation.org/gc_cd_rules_n_procs.html)

further maintain records of District Harvesting Committee meeting, approval letters from village councils, copies of harvest licences and transit permits, business licences, tax identification numbers and receipts. At the road check points detailed information about passing vehicles shall be maintained in ledger books (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). The guidelines are emphasizing the central role of the Village Assembly and accentuate the duty of the VFC to raise awareness and inform community members about forest governance procedures and by-laws. The CBFM guidelines are however governmental “notes of guidance” which are regarded as advisory rather than legal command (URT 2007). The evaluation report commissioned by FBD on PFM in Tanzania 2009 found that community members in general had low knowledge of forest management plans and by-laws (Blomley & Iddi 2009:42).

The FBD evaluation report on PFM 2003 revealed that there was a link between villagers’ awareness and the demand for PFM. In villages with no exposure to PFM there was poor awareness, and therefore little demand for PFM interventions. PFM was always initiated after external stimulus and support. Some communities were attracted by the possibilities of controlling the income from their own forest, whereas other villages demanded PFM in order to protect their forest from exploitation by outsiders (URT 2003). According to Wily (2004) the poor majority of the village may also use the implementation of PFM to hinder excessive extraction of forest resources by powerful actors within their own community. Awareness raising and education of villagers are thus essential in order to achieve levels of participation and commitment within communities. This is further emphasized in the objectives of the Forest Act 2002 part II # 3(b); “to encourage and facilitate the active participation of the citizen in the sustainable planning, management, use and conservation of forest resources through the development of individual and community rights, whether derived from customary law or under this Act, to use and manage forest resources”, and # 3 (h); “to facilitate greater public awareness of the cultural, economic and social benefits for conserving and increasing sustainable forest cover by developing programmes in training, research and public education” (URT 2002).



#### **4.4 What is the local perception of corruption**

Asking about corruption was not as sensitive as I had feared. With the exception of District Forest Officer, road check-point staff, village leaders, most of the VFC members and a few villagers, everyone I spoke to openly admitted that corruption was a serious problem within the forest sector. Most of the people interviewed believed also that nepotism and favourism were negative aspects. Many examples were given, for the most part involving (business) people from outside the village bribing the village leader or forest patrollers in order to harvest. Fellow villagers were also accused of illegal forest activities; “they say they will conserve, but then they go and harvest themselves without telling the others”<sup>17</sup>. Only a few examples involved nepotism. Nepotism is widespread and by many rural Tanzanians seen as ‘natural’ (Milledge et al 2007). With regard to accountability this is not necessarily a disadvantage as there may be more reluctance toward cheating or lying to a senior family relation<sup>18</sup>.

One villager I interviewed had earlier been working with the logging of Mpingo (East African Blackwood). He claimed corruption was a big problem, and still is. He gave many examples of how villagers were paid a fraction of the real value for timber, how logs were hidden away from inspection and how the owner of a company would collude with local authorities<sup>19</sup>. Similar offences were described by consultants I interviewed and were also exposed in the TRAFFIC report.

Among the villagers, all except one respondent claimed that corruption was immoral. The women were more pessimistic to the prospect of curbing corruption than the men, whereas young people (aged up to 29) were the most optimistic. With regard to my question “Do you believe villagers may have an impact when it comes to curbing corruption?” two thirds of the villagers interviewed believed so. Only half the women answered positively, whereas almost all the men, 13 out of 15, believed villagers could help curbing corruption. All the younger interviewees and most of those over 50 years old were also positive. Of those between 30 and 50 half of the answers were positive. And all 6 interviewees from Nyamwage believed villagers could have an impact. When I asked them to elaborate on possible ways villagers

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<sup>17</sup> Interview with villager 25.11.2009

<sup>18</sup> Interview with consultant 03.12.2009

<sup>19</sup> Interview with villager 25.11.2009

could assist in curbing corruption, the most common answer was through law enforcement by reporting illegal activities to the village leader or to the police. Many villagers also believed education or access to information was a key factor, and some called for cooperation and collective action among villagers. “If we deny paying small bribes and everyone follows the rules, there will be no more corruption”<sup>20</sup>. To the question on whether the Mama Misitu campaign could change the attitude of forest officers, there was more scepticism. Less than half of the respondents believed this campaign would have a positive impact on corruption. The evaluation team from the University of Dar es Salaam found no signs of reduction in corruption after the Mama Misitu campaign (Kahyarara 2009).

Almost all my respondents had also been thinking that corruption was obstructing development. Examples given were: “Those who have money can get their right – those with no money have no right”, “if the leader is corrupt, he will take all the benefits himself, without telling or sharing with the community, so the community gets no development”, “Even in our village there is no development because the leaders are corrupt”<sup>21</sup>. The respondents perceived corruption to be a local problem, ranking local government official, staff at the road check points, forest inspectors, village leaders and local business people to be the most corrupt. The focus on local conditions might be because this is what they see and are affected by in their daily life. In Nyamwage village my respondents were less willing to rank corrupt behaviour of the various actors, none of them accusing the village leader or forest inspectors, and only one of them saying the local government was corrupt. They rather blamed business people and officers issuing licence to harvest. This reluctance to accuse fellow villagers may be a consequence of the role of my translator. In the other two villages local actors were most commonly blamed. A few examples of actual corruption were given, involving small bribes. At the same time, all except one villager interviewed, claimed that paying a small fee in order to facilitate a request was a good thing. This seeming inconsistency may indicate that the perception of corruption is not related to the size of the bribe but rather to other factors influencing their feeling of what is perceived as corrupt behaviour.

The TRAFFIC report describes some social and cultural factors that influence stakeholders’ perception of corruption. Some of these are rooted in Tanzanian culture, some specifically to

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<sup>20</sup> Interviews with villager 24..11.2009

<sup>21</sup> Interview with villagers 24.and 25.11.2009

the southern parts of the country. Historically and in accordance with customary law, rural communities have had *open access*<sup>22</sup> to forest produce. Ignorance of current forest legislation and procedures for legal harvesting may still be widespread in rural areas. Socially, respect for seniority in age, rank or status is deeply embedded in the Tanzanian society, making it very difficult for individuals of a lower position to question a superior's abuse of rules or procedures. Both patronage and nepotism, are widely accepted, and by many looked upon as natural, particularly in rural areas. In addition, the distinction between small scale bribery and other maybe customary actions like giving a tip is often blurred (Milledge et al 2007:127-129).

#### **4.5 Trust in the Village Forest Committee**

On my question; "Do you trust the local forest committee to manage the forest to the best interest of your community?" only five respondents living in Ruhatwe and Mavuji village, three of whom were above 60 years old, said they did not trust the local VFC. They reasoned this with allegations such as "they are logging illegally themselves" or "they serve more their own interest"<sup>23</sup>. Close to 75% of the respondents answered, however, that they did trust the VFC. This contrasts studies described by Heini Vihemäki (2005) in the Eastern Usambara Mountains in Tanzania, where it was discovered problems regarding representation of various social groups in the VFC, and a distrust among other villagers towards the VFC leaders who were accused of taking part in illegal forest activities (Vihemäki 2005). The positive response to trust in my study may however reflect a relative trust, that they trust the VFC more than they would trust the Village Council or the DFO to manage the forest. To 'manage' is also a wide concept, and does not specify whether they emphasize forest conservation, to keep offenders from collecting forest produce or to ensure that licence procedures and forest income are handled in the appropriate way.

To what extent the implementation of PFM will improve forest management, largely depend on the capacity and interest of the VFC members. According to the CBFM guidelines (2007)

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<sup>22</sup> Throughout this thesis the term 'open access' is not referring to its widest definition of providing unlimited access to absolutely everybody, but rather as how forest management has been perceived to be. "Regardless of *de jure* property regime, all forests can be *de facto* open access regimes if there are no effective institutions and mechanisms to enforce the rules" (Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe 2000:96 in Mwangi et al 2008).

<sup>23</sup> Interviews with villagers 24. - 25.11.2009.

a successful VFC should consist of villagers from various parts of the community and particularly of those living near the forest, that are knowledgeable about forest resources, that are honest and can be trusted to manage money, and that are literate and active and ready to work for the community (URT 2007). VFCs are however prone to both external pressure and internal mismanagement. Elite capture and hijacking of the PFM agenda may be the result if influential individuals are taking control by abusing their social structural power and privileged access to strategic information. Community awareness and transparency will be important mechanisms in order to hold the VFCs accountable (URT 2003). Lund (2007) investigated VFC accounts in 14 villages in the Iringa district which had established CBFM. The majority of these VFCs had encountered problems with embezzlement soon after establishment. But the majority of these cases ended in dismissal of the dishonest VFC member (Lund 2007). The report of the Mama Misitu implementing partner WWF in Rufiji refers from events how villagers would blame village leaders and VFC members of being involved in corruption. In one village the whole village leadership was sacked after one of the Mama Misitu events (Kahyarara 2009). This indicates that local accountability may work in some cases.

In accordance with the Forest Act 2002 part V #33 (1b) the VFCs shall be gender balanced. I was informed that this also was reflected in practice. In the villages I visited in Kilwa and Rufiji districts, both sexes were well represented in the VFCs. In the Nyamwage village the VFC consisted of 9 members of each sex, the women doing especially good, quickly responding to meetings, fully participating in forest patrols, transect walks and so forth. In the focus group discussion I had with VFC members, 4 women and 3 men were present. The women were, however, less participative. Two of them did not say anything at all during the discussion. I do not have information on whether this reflects their normal behaviour, and if so, how it influences the power relations and decision making process within the committee.

On the question “To whom should the forest sector be accountable?”, 19 of the 31 respondents said the forest sector should be accountable to the local community or the villagers. In Nyamwage all except one of the respondents answered the local government. No more than five respondents said the forest sector should be accountable to the VFC, and only one respondent, in Nyamwage, pointed to the DFO<sup>24</sup>. This indicates that the villagers have a

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<sup>24</sup> Interview with villagers 24-, 25- and 29.11.2009.

strong sense of local ownership over the forest, which is a pre-condition both for encouraging participation and the wish for holding the VFC accountable. The fact that the DFO, road check point officer and VFC members denied any knowledge about corruption indicates however a reluctance on their part towards being held accountable downwards by the community.

According to sections 8 and 41 of the Forest Act (2002) District authorities have the right to revoke the VFC's mandate over the VLFR if the villages fail to follow their forest management plans within a given time period (URT 2007). Local decision powers are thus restricted within pre-determined directions established through management planning requirements (Ribot et al. 2006:1879). This limits the VFC's authority and calls for upwards accountability towards the District government. It will however also act as insurance for the local community that VFCs will adhere to the forest management plan approved by the Village Assembly.

#### ***4.6 Communication and relationship between stakeholders***

Consultants and forest officials interviewed were asked about the communication and relationship between stakeholders with regard to the progress of the Mama Mitsu Campaign. The question generated very different answers. Whereas most Tanzanians seemed satisfied with communication between the various stakeholders, some of the expatriate consultants were rather harsh in their critique. Some of these observations were related to the campaign, whereas some were more general. Misconceptions and rumours were mentioned as typical problems between donors and Tanzanians<sup>25</sup>.

The chain of command within the forest sector in Tanzania may seem unclear. The DFO is responsible to the District Council and the District Executive Director and has no direct lines upwards to the FBD. This may influence resource allocation and the priorities of the DFO in a way that is not favouring forest issues. Road check points are under various jurisdictions, some are set up by the District Council/DFO, some by the FBD and some are responsible to the Tanzania Revenue Authority (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b). Traders in forest produce disapprove of the numerous check points they have to pass, with diverting

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<sup>25</sup> Interview with consultants 16.11.2009, 07.12.2009 and 08.12.2009

levels of understanding by check point officers on forest issues (Kahyarara 2009). In Tanzania there is no tradition for inter-sectoral cooperation and communications between the Ministries are very limited. The formal channel of communication between foresters employed by different authorities may involve many intercedes (URT 2003). A good flow of information between various stakeholders depend thus more on personal contacts and goodwill. In many locations the relationship between forest officers and the police are ominous, and there is also very limited cooperation between armed forces and foresters (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum 2009b).

Several of the consultants I interviewed argued for improving the communication to and involvement of actors from the private sector. Suppliers of technical goods and services to support PFM, traders and timber industry actors, all rely on a sustainable forest management<sup>26</sup>. These actors may also have experience from other areas that may serve as valuable input of information<sup>27</sup>.

Traditionally the government has been responsible for forest management in Tanzania. Many foresters have behaved in a para-military way, making villagers fearful of encountering them in the forest. Foresters have also assisted in law enforcement and tax collection (URT 2003). Brockington (2006) describes how extraction of taxes by district councils and local governments were associated with institutional violence. This is a typical example of coercive power as described by Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2010). During the Mama Misitu village meetings allegations of corruption and involvement in illegal forest activities were put forward against district foresters, village leaders as well as VFC members (WWF 2009). Lack of transparency on expenditure at local level and good evidence of criminal activity by district officials have led villagers' to perceive public institutions and officials as failed and corrupt (Brockington 2006). Such perceptions are difficult to change, and the lack of trust complicates cooperation. If PFM shall succeed, district officials and foresters must adapt new styles of leadership and relations with communities (URT 2003).


The implementation of PFM transfers the right to forest revenue from the district to the village level. For many district councils this implies a dramatic drop in income. The Rufiji district, for example, used to get approximately 60% of its locally generated income from

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<sup>26</sup> Interview with consultants 30.11.2009 and 08.12.2009

<sup>27</sup> Interview with consultant 08.12.2009

forest resources. This conflicting economic interest may be the main reason why District Councils often are found to delay the approval of PFM processes by passive resistance such as foot dragging or obstruction (URT 2003). In the meanwhile, many villages experience that their forests are depleted for valuable timber (Williams 2009).



Source: Community Based Forest Management Guidelines (URT 2007)

In a study by Vyamana et al (2008) district staff was found to use changes in harvesting policies at national level to impose fictive costs and red tape on community governments, but whether this was done in ignorance or malevolence was unclear (Blomley & Iddi 2009).

With the implementation of PFM more villagers get involved in consultations, discussions and negotiations. This may influence the relationship between forest stakeholders, as they will start to know, understand and maybe even trust each other, and thus ease the flow communication (Chambers 1997 in Buchy and Hoverman 2000:18).

With regard to the Mama Misitu campaign, the PIU managed to obtain a very good, but not formalized, relationship and communication with the higher ranking officers within FBD,

FSU and senior leaders in each pilot district (Williams 2009). This was confirmed by the interviews I had with forest officials and campaign partners. But the campaign received some criticism for its' communication at local level. The distribution of merchandise was seen as an expensive and unsustainable way of raising awareness<sup>28</sup>, and questions emerged whether this distribution had appeared more like a show<sup>29</sup>. As some villagers had missed out on the event, and others had not obtained their favoured merchandise, there was some resentment around this allotment<sup>30</sup>. The merchandise was nevertheless very popular, and reinforced the Mama Mimitu message at the village level. Further, the massive response by community members in the aftermath of the TV spots, had not been previewed by the PIU, nor prepared for. If you encourage action, a system of handling information received should have been in place. The web-site could have provided another valuable source of communication. Few villagers would have access to this information, but at district and national level, CBOs and NGOs could have found such web site useful. Further, there was some criticism of the campaign's failed use of the printed press. A few of the more passive campaign partners behind Mama Mimitu, are themselves operating within the media industry, and could have provided valuable support to the PIU with regard to getting media coverage. Different perceptions about how to best reach the target audience and how the media works may be the reason, more than lack of will, behind this absence of cooperation<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>28</sup> Interview with consultant 08.12.2009

<sup>29</sup> Interview with consultant 10.12.2009

<sup>30</sup> Interview with consultant 08.12.2009

<sup>31</sup> Interview with partner 07.12.2009



## **5 Does increased awareness lead to improved forest governance?**

This chapter discusses the findings presented in chapter 4, focusing on the possible links between access to information, participation, accountability and legal enforcement in relation to awareness raising efforts and the implementation of PFM.

### **5.1 PFM and forest governance**

Rural poor, and especially the women within this group, depend disproportionately upon forest resources both for subsistence, for incomes and for safety net. To find out whether this group has benefited through the implementation of PFM it is relevant to investigate whether PFM has changed their access to the forest and forest produce, and whether they participate in the community's forest management and decision making.

#### **5.1.1 Access to forest resources**

With the implementation of PFM, forest management plans and by-laws will put new regulations on the use of the VFLR. Banning the collection of certain forest products or introducing harvesting fees that must be paid upfront are examples of regulations that will hit the poor particularly hard. In areas where villagers formerly have been accustomed to an 'open access' policy, this may cause severe limitations to villagers' access to the forest (Schreckenberg & Luttrell 2009). All villagers I interviewed admitted that their household collected various products from the forest. In Ruhatwe village I was explained that the forest was divided in two, one VFLR and one 'open access'. Several of the interviewees in this village emphasized that they only collected forest produce from the 'open access' part. 'Open access' forests will however typically be degraded or located in a longer distance from the village, and thus impose an extra burden on the villagers who cannot afford to pay for access to the VFLR. In areas where JFM is introduced, villagers may already be accustomed to severe restrictions on access and harvesting, but as forest patrolling will become more effective at local level, illegal activities will become harder to get away with (Schreckenberg & Luttrell 2009).

This can be illustrated by an example from India where Mariette Correa (1995) found that the introduction of participatory forest management actually made daily life harder for the village's women. The male dominated VFC decided to sell off all firewood from the local forest plantation rather than using it for local consumption. In order to sustain their family's needs for firewood the women were thus left with no option but to disobey the VFC's ruling. Earlier, when the forest was under central government control, women collecting firewood would at least have the backing of the men in their family. But as the regulating power was delegated to the village level, these women were now regarded as law offenders liable for fine, and did instead risk to be beaten by their husbands (Hildyard et al 2001:66). Of the forest officials and CSO representatives I interviewed in Tanzania, there seemed to be a quiet acceptance for the severely poor being involved in small scale illegal activities such as collection of firewood and charcoal production<sup>32</sup>. In a study from Iringa, Jens Friis Lund found that the 'de facto' system of legal enforcement sometimes also would consider whether the offender was poor (Lund n.d:6). Despite this sympathy for the poor, this group is nevertheless a source of conflict as they frequently break the rules<sup>33</sup>.

### **5.1.2 Participation**

Participatory forest management seeks to empower local communities. But local organisations are often weak and prone to elite capture. As found by Kajembe and Monela (2002) at a community based scheme in Tanzania, elites may exercise their social structural power to 'hijack' the process when establishing new institutions and seize control over the political space created by decentralization (Campbell et al 2007) In addition elite actors often have privileged access to strategic information, economic resources or influence over political powers in the community (ref chapter 2.1.2). The procedure for nomination and election of VFC members is therefore of special interest.

I was informed that the Village Government encouraged villagers to apply for nomination of the VFC either by announcement at the Village Assembly or adverts on the village notice board. There might be restrictions on the number of nominations from each hamlet, and women are encouraged to apply at the ratio of 50%. A democratic and open voting will then

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<sup>32</sup> Interview with forest officials 18.11.2009, 23.11.2009, and 30.11.2009

<sup>33</sup> Interview with forest consultant 18.11.2009

take place at the next Village Assembly<sup>34</sup>. It is thus no formal restrictions or procedures that exclude the poor from participating in the VFC, but if the announcement is posted on the village's notice board, illiterate villagers will be less likely to comprehend the message. Poor people are also less likely to possess the desired criteria for VFC members (ref chapter 4.6), and if their strongest concern is to find food for the next 24 hours, they will be less likely to spare time for participating at meetings and forest management activities. As VLFR often are established on degraded land, potential benefits will primarily materialize sometime into the future. This reduces the incentives for poor individuals to invest time and effort in forest management participation.

Nevertheless, a study from Ambangulu forest north-east in Tanzania suggests that the poor are putting as much time and effort into attending meetings and assemblies as the better off (Meshack et al 2006). The study does, however, not evaluate to what extent the various well-being groups influence the decisions made. Findings by Schreckenberg and Luttrell (2009:233) show that “even when the poor people do attend meetings they are less likely to voice their concerns”. In the latter study, the VFCs in the CBFM villages were dominated by the poor, whereas in the JFM they were disproportionably dominated by the rich. The very poor were underrepresented in all but one committee (Schreckenberg and Luttrell 2009). The very poor are thus less likely to benefit from PFM implementation, as they have less influence over the rules governing access to forest resources, and more to loose if this access is reduced (Lund n.d.). The community member's benefits from participation largely depend on their power to influence agenda and decisions.

Agarwal (2001) has looked into gender differences in relation to participation. She found that although the rules may allow women to participate in community forest groups, lack of knowledge of rules, social norms, logistical difficulties such as timing of the meetings and personal aspects such as educational level, property or marital status may still limit women's involvement. Where women do participate, especially in the Executive Committee of the Community Forest User Groups, considerable improvement in the forest quality was found (Agarwal 2001). Other findings from a project in Iringa, Tanzania, indicates that even where significant effort was made to address, involve, train and support women in PFM issues, the women were less likely to understand PFM than men (Korongo 2003 in URT 2003). Also in

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<sup>34</sup> Interview with forest consultant 30.11.2009

the studies from Eastern Usambara Mountains in Tanzania by Vihemäki it was found that women and poor villagers normally were the least informed about forest management issues (Vihemäki 2005).

Cleaver and Kaare (1998) tell the story of how project officers in a water and sanitation programme in Tanzania were concerned about the lesser participation of women as there was a notable disparity between the number of men and women speaking at village meetings. But for the women this was a deliberate choice of meeting strategy, as they would appoint one or two women known for their expressiveness to speak up for the whole group. They illustrated the effectiveness of this strategy by giving an example from a meeting where the surplus of a fund had been the subject of discussion. Whereas most men favoured buying beer and making a celebration, the women successfully insisted upon using the money on another water source (Cleaver and Kaare in Cooke and Kothari 2001:43). This example demonstrates how discursive power can influence decisions, even though the group in question seemed less participative.

Another study undertaken in Kenya, Uganda, Mexico and Bolivia by Mwangi et al (2008) focuses on how women's participation in forest user groups affects forest resource enhancing behaviour. Their findings showed that groups with a higher proportion of women and even more so if the groups were dominated by women, performed less well. A suggested explanation for this is the gender biased access to technology, women's labour constraints and a possible limitation to women's sanctioning power (Mwangi et al 2008). Similar constraints may be experienced when involving the poor and other marginalised groups, limiting their influential power even if they are participating. To what extent the marginalised groups may benefit from participation can, however, not be measured by changes in the forest condition, but rather to what extent participation in forest resource management can secure their interests, acquire benefits and thus contribute to poverty reduction.

## ***5.2 Awareness and accountability.***

In order to hold forest managers accountable, there is a need of awareness on several levels. First, villagers must be aware of, and understand, their rights both as part of the village assembly and as individuals. This includes knowledge of existing by-laws and management

plans with regard to the VLFR. Further, VFC members and forest officers must be aware of, and respect, their duty to keep the villagers informed, and adjust reporting formats so that the information provided can be readily understood. Finally, there must be community members that are capable and willing to act if mal practice is uncovered. This requires available sanctioning possibilities. (Björkman and Svensson 2007:6).

In Nepal ‘Strengthened Actions for Governance in Utilization of Natural Resources’ (SAGUN) programmes have successfully been facilitated by CARE, WWF and RIMS Nepal. Through public hearings and public auditing (PHPA) the executive forest committee members have to answer for decisions and financial management. In open meetings where forest user groups, DFOs, CSOs, NGOs, donors and local journalists are invited, minutes of Forest Committee meeting and financial accounts are read out loud, enabling the audience to comment and ask question regarding these. PHPAs differ from the ‘jan sunwais’ (see section 2.4) method by being organised in cooperation with the local government, and the meeting is led by a facilitator aiming to keep an open dialogue, impartial and constructive ambiance. The executive forest committee members are prior to the meeting receiving advice and given time to prepare answers for various questions. PHPAs have become increasingly popular among forest user groups and have lead to improved transparency and accountability of forest committees, enhanced communication between committee members and forest users, as well as reorganization of some weaker forest committees by including more women and poor. Executive committee members and representatives of the elite have been sceptical to such public exposure, especially where there have been misuse of funds. In contrast to the ‘jan sunwais’ method, district officials have been very supportive to the practice of PHPA, favouring the incorporation of PHPA in the constitutions of forest committees (Maharjan & Shrestha 2006). Likewise, Lund (2007) describes how VFCs in the Iringa region at quarterly village meetings through recitation of both forest income and expenditures enabled villagers to hold the VFC accountable. In cases of embezzlement, most of these ended in dismissal of the involved VFC members. This contrasts with Blomley and Iddi (2009:42) who found that VFC’s in Tanzania rarely provided feedback, nor solicited the wider community. This latter attitude reduces the possibilities for community members to hold VFC members accountable.

In order for villagers to uncover discrepancies, detailed documentation is needed, such as salary or employment papers, copy of invoices, delivery agreements and correspondence.

Much of such documentation is, however, regarded as confidential for reasons such as consideration of personal discretion or competition. Individuals, of whom private information is exposed to the public, might experience negative consequences of such. Firms and companies might find their negotiation power decreased if competitors get hold of too detailed information. A reasonable way of checking information could be to ask in privacy for individuals to confirm or invalidate information. This is, however, a much more time consuming and resource intensive method and you would lose out the effect of group mobilization obtained by revealing fraud in public.

Often remote rural communities with great forest resources, also have low adult literacy rate (Blomley and Iddi 2009:40). Where there is a lack of trust towards forest managers, outside organisations, such as CSOs, are welcomed for ensuring checks and balances<sup>35</sup>. Poor facilitation when establishing PFM processes can further result in the capturing of benefits by individual villagers to the detriment of others (Blomley et al. 2008). Studies reveal that compensation and allowances to village leaders and VFC members may outweigh funds spent on public goods and village development (Lund 2007; Blomley and Iddi 2009). Ironically this may benefit the condition of the forest as VFC members in such setting will be more devoted to their role and may be less open for informal payments. This will be especially so where external actors, such as professional charcoal producers, are a threat (Lund 2007:8-10). Where diminutive allowances are paid, the incentives for participation in the VFC will rely more on access to informal payments.

Late in 2009 the first commercial harvest in the CBFM history in Tanzania was completed in Kikole village, Kilwa district. A notice was put up, but the message was not clear and some of the information was incorrect. Mpingo Conservation Project is working with the community members to ensure improved information procedures in the future. They are also in the process of establishing transparency routines similar to those in Iringa described by Lund (Mpingo Conservation Project). As more communities boost their income by commercial harvesting, new challenges on accountability will emerge.

Finally, a new project or intervention must itself be accountable to the beneficiaries. Too many interventions have failed or ended prior to achieving its objectives, leaving the supposed beneficiaries in frustration and resignation with the incomplete outcome. Too many

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<sup>35</sup> Interview with consultant 08.12.2009.

curtailed development projects have left villagers with the feeling that the real beneficiaries were the implementers themselves (Williams 2009). I was quite startled as one of my interviewees living close to a Mama Misitu signboard knew nothing about the campaign, nor seemed interested or curious if the campaign in some way could affect her. Given the lack of development and poverty alleviation achieved up to date it may have been a natural reaction to just another 'elite capturing' project. Such experiences will make it harder to motivate villagers for participation in new projects.

### ***5.3 The Mama Misitu Campaign and legal enforcement***

According to the WWF Partner report for the Mama Misitu campaign, increased awareness on forest governance has led to improved legal enforcement in the pilot areas. Encountering forest activity or transportation of forest produce, communities will now demand to see proper documentation proving its legitimacy (WWF 2009). In any of the targeted villages it is now impossible to harvest unnoticed (Kahyarara 2009:21). Several incidents of confiscation of illegal logs after events of the campaign have been reported. Near one sawmill in Rufiji, more than 700 logs were reported by informers and immediately after confiscated (WWF:3). Villagers were also encouraged at events to contact the Mama Misitu PIU with information on suspicious forest activity. The community members who called in would be compensated for the cost of the telephone call, and the PIU would pass on the information to senior FBD staff, who set off local action against the offenders. Numerous arrests were made this way (Kahyarara 2009:17).

Also on national level the Mama Misitu campaign led to legal action against forest crime. After each of the TV spots some 50 calls were received informing about illegal forest activity. This information too was conveyed through FBD for action locally (Williams 2009:11).

Prior to the Mama Misitu campaign, similar information was given the zonal FSU directly. Earlier the FSU used to pay the informants a reward for tip-offs, but due to resource constraints this practice has almost ceased (FSU-IFM 2009). There were complaints about severe delays or lack of intervention by these units, and it was implied that district staff occasionally would tip off illegal actors enabling them to move on to avoid arrest (Williams 2009). The use of Mama Misitu as intermediate apparently made FSU prioritize the villagers'

calls for assistance. However, apart from a good working relationship between the PIU and FBD, the Mama Misitu campaign did not contribute with any funds or assets to strengthen law enforcement, and was thus relying on the same resource constrained forest officers to take action. It is therefore likely that in the long run, or if the campaign is scaled up, that also the information calls through Mama Misitu will experience lack of intervention due to limited capacity. If community members repeatedly experience that their calls for assistance do not lead to any action, they will be discouraged from reporting suspicious forest activity in the future.


#### **5.4 PFM and legal enforcement.**

The VFC members in the villages I visited seemed to associate forest management with forest patrolling. In Ruhatwe, which had implemented CBFM, these patrols were conducted twice a week. The VFC members participating in my focus group discussion were confident about the efficiency of such patrols. “There is no more illegal logging because of patrol” was mentioned several times during the group discussion. The Mavuji village had not yet implemented PFM, and they patrolled the forest only at the end of each month. With inside information of this practice, it should be uncomplicated for illegal loggers to avoid being caught. Members of the VFC in Mavuji also confirmed that they did not catch the illegal loggers, but they had on a number of occasions confiscated timber and charcoal out in the forest. As some of the examples given in chapter 5.1 indicate, PFM will make forest patrolling more effective. Local knowledge and frequent patrols will have a positive effect on both prevention and detection of illegal activities. But where VLFRs are located near urban centres, the market pressure for forest produce and outside actors logging illegally, may be beyond the capability for villagers to control (Blomley and Iddi 2009).

The households of all my respondents collected multiple products from the forest; firewood and charcoal being the most common. Traditionally the women are responsible for this collection, and are thus a group which is familiar with forest conditions. To include these women in patrolling may therefore be wise in order to detect irregularity. Female guards may also be better to persuade female offenders against breaking the rules (Agarwal 2001). This must however be weighted against the security risk for female guards and their authority when it comes to sanctioning male offenders who may resist arrest. It is important that the



villagers engaged in patrolling have knowledge of bylaws and harvesting procedures. With the implementation of PFM there will be more focus and awareness on forest related issues. Rumours about illegal activity may be picked up and easily controlled. Of my respondents, close to half were aware of ongoing logging activity, but there was no difference of such knowledge between the sexes<sup>36</sup>.



Source: Community Based Forest Management Guidelines (URT 2007)

The legal mandate of VFC members patrolling may include the right to arrest and fine offenders (Blomley and Ramadhani, 2004). If the offender pays the fine, which can be up to 5 times the amount that should have been paid in royalties, he/she will keep the produce. Otherwise the produce shall be confiscated<sup>37</sup>. One of the villagers I interviewed said she had been caught by a VFC member when making charcoal and had paid TZS 2000 in order to keep the produce<sup>38</sup>. Whether this incident was in accordance with correct fining procedure or a bribe as the interviewee thought it to be, I don't know. According to the CBFM guidelines no villager shall pay a fine without receiving a receipt. The forest patroller shall keep a record

<sup>36</sup> Interview with villagers 24., 25. and 29.11.2009

<sup>37</sup> Interview with forest official

<sup>38</sup> Interview with villager 25.11.2009

of fines and illegal forest activities. In order for the Village Assembly to influence forest management and hold the VFC accountable, transparency of the VFC's records and activities will be a pre-condition. The Village Assembly may then take decisions on dismissal of dishonest VFC members or impose changes in the mandate of the VFC (URT 2007). In addition to exercising power through the Village Assembly, villagers may impose social sanctions on dishonest VFC members and local forest offenders. Pressure from family or social relations and fear of loss of reputation may also have a preventive effect.

In villages where CBFM is implemented the Village Assembly shall approve the Forest Management Plan and Bylaws regarding the management of the village forest. These documents will be enacted by the further authorization of the District Council. The Village Assembly is thus taking part in the design of law enforcement procedures, such as appropriate punishment of forest offenders or the practice for resolving conflicts (URT 2007). Due to lack of legal knowledge among villagers some bylaws are however found to be violating principle law, and can thus not be used in court (Blomley and Iddi 2009). Further, resistance from district authorities to enact by-laws have proven to be another constraint in pursuing legal enforcement at local level (URT 2003). In communities where low awareness and legal literacy bring such institutional failures, the improvement in detection will not lead to increased suppression of forest crime. Communities that are aware of laws and regulations with regard to CBFM, are, however, proven to be both ready and able to defend their rights (URT 2003.).

### ***5.5 Anti-corruption strategies eligible for the poor to engage in***

“Tanzania, like most African countries, is faced with corruption in its public and private sectors that has assumed endemic proportions. The government views this scourge as public enemy number one”.

(The National anti-corruption strategy and action plan for Tanzania 1999:4)

The National anti-corruption strategy and action plan for Tanzania came in 1999, while President Mkapa was in power. Fighting corruption was one of his main policy issues (Policy Forum 2009). The 1999 strategy plan lists prevention, enforcement, public awareness and institution building, as main objectives to be addressed in the fight against corruption. Since then, according to the World Bank Institute's Worldwide Governance Indicators and

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, there has been an improvement in corruption control. Although Tanzania's anti-corruption law is perceived as strong, the Global Integrity Report 2006 judges Tanzania still as very weak on factors such as public access to information, accountability and law enforcement (Policy Forum 2009).

Corruption in developing countries is a systemic problem, and in order to achieve improvement, focus should be on developing the systems rather than chasing individuals (Langseth et al 1997 in Leeuw et al 1999). In its' anti-corruption approach the World Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI) aims to assist the development of institution building, the prevention of corrupt practices, the prosecution of corrupt officials and awareness raising within the civil society in cooperation with governments and civil society (Leeuw et al. 1999). The role of the civil society is crucial, and transparency, accountability and legal enforcement are generally seen as key factors in anti-corruption policies.

In his paper "Engaging the poor to challenge corrupt governance" (2008) Benjamin Lough has divided possible anti-corruption strategies into 4 categories, namely Universal legal reform, Public-sector reform, Democratic participation and Social action. The first two approaches are top-down interventions, while the two latter require grass-root mobilization and are thus the pertinent methods for poor people to get involved in (Lough 2008:533).

Democratic participation is a soft strategy for community change (Lough 2008). As VFC members are elected by village assembly, they can be held accountable by their electorates. For democracy to work it is a precondition that the voters get access to reliable information. Moreover, when voting, the issue of highest importance will probably be decisive for the electorate. For other issues, accountability through elections/democracy will be less likely to work<sup>39</sup>.

Social action calls for class consciousness and shared identity. Mass mobilization to boycott, rally, picket, strike or otherwise express their demands are examples of such social action. It is, however, a confrontational method that often results in violence (Lough 2008:536). Most CBOs and NGOs will be reluctant to promote such actions, as these organisations are depending on a good relationship with the authorities. Encouraging actions perceived to be

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<sup>39</sup> Interview with consultant 13.11.2009

rebellious will distort collaboration with local authorities, and may be punished by denial of further engagement in the area (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). Further, CSOs and NGOs may themselves struggle with their trustworthiness. According to a research on poverty alleviation (REPOA 2007) adult Tanzanians rank the trustworthiness of NGO officials below the ones of both the police and businesspeople (Policy Forum 2009). Many state officials reject the NGOs' legitimacy as an independent voice, arguing that NGOs are self-appointed and often working for a foreign agenda (Policy Forum 2009). Given the numerous briefcase organisations and variability of professionalism among NGOs, their skepticism may sometimes be well founded.


The poor is a group that may be difficult to engage, as most will prioritise the daily struggle for food. The right to information is conceived as of little importance to them, as they lack the time, literacy and sanctioning abilities to act upon it (Jenkins and Goetz 1999:7). They are, however, more likely to engage against corruption or mal governance, if they are personally affected, rather than if the mal function is distressing the community at large. I.e. the poor will be more disturbed by embezzlement of private goods such as subsidized food, than if public goods such as infrastructure are affected (Kolstad and Wiig 2008:525). According to this theory and with regard to forest governance, villagers will only engage in anti-corruption efforts if they see their access to forest produce threatened or if their personal income from such, actual or potential in the short term, diminished. Many poor see, however, corruption as an inescapable hassle and feel rather fatalistic about their possibility to improve their own situation (Lough 2008:539).

During my interviews with the villagers I did not ask about their income, food security or other questions eligible for poverty ranking, but among the 31 villagers I interviewed only 6 seemed to feel absolute negative about their own possible role in curbing corruption. Two of these added "because I don't know anything about this", whereas two meant they would need help from outside<sup>40</sup>. More than two thirds of the respondents believed they could have an impact, most of them also having an idea of how that could be, namely by reporting incidents of corruption to authorities for legal action, through access to information and education, and through villagers' cooperation to stop paying bribes and collectively following the rules. In practice there may, however, be difficult to report such incidents, as these authorities

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<sup>40</sup> Interview with villagers 24. and 25.11.2009

themselves are perceived as corrupt by many villagers. For this policy to work there should be an independent institution external to the village to which villagers could report their worries. Local CSOs may act as such independent actors, but capacity constraints and lack of credibility by general population may be a problem also for these (Policy Forum 2009).



Source: Tanzania Governance review 2006-2007 (Policy Forum 2009)

Villagers may be involved in corruption either as the injured party of extortive demands from public officials claiming payment for services they are entitled to, or as collusive participant in order to gain a personal advantage. Whereas the first type of corruption may be influenced through awareness raising and effective channels of information, the latter will be harder to address as it is mutual beneficial for both parties (Kolstad and Wiig 2008). Fellow villagers may, however, take action if such favouritism is threatening their own situation.

For villagers to engage in informed action, awareness and access to reliable information will be a precondition. Awareness raising programmes must thus respond to potential incentives in anyone area (URT 2003).

## **5.6 Local ownership**

Most Tanzanians I spoke to both at district level, within FBD and with the campaign partners said there was local ownership behind the Mama Misitu campaign and that the initiative came from the bottom. The leading partners in the pilot district had been working against illegal logging for many years, and they already had the connections and relations both at district level and with the various villages. They thus owned both the problem situation and the resources to address it. Institutions at national as well as local level were actively supporting this effort. The Mama Misitu campaign just came as a supplementary activity to their ongoing work.

Some of the expatriate consultants I spoke to said that there had not been enough participation and that the campaign activity plans all came from the PIU centrally. Too little training, too little resources and too short time frame had made it difficult to implement the campaign in a participatory way. With regard to concepts there was a significant gap between those who designed the campaign and those who implemented it. PIU had been under pressure to act and events were driven from Dar central, without giving the local partners enough time to adjust events locally.

These opposing views make it necessary to look further into the design and implementation of the campaign.

### **5.6.1 Design of the campaign**

The campaign was a collaborative initiative and designed to be **participatory, replicable** and **scalable**. It was developed by TFWG, a versatile group of professionals, in cooperation with other CSOs (Williams 2009). This indicates that participation primarily is at national or central level, benefiting from the various knowledge of academics, consultants and centrally located experts. The local partners, staff at district level or the beneficiaries of the campaign, were not included in the planning phase, despite the intention of locally customizing and targeting the programme based on baseline overviews of the state of forest management and governance in each district (Mama Misitu PIU 2008). In fact, the budgets were developed before the pilot areas and the resource needs of implementing partners even were identified

(Williams 2009). As stated in the University of Dar Es Salaam, Department of Economics' evaluation report, the campaign's communication strategy lacked participatory approach. "It was ready made program that was almost imposed in the districts" (Kahyarara 2009:22).

There is a contradiction between the design objectives of participation, replication and scalability - the two latter seeming difficult to combine with general participation and adaptability to local conditions. The inadequate identification of local stakeholders and relevant conditions in the pilot district may have lead to project omissions. The lack of information on alternative livelihoods, destruction of mangrove and villagers assistance for transport of illegal forest produce seaways, were examples of omissions described in section 4.2.

It was also recorded that the branding of the campaign – the Mama Misitu identity – was not so well received at the local level. There was a perception that the campaign was more addressing the women, despite the fact that there are most men involved in illegal forest activities. Many men found it inconvenient to wear the promotional materials as T-shirts and caps due to the womanly Mama Misitu logo (Kahyarara 2009). For future campaign activities it could therefore be considered to give some of the merchandise a more masculine, but still recognisable, version of the logo and message. The Mama Misitu identity was, however, deliberately chosen by the campaign designers, both as a relation to powerful women such as the Nobel Peace Price winner Dr. Wangari Maathai, as well as calling for more participation from the women (Williams 2009).

### **5.6.2 Implementation of the campaign**

The combination of national and local approach, and the lack of participation in the outline of the campaign, continued to dominate the procedures for the implementation. Both the TV spots and the radio programmes were broadcasted on national level, not adjusted to any local conditions in the pilot area. The drama group road-show was also directed centrally, although I was told there had been some local adaptation of the performance. At village level it was claimed dissatisfaction with the use of an external drama group. It was perceived as a lack of acknowledgment of the community's resources when it came to performers and traditional dancing groups (Kahyarara 2009:24). This may indicate that villagers either hadn't seen the

TV spots or did not appreciate the recognition of the drama performers. The use of national media as TV is very expensive, and in order to benefit locally great care must be taken to timing and coordination of activities.

If the campaign is scaled up, this will be very challenging, especially with regard to the great variety of local CSOs as implementing partners. The demand on law enforcement units will also be unpredictable as responses to the TV spots will come from all over the country and thus be difficult to prepare for. It was also recorded some discontent related to the distribution of the campaign merchandise, primarily from villagers that did not receive any. Although expensive to produce, if it is handed out in a fair and equitable way, e.g. to participants in competitions or villagers attending seminars, it will be an efficient reminder of the campaigns message lasting long after the events.

Delays and uncertainties in funding were considerable challenges throughout the whole pilot phase. This was perceived as frustrating by the implementing partners. PIU has not been clear enough on these issues, and the timeframe of the actual events was affected by the slow funding process. It is probable that some of the delay was caused by slow reporting back from the implementing partners, as these have their own routines and standards for accounting. The partners forming the Mama Misitu Campaign coalition vary considerably with regard to focus, professionalism and procedures for reporting within their own organisation. Additional reporting for the Mama Misitu project came as a supplementary workload. At the same time the PIU has been under pressure to comply, not leaving the local partners sufficient time for working on the implementation. “Some concerns have been raised about ensuring that the PIU really does facilitate partners to implement, rather than implementing itself” (Williams 2009:15).

### **5.6.3 Support for the Mama Misitu campaign**

The approach of the Mama Misitu campaign is not to confront but rather to cooperate with the authorities. The PIU has successfully invested in obtaining good relations with central government. The campaign has thus benefited from a strong support from both FBD and the FSU. Their working relationship has included cooperation on intervention in illegal activities,



as the PIU would pass on such information received to the FBD for them to take action<sup>41</sup>. Also with regard to the implementation of PFM there has been good cooperation.

A documentary film showing success stories of PFM has been developed and intended for educational purposes by both Mama Misitu and the FBD (Kahyarara 2009). In an evaluation report on PFM by the FBD, the Mama Misitu campaign is mentioned as an important initiative for raising awareness and creating understanding for good forest governance (Blomley and Iddi 2009:53). The sound co-operational connection is however based on good personal relationship with key employees within the department, and has not been formalised by any written agreements. This might be of some concern, especially in case of personnel changes (Williams 2009). Despite efforts by the Mama Misitu PIU, the campaign did not succeed in gaining support from the very top level of central government. Lack of cooperation from the MNRT blocked the attempts to gain access both to Prime Minister and the President of the United Republic of Tanzania (Williams 2009:15).

At the district level, the government leaders were very supportive for the campaign. In Rufiji, the District Executive Director expressed that the Mama Misitu campaign was strongly complementary for the implementation of PFM, as the VFCs still were relatively weak and in need of support. She further believed that the campaign would improve the accountability and effort put down by district officers in law enforcement. The campaign was seen as an important tool to raise awareness of villagers and to report illegal forest use (Williams 2009).

The Mama Misitu campaign has received less enthusiasm among District Natural Resource Staff (DNRS). Consultants questioned whether the DFOs were honest when saying they supported the campaign<sup>42</sup>. This group experienced pressure to perform both within law enforcement and to render services in relation with PFM, but the control only very limited resources. This unfeasibility may influence both their morale and professionalism. Local community members have also been raising allegations of district staff being associated with illegal activities (Williams 2009:15). The DFO in Kilwa whom I interviewed was well aware of the Mama Misitu campaign. Its' message was not new information, but acted as a reminder. Mama Misitu was using already existing networks to spread their mission. There had been a reduction in illegal logging after the start of the campaign, but this might also be

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<sup>41</sup> Interview with consultant 18.11.2009

<sup>42</sup> Interview with consultants 08. and 10.12.2009

due to the export ban on logs. He emphasized also the lack of resources in the forest sector to be a major constraint to satisfactory forest management. Poverty and the lack of alternative livelihood and access to affordable alternative energy sources were further mentioned as main challenges in order to improve forest conditions.

To what extent the officials at the check point were supportive of the campaign is more uncertain. In one of my interviews<sup>43</sup>, increased awareness was presented as a problem, affecting their income opportunities negatively. Also in the evaluation report by the University of Dar Es Salaam, check point officials are claiming that there is more pressure on operators to comply with regulations within forest sector now, from the villages they pass, the districts where they operate, as well as from the central government (Kahyarara 2009).

Traders of forest produce felt that they were often perceived as criminals. There are too many check points at which staff had different levels of understanding of harvest requirements. Even when transporting legal forest products they would sometimes be met by demands of bribes. Their opinion of the Mama Misitu campaign was mixed, but they expressed a desire to be included as stakeholders in the future campaign. Their knowledge and experience from other areas may contribute with valuable input in the effort to ensure effective forest management (Kahyarara 2009).

### ***5.7 Challenges for awareness raising campaigns***

Public pressure is generally more efficient than logic argumentation, evidence or policy papers in order to generate government response (HakiElimu web site)<sup>44</sup>. Awareness is generally recognised as precondition for public action. It is therefore of interest to look at awareness raising methods and what may be motivating for participation and public engagement. HakiElimu is a Tanzanian non-profit civil society organization whose focus is on public access to education, equality, human rights and democracy. They have wide experience in transmitting messages to ordinary citizens, and are often utilising mass media to stimulate citizens into taking informed action. HakiElimu was one of the CSOs consulted when designing the Mama Misitu campaign (Williams 2009).

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<sup>43</sup> “Now there is this problem of awareness, it is less traffic and more of the papers are in order” - Interview with road check point officer 25.11.2009

<sup>44</sup> <http://www.hakielimu.org/>

*Getting the message right and ways of transmission.*

When designing a message, average literacy rate and years of schooling of the target audience must be considered. By presenting information in accessible formats as cartoons, posters or illustrated story books you may reach a wider audience. People like humour and contradictions, and the message will obtain more attention by provoking than by preaching. Roadside billboards should contain short and catchy messages, readable in a glance. Public competitions, such as essay or drawing competitions, are popular and effective ways to gather public views and generate debate (HakiElimu web-site). Mass media, such as radio or TV spots, reach a large audience. The TV spots on forest crime produced by Mama Misitu generated good response from citizens all over Tanzania (Williams 2009). HakiElimu runs weekly a live program where leaders answer questions from citizens, and in this way are held accountable by ordinary people. These kinds of programs rely however on cooperation from the leaders.

The Mama Misitu PIU aimed to obtain and publicise clear statements regarding corruption and moral values from top government leaders. This was however not feasible due to lack of cooperation (Williams 2009). The PIU attempted also to get newspapers to address issues covered by the campaign, by inviting 15 journalists 3 days out in the field. This effort resulted however in only 4 articles, all written by the same journalist (Williams 2009). I was explained following possible causes for this disappointing outcome; journalists in Tanzania are often poorly paid casual workers or freelancers, and it is frequently expected that they are remunerated both by the “subject” of an article and by the newspaper printing it. Bribes are not uncommon whether it is to write or not to write something. Articles describing situations in rural areas may get less attention than those dealing with issues in Dar es Salaam. Forest degradation or illegal logging has low news effect, it is rather regarded as a continuous problem. It might therefore have been more rewarding for the PIU to also address editors as they are the ones taking the decisions on what to publish<sup>45</sup>. HakiElimu is supporting journalists and editors who carry out independent research related to the organisation’s main focus themes. The outcome of such support is both increased coverage and improved quality of the journalists work (HakiElimu web site). If the message is to be transmitted at both

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<sup>45</sup> Interview with consultant 07.12.2009

national and local level, the message must be recognisable in order to gain synergetic effect. Participatory local adaptation of the message will in such cases be less optimal.

Another challenge is to connect with the appropriate individuals when approaching a community. As stated in the FBD evaluation of PFM progression 2003;”The lesson is that sometimes those who attend the formal village meetings and consultations when PFM experts visit a village are people with little else to do, and perhaps nothing to do with forest and woodland management. Those with the greatest stake in forest management are often busy with other things, often in the forest. Women frequently fall into this group and consequently their interests are not effectively captured” (URT 2003:21). Introducing the project to the village leader on arrival may alleviate the abovementioned problem, but leaving the identification of participants solely to the village leadership may also increase the risk of elite capture. If information sharing isn’t naturally encouraged within Tanzanian society, formal systems must be developed to ensure diffusion of information from participants to the wider community (URT 2003).

Finally, donor dependence is a challenge that must be taken into consideration. Preferably dissemination of information should be based on inexpensive methods, allowing the campaign to run without interruption caused by funding delays. Unplanned discontinuities of activities can seriously affect the campaign’s effectiveness (Williams 2009). The Mama Misitu campaign relies on expensive methods requiring coordination both at national and local level. TV spots and radio programmes are costly to produce, so are the merchandise which has been distributed in the villages. It is unlikely that the campaign can continue without further engagement by donors (Kahyarara 2009).

## 6 Conclusions

In this study I have examined possible relationships between awareness and good forest governance. Main indicators have been the concepts of accountability, participation and law enforcement. Within all these concepts, power relations between stakeholders will be an influential factor either increasing or constraining each stakeholder's choice of action.

Considering the limitations of my study elaborated in chapter 3.6, I am cautious to draw pretentious conclusions, but I will nevertheless summarise the findings I consider to be most important of my study.

- First, I refer to the conservational value villagers seem to put on the forest. This is consistent with findings by Blomley and Iddi (2009). Underlying reasons may, however, not be so conservational, but rather reflect the delay in PFM implementation and lack of knowledge on regeneration rates or market value. Increased awareness on sustainable extraction of forest resources and the benefits of these may influence their perception of forest value.
- Second, the majority of the villagers perceived corruption to be a local problem, affecting themselves and hindering development in their own village. Further, two thirds of the villagers were optimistic when it came to possible impacts they themselves could have on curbing corruption. This is not consistent with the more general perception that the poor view corruption as a vexing, but unalterable fact of life (Lough 2008). If my findings are representative, raising awareness at the local level may motivate villagers to engage against corruption. In order to avoid 'powerless awareness' it is, however, important that independent or external actors or institutions are available to act on information received where local institutions are perceived as untrustworthy.
- Third, I will point to the strong sense of ownership villagers seemed to have over the forest. The sense of ownership seemed equally strong in the village that had implemented CBFM as in the village where they still were in the process of doing so. If this reflects the general situation, raising awareness on forest governance issues such as transparency and accountability, may motivate villagers to put pressure on their local government to act accordingly.

Assuming that these findings are representative, villagers may benefit from increased awareness on several issues. Seen in the context of governance, I can summarize my thesis as follows;

*Awareness and participation.*

In the process of establishing PFM, awareness is a key factor to encourage representatives from all parts of the community to participate, either as VFC member or as members of the Village Assembly. By using their influence in the formation of by-laws and forest management plans, good routines of governance may be ensured. By participating, villagers will gain access to even more information, - entering into a positive spiral towards more equal power relations.

*Awareness and accountability*

Awareness by villagers in general will make it more difficult for elite or local leaders to capture benefits to the detriment of others. Likewise, increased awareness at the local level may help to prevent corrupt practices within forest governance. Informed villagers may more easily raise demands on transparency and accountability by the local authorities, and their demands will be more difficult to neglect.

*Awareness and law enforcement*

The legal framework related to forest governance seems adequate. The problem is rather a lack of implementation of existing laws<sup>46</sup>. Powerful actors may resist legal enforcement and with the lack of legal knowledge at local level this evasion goes unchallenged. As forest governance is decentralized to the village level, many studies predict that forest patrolling becomes more effective. Increased awareness could therefore lead to local pressure for improved law compliance. Further, increased awareness of existing laws would benefit the villagers in the wording of by-laws, making sure they don't violate national laws and thus end up with unenforceable legislation.

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<sup>46</sup> Interview with consultant 17.11.2009

### *The Mama Misitu campaign*

By anchoring the Mama Misitu awareness raising campaign to national institutions and long standing civil society organisations in Tanzania, the campaign gained legitimacy and credibility. The campaign addresses well known problems, and obtained wide support from both the FBD as well as district government leaders. Apart from some critical comments on practical issues related to the implementation, all my key informants were positive to the Mama Misitu campaign. The implementation at the local level was handled by civil society organisations with extensive local knowledge and previous working experience in the area. All these factors may have led to the common perception of local ownership of the campaign, even though the planning and design of the campaign was undertaken centrally by a rather small group of professionals.

A universal advice for the continuation of the campaign has been to strive for more participation from the various stakeholders early in the planning process for new activities. Considering the great challenges with regard to timing and coordination in order to gain synergy from running the campaign simultaneously at national and local level, it is probably a better strategy if selected districts through participatory planning could set up their own timetable of events, supported by information packages, campaign merchandise, and technical and professional assistance by the Mama Misitu PIU. This will probably reduce the synergy effects, but facilitate local participation and implementation. The campaign's policy to aim for cooperation rather than confrontation with government officials, has ensured a good working relationship with the government, but has also led to failure, i.e. when it comes to pursuing high ranking politicians to condemn corrupt behaviour. The advantages of maintaining a good relationship does, however, outweigh the negative consequences, especially when it comes to sharing of information, dialogue and legal enforcement. It is further of vital importance that appropriate legal enforcement units will be allocated adequate resources for responding to information passed on by villagers on illegal forest activities. It is essential for the continuous engagement of villagers that they can trust the integrity and ability of the legal enforcement institutions. Likewise, the awareness campaign itself needs to secure its funding, possibly by building up a buffer of cash, in order to keep the activities running smoothly also during delays of transfers by donors.

*Awareness and changes in power relations.*

Despite the effort to decentralize governance in the forest sector, substantial power remains with the district authorities. Foot-dragging in the enactment of by-laws and forest management plans, the holding of key positions in the harvesting committee and the slow reaction to act on forest offences, are examples of the continuous constraints on villagers' control over their forest resources. Whether this is a result of overstrained DFOs, limited resources, a reluctance by district authorities to hand over income opportunities to local level, or caused by personal motives such as reluctance to give up income possibilities by exploiting the inadequacies in the system, remains unclear. The reasons may be plural, but either way, by increasing VFC's awareness and competence on legal and management issues, they will be more able to defend their village's interests in interactions with the district authorities.

Awareness of the market value of forest resources and how to approach market actors will further strengthen their position in relation to private companies or other external actors.

Finally, to encourage villagers' participation in forest governance I believe eligible strategies for the distribution of forest related income to household level in a fair and justifiable way will be essential. If villagers personally benefit from good forest governance, they will also be more likely to pressure for transparency, accountability and law enforcement, and in this way hinder elite capture and contribute to strengthen local institutions and the systems around forest governance. Information endows power, and it is in the best interest for future forest governance if this is disseminated equally to all stakeholders.



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## Annex 1: List of interviewees

<i>Name:</i>	<i>Institution:</i>
Mtingwa, Rehema	Mama Misisitu PIU, Campaign leader
Kinyau, Nicholas	Mama Misisitu PIU, Field coordinator
Ball, Steve	Mpingo Conservation Group, Implementing partner Kilwa
Makala, Jasper	Mpingo Conservation Group, Implementing partner Kilwa
Malugu, Isac	WWF Kilwa, Implementing partner Rufiji
Mfangavo, Mustapha	Kilwa District, DFO
Kiimu, Hadija R.	URT, MNRT, FBD, Assistant Director Utilization
Kigula, Joseph	URT, MNRT, FBD
Meshack, Charles	TFCG, Executive Director
Sorensen, Carol (telephone)	TFCG, Technical Advisor
Sianga, Cassian	TNRF, Coordinator
Fuglesang, Minou (telephone)	Femina HIP, Director
Chenga, Jumapili M.	TRAFFIC, Programme Officer
Sundet, Geir	KPMG, Programme Director, Accountability in Tanzania
Cooksey, Brian	Tanzania Development Research Group (TADREG)
Kahyarara, Godius	University of Dar es Salaam, Department of Economics
Williams, Andrew	Independent consultant, former coordinator TNRF
Mäkelä, Merja	Embassy of Finland, Dar es Salaam
Milledge, Simon	Embassy of Norway, Dar es Salaam
Jørgensen, Ivar	Embassy of Norway, Dar es Salaam
Jansen, Eirik	NORAD

### Also:

Attending the presentation of the Mama Misisitu Evaluation report at the Finnish Embassy, 10.12.2009  
Interviews with two employees at the Migeregere road check point 25.11.2009  
Focus group discussion with member of the VFC Ruhatwe village 24.11.2009  
Interviews with three members of the VFC Mavuji village 25.11.2009  
Interviews with 31 villagers in the Ruhatwe, Mavuji and Nyamwage villages, 24, 25, and 29.11.2009  
Unsuccessfully trying to interview Pius Cheche, Bio-shape plantations, Kilwa

## **Annex 2: The Mama Misitu Partners**

### **Africare**

Formed in 1970, Africare works to improve the quality of life in Africa. Africare works in partnership with African communities to achieve healthy and productive societies through capacity building of local institutions. Africare-Tanzania ensures that all its projects involve participation and input from the ‘grassroots- level’, as well as support and governance from local bodies, skills training, and instruction for future sustainability.

<http://www.africare.org/our-work/where-we-work/tanzania/>

### **Care Tanzania**

Care Tanzania began operations in 1994 in response to the massive arrival of Rwandan refugees, providing food, water, sanitation, shelter and health care to some 500 000 people. Since 1996, Care Tanzania has built a large development programme, reaching poor communities in several districts in the country. Their aim is to improve access to quality education, fight HIV and AIDS, improve health care, improve nutrition and distribute food to vulnerable populations, and preserve the environment.

<http://www.careinternational.org.uk/?lid=11062>

### **FARM-Africa**

FARM-Africa started work in Tanzania in 1990 and is an international NGO that aims to reduce poverty in Eastern and Southern Africa. FARM-Africa works in partnership with marginal farmers and herders, providing training and support that poor rural communities need in order to manage their resources sustainably and effectively. Families are directly assisted to help work themselves out of poverty through improved ways to manage their crops, livestock, forests and access to water.

<http://www.farmafrica.org.uk/>

### **Femina HIP**

Femina HIP is a multimedia civil society edutainment and sexual health initiative. Femina HIP aims to create a media platform enabling people to express themselves, share experiences, and learn. The media products include: Fema magazine, Si Mchezo! magazine, Fema TV Talk Show and the chezasalama.com website. Their target audience is youth aged 15-25, and their magazines are distributed free of charge to secondary schools, civil society organisations, local governments and work places. Through this mix of mediums, Femina HIP aims to enhance positive and democratic public debate, stimulate critical thinking and personal responsibility, and contribute to behaviour and social change in Tanzania.

### **Journalists Environmental Association of Tanzania (JET)**

JET was established in 1991 and is an environmental NGO watchdog dedicated to raise public awareness on sustainable management of natural resources. JET collects information, provides forums and carries out field research and education programmes on environment and sustainable development and disseminates it through JET publications and other media so as to enable Tanzanians, especially rural people to be aware of the need for environment conservation.

<http://www.jettanz.org/>

### **Lawyers' Environmental Action Team (LEAT)**

Established in 1994 the Lawyers' Environmental Action Team is the first public interest environmental law organization in Tanzania. Its mission is to ensure sound natural resource management and environmental protection in Tanzania. LEAT carries out policy research, advocacy, and selected public interest litigation. Its membership largely includes lawyers concerned with environmental management and democratic governance in Tanzania.

[www.lead.or.tz](http://www.lead.or.tz)

### **Shirikisho la Mitandao ya Jamii ya Usimamizi wa Misitu Tanzania (MJUMITA)**

The Tanzania Community Forest Conservation Network is a network of community based organisations involved in Participatory Forest Management across Tanzania. MJUMITA was established in 2000. The network advocates for improved application of participatory forest management across the country. The network has over 5000 members.

### **Mpingo Conservation Project (MPC)**

The Mpingo Conservation Project offers a unique opportunity for integrated conservation and rural development across large areas of habitat in Tanzania and Mozambique. The aim of the Mpingo Conservation Project is to use Mpingo as an economic tool to advance conservation of mpingo's natural habitat; Miombo woodland. In 2010 the group changed their name to the Mpingo Conservation & Development Initiative.

[http://www.mpingoconservation.org/kilwa\\_district.html](http://www.mpingoconservation.org/kilwa_district.html)

### **Policy Forum**

Policy Forum is a network of NGOs. Currently this growing network has over 50 Tanzanian member organisations. Its' aim is to influence policy processes to enhance poverty reduction, equity and democratization. They further aim to increase informed civil society participation in decisions and actions that determine how policies affect ordinary Tanzanians, particularly the most disadvantaged.

[www.policyforum.or.tz](http://www.policyforum.or.tz)

### **Tanzania Association of Foresters (TAF)**

TAF was established in 1976. They have over 900 members, many of them holding expertise and experiences in forestry, beekeeping, environmental management, and wildlife and natural resource management. Most of the members come from higher learning and research institutions, the Government, and NGOs. TAF aims to disseminate forest information and foster public interest on forest issues, as well as promoting all aspects of forestry in cooperation with other organisations. The Association has carried out numerous studies, assessments and developed plans related to natural resource conservation, sustainable utilization and policy development.

[www.taftz.org/aboutus.html](http://www.taftz.org/aboutus.html)

### **Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG)**

TFCG is a Tanzanian national NGO whose mission is to conserve and restore the biodiversity of globally important forests in Tanzania for the benefit of the present and future generations. For the last 25 years TFCG has been actively involved in promoting the conservation of the coastal forests.

<http://www.tfcg.org/index.html>

### **Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF)**

Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF) is a collective civil society-based initiative to improve renewable natural resource management in Tanzania. They address fundamental issues of governance such as transparency, accountability and local empowerment, by bringing together a diverse range of stakeholders and interests to share information, build collaboration and pool resources towards a common aim of better and devolved natural resource management.

<http://www.tnrf.org/>

### **TRAFFIC Tanzania**

Operating in Tanzania since 1995, much of TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa's (TESA) work involves creating awareness and influencing policy decisions about important trade, use and environment issues, building capacity within government institutions to deal proactively with these issues, and working with other NGOs, research institutions and local communities to find solutions to pressing livelihood issues that currently impact negatively upon species or ecosystems of concern.

[www.traffic.org](http://www.traffic.org)

### **Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS)**

WCS has been working in Tanzania for 50 years to help the country safeguard its unique global heritage. More than 130 projects have been supported, encompassing training, research, monitoring, institutional support, education, and the gazettement and extension of Tarangire, Ruaha, Serengeti and Kitulo National Parks.

### **World Conservation Union (IUCN)**

IUCN was founded in 1948 and brings together over 1000 organisational members and some 10000 experts from 181 countries in a unique worldwide partnership. Its mission is to influence, encourage and assist societies throughout the world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable. In Tanzania IUCN is working with partners and stakeholders to improve forest governance.

### **Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania (WCST)**

Founded in 1988, the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania's mission is to work towards the conservation of the flora, fauna, and environment of Tanzania for the benefit of mankind. Since its founding, WCST has been involved in a wide array of conservation activities at local and national levels.

### **World Wide Fund for Nature – Tanzania Programme Office (WWF-TPO)**

The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has experience from Tanzania since 1962. In 1990 the WWF-Tanzania Programme Office was established. Concerned about the preservation of Miombo woodlands, WWF is working with local communities, governments and NGOs, encouraging the use of natural resources in a more sustainable way. Their objectives are to increase the local population's participation in natural resource management and to secure a non-discriminatory access to forest produce, as well as promoting alternative livelihoods

[www.panda.org/who\\_we\\_are/wwf\\_offices/tanzania](http://www.panda.org/who_we_are/wwf_offices/tanzania)

(Sources: Information brief from Mama Misitu and the various web-sites referred to above.)



## Annex 3: Questionnaire villagers

31 respondents.

1	Age	Frequency	male/female
	- 19	1	f
	- 22	1	m
	- 25	1	m
	- 26	1	m
	- 27	1	f
	- 29	1	m
	- 30	1	m
	- 32	2	f, f
	- 33	1	f
	- 34	1	f
	- 35	3	f, f, f
	- 38	1	m
	- 40	3	f, f, f
	- 42	1	m
	- 47	1	f
	- 49	1	m
	- 50	1	f
	- 59	1	m
	- 60	1	f
	- 64	1	m
	- 65	1	m
	- 66	2	m, m
	- 68	1	m
	- 72	1	m
	- Don't know	1	f

Some of the respondents did not know their age. They would go and get their identity card and show me.

2	Educational level	Frequency
	- None:	3
	- Standard 2	1
	- Standard 3	1
	- Standard 4	3
	- Standard 6	1
	- Standard 7	14
	- Form 2	1
	- Form 4	4
	- Adult education	1
	- Quaran school	2

<b>3</b>	<b>Employment</b>	
	- Farmer	24
	- Witch doctor	2
	- Teacher	1
	- Carpenter	1
	- Business person	1
	- Cook	1
	- Unemployed	1

**4 Do you think forest conservation is important?**

All respondents answered Yes.

**Why? (multiple answers possible)**

- Water catchment	22
- Conserve environment	13
- Shelter for wild animals	12
- Provide timber/building materials	12
- Fresh air	5
- Provide firewood	4
- Preserve for next generation	3
- Good for soil (catchment/fertilizer)	3
- Protect trees	3
- Provide medicine	3
- Avoid disasters	2
- Good for climate	2
- Provide shadow	1
- Protect bees	1
- Provide meat	1
- Provide fruits	1
- Charcoal from remains	1
- Communities live in peace	1
- Don't know	1

5 **Which resources do your household extract from the forest?** In a few cases where firewood and charcoal was not mentioned we added a question about the main energy source of the household, which then added these two resources to the list.

- Firewood	31
- Building materials	21
- Charcoal	20
- Timber for furniture (bed, table, chair)	15
- Medicine	11
- Fruits	11
- Honey	9
- Meat	9
- Grass for roofing	9
- Mushrooms	6
- Water	4
- Hamp	3
- Stones	2
- Grass for making mats	1
- Tourism	1
- Charcoal for sale	1
- Fertilizers	1

6 **Are you aware of any logging activity near your village?**  
Yes (13), No (13), Not sure (5).

7 **Do you know if this activity has obtained the necessary permits?**

- Don't know	3
- Yes it is legal	5
- Yes it is illegal	5
- It is villagers harvesting	9
- Others are harvesting	4

8 **Do you trust the local forest committee to manage the forest to the best interest of your community?**

Yes (25), No (5), Don't know (1). Of those answering No, it was added: They serve more their own interest (2), they are logging illegally themselves (1) and It is not easy for them to control (1).

9 **Do you think it is OK to pay a small fee to the authorities in order to speed up the process of a request?**

Yes (30), No (1). Some of the yes answers even added that it was good.

10 **Do you believe corruption is a problem in the forest sector?**

Yes (28), No (2), Don't know (1).

11 **Do you believe nepotism and favourism is a problem in the forest sector?**

Yes (20), No (8), Don't know (3)

- 12 Do you believe a person engaging in corruption or illegal logging is immoral?**  
Yes (30), Don't know (1)
- 13 Do you reflect upon that corruption and nepotism is an obstruction to development in Tanzania? How?**  
Yes (29), No (2)
- 14 Have you ever been requested to pay a bribe when dealing with someone from the forest sector?**  
Yes (2), No (29)
- 15 Whom do you believe is most corrupt: (the following options were listed)**
- |   |    |
|---|----|
| - Central Government officials            | 7  |
| - Local government officials              | 11 |
| - Politicians                             |    |
| - Staff at road check points              | 9  |
| - Forest inspectors                       | 8  |
| - Hammering personnel                     | 1  |
| - Issuing officers for harvest permits    | 3  |
| - Issuing officers for export certificate |    |
| - Port/export harbour personnel           |    |
| - Village leaders                         | 8  |
| - Local Business people                   | 8  |
| - Foreign business people                 |    |
| - International institutions              |    |
| - NGOs                                    |    |
| - Ordinary people                         | 1  |
| - Others (please state)                   |    |
| - All of them                             | 1  |
| - Traffic police                          | 1  |
| Don't know anything about corruption      | 6  |
- 16 Who do you think the forest sector should be accountable to?**
- |   |    |
|---|----|
| - Local community/villagers                 | 19 |
| - Village Forest Committee                  | 5  |
| - Mpingo Conservation Group                 | 1  |
| - Village leader, village executive officer | 2  |
| - Local government                          | 7  |
| - Someone from outside the community        | 1  |
| - Hamlet leader                             | 1  |
| - Forest inspectors                         | 1  |
| - Road check point officers                 | 1  |
| - District Forest Officer                   | 1  |
| - Don't know                                | 2  |

**17 Have you heard about Mama Misitu?**

Yes (25), No (6)

**If yes; what is their mission?**

- Create awareness of forest value 10
- Stop cutting trees down 7
- How to make sustainable forest for next generation 3
- Awareness on how to protect the forest 18
- If trees are cut, must plant new 2
- Mobilize people to protect their forest 2
- Not burn/set fire to the forest 1
- Awareness about the effect of destroying the forest 1
- Don't know their mission 3

**If yes; where/how did you hear about it?**

- Village meeting 7
- Seminar 5
- Drama group 11
- Choir 2
- Video shows 4
- TV-spots 1
- Radio 1
- T-shirts, Khangas, Caps 6
- Signboard 4
- Leaflets 1
- Heard from other villagers 1

**18 Do you believe this campaign will manage to change the attitude of corrupt officers?**

Yes (13), No (5), Don't know (13)

**19 Do you believe the campaign will help raise awareness?**

Yes (18), No (0), Don't know (12), Must repeat – once is not enough (1)

**20 Have you experience with other NGOs/campaigns raising awareness on forest issues earlier?**

Yes (19), No (12),

- Mpingo Conservation Group 2
- Vunjuvunja Sasaa Group 2
- Choirs 1
- Utumi 1
- Radio 1
- Tujilinde 1

**21 Do you believe villagers may have an impact when it comes to curbing corruption?**

Yes (21), No (6), Don't know (3). One woman would not answer this question as the village leader had come within ear shot.

**How?** (some examples)

- Yes, by taking them to the village executive officer and then to the police and report them
- Information and less secrecy can help so everyone get their right
- Corruption does so that you can be taken to court without having done anything. They will not believe what you say. But with education it may help, but some cannot be educated or helped at all.
- Instead of taking bribes they should report when seeing illegal activities.
- Yes, but they need assistance from outside, central government or even from abroad.
- Yes, when they see someone corrupt, they can join forces and take him to the village executive office or even the police.
- They must get educated, because then they will see the importance of the forest and follow up on it.
- Yes, if people can cooperate they can fight corruption
- Yes, by using local meetings, give instructions and by-laws.
- Yes, if we deny paying little money and follow the rules and instructions. Then there will be no need for corruption.

**22 Do you think it is possible to curb corruption?**

Yes (17), No (9), Don't know (3), Can reduce it (2).